DTIC ADA530385: The Cognitive Performance Component in Networked System of Systems Evaluation

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ITEAJournal2010;31:232–239
Copyright’2010bytheInternationalTestandEvaluationAssociation
The Cognitive Performance Component in Networked
System of Systems Evaluation
B. Diane Eberly
U.S. Army Evaluation Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland
TheArmy’sFutureForcerequirementscontainampledescriptionsofthephysicalarchitecturefor
mannedand unmanned systems, and amultilayer network towhich theArmy will eventually
migrate. Requirements specifications that will allow those entities to seamlessly function as an
interoperable and integrated entity also exist. However, few descriptions exist of the cognitive
performance requirements that will be essential for the individual, team, and units to perform
commandand controlfunctionbecausethey increasingly rely on anetworked system ofsystems.
Evenmoreelusivearethemethodsforevaluating,inanoperationalenvironment,whetherthe
cognitive performance requirements have been met. Increased task complexity, uncertainty,
workload, distributed command and control, battlefield visualization, and situational
understanding are but a few of the areas that a future networked system of systems design is
required to address.
The volume of communications and information exchange within and between layers of
command call for simplification in tools and processes provided to warfighters. Networked-
enabled command and control must allow warfighters to manage these increasing demands at
operational tempos that drive proactive versus reactive maneuvers against a highly adaptive
threat. This article describes a number of factors that affect the networked system of systems’
ability to enhance cognitive performance and support the levels of coordination and
collaboration required for distributed command and control in a complex battle space.
Consideringthesefactorsintheevaluationofanetworkedsystemofsystemsisimportantgiven
the increased levels of higher order cognitive processing necessary to operate in such an
environment.
Key words: Cognitive performance; networked system of systems.
T he 2009 Army Posture Statement adversaries utilizing unconventional tactics (Depart-
characterizes the global security envi- mentoftheArmy,2007).Thesechallengescanonlybe
ronment as ‘‘more ambiguous and met with human and technological capabilities that
unpredictablethaninthepast.’’Recent enable greater levels of collaboration and information
conflicts have demonstrated greatly sharing, which then lead to self-synchronization.
increased complexity in planning and executing the Aberts and Hayes (2003) identified these COAs as
range of military operations required for engaging in critical capabilities for the ‘‘next revolution in military
irregular, nontraditional, disruptive, and sometimes affairs,’’ more prominently known as network centric
catastrophic warfare. As amplified in the Capstone warfare, described by Cebrowski and Garstka (1998).
Concept for Joint Operations (DoD, 2009), rapidly Unarguably, the greatest capability demand for
changing conditions in the joint operations area are achieving victory in the range of military operations
posing significant challenges for commanders and are isthedevelopmentoftechnologies,techniques,tactics,
creating taxing demands on their ability to generate andproceduresthatsupportthegenerationofproactive
courses of action (COAs). These COAs are often in COAs. Such capability demands require effective
collaboration with other service, multinational, and employment of sensors, systems, and decision aids
interagency contributors to combat highly adaptive designedtodeliverhumanandsensorinputs,fusethem
232 ITEAJournal
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CognitivePerformance&NetworkedSystems
intoinformationsourcessuppliedtoincreasesituational become ahindrance rather than an aid to the user if it
awareness, and support making resolute decisions that doesn’t support the way he or she needs to use it. Of
canincreasespeedofcommand.Clearly,thesedemands course, people can usually modify their behaviors to
cannot be met through the application of human adapt to technology, but there are potential risks in
abilitiesalone.Severaltypesoftechnologiesarerequired adoptinganattitudethatusersshoulddothatinsteadof
to accomplish this feat. Further, these technologies providing technologies designed to better coincide
cannot operate in isolation. Implementing network with their behaviors.
centric warfare requires assurance that a multitude of WithinthecontextoftheArmy’sconceptforunified
networked systems can communicate and exchange battle command (UBC), the remainder of this article
information, hence a networked system of systems focuses on the factors that shape the way people use
(SoS); there must be assurance that they provide the networksandnetworkedSoS,influencehoweffectively
qualities and characteristics that complement the way they are able use the embedded capabilities, and
warfightersexecutemissions,versusprovidingonesthat determine how much they are willing to rely on them
mayultimatelyburdenthem.KevinP.Byrnes,General, to execute their tasks. In addition, a number of other
United States Army, Commanding, said the following factors that shape not only individual performance but
(DepartmentoftheArmy,2005): also collectively shape the performance of teams and
organizations planning and executing net-centric
‘‘Technologicaladvancesalonewillnotconstitute operations.
transformation. Our most critical asset is not
technology, but the critical thinking of our Unified battle command
Soldiers and leaders.’’ (Department of the Army, TheUBCconceptidentifiesastrategythatutilizesa
2005;KevinP.Byrnes—General,UnitedStates SoS approach to federate several battle command
Army, Commanding) applications. This federation delivers a suite of
integrated battle command functions applicable to all
A networked SoS naturally implies using computer Army echelons. The training and doctrine command
technology to manage the transmission of information capabilitiesmanagerforbattlecommandidentifiedthe
between two or more systems, or between devices battle commandessentialcapabilities(BCEC) thatare
attached to them. Conley (2009) further describes essentialforcommanderstoexecutebattlecommandin
thesesystemstoincludeweaponsandvehicleplatforms the realm of full spectrum operations. The integrated
as nodes within this SoS and that these platforms as
suite of applications is designed to provide a ‘‘robust’’
networknodesmustbeequippedwithcommunications
network, seamless sharing, and displays of ‘‘relevant’’
capabilities such that a network ‘‘sees’’ them no
geospatial information, and a ‘‘standard’’ collaboration
differently from any other networked system. These
capability within and across all command levels, to
capabilities are usually generated from efforts within
include extension to the individual soldier. These are
the discipline of computer networking, which can be
consideredtobethecriticalcomponentsoftheBCEC,
considered a subdiscipline of telecommunications,
supported by the UBC concept, and are further
computerscience,informationtechnology,orcomput-
described in the following discussion.
erengineering.Inpractice,however,it’stheintegration
of capabilities from these subdisciplines that synergis- BattleCommandEssentialCapabilities(BCEC)
ticallyprovidethecapabilitytomoveinformation,ina
An integrated capabilities development team for
variety of formats, from one location to another. To
battle command identified 10 essential capabilities to
some this capability seems quite mysterious; to others
implement the UBC concept. Those capabilities are
it’s the simplistic application of modern technology,
(Department of the Army, 2008):
butthere’slikely littleargument thatitbecomesavery
complex issue to all when you also consider require- 1. A robust network capability. The force must
ments for this capability to provide the exact possess a commander-centric, secure, integrated,
information an individual needs to make decisions andadaptablecommunicationsnetworkconsisting
and operate systems anytime he or she needs that ofline-of-sightandbeyond-line-of-sightmeans.
information, and from any location around the globe. 2. Execute tactical network operations. Command-
From an engineering point of view, developing a ers need the ability to have effective tactical
networked SoS is only limited by the available network operations (network management) con-
technology, but from the users’ point of view, the ducted and provide guidance to allow allocation
requirements go far beyond technological feats. The of network resources to maximize performance
most technologically advanced networked SoS could through all phases of the joint phasing model.
31(2)N June2010 233
Eberly
3. Display and share relevant information. The Training and Doctrine Command 2007 as shown in
Army’s battle command system must enable the Figure 1. This framework identifies 10 functional
receiptanddisseminationofessentialinformation battle command concepts. Each of the BCEC and
for display on the common operational picture functional battle command concepts has a technolog-
from dismounted soldier through army-level icalsolutionwithinthenetworkedSoS,buttherearea
command posts. This includes symbols, graphic numberoffactorsthatneedtobeaddressedtosupport
controlmeasures,friendlyandenemyinformation, the cognitive performance of users of the networked
civil considerations, and the operational environ- SoS.
mentfromdisparateinformationsystems. Significantadvanceshavebeenmadeintechnologies
4. A standard and sharable geospatial foundation. to acquire and move abundant levels of information
Commanders and leaders need common geospa- across a networked SoS and deliver it to the
tial information to enable all battle command appropriate user. However, human brains cannot
essential information requirements, create a consume and make sense of the sheer volumes of
common map foundation, and display and share information presented within a timeframe to make it
thisinformationonatailorableandinteroperable usable for planning and conducting high operational
common operational picture. tempo (OPTEMPO) missions. The remainder of this
5. Enable collaboration. Commanders and leaders article provides a comprehensive, though not exhaus-
need a common suite of collaborative tools to tive, list of factors that affect cognitive performance
allow establishment of a collaborative environ- andhowsomeofthoseimpactsdegradeeffectiveuseof
menttoachievesharedunderstandingandensure anetworkedSoStoexecutebattlecommandprocesses.
unity of effort in both high and low bandwidths.
6. Createanddisseminateorders.TheArmy’sbattle Factors affecting cognitive performance
command system must be able to create, change, in net centric operations
and distribute mission orders (both voice and While the BCEC and functional battle command
written) to include attached graphics between concepts support requirements definition for a net-
command post, platforms, and leaders. worked SoS designed to support the battle command
7. Battle command on-the-move. The commander framework, those requirements ultimately serve to
must have the ability to maintain situational optimize collaboration, situational understanding, vi-
awareness, make timely and informed decisions, sualization, and information sharing capabilities. The
and position himself at the decisive point during endstateforoptimizingthesecapabilitiesisoptimized
the battle. commanddecisionmaking(CDM),bothinspeedand
8. Execute a running estimate. The Army’s battle effectiveness. It is the speed at which commanders
command system must be able to support receive the information they need to develop the
running estimates by continuously gathering necessary levels of situational understanding; visualize
and tracking information to support tactical thebattlefield;collaborate withotherservices,nations,
decision making by providing a continuous or agencies; and make effective decisions to achieve
assessment of current and future operations, desired end states that support achieving the ultimate
including conclusions and recommendations. end state of thwarting or defeating intentions of the
9. Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and mul- adversary. Figure 2 provides a graphic illustration of
tinational interoperability. The Army’s battle the dependent relationships between these capabilities
command system must be able to exchange that support CDM. This premise serves as the
relevant operational information with joint, foundation for the discussion that follows regarding
interagency, intergovernmental, multinational the factors that contribute to, or detract from the
partners; nongovernmental organizations; and development of these capabilities.
contractors. Thereareanumberoffactorsthatcontributetothe
10. Rehearsal and training support. The Army’s development of capabilities that affect speed and
battle command system users must be capable effectiveness of CDM. These factors are both internal
of preparing for operations using embedded and external to the decision maker. Internal factors
rehearsal and training tools that accurately relate to those that form the inherent abilities of the
represent the spectrum of missions and environ- decision maker, while external factors are those that
ments. affect the inherent abilities of the decision maker.
Figure 3outlinesanumberoftheinternalandexternal
In addition to the BCEC, UBC calls for imple- factors that impact cognitive performance, and hence
mentation of the battle command framework of the contribute to developing the primary capabilities that
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CognitivePerformance&NetworkedSystems
Figure1. Thebattlecommandframework.
support CDM (see Figure 2). Internal factors are that determine his or her ability to cope with a set of
grouped into the categories of ability, disposition, and circumstancesinanoperationalsetting.Theauthorhas
state,andexternalfactorsaregroupedintoautomation, grouped these factors into three areas: (1) ability, (2)
environment, and team. This is certainly not an disposition,and(3)state.
exhaustive list, and the intent of this article is not to
1. Ability. Shaping factors in this area primarily
delve into all aspects of the effect of these factors on
center on formal education, occupational train-
cognitive performance but to identify some of those
ing, and repeated exposure to events from which
that can be observed and/or measured for their impact
an intuitive reaction or thought process is
on the primary capabilities supporting CDM. The
developed and repeated when a like event is
following section is dedicated to identifying these
presented again. These are similar to learned
factors,providingabriefdescriptionofeach,andsome
behaviors suchastestinghow hotacupofcoffee
of their impacts on cognitive performance, and why it
is before taking a drink because a burned tongue
isimportanttoconsidertheminthetestandevaluation
had resulted sometime in the past when the
of a networked SoS.
temperature was unknown.
Internal factors Professional military education provides the foun-
Shapingfactorsthataffectcognitiveperformanceand dationforknowledgethatwarfightersneedtoplanand
areinternaltoanindividualarethoseheorshebringsto conduct military operations. Training provides war-
thesituation.Theyareaculminationofthethingsthat fighterstheopportunitiestousetheknowledgegained
areinherenttotheindividual’sgeneticmakeup,learning from professional military education. Skills and
experiences he or she has been exposed to, references abilities are the by-products of education and training.
committed to memory, and physiological condition(s) They are what has been gained by the individual as a
31(2)N June2010 235
Eberly
Figure2. Primarycapabilitiessupportingcommanddecisionmaking.
result of prior education and training. In a situation strained circumstances, provided the mental model
requiring a decision, education, training and the for that situation has been developed.
resulting skills and abilities obtained influence the With respect to the cognitive performance of an
quality of the decision made. It is the repetition and individual engaged in planning and executing military
richnessof experiences,however,that provide decision operations using a networked SoS, the abilities of the
makerstheopportunitytostoreinmemoryanintuitive individual must be considered when evaluating the
response to a situation. Those stored memories performance of the networked SoS. Because the
contribute to developing a mental model that can be capabilities of the networked SoS must support a
used in a similar situation and thus increase the speed decision maker in developing the most effective and
atwhichthedecisionismade.Kleinetal.(1993)refer rapid decisions he or she can, the abilities of that
to this as recognition-primed decision making, which person must be considered before evaluating whether
has since become the accepted theory for how the networked SoS has met the prescribed require-
individuals make decisions in complex, time-con- ments.
Figure3. ShapingfactorsthataffectcognitiveperformanceandthedevelopmentofprimarycapabilitiessupportingCDM.
236 ITEAJournal
CognitivePerformance&NetworkedSystems
2. Disposition.Everyonecomesintotheworldwith 3. State. Shaping factors in this area are the
inborn traits. In addition, people develop addi- physiologicalconditionsthataffectanindividual’s
tional traits as a result of experiences throughout normalcognitiveperformanceabilities.Consider-
theirlives. Regardlessoftheirsource,these traits able researchhasbeenconducted in assessing the
influence the ways in which individuals use effect of state factors on cognitive performance.
technology. Traits attributed to personality and Assessing cognitive performance in a net-centric
culture factors tend to influence how people feel environment is more critical to the evaluation of
about technology, while factors such as motiva- system or SoS performance because there are
tion, need for cognitive structure, risk adversity, greatercognitivedemandsonindividualsinanet-
and uncertainty tolerance tend to influence how centric information-driven environment. Wesen-
and how much people use technology. For sten,Belenky,andBalkin(2005)explainthatthe
instance, the more adventuresome and adaptive ability to integrate information, anticipate, and
an individual, the more likely he or she will plan depends on the brain’s prefrontal cortex to
explore the potential for technology to support execute. Various physiological stressors (or per-
accomplishment of tasks. Conversely, the more formance shaping state factors), such as high
risk adverse or lack of tolerance for uncertainty, workload(physicalandmental),fatigue,andpoor
the less likely he or she will seek help from nutritiondegradethefunctioningoftheprefrontal
technology. cortex, and by extension degrades cognitive
performanceingeneral.
Motivation to use technology can stem from a
number of sources; however, necessity can often rule Lackoftrust,toomuchuncertainty,andpoorsituational
over desire depending on the perceived or real awareness, while not direct stressors to the prefrontal
usefulness and/or ease of use of the technology. For cortex,canalsodegradecognitiveperformance.Whentrust
themostpart,thenetworkedSoSsupportingplanning in the information provided from technological devices
and execution of military operations leads to necessity becomeslow,individualsfeeluncertainthattheyhavethe
forusingit,unlessitispossiblefortheusertodevelop necessary information to make a decision, which leads to
a work-around that he or she finds more satisfying increasesindecisionmakingtime.Iftheylearntodistrust
thanrelying onthe technologyavailable to accomplish thetechnology,orinthiscasethenetworkedSoS,theycan
a task. fall into patterns of ignoring the information produced
Anindividual’s needforcognitivestructurerefersto whentheyshouldn’t.Iftheybecomeoverconfidentthatthe
how much ambiguity in the information he or she is networked SoS is flawless and begin to overtrust the
obtainingcanbetoleratedbeforeitleadstodissonance, information, never questioning its validity, equally bad
stress, uncertainty, or confusion. According to Roney decisionscanbemadewithequallybadoutcomes.
and Sorrentino (1987), people are either certainty or Situational awareness is in itself a key capability
uncertaintyoriented.Certainty-orientedpeopletendto supporting CDM and has received the recognition as
bin information as valid or invalid, and ignore being the primary enabler for decisive victory in
information that is either inconsistent or ambiguous. planning and executing military operations. If the
Uncertainty-orientedpeople,ontheotherhand,havea information provided from a networked SoS is not
greater ability to deal with the same ambiguous or sufficient, poorly represented or formatted, and/or
inconsistent information by binning it as such and lacks the salient cues to adequately result in an
allowing the possibility for its usefulness. Therefore, accurate, current, and relevant level of situation
when validating whether a networked SoS meets the awareness,decisionmakersareatriskformakingpoor
users’ requirement through the use of feedback from decisions, not because of their inherent abilities, but
theuser,itisnecessarytoknowhowmuchuncertainty because the networked SoS has not provided the right
users can tolerate before evaluating whether the capabilities to ensure that the decision maker is
prescribed requirements have been met. equipped to make optimal decisions.
Risk adversity and tolerance for uncertainty also Understandinganindividual’sstatewhileengagedin
determine how much an individual is willing to trust theuseofanetworkedSoSisimportantforevaluating
whether technologies provided will actually do what whether it meets the user’s requirement for it to
the individual is told they will do. If trust is high, support execution of military operations.
willingness to use (without doubt) the technology will
behigher.Iftrustislow,theindividual’swillingnessto External factors
rely on the technology decreases. The factor of trust is Shaping factors that affect cognitive performance
further examined in the next section on state. and are external to an individual are those that the
31(2)N June2010 237
Eberly
situation and surroundings impose on him or her. Just requiring higher levels of cognitive functioning,
as with internal factors, they are a culmination of such as decision making.
things that determine his or her ability to cope with a
Withthatunderstanding,itisimportanttoevaluate
set of circumstances in an operational setting. The
theenvironmentalconditionsofatestenvironmentfor
author has grouped these factors into three areas: (1)
its potential to affect cognitive functioning because
automation, (2) environment, and (3) team.
degradingthatabilitycancausetheuserofanetworked
1. Automation.Shapingfactorsinthisareaprimar- SoStoimproperlyuseit,performpoorlywhileusingit,
ily center on the capabilities within the net- orreverttoamorehabitualmethodofexecutingatask
worked SoS. They include the networks them- that bypasses using the technology altogether.
selves, and all the tools and aids that collect,
3. Team. The Army is acquiring more complex
reduce, organize, present, and transmit informa-
manned and unmanned systems, of which many
tion for use in the planning and execution of
requiremorethanonepersontosetup,calibrate,
operations.Executingandplanningthefullrange
operate, monitor, and/or interact. The complex-
of military operations in the current joint
ity of the systems may require one individual to
operations area requires unprecedented levels of
attend to the system nearly 100% of the time,
information that can be trusted and acted on
thus requiring other individuals to monitor the
immediately.ItiscriticalthatthenetworkedSoS
environment, send and receive sensor informa-
be fully operational nearly 100% of the time so
tion, or conduct a variety of other tasks
that decision makers have all of the information
depending on the unit and mission. The ability
they need (without an overload of unnecessary
of the team, which may be colocated or
information) in a timely manner to support the
distributed, to collaborate and synchronize tasks
development and execution of proactive COAs
requires the team to have complete understand-
designed to interrupt and/or outpace the adver-
ing of what every other member of the team
sary’s decision cycle.
needs to accomplish and where each person is in
Evaluation strategies must include decision makers’ the process (Cooke et al. 2000). Additionally,
cognitive performance in this kind of net-centric when the team understands the commander’s
environment. Assurance that the networked SoS is intent, and they share agood mental model with
providing the opportunity to keep a full level of thecommander,teamprocessesimprove(Serfaty,
situational understanding, an accurate battle space Entin,andJohnston1998).Membersoftheteam
visualization through a current common operational are able to back one another up, anticipate what
picture,theabilitytosharethatinformationwithmission actions another member is about to take, and
collaboratorsthrougheffectiveandefficientcollaboration interpret cues that might indicate excessive
tools,andthetimelydeliveryofcommander’sintentare overload or stress on a team member.
among the more critical capabilities for the networked
Requirements for systems, and especially networked
SoS. However, the technological solution to providing
SoS,typicallydonotidentifytheteamprocessesthatare
thosecapabilitiesisnottheonlyconsideration;theymust
necessaryforemployment.Evaluators,therefore,should
support the rapid OPTEMPO and unique ways in
be cognizant of this and establish derived measures to
whichwarfighterswishtousethenetworkedSoStoplan
evaluatetheabilityofthesystemsornetworkedSoSto
andexecutemissions.Evaluatingthesecapabilitiesneeds
supportnotonlyindividualcollaboration,visualization,
tooccurinthesamemissioncontextandOPTEMPOas
situational understanding, and information sharing
real-worldoperationstodetermineifthenetworkedSoS
needs,butalsothoseoftheteam.
issuitablefortheusers’needs.
2. Environment. In the section on internal factors, Summary
it was noted that an individual’s state can affect The intent of this article is not to prescribe specific
the functioning of the prefrontal cortex, whichis test and evaluation strategies and measures, but to
responsible for higher level cognitive functions makethereaderscognizantofthefactorsthathavethe
(Wesensten, Belenky, and Balkin 2005). They potential to influence how users will use a networked
expound on that by stating environmental SoS and how well the networked SoS can support the
conditions can cause sufficient degradation in users’ needs. While the Department of Defense does
an individual’s physiological state to result in not directly procure warfighters, it does invest heavily
impairedfunctioningoftheprefrontalcortex,and in training, educating, and otherwise ‘‘making ready’’
thushisorherabilitytosuccessfullyexecutetasks warfighters to conduct missions to defend our country
238 ITEAJournal
CognitivePerformance&NetworkedSystems
andpromotepeacearoundtheworld.Assuch,whenwe Cebrowski,A.K.andJ.J.Gartska,1998.Network-
consider the capabilities we choose to procure for their centric warfare: Its origin and future. Navy Proceedings
use, we must consider not just the best technological (January)28–36.
solution, but the solution that best supports optimizing Conley, S. F. 2009. Test and evaluation strategies
warfighters’ performance, reducing demands on their for network-enabled systems. ITEA Journal 30 (1):
already heavily taxed physical and cognitive abilities. 111–116.
Admittedly,designingtestplanstoexaminethesefactors Cooke,N.J.,E.Salas,J.A.Cannon-BowersandR.
canbedifficult,andcertainlynotallcanbeincorporated J. Stout. 2000. Human Factors. 42, 151–173.
into an evaluation strategy. However, those systems or Department of the Army. 2005. Training and
SoS that are being acquired to support higher order Doctrine Command (TRADOC) PAM 525-3-0, v2.0
cognitive processes such as developing situational (2005).Army.http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/
awareness, supporting collaborative processes, and visu- p525-3-0.pdf(accessedNovember25,2009).
alizingthebattlespaceshouldconsiderfactorsthatshape Departmentofthe Army.2007.Traininganddoctrine
thewarfighters’abilitiestodoso. C command (TRADOC) PAM 525-3-3, v1.0. The United
States Army functional concept for battle command 2015–
2024.http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525-3-0.
pdf(accessedNovember25,2009).
DIANE EBERLY is currently employed as an operations
DepartmentoftheArmy.2008.TrainingandDoctrine
research systems analyst attheArmy Test and Evaluation
Command (TRADOC) capabilities manager—Battle
Command,ArmyEvaluationCenteratAberdeenProving
command (TCM-BC). Battle command essential capabil-
Ground, Maryland. She has also had the opportunity to
ities whitepaper. http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/
work at the Joint Forces Command Experimentation
pams/p525-3-0.pdf(accessedNovember25,2009).
Directorate (J9) in Suffolk, Virginia, as the field element
DoD (Department of Defense). 2009. Capstone
chief for the Army Research Laboratory, Human Research
concept for joint operations Version 3.0 (CCJO v3.0),
and Engineering Directorate. Additionally, Diane was
January. Future force capstone concept 2015–2024. www.
employed by the Commander, Navy Submarine Force in
dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/approved_ccjov3.
Norfolk, Virginia, as the Branch Head for Plans and
pdf (accessed November 25, 2009).
Programs, and for Warfare Assessments. She received her
Klein, G., J. Orasanu, R. Calderwood, and C. E.
master of science degree in information systems and
Zsambok. 1993. Decision making in action: Models and
operations analysis from the University of Maryland
methods. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing.
Baltimore County in 1997. Diane has over 25 years of
Roney, C. J. R., and R. M. Sorrentino, 1987.
research, development, test and evaluation experience,
Uncertainty orientation and person perception: Indi-
primarilyfocusedonevaluatinghumansystemsintegration
vidual differences in categorization. Social Cognition 5,
for weapons and information systems in the defense
369–382.
acquisition lifecycle. E-mail: [email protected]
Serfaty, D., E. E. Entin, and J. Johnston. 1998.
Team coordination training. In Decision making under
References stress: implications for training and simulation, ed. J. A.
Alberts, David S., and Richard E. Hayes. 2003. Cannon-Bowers and E. Salas. Washington, D.C.:
Power to the Edge, DoD Command and Control APA Press. pp.221–245.
Research Program; June; ISBN 1-893723-13-5; Wesensten, N. J., G. Belenky, and T. J. Balkin.
http://www.dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Alberts_Power. 2005. Cognitive readiness in network-centric opera-
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