Table Of Content

Theater Missile Defense Reflections for the Future LT COL MARK KIPPHUT, USAF A S A RESULT OF Gulf War efforts the Gulf War were (1) that missiles will play a countering Saddam Hussein’s short- significant role in future wars, and (2) that locat range ballistic missiles (SRBM), thea- ing, targeting, and destroying mobile missile ter missile defense (TMD) has transporter-erector-launchers (TEL) is both emerged as a leading doctrinal issue. Our inabil- time and resource intensive. Yet before the ity to halt Scud attacks spurred a virtual cottage United States Air Force (USAF) develops new TMD doctrine, tactics, techniques, and proce- industry. Pundits and prognosticators of all dures, it would serve us well to first reflect on the shapes and sizes are offering insights into how past. we should best counter this “new” threat. The two distinctive TMD lessons that emerged from 35 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1996 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1996 to 00-00-1996 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Theater Missile Defense. Reflections for the Future 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Air and Space Power Journal,155 N. Twining Street,Maxwell REPORT NUMBER AFB,AL,36112-6026 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 18 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 36 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1996 Background The second inhibiting factor is the Air Force doctrinal bias for air superiority based on neutral The Gulf War was not the first time airpower izing manned fixed-wing aircraft. Airmen often was required to counter enemy cruise or ballistic proclaim that, first and foremost, the enemy’s air missile attacks. During World War II, Operation forces must be defeated by air supremacy—a war Crossbow, the Allied attempt to counter German cannot be won without it.3 This belief suffers V-1 and V-2 operations became the dominant fo from “mirror-image” analysis. Because America cus shaping airpower employment during the relies on fixed-wing aircraft as the primary critical spring and summer months of 1944. Un means of waging air war, then these must be the fortunately, Gulf planners did not learn Cross- only “things” that are really important. This is bow’s lessons, because, as this article shows, dogma, not doctrine. It ignores the trend within most of the challenges faced in World War II re- the third world, where ballistic missiles play an surfaced during efforts to suppress Scuds during important role.4 The initial drafts of the latest Air the Gulf War. Force doctrine are reexamining the restrictive Two factors inhibited Gulf War air planners definition of air superiority, but changing doc- from properly anticipating or countering the Iraqi trine requires more than just new words; we must Scud menace. First, Air Force officers are poor refocus our thinking!5 students of history. Our intellectual foundation Just seven days after D day, a V-1 launched tends to be based on Jominian reductionism. from France hit a railroad bridge in London. Rather than properly studying history to gain a Thus, a new era in warfare was born—the em rich appreciation of the subtleties of war, we ran- ployment of missiles against civilian and military sack the history record in search of principles that targets. Iraqi use of Scuds during Desert Storm guarantee success. This “cookie-cutter” ap continued this trend.6 Adolf Hitler and Saddam proach typically leads to dogmatic application, Hussein had similar purposes for launching their not strong doctrinal thought.1 missiles. Each wanted to incite civilian terror to erode public support for the war effort and to pro voke a reaction from his enemy that could funda mentally alter the war. Despite inaccuracy and Before the USAF develops new TMD small warheads, ballistic missiles can leverage an doctrine, tactics, techniques, and proce opponent and contribute to breaking the enemy’s dures, it would serve us well to first re will to fight. flect on the past. Hussein learned this during the savage Iran-Iraq war. In response to Iranian missile attacks against Baghdad, he ordered the launch of almost To avoid this pitfall, the Air Force must reject 200 missiles at Iranian cities, primarily Tehran.7 its biases toward using history to discover the in- The Iraqi missile attacks caused little destruc disputable laws of war and instead adopt a tion, but each warhead had a psychological and Clausewitzian view that requires that history be political impact—the strikes boosting Iraqi mo properly studied to gain an appreciation of the rale while causing almost 30 percent of Tehran’s physical and psychological factors governing population to flee the city. The threat of rocket conflict. This approach instructs us how to ing the Iranian capital with missiles capable of think, not how to act. For Clausewitz it was not a carrying chemical warheads is cited as a primary matter of “knowing that,” which is important, but reason why Iran accepted a disadvantageous of “knowing how to act,” which is critical!2 The peace agreement. examination of history, therefore, yields no spe Despite the role ballistic missiles played in cific formula, no single guide for action; instead, it ending the Iran-Iraq war, coalition commanders educates the warrior to find his way through the and their staffs did not appropriately anticipate jungle of chance and uncertainty that charac the impact that Scud attacks would have on their terizes the combat environment. plans. They grossly underestimated political 36 THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE 37 A V-1 ends its flight. Airpower failed to achieve its objective of “limiting the intensity” of either the V-1 or V-2 once German launch operations began. pressures and their impact on resource allocations equaled 60 percent of the total Allied Combined as a result of the attacks on Israel. In both World Bomber Offensive (CBO) tonnage dropped dur War II and the Gulf War, airpower was the princi ing 1944, the best year of the CBO! pal means employed to stop enemy missiles, and If achieved, this objective would certainly have in each case the results were at best inconclusive, altered the war, especially if one considers the and at worst, absolute failures.8 small geographic nature of southern England. Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower concluded that if the Germans had succeeded in perfecting and Crossbow Campaign using these new weapons six months earlier, our invasion of Europe would have been exceedingly Originally, Hitler had set the end of December difficult, perhaps impossible . . . if the 1943 as the target date for the start of the V-1 and Portsmouth-Southhampton area had been one of V-2 assault.9 However, the effects of Allied air the principal targets, OVERLORD might have been attacks and German developmental problems de written off (emphasis added).10 layed the first attacks until D day. The German ob jective was to attack the United Kingdom with Ultimately, due in part to Crossbow and other approximately 94,000 tons of high explosives per Allied operations, the Germans did not achieve month and by 1945 German planners estimated their primary goals. Nevertheless, V-weapon they could strike southern England with one mil- suppression efforts had a tremendous impact on lion tons of explosives per year. This would have Allied air planning. Crossbow affected not only 38 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1996 the conduct of the CBO, but also strained the re- lay slowed the full coordination of Allied efforts sources supporting Operation Overlord. to suppress the threat. Once all the critical details were disclosed, American leadership, both military and civilian, rapidly realized the potential impact of V-weap The Gulf War was not the first time air- ons employment. A conclusive estimate of Ger power was required to counter enemy man capabilities and intentions was sent to Gen cruise or ballistic missile attacks. Henry (“Hap”) Arnold and Gen George Marshall by Eisenhower in December 1943. It claimed that “the equivalent of at least a 2,000-ton bomb ing attack [could be achieved] in a period of 24 Despite the Allies’ best efforts, the Germans hours.”13 This compares favorably with German launched approximately 15,500 V-1 and V-2 planning that called for a maximum of just over missiles between June 1944 and March 1945, 3,000 tons per day by mid-1944.14 forcing Eisenhower to direct that Crossbow take priority over all other Allied air operations, in Crossbow Planning cluding those in support of the Normandy beach- head and the CBO.11 By the end of the war, The objectives of Crossbow were to “delay the suppression of V-weapons accounted for more beginning of attacks and to limit their intensity than 69,000 strike sorties and almost 137,000 tons of once begun.”15 Overall, the height of the cam munitions. Clearly, the Germans had created a paign was from August 1943 until August 1944, major diversion, and if this threat was not neu as the Allies first attempted to delay the introduc tralized quickly, the continued diversion of tion of V-weapons and then to suppress their use. scarce airpower resources away from the Nor Ironically, formally coordinated countermeasure mandy lodgment and CBO could have jeopard plans were not developed and approved until af ized the entire Allied war strategy. ter August 1944, when the threat had diminished. The Allies established a combined planning cell to determine the best strategy for reducing mis Allied Intelligence and Warning sile capabilities. This organization, dominated by By late 1942, the frequency of reports concern British officers, directed Anglo-American opera ing new German “secret weapons” was increas tions against all elements of German long-range ing; and in early 1943, the British government missile programs, including research facilities, received “unambiguous warning” of German inten manufacturing plants, storage sites, launch sites, tions to attack Britain using unmanned missiles, and airborne intercept operations until July 1944. possibly with chemical, biological, or nuclear Throughout Crossbow, the British approach fo weapons. In response, Prime Minister Winston cused on the physical destruction of the launch Churchill tasked a special panel to direct all V- sites, while the American approach was to de weapon intelligence activities and to recommend stroy the broader V-weapons support infrastruc countermeasures. In November 1943, based on ture, focusing on production capabilities, the committee’s recommendations, the British logistical support facilities, and the electric grids War Cabinet directed an intensification of coun supporting the launch sites. These disagreements termeasure efforts. were never fully resolved; in fact, there was no Crossbow began in earnest in December single target set whose destruction could have 1943, and eventually included all Allied offensive halted German missile operations. Crossbow’s suc and defensive V-weapon countermeasures.12 It cess in delaying the introduction of V-weapons was also in December that the British finally came from the cumulative effects of repeated op revealed to their American counterparts the full erations against all elements of the “system.” magnitude of the threat. Before then American Crossbow offensive operations can be divided aircraft had flown missions against V-weapon into two phases: Crossbow I, April 1943 to early targets without fully understanding why. This de- June 1944; and Crossbow II, mid-June 1944 to THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE 39 May 1945. The first phase consisted of the in hand, Allied leaders devoted a significant effort itial identification of the V-weapons target set, to suppressing the threat at the expense of other primarily by aerial reconnaissance, and attacks critical missions.20 against German-based research facilities plus the operational launch and support facilities being Crossbow Sortie Allocation built in France. The second phase was more ac tive, and arguably more critical, because it at- Crossbow operations between August 1943 and tempted to stop missile operations once strikes April 1945 required 68,913 strike sorties deliver against England and other targets started. This ing 136,789 tons of munitions. They involved phase broadened the focus of bombing to include both strategic and tactical sorties.21 supply sites, supporting infrastructure, and pro Strategic Air Forces. Overall, strategic air duction facilities. In the end, the entire enemy V- forces flew 53 percent of all Crossbow sorties weapon “system” was attacked—research and (36,795) and delivered 84 percent of all tonnage development facilities, manufacturing plants, (114,790). This equates to 5.6 percent of all sorties transportation nodes, supporting electric grids, and 6.8 percent of all tonnage delivered between storage areas, and launch sites. 1939 and 1945. Between August 1943 and Au- gust 1944, Crossbow consumed 14 percent of all Crossbow Results Allied strategic sorties and 16 percent of total tonnage. While the Allies succeeded in destroying or neu tralizing all permanent V-weapon sites, the Ger Tactical Air Forces. Tactical air forces flew mans displayed a capability to continue launch 47 percent of all Crossbow sorties (32,091) while operations by limiting the signature of new, delivering only 16 percent of the total tonnage modified firing sites that utilized small, simpli (21,999). From August 1943 to August 1944, fied launchers protected by extensive camou tactical air forces devoted 17 percent of total sor flage, concealment, and deception (CC&D) tie generation and 13 percent of total tonnage to techniques. The United States Strategic Bombing Crossbow operations. Likewise, the RAF Fighter Survey (USSBS) concluded that air attack against Command flew an additional 4,600 sorties, or 79 the entire V-weapon “system” slowed the intro percent of all its offensive sortie generation, fol duction of the V-1 and V-2 by three to six lowing the elimination of the strategic air threat months.16 Therefore, Crossbow achieved one of its to the United Kingdom, aimed at suppressing V-2 stated objectives: “delaying the beginning of the launch operations. Finally, Crossbow consumed attacks.” This allowed the Allies to execute 40 percent of reconnaissance sorties after 1943. Overlord before the full impact of Hitler’s “se cret” weapons could be realized. Both General Crossbow Observations Eisenhower and General Bradley make this point in their autobiographies.17 Based on this judg The four major lessons airmen should derive ment, Crossbow I can be labeled a qualified from Crossbow are: “success”; however, without question Crossbow • Attacking an enemy’s missile infrastruc II must be labeled a dismal failure. Airpower ture can be effective as a long-term strat failed to achieve its objective of “limiting the in- egy, but such an approach is unlikely to tensity” of either the V-1 or V-2 once German have an immediate impact on stopping launch operations began.18 Despite the applica launch operations. tion of thousands of sorties against over 250 targets during the critical summer months of 1944, • Effective attacks against small, mobile the Germans averaged just over 80 launches per targets employing CC&D efforts requires day. German sources contend that they never failed real-time reconnaissance support; other- to launch due to direct intervention by Allied air- wise, targets are going to be difficult to power or a shortage in weapons.19 On the other find, if not impossible to attack. 40 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1996 The Great Scud Chase • Planning requires comprehensive intelli gence support that extends well beyond simply focusing on the technical capabili By the time the United Nations authorized the ties of an enemy system. The corollary is coalition to “use all necessary means” to evict that operational plans must fully take into Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Hussein had few strate account enemy actions and reactions. gic options remaining.25 One was Scud missile attacks against Israel to undermine the integrity of the • Political pressure can directly determine coalition and to intimidate Saudi Arabia. resource allocation. Within 24 hours of the opening of Desert Storm, Iraq launched the first of at least 88 Scuds at Throughout Crossbow an extensive debate Israel and the Arabian Peninsula.26 Just as in erupted over the best methods of neutralizing the Crossbow, the coalition responded by diverting precious resources away from other areas to threat. The British believed the destruction of the counter Scuds. Hussein, like Hitler, created a launch sites by heavy bombers would provide the significant diversion. best means to an end, while American airmen Approximately 4,750 anti-Scud sorties were held the destruction of the supporting infrastruc planned, including the change or addition of 553 ture by heavy or medium bombers would com sorties.27 Daily Scud-hunting sorties numbered plement fighter-bomber attacks against V-1 sites.22 between 75 and 160, or about 5 percent of These differences were never fully resolved, and planned daily sorties. Overall, counter-Scud ef only after extensive efforts failed to slow V-1 forts represented between 2 and 5 percent of all launch rates was the American approach finally 55,075 offensive fixed-wing sorties generated by accepted and implemented.23 coalition airmen, 4 percent of all scheduled sor The lack of a unified approach also wasted time ties, and 11.5 percent of all new sorties added to and resources. For example, even after Allied in the daily air tasking order.28 The anti-Scud strat telligence confirmed that the fixed V-1 and V-2 egy had essentially three parts: (1) preplanned at- sites were neutralized in July 1944, political pres tacks against production, storage, and fixed sites; sure by the British government required Gen Carl (2) 24-hour patrols to disrupt prelaunch activities; Spaatz to continue to send heavy bombers against and (3) 24-hour patrols to attack launch sites after them. Precious resources were used to attack they fired their missiles.29 militarily insignificant targets while the legiti Contrary to the postwar assessments of several mate needs of the CBO and the battle in Northern authors, the existence and extent of Iraq’s ballis France went unsatisfied. tic missile programs were fairly well understood.30 Although, in retrospect, some US Overall, while air attacks did delay the intro prewar technical estimates were less than 100 duction of V-weapons, it did not seriously hinder percent accurate, the general capabilities of Iraqi or halt launch operations once they were initi missile programs were well documented.31 Ad ated. It appears that the better approach would ditionally, Iraqi employment practices during its have been to adopt a strategy closer to American war with Iran were well understood by the US in recommendations, augmented by additional de telligence community and the academic world.32 fensive operations.24 Postwar analysis shows Had planners, both in Washington and in-theater, that the greatest impact on German efforts came fully appreciated airpower’s limitations during from the indirect effects that bombing had on Crossbow and better understood Hussein’s em disrupting V-weapon production and distri ployment of ballistic missiles in the Iran-Iraq war, bution. Silencing V-weapons eventually re there would have been fewer surprises. quired ground forces to overrun the launch sites. Against this backdrop, the focus shifts ahead nearly 50 years to examine the challenges posed by Iraqi ballistic missiles. Coalition Intelligence and Warning THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE 41 By 1990, Iraq had three mobile Scud or Scud- the Jordanian border. These contained 28 launch based variants in its inventory: the Soviet-sup- positions, allowing the Al-Husayn missile to hit plied 160-mile-range SS-1 (Scud), plus two all major Israeli cities, nuclear facilities in the indigenous Scud variants, the 325-mile Al- Negev desert, and Syria. The existence of these Husayn and the 400-mile Al-Hijarah.33 All were fixed launch sites led many planners to believe inaccurate and could only strike cities or other they had found their trump card: if these sites large-area targets. As a result, Iraqi Scuds were were destroyed, the threat to Israel would be di- judged to be more of a psychological than a mili minished.38 This was shortsighted because it tary threat. minimized the role of mobile Scud operations and discounted a demonstrated Iraqi capability Although the absolute number of Scud missile during the Iran-Iraq war. airframes available to the Iraqis was unknown, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) had esti In retrospect, the role the fixed sites played in mated that the Soviet Union delivered at least Iraqi strategy is unclear. Iraq had the ability to 600 missiles.34 Postwar disclosures showed target Israel using mobile launchers, and al Baghdad had purchased around 800 missiles, though the use of fixed sites may marginally im many of which had been utilized to build Iraqi prove accuracy, Scud missiles remained an area extended-range Scuds.35 All Iraqi variants could weapon. Therefore, there is a possibility that the be launched from either fixed sites or mobile fixed sites were an elaborate deception effort. launchers.36 Certainly the Iraqis, probably through their rela The Iraqis used well-known Soviet doctrine tionship with the Soviets, the masters of modern for the deployment and employment of their deception, considered using replicas to draw off SRBMs.37 Iraqi missile crews required 60 to 90 enemy combat power. minutes to set up and launch a missile from a pre- Postwar analysis shows that the Iraqis also re- surveyed site. Based on Soviet and Middle East- lied on other types of deception. They employed ern models, it was believed that the Iraqis would elaborate high-fidelity decoys to complicate tar launch from concealed locations and minimize geting and protect TELs. This also confused the their exposure while moving to and from launch battle damage assessment process.39 Planners locations. This included launching under the should have anticipated Iraqi use of CC&D given cover of darkness or weather. the close Baghdad-Moscow relationship and So viet doctrinal emphasis on active and passive de ception techniques to protect high-value targets.40 The number of Scud TELs in service at the Air Force officers are poor students of time of the war remains a source of contention. history. . . . Rather than properly study The uncertainty over this issue is often cited as ing history to gain a rich the reason why coalition forces could not stop launches.41 Prewar estimates and postwar analy appreciation of the subtleties of war, we sis do not differ greatly. The lowest prewar count ransack the history record in search of was 12, while the upper estimate was 22.42 Post- principles that war analysis places the number at 36 (33 opera guarantee success. This “cookie tional), a number supported by the Gulf War Air cutter” approach typically leads to dog Power Survey (GWAPS), the air warfare survey matic application, not strong doctrinal commissioned by the USAF.43 It was also believed before the war that Hussein’s “missile-men” had thought. presurveyed a number of launch sites within Iraq and Kuwait to support launch operations against Saudi Arabia and Israel. In an attempt to improve its capability to Throughout the fall of 1990, estimates of the threaten Israel, Iraq constructed five fixed size and capabilities of the Iraqi SRBM force launching complexes in its western desert near were under continual refinement as more infor- 42 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1996 mation became available. DIA established a spe August 1990, President George Bush specified cial Scud Cell at its Washington-based Joint Intel US national objectives as: ligence Center. This group identified (1) the • Immediate, complete, and unconditional prewar dispersal of missiles from their garrisons; withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Ku (2) the likelihood that Iraqis would use darkness or wait; poor weather to mask employment; and (3) ex pected employment strategies, including attacks • Restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate gov against Israel. The culmination of this effort ernment; came in December 1990, when the cell provided Central Command (CENTCOM) and its air com • Security and stability of Saudi Arabia ponent, CENTAF, a full appraisal of the Iraqi and the Persian Gulf; and Scud force, including the expected launch se • Safety and protection of American quences, existence of presurveyed launch points 49 citizens abroad. in the western Iraqi desert, use of dispersed logis tical support, and the correct size of the mobile As the third policy objective implied, the launcher force.44 president determined early on that, in addition to the Hussein stumbled onto a Clausewitzian ap restoration of Kuwait, US forces would eliminate proach, attacking Israel to provoke an Israeli Hussein’s capability to continue to threaten the counterstrike by overflying either Saudi Arabia region. Implied was the destruction of Iraqi bal or Jordan, or both. He reckoned Arab coalition listic missiles and any program to mate them with members could never accept alignment with Is weapon of mass destruction (WMD) warheads. This rael against another Arab state; thus, by striking objective was central to all subsequent political and at Israel, he indirectly targeted coalition unity.45 military strategies adopted throughout Desert Despite knowing this, US military authorities Storm. throughout the Gulf were surprised by the To achieve the president’s objectives, General amount of political pressure generated by the at- Schwarzkopf, in concert with Secretary of De tacks. Many senior leaders admit they underesti fense Dick Cheney, identified five primary opera mated the Scud’s impact because of its notorious tional objectives: inaccuracy and small warhead.46 Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf regarded the missiles as “militarily • Neutralize the Iraqi national command irrelevant.” His most senior airman and joint and control system; force air component commander (JFACC), Lt • Eject Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait; Gen Charles Horner, thought the missiles were “lousy weapons.” His chief planner, Brig Gen • Destroy the Republican Guard; Buster Glosson, believed they were “not militar ily significant.”47 It was only after significant • Destroy Iraqi ballistic missile and nu- pressure was imposed from Washington that the clear, biological, and chemical (NBC) commander in chief (CINC) of CENTCOM “got capability; and the message” and redirected his forces to attempt • Assist in the restoration of the legitimate to stop, or at least try to suppress, missile 50 government of Kuwait. launches.48 From these objectives, General Schwarzkopf refined his mission statement to include the need to “as early as possible, destroy Iraq’s ballistic mis Counter-Scud Planning sile and NBC capabilities.”51 He established the To understand how coalition counter-Scud opera following as the focus for CENTCOM Operations tions were conducted, it is necessary to first con Order 91-001, 17 January 1991, which directed sider how the air campaign plans were derived and combined military operations during Desert integrated into the CINC’s joint campaign. In Storm: THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE 43 duction and support facilities. The following tar- • Attack Iraqi politico-military leadership get sets were to “reduce [the] offensive threat to and command and control; regional states and friendly forces”: • Gain and maintain air superiority; • Fixed Scud launchers, • Sever Iraqi supply lines; • Ballistic missile support bases, • Destroy nuclear, biological and chemical • Known surveyed launch sites for mobile production, storage, and delivery capa launchers, bilities; • Hardened aircraft shelters possibly hid • Destroy Republican Guard forces in the ing mobile launchers, and Kuwait theater; and • SRBM research, development, and pro 52 • Liberate Kuwait City. 53 duction facilities. This demonstrates that General Schwarzkopf However, when the war started and Iraq began had little latitude concerning the reduction of launching missiles, counter-Scud efforts rapidly Iraqi missile capabilities. Scuds, along with Iraq’s expanded and eventually consumed the daily sor NBC program, were to be destroyed. By accom tie-generation equivalent of a fighter wing.54 plishing this, it was assumed that the regional threat posed by Hussein would be eliminated and Iraq’s ballistic missile program was consid the “security and stability of Saudi Arabia and ered critical; however, due to assumptions made the Persian Gulf” would be maintained. General in Washington, and later retained bmade in Wash Schwarzkopf relied on airpower, under the direc ington, and later retained by theater planners, in tion of General Horner, to achieve this objective. itial efforts focused solely on attacking the fixed General Horner, in turn, directed his staff to sites in western Iraq and SRBM production and eliminate Iraqi Scud capabilities as quickly as storage facilities.55 The hope was to neutralize the possible during the opening phase of the air cam short-term threat to Israel and to eliminate the paign. long-term threat to the region.56 The theater commanders and staffs recognized that the po tential impact of the Iraqi mobile launcher targeting problem was too difficult to solve and that despite Had planners, both in Washington and best efforts some TELs would escape to launch their missiles.57 Reflecting the views of Generals in-theater, fully appreciated Schwarzkopf and Horner, planners regarded Iraqi airpower’s limitations during Scuds as “nuisance weapons.” They believed the Crossbow and better understood best strategy was for the coalition and Israel to Hussein’s employment of ballistic mis absorb the attacks. In their view, to attempt to lo siles in the Iran-Iraq war, there would cate and destroy mobile TELs was sortie-inten have been fewer surprises. sive and counterproductive.58 Therefore, a prewar search-and-destroy scheme for finding and attacking mobile Scuds was not devised.59 Only after Scuds were launched at Israel did the theater General Horner envisioned three counter-Scud develop a counter-TEL strategy.60 objectives: (1) keep Israel out of the war; (2) de The low priority initially placed on counter- stroy Iraq’s Scud-associated production facilities; Scud efforts is reflected by the growth in the total and (3) find and destroy Scud TELs that threat number of SRBM targets. In August 1990, 24 ened the Arabian Peninsula. Initially, only a few were identified, but by mid-January the number missions were planned against the western launch grew to 121.61 Postwar analysis concluded that sites and a limited number of other missile pro by July 1992 there were at least 154 SRBM-asso-