DTIC ADA529830: The Development of Royal Air Force Strategic Bombing Doctrine between the Wars. A Revolution in Military Affairs?

17 Pages·0.64 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

The
Development
of Royal Air
Force Strategic
Bombing
Doctrine
between the
Wars
A Revolution in Military
Affairs?
DR. SCOT ROBERTSON
The strategy and operations of any war can be understood only in the light of
conditions of the ten or twenty years before its beginning. Technology,
organization, doctrine, training, command and staff appointments—all the
essentials of action in war—are put in place and developed in peacetime. The
testing experience of combat will bring about change, but prewar elements
continue to affect many events throughout the longest of conflicts.
—Peter Paret
37
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The Development of Royal Air Force Strategic Bombing Doctrine
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between the Wars. A Revolution in Military Affairs?
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38 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1998
[The military] is like a sailor navigating by dead reckoning. You have left the
terra firma of the last war and are extrapolating from the experiences of that
war. The greater the distance from the last war, the greater become the chances
of error in this extrapolation. Occasionally there is a break in the clouds: a
small-scale conflict occurs somewhere and gives you a “fix” by showing whether
certain weapons and techniques are effective or not: but it is always a doubtful
mix. . . . For the most part you have to sail on in a fog of peace until at the last
moment. Then, probably when it is too late, the clouds lift and there is land
immediately ahead; breakers, probably, and rocks. Then you find out rather
late in the day whether your calculations have been right or not.
—Sir Michael Howard
P
ET ER PARET’S COMMENT regardi ng new. In fact, it is a theme that has been played
the fac tors that af fect strat egy and op­ out many times before. Fol low ing the con clu­
era tions in war—the idea that they sion of most major conflicts of the past few
have their roots in one or two preced­ cen tu ries, armed forces have confronted the
ing decades—is particu larly apro pos today. two problems of reduc ing their estab lish­
From Vancou ver to Vladi vos tok and from ments and at the same time adjust ing to new
Tal linn to Ti rana, mili tary es tab lish ments are re ali ties.
wres tling with complex factors that will in- In the contemp or ary United States and
flu ence the way armed forces organi ze, plan, else where, we are witness ing a vigor ous de-
and equip themselves to fight future battles. bate, driven by the desire to master the prob­
This planning envi ron ment is shaped by lems of reduct ion in force structure, while at
two compet ing, some might even say contra­ the same time assuri ng that armed forces
dic tory, consid era tions. The first is the after- make the best use of technol ogic al and doc­
math of the cold war, which brought with it trinal changes brought to light in the Persian
an under standa ble desire to reduce the ex­ Gulf War. This debate turns on the prospects
pense asso ci ated with large and technol ogi­ for what has come to be termed a revolut ion
cally sophis ti cated armed forces. This desire in military affairs (RMA), defined as “a major
is neither new nor even remark able. It has change in the nature of warfare brought
been a hallmark of the after math of most about by the inno va tive appli ca tion of tech­
mode rn conflicts. The second shaping con­ nolo gies which, combined with dramatic
sid era tion arose from the conduct of the Per­ changes in military doctrine, and organ iza­
sian Gulf War. Military estab lish ments tional concepts, funda men tally alters the
around the world watched the perform ance char ac ter and conduct of operat ions.”1 So far,
of the coalit ion force in awe. This perform­ how ever, the debate has not reached defini­
ance was char ac ter ized by a de gree of tech no­ tive conclu sions. As Jacob Kipp noted re­
logi cal sophis ti ca tion, married to doctrinal cently, “the exchanges have become increas­
and opera tional concepts, that resulted in a ingly intense. The two posi tions, pitting
new vision of what high-intensity, fast-paced ad vo cates against doubting Thomas’s, con­
op era tions of the future might entail. trast a revolu tion ary inter pre ta tion as op­
This planning envir onm ent, with its twin posed to an evolu tion ary one.”2 Undoubt­
im pera tives of demo bi li za tion and moderni­ edly, this debate will continue in the years to
za tion, which now occu pies the collec tive come.3 Given the ongoi ng debate and the un­
minds of armed forces across the world, is not cer tainty regard ing its resolu tion, we would
RAF STRATEGIC BOMBING DOCTRINE 39
be wise to pause and consider the factors that into the problems asso ci ated with an RMA.
will drive the debate, and that will come to­ One such histori cal case study is that of the
gether to influ ence its outcome. For this pur­ de vel op ment of strateg ic bombing doctrine
pose, it may be in struc tive to draw on his tori­ in the Royal Air Force (RAF) between the two
cal expe ri ence, whose record is at least world wars.
somew hat clearer.
Such a use—or perhaps misuse—of history
Development of Strategic
may be frowned upon in some quarters. To a
cer tain extent, this is a valid criticism. As Sir Bombing Doctrine
Mic hael Howard has observed, “It is safer to
start with the assump tion that history, what- The day may not be far off when aerial operations,
ever its value in educati ng the judgement, with their devastation of enemy lands and
teaches no ‘le ssons,’ and the pro fes sional his- destruction of the industrial and populace centres
on a vast scale, may become the principal
to ri ans will be as scep ti cal of those who claim
operations of war, to which the older forms of
that it does as pro fes sional doc tors are of their
military operations may become secondary and
col leagues who peddle patent medicines
subordinate.
guar an tee ing in stant cures.”4 Al though this is
a sound caution ary proscrip tion, Sir Michael —Smuts Committee Report, 1917
reco gn ized that in the mili tary con text, there
Future weapons will be able to strike enemy forces
are unique circum stances in which histori cal at great distances. In mid- or high-intensity
study can prove not only helpful but perhaps combat, it may not always be necessary to
in dis pen sa ble. He char ac ter ized the situation physically occupy key terrain on the ground, vital
con front ing the military profes sion as one in airspace, or critical chokepoints at sea in order to
which “there are two great diffi cul ties with control them. While wars will still be won only
which the profess ional soldier, sailor, or air- when soldiers occupy the enemy’s territory, it may
not be necessary in every case to “close with” the
man has to con tend in equip ping him self as a
enemy in order to destroy him.
com mander. First, his profes sion is almost
unique in that he may only have to exer cise it —Adm David Jeremiah, 1993
once in a life time, if in deed that of ten. . . . Sec­
From the last months of the Great War,
ondly the complex problem of running a
down to the outbreak of the Second World
[mili tary service] at all is liable to occupy his
War, the notion of strateg ic bombing had
mind and skill so completely that it is easy to
held out great prospect and at the same time
for get what it is being run for.”5
had cast a pall. On the one hand, the devel op­
Faced with this en ig matic situa tion, armed
ment of strateg ic bombing forces had appar­
serv ices find it diffi cult to consider future re-
ently heralded a new era in which war would
quire ments removed from the hurly-burly of
be come a sim pler task. Ex ten sive land and na­
day- to- day problems. In the absence of the
val forces were no longer conside red nec es­
opp ort un ity to hone skills and judgement on
sary. Victory would go to the side that could
the battle field, military services need to look
mas ter the skies and take the war to the very
to their equiva lent of the labo ra tory, which in
heart of the enemy nation. On the other
some cases is derived from the body of past
hand, fear of a strateg ic bombing duel exer­
ex pe ri ence—that is, history. The study of his-
cised a paralyz ing restraint on British foreign
tory can suggest relevant questions to ask,
pol icy.6 That fear, further more, weighed
enum era te certain princi ples worthy of fur­
heav ily on the minds of British politi cians
ther in ves ti ga tion, and—per haps most im por­
and the public alike. Once it became evident
tantly—sharpen the ability to make judge­
that war loomed on the ho ri zon, air war ter ri­
ments re gard ing com pli cated and
fied people most. They would have to make
in com plete infor ma tion. One can exam ine
prepa ra tions, both to prosecute and endure a
num ero us histori cal instances for insights
stra te gic bombing duel.
40 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1998
At the outbreak of the Great War, expectations of what aircraft might contribute were modest. The general consensus
was that aircraft could best serve as observation platforms, but beyond that, little was expected.
Even though Bomber Command eventu­ In a recent study on military inno va tion,
ally under took a massive nighttime area Alan Beyer chen devel oped a simple sche­
bombi ng campaign against Germany during matic that can be extremely help ful in un tan­
the Second World War, the results of that gling the complex and often overlap ping fac­
camp aign were neither deci sive nor consis­ tors at play. This schematic seeks to estab lish
tent with prewar expec ta tions. How was it a hier ar chi cal framework that recogn izes the
that this transpired? There are no short, sim­ re la tion ships in the tradi tional strategy-
ple answers to this question. What emerges operations- tactics trinity. However, rather
from an exami na tion of the devel op ment of than view ing it as a sim ple hi er ar chi cal frame-
the idea of strateg ic bombing in the British work, Beyer chen sees it—at least in the con-
con text is a com plex web of com pet ing ex pla­ text of the pro cess of mili tary in no va tion and
nat ions. Yet, when the many strands are un­ revo lu tion—as a trian gu lar rela tion ship. In
rave lled, the pattern that remains is of a dis­ this re la tion ship, each com po nent has the po­
junc tion be tween the ory and doc trine. In that ten tial to af fect the other two. Moreo ver, Bey­
sense, then, one might reasonab ly suggest er chen proposes two addit ional ways of con­
that this was a case of a revo lu tion gone awry. sid er ing the process of military inno va tion
This ar ti cle fo cuses on the means by which and revolu tion. Although these are based on
the RAF sought to advance its revol ut iona ry the tradit ional distinc tion among strategy,
ideas re gard ing stra te gic bomb ing. It en deav­ op era tions, and tactics, they may prove more
ors to con sider the com plex in ter re la tion ship use ful in reveal ing the essence that under lies
of forces and factors that led the RAF to pur­ the pro-cess of inno va tion or revolu tion. The
sue its particul ar approach to strate gic air- first of these sets out the trian gu lar rela tion­
power. Prior to delving into this, however, ship among context, proced ures, and equip­
one must set out a framework for this analy­ ment. The second altern at ive entails estab­
sis. Without one, the overwhelm ing number lish ing the rela tion ship among technol ogic al
of factors to consider would make the task change, opera tional change, and techni cal
very nearly impos si ble. change.7
RAF STRATEGIC BOMBING DOCTRINE 41
The remain der of this arti cle emphas izes them selves—hence, the devel op ment of the
the first of these trian gu lar representa­ pur suit role for aircraft.
tions—namely, that among context, proce­ The next devel op ment involved employ­
dures, and equipment. In other words, it seeks ing aircraft as ground-support weapons. In
to ex am ine the con text within which the RAF this role, aircraft either oper ated directly
at tempted to develop its revolu tion ary ideas against troops or slightly to the rear, at tack ing
about stra te gic air power, doc trinal con sid era­ sup ply dumps and com mu ni ca tions fa cili ties.
tions, and, although only fleetingly, equip­ It was a short step from this—what is now
ment as pects. It is about the the ory and de vel­ termed close air support—to taking up
op ment of an “idea” of war. It is an at tempt to longer- range operat ions, attack ing targets far
con sider how those people respon si ble for from the loca tion of the fighting at the front.
the RAF as a collect ive profes sional body—the These op era tions that were di rected fur ther to
Air Staff—sought to prepare for a future war, the rear constit uted the first attempts at “stra­
for, in es sence, the stra te gic bomb ing pun dits te gic” operat ions. Both Germany and Britain
were pushing the notion that the advent of ex peri mented with this use of airpower, but,
air power constit uted an RMA. in strictly op era tional terms, nei ther achieved
Early strateg ic theoriz ing in the RAF drew a great deal of success.8
heavi ly on the limited expe ri ence of “strate­ This situa tion changed when Ger many un­
gic” bomb ing in the First World War. That ex­ der took raids on the United Kingdom, first
pe ri ence profoundly influ enced much of with zeppel ins and then with Gothas. With
what followed in the two decades leading up this, Germany brought the war directly to
to the Second World War. One must note, Lon don and the southeast. Up to then, with
how ever, that many of the conclu sions re ­ the war taking place across the English Chan­
gard ing the potent ial future use of airpower nel, the British public had not been directly
were derived from a cursory exami na tion of threat ened with physical harm. In politi cal
the his tori cal rec ord. In that sense, then, ana­ terms, the Ger man air raids against the Brit ish
lysts flouted the Clausewitz ian dictum re­ Isles produced a seri ous crisis of confi dence
gard ing the search for first prin ci ples through that threatened to under mine the ability of
rigo ro us histori cal exami na tion and critical Brit ain to carry on with the war effort. The
analy sis to deter mine cause and effect. Al­ pub lic be came alarmed and out raged, and the
though it is not nec es sary to delve deeply into gov ern ment reacted with panic. The prevail­
the details of aerial opera tions during the ing feeling in politi cal circles was that if the
First World War, one must re view some of the Ger man raids con tin ued un abated, the Brit ish
im por tant de vel op ments that emerged as the will to continue the war would crumble.
air weapon began to make its presence felt. Hence, steps were taken to cope with the
At the out break of the Great War, ex pec ta­ threat posed by German aerial raiders.9
tions of what aircraft might contrib ute re­ Again, tell ing this story in great de tail is not
mained modest. The general consen sus was nec es sary. In the first instance—the zeppe lin
that aircraft could best serve as obser va tion raids—air defense measures had some limited
plat forms, but be yond that, peo ple ex pected suc cess in dealing with the lumber ing giants.
lit tle of them. With the emerging stalemate Then with the appear ance of the fixed-wing
of trench warfare, the airplane began to Gotha bombers, the situa tion de te rio rated. In
show itself as a weapon of great poten tial. par ticu lar, two raids on London—the first on
When it became obvi ous that aerial recon­ 13 June 1917 and the second on 7 July
nais sance was invalu able for artil lery spot­ 1917—stand out as impor tant landmarks.
ting, and thus danger ous to troops on the Both raids re vealed the short com ings of ex ist­
ground, each side be gan to search for ways to ing defens ive measures. The British had too
drive off the enemy’s obser va tion aircraft. few anti air craft guns and fighters, and the or­
They did this first through ground fire and gani za tion of the warn ing sys tem left much to
then by mounting machine guns on aircraft be desired. As Sir Charles Webster and Noble
42 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1998
Frankland noted, “These raids and the subse­ stra te gic bombing, he cast about for alter na­
quent . . . attacks of the autumn did much to tives. This search was coloured by one major
de ter mine the future of the British Air Serv­ gov ern ment pol icy de signed to di rect de fense
ice.”10 A politi cal hue and cry resulted, sub­ pol icy in the postwar period—the much vili­
ject ing the air serv ices to in tense scru tiny and fied Ten-Year Rule,11 which stated, “It should
criti cism. People branded the air defense be assumed for framing revised esti mates,
meas ures as inef fi cient and inef fec tive, and that the British Empire will not be engaged in
ques tioned the overall direc tion of the air any great war during the next ten years, and
war. One must recall that at this juncture, the that no Expe di tion ary Force is required for
Cabin et and the High Command had en- this purpose.”12
gaged in a running battle with Sir Douglas Und oubte dly, the object of the Ten-Year
Haig over the course of events on the western Rule was financ ial. At a time of auster ity, but
front. While politi cians called for better de­ also at a time when the respon si bili ties of the
fenses at home, Haig and his air advi sor Maj de fense services had taken on even greater
Gen Hugh Tren chard, com mander in chief of scope, the govern ment had to find a formula
the Royal Fly ing Corps, re sisted every re quest to govern the finan cial call that the defense
for the transfer of aircraft from the western serv ices could make on the budget. In the po­
front to the home front. Trenchard viewed liti cal atmos phere of the time, one in which
de fense as a misuse of aircraft, offense being the prevail ing senti ment was to get back to
their only proper role. Compro mise took the busi ness as usual, it was politi cally dan ger ous
form of the creation of the RAF. to adopt a policy that would sanction “high”
At the end of the war, the unbrid led hostil­ de fense spending. Against this backdrop,
ity of the two older serv ices and the equivo cal Trenc hard set out to find new roles for the
at ti tude of the govern ment towards the con- RAF, roles that would justify its contin ued ex-
tin ued indep ende nce of the RAF seemed cer­ is tence.
tain to assure that its exist ence as a separate Con scious of the need for finan cial re­
serv ice would be very short indeed. Despite straint, Trenchard astutely shaped a policy
this, Trenchard set out to protect the contin­ that did not run afoul of the limits imposed
ued inde pend ence of the RAF. Perhaps recog­ by the Ten-Year Rule. In fact, Trenchard
niz ing the diffi culty of ar gu ing for in de pend­ framed a policy that would yield the RAF new
ence on the basis of the impor tance of in de pend ent roles and save the governm ent
The Gotha—Imperial Germany’s strategic bomber. While the public was alarmed and outraged (by the zeppelin and
Gotha raids), the government reacted with panic. The prevailing feeling in political circles was that if the German raids
continued unabated, the British will to continue with the war would crumble.
RAF STRATEGIC BOMBING DOCTRINE 43
money. He out lined his views on the fu ture of Air control took on ever-increasing impor­
the RAF in a memoran dum of August 1919, tance as it became appare nt that army and
writ ing that “hostili ties ceased before the navy attacks on the inde pend ence of the RAF
evo lu tion of the indep ende nt Air Force had would not dimini sh over time. In air control,
reached a point which enabled sure deduc­ Tren chard saw the pos si bil ity of re duc ing the
tions to be drawn as to the value of indep end­ con sid er able cost of polic ing the empire and
ent aerial operat ions. . . . But there can be no the newly acquired Mandated Terri to ries,
doubt that we must be prepared for long dis­ thereby demon strat ing to the govern ment
tance aerial opera tions against an enemy’s the value of the RAF.
main source of supply and Naval ports.”13 It is im por tant to un der stand the na ture of
Such a statement contains little to which air- control operat ions, for in this sphere the
one can take except ion. In fact, had Tren­ RAF gained virtu ally all of its peacetime op­
chard and the RAF adhered to its spirit, per- era tional exper ie nce, and nearly all of the
haps they would not have lost sight of what later senior RAF offi cers served at one time or
should have been their central concern—the an other in areas where they gained some ex­
prepa ra tion of an effi cient and effec tive air pe ri ence with air- control op era tions. It would
force capa ble of under tak ing long-range aer­ be foolish to attempt to deny the initial im­
ial operat ions. Trenchard did pay lip service por tance of air-control operat ions, serving as
to this objec tive in a later memoran dum, they did to impress upon the govern ment the
publ ished as a command paper, in which he im por tance of maintain ing an inde pend ent
out lined the steps needed to create such a air force. However, one might legiti mately
force. Research and devel op ment in naviga­ ques tion the extent to which the opera tional
tion, wireless teleg ra phy, photog ra phy, and ex pe ri ence gained in this role in flu enced later
en gi neer ing, along with the foster ing of an con sid era tions of strateg ic theory and doc-
“air force spirit” were accorded special em­ trine. It would seem that people in posi tions
pha sis, as was the need for staff and training of respon si bil ity within the RAF and the Air
col leges.14 In the financ ially straitened cir­ Min is try lost sight of the fact that air-control
cum stances of the time, however, Trenchard op era tions were, in the first instance, an ad­
reco gn ized that such projects remained be­ min is tra tive tool in a bu reau cratic bat tle. Had
yond the mea gre means of the first few peace- they not lost sight of this fact, then the air-
time budgets. control ex peri ment would have re mained just
The long-term objec tive remained the that—an experi ment and an expe di ent. In-
crea tion of an air force capa ble of under tak­ stead, the ex pe ri ence gained in air- control op­
ing in de pend ent stra te gic op era tions, but the era tions would unduly influ ence the theory
need of the moment called for blunting the and doctrine of strate gic bombing in the
at tacks of the army and navy. Trenchard larger sense.
chose to employ the instru ments of air con­ Air control contrib uted markedly to the
trol or impe rial polic ing. Malcolm Smith has dif fi cult and expen sive task of polici ng the
at trib uted the incep tion of the scheme for emp ire.17 Moreo ver, it did so at a re duced cost
“air con trol” to Win ston Chur chill, who gave to the gov ern ment, which in it self was im por­
back ing to the idea at the Cairo Con fer ence in tant. Be that as it may, the opera tional ex pe ri­
March 1921, but the idea itself had been ence gained in air control was never likely to
mooted much earlier, in Trenchard’s memo pro vide much in the way of guidance to the
of 14 August 1919.15 The memo stated that larger and more central question of how to
“since the Ar mi stice . . . events in the near East de velop the aerial weapon for service against
and India have tended to show that against a a first-class power in any future war. Air con­
semi-c ivilized enemy unpro vided with air- trol was carried out in what can only be de-
craft, aer ial op era tions alone may have such a scribed as an arti fi cial envir onm ent, one that
de ter rent effect as to be practi cally deci­ would hardly exem plify the envi ron ment
sive.”16 that would confront the RAF in operat ions
44 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1998
An RAF Hawker Fury, one of the later models used in imperial policing. Since the Armistice, events in the near East and
India tended to show that against a semicivilized enemy unprovided with aircraft, aerial operations alone may have such
a deterrent effect as to be practically decisive.
de vel op ment and the limited time available
against a ma jor en emy. As Mal colm Smith has in an operat ional squadron.
com mented, “the suc cess of Air Con trol lay in It is im por tant to un der stand the evo lu tion
the fact that retalia tion [against the British] of the Air Staff’s theory, given that belief in
was virtu ally impos si ble.”18 the offens ive power of the bomber provided
This very fact should have limited the ex- the ration ale—at least in the collect ive mind
tent to which lessons were drawn regardi ng of the Air Staff—for the indep ende nce of the
the effi cacy of bombing. Bombing recal ci­ RAF. This becomes all the more vital in light
trant tribesmen who could mount no effec­ of the fun da men tal im pact that no tions of air-
tive oppos it ion was one thing, but it should power had on the overall approach to British
have been obvi ous that under tak ing bomb­ se cu rity policy throughout the inter war pe­
ing opera tions against an enemy capa ble of riod. Recent histori cal research has revealed
mount ing some form of defense—ei ther pas­ the extent to which the bomber cast a long
sive or active—would be a completely differ­ shadow over conside rat ions of British secu­
ent thing. Over time, this essen tial differ ence rity and foreign policy.19 What remains to be
be came blurred, first as the RAF began to re- con sid ered is the ex tent to which this fear was
arm in the early 1930s and then in the later self- generated. If one can argue that the Air
1930s as it un der took the ar du ous task of pre- Staff contrib uted to the process whereby ex­
par ing Bomber Com mand for its role as a stra­ ag ger ated fears of the bomber served to un­
teg ic force. One should not take this as a sug­ duly influ ence British secu rity policy
ges tion that air-control opera tions were through out the inter war period, then the Air
com pletely devoid of value to the RAF, for Staff must bear consid er able respons ib ili ty
that is not the case. Air-control mis sions pro­ for the conse quences of its actions.
vided a valuable oppor tu nity to acquire op­ Pur su ing this line of in quiry is dif fi cult for
era tional expe ri ence during peacetime. Fur­ a number of rea sons. In the first place, it is not
ther more, they allowed for experi men ta tion really pos si ble to speak of a uni form the ory of
with equipment and methods of bombing, air power to which the Air Staff sub scribed for
de spite the meagre budget for research and most of the period in question. Rather, the
RAF STRATEGIC BOMBING DOCTRINE 45
the ory of the strateg ic offens ive in Britain pect of contem po rary culture as nuclear
evolved over time. The entire British ap­ weapo nry was to become later.”21
proach was, to an extent, reflected in the A final factor to consider is that devel op­
think ing of Hugh Trenchard while he was ment of the theory of the strateg ic offens ive
chief of the Air Staff from 1919 to 1929, and co in cided with the RAF’s early suc cesses in air
af ter his re tire ment when he con tin ued to ex­
ert a power ful public and private influe nce.
Tren chard’s thinking evolved to such an ex- The development of theory of the
tent that he soon became a Cassan dra for the strategic offensive coincided with
overw helmi ng power of the bomber. Unlike
the RAF’s early successes in air
Giu lio Douhet, however, Trenchard did not
control throughout the empire.
out line his theories of airpower in a single
These operations were taken by the
vol ume; further more, he altered them sub­
Air Staff as a vindication of its
stant ially over time. His claims regard ing the
confidence in the overwhelming
power of the bomber grew ever more ex treme
bec ause he had to press constantly for the power of the bomber.
right of the RAF to exist in the face of attacks
by the Admi ralty and War Office on the air
for ce’s inde pend ence.
An other factor compli cat ing any discus­
sion of the Air Staff’s theory of the strateg ic con trol throughout the empire. These op era­
off ens ive is the extent to which unoff ic ial tions were taken by the Air Staff as a vindic a­
ideas concern ing aerial warfare began to tion of its confi dence in the overwhelmi ng
com pete with the “offic ial” theory. In part, power of the bomber. This, coupled with the
the rise of nonmili tary ideas stemmed from staff’s in ter pre ta tions and analy sis of the con­
the fact that during the early years of the in­ tri bu tion of airpower during the Great War,
ter war period, the Air Staff remained busily made the future seem clear—at least to the Air
en gaged in its intern eci ne bureau cratic bat ­ Staff. Airpower, particu larly strateg ic offen­
tles. Con se quently, it had lit tle time to de vote sive airpower, held the key. Defense against
to the task of devel op ing a doctrine of strate­ this new and poten tially devas tat ing weapon
gic air power. Even so, non serv ice com men ta­ seemed impos si ble; thus, the only appar ent
tors would undoubte dly have pressed their re course entailed rely ing upon the coun ter of-
own views concerni ng the devel op ment of fen sive potent ial of the bomber.
air power, for it had ap par ently al tered the en- In retro spect, these analyses were flawed.
tire basis of British secu rity policy. The no­ They failed to take account of the total ity of
tion that Britain was vulner able—that it was the brief ex pe ri ence of air power in the Brit ish
no longer an island—had a profound impact con text. Airpower advoc ates chose to focus
on the Brit ish peo ple. Barry Pow ers wrote that only on those aspects that sustained their
“this cliche repre sented a gener al ised view- views. The inabil ity or unwill ing ness to sub­
point; in this case that Eng land’s de fen sive se­ ject their notions regard ing airpower to the
cu rity was lost with the devel op ment of the kind of seri ous scrutiny suggested by Clause­
air plane and that England existed thereaf ter witz was a major shortcom ing that plagued
in grave jeopardy. This funda men tal shift in the Air Staff’s ef forts. The role of stra te gic air-
Eng land from confi dence to inse cu rity about power during the Great War was marginal,
its defens ive posi tion was of major conse­ and air-control operat ions, although provid­
quence during the inter war years.”20 Such a ing a valuable oppor tu nity to gain opera­
view point pervaded British soci ety. Malcolm tional flying exper ie nce, resulted in a false
Smith has com mented that “the idea of aer ial un der stand ing of the require ments for car ry­
bom bard ment was almost as haunting an as­ ing out a strateg ic offen sive.