DTIC ADA529795: Transformational Leaders and Doctrine in an Age of Peace: Searching for a Tamer Billy Mitchell

16 Pages·0.74 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

Transformational
Leaders and Doctrine
in an Age of Peace
Searching for a Tamer Billy Mitchell*
MAJ WILLIAM C. RYNECKI, USAFR
T
HIS ARTI CLE IS about three inter war nomic, politi cal, and tech no logi cal change in

trans for ma tional American military the devel oped world. During that “age of

lead ers: Maj Gen John A. Leje une, peace,” these men indi vidu ally and collec-

Ma rine Corps comman dant; Adm tively saved, changed, and cre ated mili tary in-

Wil liam A. Moffett; and William “Billy” sti tu tions and fundam ent ally rede fined the

Mitchell. This 20-year inter lude between the air doctrine of the US Marine Corps, Navy,

world wars marked a time of great so cial, eco- and Army Air Corps.1 The doc trinal seeds were

*I would like to thank Maj John Reese for his invaluable guidance on Adm William A. Moffett, Mr. Budd Jones for allowing me to
change course relatively late in the academic year and giving me great sources and encouragement to carry on, and Captain Tomislav of
the Croation Air Force for his invaluable technical assistance.
22
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1998 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1998 to 00-00-1998
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Transformational Leaders and Doctrine in an Age of Peace. Searching for
5b. GRANT NUMBER
a Tamer Billy Mitchell
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6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
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Air and Space Power Journal,155 N. Twining Street,Maxwell REPORT NUMBER
AFB,AL,36112-6026
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Upon the fields of friendly strife are sown the seeds that, upon other fields, on
other days will bear the fruits of victory.
—Douglas MacArthur
planted in response to the force-on- force car­ trine and organi za tion did not manifest itself
nage of World War I, the ideas germin ated in in combat effec tive ness or insti tu tional rec ­
the rough growing season of the inter war pe­ og ni tion un til af ter all three were long re tired
riod, and the blooming of doctrine during or deceased.
World War II with its actual employ ment on Duri ng the 1920s, General Leje une led the
the battle fields and oceans of the world. Ma rine Corps through the insti tu tional
These men are still impor tant and rele vant equiva lent of winter ing at Valley Forge. He
to day be cause they in flu enced two im por tant fos tered a climate in which the Marine Corps
ar eas. The first area is doctrine—how their re de fined itself to adopt amphibi ous assault
serv ice should best go about do ing its mis sion and maneu ver warfare doctrine, ulti mately
when defend ing the United States. The sec­ sav ing the corps. Admi ral Moffett walked
ond area is their influ ence on organi za tion, softly but carried a big insti tu tional stick in
train ing, allo ca tion of resources, force struc­ mas ter ing the Washingt on politi cal scene as
ture, and personn el. These issues are very head of the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronau tics—a
much a part of the “jointness” debate, par­ venue that allowed him a secure in sti tu tional
ticu larly the doctrinal debate within the Air fo rum to champion the airplane’s role in
Force today. revo lu tion iz ing naval warfare. And, finally,
The funda men tal question this arti cle at- Gen eral Mitchell campaigned relent lessly to
tempts to an swer is, In times of great change, heighten what he consid ered to be insti tu­
how do success ful transform at ional military tional neglect of airpow er’s potent ial in war-
lead ers guide or attempt to guide their ser­ fare. He argued vehe mently for an inde pend­
vices through these peri ods? To answer this ent air force to effec tively manage this new
ques tion as the Air Force turns 50 and pre- di men sion in military technolo gy. But, like
pares for a new century, the arti cle follows many of histo ry’s forward thinkers, Mitchell
these three extraor di nary leaders from their did not live to see his dream real ized.
early years during the inter war period, exam­ The journey with these remark able men
ines their doctrinal legacy, and parlays their be gins with John Archer Leje une. Of the
ex pe ri ence into lessons learned. three, Leje une is the most revered of the trio
While not as famous (or infa mous) as due to his lasting impact on the daily life of
some “great captains” in military history, the corps, includ ing the empha sis on extem­
John Archer Leje une, William Moffett, and po ra ne ous speaking by its offi cers, the estab­
Billy Mitchell compare favora bly with histo­ lish ment of the first profess ional military
ry’s great contribu tors to military theory and jour nal (the Mar ine Corps Gazette), and the
doc trine. They were contem po rar ies and ini tia tion of the tradit ion of formally cele­
made their mark by influ enc ing future serv­ brat ing the corps’s birthday on 10 Novem ber
ice organi za tion and doctrine during their any where in the world where two or more
lifet ime. Also, their influ ence on service doc­ mar ines gather.
23
24 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1998
serv ices but told the persis tent cadet, “You
have too many brains to be lost in the Marine
Corps.”4
Early assign ments took Leje une to the
west ern United States, the Carib bean and
Cuba during the Spanish-American War,
and Mex ico at the be gin ning of the Mexi can
Revo lu tion. Several years later, he im­
pressed many by his perform ance at Army
War College. At the time, he was one of the
few ma rines to at tend sen ior serv ice school.
In the final analysis the size of the Marine Corps From 1915 to 1917, Leje une served as assis­
will be determined by the American people. We tant to the comman dant, where he learned
must consider, therefore, how we can retain and if
the intri ca cies of Washing ton politi cal life.
possible increase the affection and esteem in which
Prior to US in volve ment in World War I, Le­
the Marine Corps is now held by the American
je une commanded the Overseas Depot at
people.
Quan tico.5
—John A. Lejeune Briga dier General Leje une arrived in
France in June 1918 and quickly made an im­
“Some where in their history,” writes pact. The American Expe di tion ary Force
Tom Clancy, “the members of the [Marine] (AEF) commander, Gen John Pershing, re­
Corps seem to have gotten a reputa tion for sisted attempts by the Marine Corps leader-
be ing simple-minded jarheads,” when in ship, includ ing Leje une, to employ the corps
fact they “have been among the most inno­ in an am phibi ous role in the Bal tic or Adri atic
va tive of the world’s military forces.”2 The Sea. Pershing argued that “our land forces
man most respon si ble for initi at ing that must be homo ge ne ous in every respect” and
doc trinal in no va tion and sus tain ing a meas­ ad vised against their use as a separate divi-
ure of intel lec tual rigor in the service was sion.6 Leje une’s reputa tion among the AEF
Gen eral Leje une, the 13th comman dant of sen ior staff, many of whom he knew from
the Marine Corps. Army War College, was impec ca ble. In
Al though Leje une grew up poor in Europe, Le je une com manded the Army’s 64th
post–Civil War Louisi ana, he retained In fan try Brigade and the 4th Marine Brigade
happy childhood memories of gather ing be fore earning his second star and assumi ng
honey and hunting small game with his comm and of the 2d Marine In fan try Di vi sion
dad. In 1881 Leje une became a military ca­ on 28 July 1918.7 Even though he would later
det at Louisi ana State Univer sity. Three serve nine years as Marine Corps comman­
years later, he entered the US Naval Acad­ dant, Leje une conside red this the pinna cle of
emy, Class of 1888. Follow ing graduation, his military career. The 2d Divi sion con­
his man da tory cruise, and an other set of rig- ducted sustained ground opera tions with dis­
or ous exams, Leje une found that he “nur ­ tinc tion in France. Unlike Pershing’s style of
tured a grow ing dis like for life at sea and the in timi dat ing subor di nates, Leje une chose to
Navy in particu lar.” 3 So he fought hard, lead by gaining the “loyalty and devo tion of
show ing shrewd politi cal skills that he his men.”8 From the Armis tice to the middle
would employ throughout his career, to se­ of 1919, Lejeu ne’s divis ion occu pied an area
cure a commis sion in the Marine Corps. around the bridgehead at Coblenz on the
This was a career deci sion newly opened to Rhine. He returned from Europe later that
his year group, but it was highly un usual by year. After meeting with President Woodrow
Navy standards. Leje une person ally made Wil son and the man he would soon re place as
his case to the Bureau of Naviga tion chief, Ma rine Corps comman dant, Maj Gen George
who ulti mately allowed Leje une to transfer Bar nett, Leje une returned to Virginia and
TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERS 25
assumed command of the new Marine train­
ing center at Quantico.9
It is said that success ful military offi cers,
in addi tion to being extremely capa ble,
have mentors who help them along. In
Leje une’s case, his rela tion ship to Sec re tary
of the Navy Jose phus Dan iels was key. Dan­
iels had admired Leje une’s straightfor ward
and profes sional style when Leje une served
as assis tant to the comman dant from
1914–17. In addi tion, Leje une had an im­
Naval aviation’s striking power, versatility, and
pres sive war record, a great mind, and the
mobility are essential for controlling the seas and
lead er ship skills neces sary to run the corps.
littoral areas while defending the fleet and other
Dan iels had never supported General Bar-
friendly forces in assigned operating areas against
nett as comman dant. In fact, Barnett had
all enemy threats.
got ten the job over Daniels’s objec tions. In
the summer of 1920, when it appeared that —AU-16, Employment of Navy and Marine Forces
a Repub li can would capture the White
House, Dan iels ousted Bar nett and re placed Like Leje une, William Moffett grew up in
him with Leje une, whom the Democrats the South and graduated from the Naval
sup ported. Acad emy when Capt Alfred Thayer Mahan
Le je une’s change of command was as un­ was still on the faculty. Fol low ing gradua tion
cere mo nio us as it was brief. Before noon on in 1892, Moffett followed the typical career
30 June 1920, Leje une reported to Barnett’s path of mostly sea duty inter rupted with the
off ice. Barnett asked him why he failed to in- oc ca sional shore assign ment. He made a
form him of Daniels’s plot. Leje une replied name for himself in this “Battle ship Navy”
that his hands were tied. Barnett ordered when he first be came aware of the po ten tial of
Leje une to stand at atten tion in front of his na val aviation for fleet defense as com man­
desk. The outgoi ng comman dant charged his dant of the Great Lakes Na val Train ing Cen ter
sub or di nate with disloy alty, unpro fes sional for naval avia tors and mechan ics. At Great
con duct, and being a false friend. At twelve Lakes, Moff ett earned a reputa tion as a bril­
o’clock, Barnett ordered an aide-de-c amp to liant admin is tra tor during the naval aviation
rem ove one star from his (Barnett’s shoul­ buildup for World War I. He became good
ders) and marched out of the office without friends with chewing-gum magnate William
so much as a handshake with Leje une.10 Wrig ley Jr. and aviation trainee Joseph Pulit­
Af ter Warren Harding’s election in No­ zer, editor of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Both
vem ber, the Sen ate set aside Le je une’s con fir- would later help Moffett keep his job as head
ma tion until the new president took office. of the Bureau of Aeronau tics. By early 1918,
On 4 March 1921, Leje une, still unsure of his some two thousand aviation students were in
fu ture, headed to the Capitol to attend train ing.12
Harding’s swearing-in ceremony. As the Af ter the war, Moffett gained a key as­
crowds gathered, Navy Secretary-designate signment as commander of the battle ship
Ed win Denby approached Leje une. Denby Mis sis sippi. While skip per of the Mis sis sippi, he
came right to the point: “General Lejeu ne, wit nessed the bat tle ship Texas oper at ing with
would you serve as Comman dant of the Ma­ “flying- off platforms” that enabled small air-
rine Corps during my admini stra tion?”11 craft to be flown off the ship. But the wheeled
Mean while, across town at the Navy Depart­ planes could not recover on the platforms,
ment, Adm Wil liam Mof fett was pre par ing to hav ing to either land ashore or ditch along-
take over as head of the newly created Bureau side the ship after completi ng their missions.
of Aeronau tics. Not to be out done, Mof fett had his men build
26 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1998
flying- off platforms on his ship. The Miss is­ made an impas sioned speech on the Senate
sippi op er ated with a pair of Sopwith Camels floor support ing the bureau. In mid-July,
while in Guantánamo, Cuba.13 The dual ex pe­ both houses passed the bill, and President
ri ence at the Great Lakes Na val Train ing Cen­ Harding signed the law that created and es­
ter and the aircraft tests off the battle ship in- tab lished in the De part ment of the Navy a Bu­
spired Moffett, who was slowly becom ing a reau of Aeronaut ics headed by a chief and ap­
na val airpower enthu si ast. pointed by the president for a four-year term.
In early 1919, Lt Comdr Jerome Hunsaker Af ter Harding appointed Moffett to his first
re turned from Europe aboard the same ship term, Presi dents Cal vin Coo lidge and Her bert
as Army general and airpower advo cate Billy Hoo ver reap pointed him.16
Mitchell. Hun saker warned his su pe ri ors that Mof fett real ized relatively late the signifi­
Mitchell meant business. In early April that cance of airpower in both its offen sive role
year, Mitchell appeared before the Navy’s and as a weapon for fleet defense. In fact,
Gen eral Board and testi fied that warships many his to ri ans ar gue that Billy Mitchell was
could not effec tively de fend them selves from re spon si ble for making Moffett and the Navy
air attack and that land-based aircraft could what Mitchell’s biog ra pher Alfred Hurley
de fend the nation’s coastlines out as far as calls be ing “air con scious.” No mat ter the real
one hundred miles.14 That claim rankled the rea son for his conver sion, Moffett, armed
stodgy naval leader ship. But more alarming with his newfound authority, was more than
to naval aviators were Mitchell’s calls that ready for the bat tle with Mitchell to de cide in­
“they [the Navy] and their air planes . . . be in­ sti tu tional control over this emerging tech­
cor po rated into an indep ende nt air force.”15 nol ogy.
For Mof fett, Mitchell’s as ser tions rep re sented
an insti tu tional slap in the face regard ing the
Navy’s insti tu tional preroga tives to defend
the fleet with its organic, land-based air arm
and the evolving aircraft carrier.
Af ter he relin quished command of the
Missis sippi in Decemb er 1920, Moffett was
se lected by Adm Robert Coontz, chief of na­
val operat ions, to be direct or of naval avia­
tion. The job carried little admin is tra tive A man might be a flyer and still be an egregious ass.
author ity as part of the all- powerful Bu reau of In fact, I think there have recently been some
Navi ga tion. That soon changed. Mitchell’s instances of that kind.
calls for a separate air arm, combined with —Sen. Miles Poindexter
con gres sional will to focus on the devel op­
ment of military aviation, brought the issue Mitchell, born in France in 1879, came into
front and cen ter in Washing ton. The new a world of some com fort. His grand fa ther was
Harding admin is tra tion sup ported con gres­ a self-made million aire and his father a
sional efforts to estab lish a “central ized Bu­ United States sena tor—cir cum stances
reau of Aeronau tics in the Navy Depart­ Mitchell would later call a “fair founda tion”
ment.” Edwin Denby, the new secre tary of upon which he built his aviation career.17
the Navy, con sid ered the bu reau a vi tal ne ces­ Search ing for an active life, Mitchell found
sity. By April 1921, Moffett, who came into his niche in the Army during the Spanish-
the job somewhat ambiva lent about air- American War and gained a commis sion in
power, was soon a true believer in naval avia­ the First Wiscons in Volun teer Signal Com­
tion and testi fied before Congress in support pany in the Signal Corps, the Army branch
of the separate bureau. An oppo nent of that would soon oversee the evolving air-
Mitchell, Sen. Miles Poindex ter (R-Wash.) plane. Unlike Moffett and Leje une, who
TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERS 27
General Mitchell’s bombing tests. Many historians argue that Billy Mitchell was responsible for making [Admiral] Moffett
and the Navy “air conscious.”
earned their commiss ions at the prestig ious the British to be vastly supe rior.”19 The im­
and rigoro us Naval Academy, Mitchell ob ­ pres sion able Major Mitchell flattered Maj
tained his com mis sion with rela tive ease. “In- Gen Hugh Trenchard, commander of the
flu ence,” he once wrote, “cuts a larger figure Royal Flying Corps in France, into reveali ng
in this war than merit.”18 So from his earlie st his views on the role of the air weapon of the
exp er ie nces, born into a fam ily of wealth and prese nt and of the future. Mitchell even took
re ceiv ing a commis sion through influ ence, on some of Trenchard’s blunt persona li ty
one can trace the roots of Mitchell’s procliv­ traits.
ity for get ting his way and hav ing a lack of re­ Alf red Hurley writes that the British gen­
spect for insti tu tional preroga tives. eral believed intensely, and influ enced
Mitchell earned his wings at his own ex­ Mitchell’s belief, in the air offens ive and that
pense in early 1917. But it soon paid divi­ comm and of the air over the battle field was
dends. Either through merit, extraord in ary pos si ble only through “relent less and inces­
luck, or his family’s politi cal influe nce, the sant of fen sive.”20Other early theo rists also in-
War Depart ment sent him to Europe as an flu enced Mitchell. Giu lio Douhet and Basil H.
aero nau ti cal observer. He arrived in France Lid dell Hart claimed strateg ic airpower was
just two weeks before the United States de­ “the only so lu tion to the grisly in de ci sive ness
clared war on Germany. During the war, of ground war fare.”21 Af ter the Royal Air Force
Mitchell commanded an Army engi neer regi­ (RAF) was created in 1918, Winston Chur­
ment in General Lejeu ne’s 2d Divi sion and chill, minis ter for war and air, declared that
headed the Army Air Serv ice in France. He was “the first duty of the RAF is to garri son the
less inter ested in regular Army command of Brit ish Empire.” 22 The RAF was initially cre­
troops, focus ing instead on learning more ated to hold down costs of maintain ing or der
about the applic at ion of airpower in war. He in the British Empire, although another prin­
also became somewhat of an Anglo phile. “In ci pal employ ment doctrine the RAF devel­
ques tions ranging from their grooming of oped between the wars stressed inde pend ent
horses to their worldview, Mitchell believed air opera tions against the enemy’s mate rial
28 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1998
and moral resources. Heavily influe nced by The hu man suf fer ing and physi cal dev as ta­
Trenc hard, Douhet, Liddell Hart, and by RAF tion person ally witnessed by Mitchell and Le­
op era tions during the war and after, Mitchell je une in Europe, and watched closely by Mof­
be gan to form ideas on how air power ap plied fett at Great Lakes, im pacted them as much, if
to defend ing the United States. not more, than the European politi cal and
Mitchell drew many of his ideas from Tren­ mili tary leaders who had so badly miscal cu­
chard, espec ially the fundam ent al conclus ion lated. The three men were deter mined that if
that airpower was primari ly an instrum ent for an other world war came, their service would
of fen sive, not defen sive, employ ment. not repeat such carnage. Therefore, the theo­
Mitchell em braced Tren chard’s con cepts on air retic al approach to war and ways to incor po­
sup rema cy and demons trated them as chief of rate emerging land and air tech nol ogy had to
the Air Service, 1st Brigade. By the time of the be explored. The climate for seri ously ex plor­
Saint- Mihiel offens ive of Septem ber 1918, ing these is sues ex isted in the in ter war pe riod
Mitchell was chief of the Air Serv ice, First Army, due to the rare conver gence of disast er and
Americ an Exped it iona ry Force.23 tech nol ogy—a conver gence that would pro­
Duri ng the war and shortly af ter, four fun­ foundly impact Marine Corps amphibi ous
da men tal points (while not de fined as such at doc trine as well as Army and naval aviation
the time) became clear in Mitchell’s mind doc trine.
and would guide his zealous advo cacy in the It seemed like a good idea to the Euro­
years to come. First and second, he was con­ pean powers when they jumped naked into
vinced the airplane repre sented a military the “briar patch” in 1914. But the human
techn olo gy revolu tion which would, in turn, and mate rial costs of the war were stagger­
prompt a revo lu tion in mili tary af fairs. Third, ing. Con sid er ing all those killed or
this new tech nol ogy must be used of fen sively wounded in action and civil ian deaths re­
to gain command of the air. And finally, an sult ing from disease, famine, priva tion, and
in de pend ent air force would be neces sary to war time birth defects—the final casu alty list
con soli date the revolu tions and theory into for the war and beyond might have been as
sound employ ment doctrine. Armed with much as 60 million people. Some econo -
this reve la tion, Mitchell re turned home from mists have cal cu lated the war cost the world
the war like an evangel ist who had seen the econ omy $260 billion, which “repre sented
light and was more than ready to preach the about six- and- a- half times the sum of all the
faith to the igno rant. na tional debt accu mu lated in the world
from the end of the eighteenth century up
Mitchell kept his briga dier gen eral rank af­
to the eve of the First World War.”24 The re­
ter the war. But regard less of Mitchell’s suc­
ver bera tions of that war were felt most
cess, the War Depart ment consid ered him a
strongly in Europe, where lead ers pledged it
loose cannon and placed him under the su­
would never hap pen again. The war had also
per vi sion of a nonflyer, Maj Gen Charles Me-
pro foundly changed America. The nation
no her, the new direct or of the Air Service.
was now a reluc tant world power.
Disaster and Technology: The For some, the Great War repre sented a
chasm between the simple nineteenth-century
Roots of Doctrine after the
world of their youth and the indus tri al ized
Great War post war “Roar ing Twen ties” Amer ica. Writ ers
like Willa Cather and F. Scott Fitzgerald la­
This war has marked us for generations. It has left mented the loss of their uncom pli cated
its imprint upon our souls. All those inflamed world. Cather expressed that feeling best in
nights of Verdun we shall rediscover one day in the her Pulitzer-prize- winning novel One of Ours,
eyes of our children. about Nebras kan farm boy Claude Wheeler.
“The army, the war, and France,” she wrote,
—Artillery Lieutenant de Mazenod “com bined to give Claude the youth he had
TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERS 29
never had.” When he had had it, he might
die. In deed, Willa Cather in sists it was best he
should. When he is killed in the fall of 1918,
it was “believ ing his own country is better
than it is, and France better than any country
can ever be. These beliefs would have per­
ished had he seen the postwar world.”25 Post-
war America was a place of extraor di nary so­
cial, economic, and technol ogic al change. It
was “an age of peace.”
Billy Mitchell hardly la mented the pass ing
of the stuffy nineteenth century. He cele­
brated the new age of high tech nol ogy and all
of its possi bili ties. Mitchell was a real ist who
be lieved the war to end all wars did not live
up to its name and that the so-called peace
trea ties that ended it did not herald a return
to world peace. His expe ri ence in the war
con vinced him that in the next world war,
which was inevit ab le, airpower would pre-
vent the 1914–18 carnage from reoc cur ring.
“Dur ing the 1920s, the most sensa tional
epi sodes in Ameri can avia tion were
Mitchell’s demon stra tion in 1921 of how
bomb ers could sink bat tle ships and Char les In short, the Air Force needs a tamer Billy Mitchell.
Lind bergh’s flight across the Atlan tic in
May 1927.”26 In discuss ing Billy Mitchell’s
plan new strategies and move into new weap­
im pact during the volatile postwar era, his-
ons devel op ment, espec ially after limits on
to rian Michael Sherry asked, “How could
capi tal ship devel op ment were agreed to by
individu al ism persist in the wake of mass
the world naval powers particip ati ng in the
war and in the midst of mass culture?”27 In
Wash ing ton Na val Con fer ence, which his ad-
gen eral, he says, the American public came
mini stra tion had spon sored. Harding be came
to accept the bomber as an instru ment of
a strong advo cate of airpower and was in­
war fare due in part to the hero ics of
trigued by Mitchell’s ideas.30 Al ready the line
Mitchell and Lindbergh. Although the con­
was being drawn all over the world between
cept of fu ture aer ial war was purely ab stract
the two schools of thought on the issue of
for most Americans, they felt a sense of se­
capi tal ships. Mitchell’s vi sion of na tional de­
cu rity in airpower, and their attrac tion to it
fense deep ened the line, and his drive to dem­
deep ened during the 1920s.28 ons trate that the battle ship was a weapon of
“Al most from the begin ning,” writes Isaac the past was cal cu lated to bring the con flict to
Don Levine, another Mitchell biog ra pher, a head.31
“Mitchell’s struggle for air power took on the Mitchell’s pub lic cam paign for
char ac ter of a chal lenge to sea power . . . es pe­ government- sponsored bombing tests on
cially the battle ship.”29 Here lies the crux of Navy battles hips finally paid dividends in
the insti tu tional battles for control of early 1921. The New York Times editor ia li zed
whether the Army and Navy would maintain that the nation could not afford to ignore
sepa rate air arms or whether airpower would Mitchell’s claims.32 Mitchell won this battle
be controlled by an indep ende nt air force. with the Navy but would lose the ensu ing
Presi dent Harding en cour aged the mili tary to bu reau cratic war. In ad di tion, Mitchell’s de-
30 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1998
mands for bomb ing tests woke up the Navy to the third front was Billy Mitchell. Mitchell ar­
the sig nifi cance of aviation—to what Al­ gued that the airplane and the airship
fred Hurley calls the Navy’s “aviation con­ brought an entirely new dimen sion to war-
scious ness.” In pursu ing this new con­ fare and that aviation alone could fight and
scious ness, the Navy had the clear win the nation’s wars. He believed that long-
range bombers had such enormous destruc­
tive capac ity that neither navies or armies
Mitchell’s battles with Moffett and could re sist it. Mitchell be lieved strongly that
the Navy and his public airpower to fully real ize airpow er’s military potent ial,
advocacy eventually led the Army to it was neces sary to have a separate air force
“sup plied with the most up-to-d ate equip ­
successfully marginalize his
ment, flown by trained air personn el, and led
influence within the institution by
by of fi cers who were un en cum bered by ties to
trying him for insubordination.
ei ther the Army or the Navy.”36
Dur ing the tumul tu ous 1920s, Moffett
deftly choreo graphed the growing airpower
de bate in the Navy’s favor by simult an eo usly
ad van tage in institutional and bureau­ suc cor ing his naval aviation colleagues,
cratic infra struc ture to suc cess fully battle sooth ing the admi rals who were battle ship
Mitchell. In July 1921, Con gress author ized cur mudg eons, and bureau crati cally outma­
the Bureau of Aeronau tics to be headed by neu ver ing Billy Mitchell.
Ad mi ral Moffett, who proved to b e a There was no profess ional love lost be-
shrewder campaigner than Mitchell and tween Moffett and Mitchell. Their most pub­
one of his most formi da ble antago nists.33 lic confron ta tion came during the Washing-
While the airplane fasci nated Mitchell and ton Naval Confere nce when they both served
most Ameri cans, it height ened Navy aware­ on a special subcom mit tee to consider the
ness to the im pli ca tions of airpower to fleet quan ti ta tive and quali ta tive limi ta tions of air-
de fense and caused huge fissures within craft. As Moffett recalled, “When Mitchell
the Navy bureauc racy. Moffett’s biog ra­ breezed in with a secre tary, all ready to take
pher, William Trimble, argues that as chief the chair, I in quired by what author ity he pre-
of the Bu reau of Aero nau tics, Mof fett’s con­ tended to assume the chairman ship. He
sid er able po liti cal skills en abled him to suc­ mum bled something about rank. ‘Since
cess fully wage a three-front campaign to when,’ I de manded, ‘does a one- star briga dier
make Washing ton more conscious of naval rate a two-star admir al?’ That stopped him.”37
air.34 To keep him out of more mischief, Mitchell
He had first to confront some of the was whisked off to Europe on an inspec tion
lower- ranking true believ ers like Henry tour of military aviation facili ties. Maj Gen
Mustin and Kenneth Whiting, both naval Ma son Patrick repre sented Army aviation for
avia tors and “ardent con verts to avia tion and the balance of the confere nce.38
un swerv ing in their certainty that the air-
plane would revolu tion ize naval warfare.”35
Some of them advo cated establ ishi ng a sepa­ The Doctrine Articulated
rate aviation corps within the Navy, which
Mof fett opposed. He felt separat ion would The history of warfare is the history of doctrine. . .
pre vent the full inte gra tion of aviation into . We have a doctrine for landing on beaches, a
the fleet. Then there were the “battle ship ad­ doctrine for bombing, a doctrine for AirLand
mi rals” who scorned naval aviation and ran Battle. . . . What is missing . . . is a doctrine for
the all- powerful Bu reau of Navi ga tion, which information.
had a vir tual stran gle hold on per son nel se lec­
tion, assign ment, and promo tion. Fi nally, on —Paul Strassmann