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Air University Recovers from Vietnam and Regains Respect WESLEY PHILLIP S NEWTON AND J EROME A. ENNELS B Y THE END of World War II, Army Air March 1946, these leaders, most of whom Forces lead ers re al ized that their de ci- were ACTS graduates, estab lished Air Univer sion to close the Air Corps Tactic al sity (AU) to fill the void left by the Tacti cal School (ACTS), while deemed neces- School’s inac ti va tion and to correct many of sary, had been short sighted. As a re sult, on 12 the problems and defi cien cies of the prewar This article is based on a paper presented on 11 April 1997 at the annual meeting of the Society for Military History in Montgomery, Alabama. Themes in the paper and article are from the authors’ The Wisdom of Eagles: A History of Maxwell Air Force Base (Montgomery, Ala.: Black Belt Press, 1997). 60 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1997 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1997 to 00-00-1997 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Air University Recovers from Vietnam and Regains Respect 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Air and Space Power Journal,155 N. Twining St,Maxwell REPORT NUMBER AFB,AL,36112-6026 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 9 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 AIR UNIVERSITY RECOVERS FROM VIETNAM 61 mili tary educa tion system. Like the Tactic al poses and five student dormi to ries. A School be fore it, AU’s pri mary mis sion was to per ma nent home for the library was the cen- educ ate Air Force offi cers in the strategies, tac tics, and techniques of airpower employ ment and to serve as a sounding board for At the outset, General Fairchild ideas concerni ng the critical role of airpower found a problem with the students, in future wars. As Maj Gen Muir S. Fairchild, many of whom had difficulty with the first AU com mander, so elo quently put it, Air Univer sity was created to produce air - writing. power planners and leaders who would “de- sign an Air Force so ade quate it need never be used.”1 This arti cle exam ines AU’s attempt to ac ter piece for this “Academic Circle,” later com plish this mission and evaluates the im named Chennault Circle. In time, the Air pact of the cold war, particu larly the lessons Force Histori cal Research Center would join learned from the Vietnam conflict, on those the li brary—both fa cili ties con sid ered the fin ef forts. Although the study covers AU in gen est of their kind in the military.2 eral, it fo cuses on the AU pro fes sional mili tary A much longer- lasting set of prob lems con edu ca tion (PME) program and the way that cerned the na ture and qual ity of stu dents and AU schools drifted away from their primary fac ul ties of the PME schools. It also had to do mis sions of educat ion in the profes sion of with what was taught. arms and assumed an unof fi cial role of pro Ini tially and for a number of years, all stu vid ing in struc tion in high- level pol icy and de dents and faculty members at Air War ci sion making. The re sult was a de cline in the College (AWC) and Air Command and Staff qual ity and rele vance of the AU PME pro gram School (ACSS) were military. The first two and the loss of academic prestige among fel classes were composed of and taught by men low Depart ment of Defense and sister-service with fine war records. The instruc tors PME schools. This artic le contends that a per properly focused on an air arm’s main busi sis tent struggle to regain respect in the PME ness—air warfare— emp has izi ng lessons fresh arena through major curricul um overhauls, from World War II. But within the United in no va tive faculty acqui si tion methods, and States Air Force, born in 1947, the lesson of a new student-selection proce dures eventua lly stra te gic of fen sive against a highly in dus tri al re turned AU to its pre vi ous status as one of the ized socie ty became all too perva sive and re pre mier mili tary edu ca tion in sti tu tions in the mained influ en tial far too long. world. Lt Gen Alvan C. Gillem II, USAF, Retired, Air Univer sity was launched at Maxwell who was in the second class of ACSS, identi Field, Alabama, with well-deserved praise for fied a problem with the facul ties. When he its founders and mostly reason able expres was there in 1947–48, they were men of stat sions of opti mism for its future. But for the ure but gener ally in ex pe ri enced in univers ity first decade of its exist ence, AU lacked ade teach ing meth ods. When he re turned in 1954 quate facili ties, equipment, and billet ing for as assis tant comman dant of ACSS, the facul its students. Indeed, the AU library was scat ties were “better qualified from the stand- tered among nine differ ent buildings. point of teaching techniques” but did not All this was under stand able, given dif fi cult pos sess “quite the stature of the original post war economic condi tions and the prior group.”3 Finding and retain ing able faculty ity assigned to operat ional concerns with the be came increas ingly diffi cult. ad vent of the cold war in 1947. By the mid- At the outset, General Fairchild found a 1950s, the inadeq uac ies began to be over- probl em with the students, many of whom come with the comple tion of five new build had diffi culty with writing. Compared to ings for admin is tra tive and academic pur their colleagues in the Navy and the Army 62 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1997 Once upon a time—the AWC building as it was. For the first decade of its existence, AU lacked ade quate facilities, equip ment, and billeting for its students. ground forces, few air offi cers had col lege de war. President Harry S. Truman consid ered grees. Therefore, AU had to offer some re me- this a clear case of a military commander dial work until the Air Force Reserve Offi cer mak ing an unau thor ized and impoli tic pub Train ing Corps and the creation of the Air lic statement. Conse quently, Air Force chief Force Acad emy in the 1960s over came this de of staff Hoyt Vandenb erg suspended Ander fic iency.4 son from his post; Anders on retired soon AU headquar ters estab lished crite ria early there- after.7 on for the quality of offi cers desired from the In 1950 the Korean conflict produced or vari ous com mands. But the com mands’ head gan iza tional chaos at AU—specifi cally, the quar ters began to evade requests for offi cers sus pen sion of AWC, Air Univer si ty’s crown they wished to retain by substit uti ng names jewel. This action constit uted Headquar ters of less qualified and valued offi cers.5 US AF’s lesser response to strong feelings in From the begin ning, AU was charged “to the op era tional com mands that AU should be study Air Force respon si bili ties for national closed and its person nel and students as- se cu rity and to develop recom men da tions as signed to Korean War duty. Air Command to long-range Air Force objec tives,” with and Staff College (ACSC, formerly ACSS) be- AWC students to address these matters in came an inter me di ate headquar ters—a sort of their theses. By 1956, however, AWC no catch all—un der AU headquar ters for various longer ex pected its stu dents to do so. This loss other organi za tions in the AU orbit. New or of expec ta tion could only dim some of AU’s gani za tions, such as Air Force ROTC head lus ter.6 quar ters, were assigned to AU, taxing its abil The 1950s saw even bumpier air for AU. In ity to absorb them. 1950 Maj Gen Orvil Ander son, the first AWC This Korean-era cri sis was gradu ally sorted com man dant, advo cated before a Mont out after hostili ties ended in 1953. A positive gomery civic club that the United States drop re sult was the move of the junior-officer PME A- bombs on the Soviet Union in a preven tive school from Tyn dall AFB, Flor ida, to Max well AIR UNIVERSITY RECOVERS FROM VIETNAM 63 AFB. Restruc tured and soon renamed Squad ron Offi cer School (SOS), it joined the other PME schools at Maxwell.8 The reputa tion of the AU PME schools de te rio rated in the 1960s. Head quar ters USAF fi nally attempted cor rec tive ac tion in 1968, in- form ing all commands that to retain any of fi cer requested for the PME classes, a com mand had to present an accept able excuse to Head quar ters USAF.9 The year 1964 marked the be gin ning of the di rect in volve ment of the United States in another major hot war stemming from the cold war—Viet nam. This produced no organ iza tional chaos at Maxwell, but the number of stu dents attend ing the PME schools dropped sig nifi cantly. The AU commander most seri ously con- fronted by the cresting of anti war senti ment dur ing his ten ure was Gen eral Gil lem, vet eran of more tranquil tours at AU. His most press ing concerns included declin ing AFROTC enroll ments and pro test ral lies con ducted by anti war students, faculty, and outsid ers on many campuses. Directed against AFROTC de tach ments, these rallies were often disrup tive and sometimes violent. Lt Gen Alvan C. Gillem II, USAF, Retired, who was in the Gloom lessened slightly in 1970–71 with a second class of ACSS, identified a problem with the dec line of anti war activit ies against AFROTC. faculties. When he was there in 1947–48, they were men But enroll ment in the General Military of stature but generally inexperienced in university teaching methods. When he returned in 1954 as assistant Course remained low and would not recover commandant of ACSS, the faculties were “better qualified for over a decade. General Gillem visited from the standpoint of teaching techniques” but did not mainly black campuses such as Grambling possess “quite the stature of the original group.” State Univer sity to seek more black students for AFROTC. 1949–50. Women had gained token presence His actions were moti vated both by the in the 1960s, for the most part in SOS. But by need for new detach ments and by social the end of the Vietnam conflict, minori ties change. The late 1960s had seen intens if ic a had made little further progress in student tion of social ferment in the United States, bod ies or fac ul ties of the two upper- level PME some of it influ enced by the reac tion to Viet schools. Only social and offi cial pressures nam. The ferment was reflected in a new over the next two decades would bring real course in the 1970–71 AWC curricu lum—Im change. pact of Social and Cultural Changes on The classes for 1971–72 reached pre- United States National Secur ity. Minori ties Vietnam levels, and overt hostili ty against ex erted pressure to allow their particip at ion AFROTC contin ued to decline. Earlier, in in areas of socie ty previ ously closed or barely 1970, Headquart ers USAF had directed AU to open to them. un der take project Corona Harvest, designed Col Benja min O. Davis Jr. had begun the to extract lessons from the conflict in South- rac ial inte gra tion of AWC with the class of east Asia. The project soon began produci ng 64 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1997 armed forces as a whole, one found bitter feel ings and scapegoat ing. Accu sa tions spread that the civil ian leader ship in Wash ing ton had tied the armed forces’ hands; that the media had wrongly portrayed them; and that the anti war movement, led by activi sts such as Jane Fonda, had betrayed them. Pro pon ents of this argu ment maintained that these things had produced defeat. At Max- well, the debate had a natural platform soon af ter the war. Several retired Army, Air Force, and Navy flag offi cers—all veter ans of Viet nam—talked to PME students about politi cal mis man age ment, unfair media image, and be trayal. At tempts to charact eri ze the early student re ac tion to this perspect ive have produced dif fer ing interp ret at ions. Earl H. Tilford Jr., an Air Force major who edited the Air Univer sity Review and later became a civil ian fac ulty mem ber at ACSC, contended that most stu dents accepted the “stabbed-in- the- back” the sis into the early 1980s. But an analysis of AU’s reac tion to Vietnam by Air Force major Su zanne Budd Gheri in 1985 found that be- cause Vietnam veter ans attend ing the senior PME schools were not in volved in ma jor tac ti When General Furlong was AU commander, he did suffer cal deci sions, they were more reali st ic about one stunning setback. . . . Over his objections, cause and effect.12 Headquarters USAF terminated AU’s status as a MAJCOM, placing it under Air Training Command (ATC). The Gheri study traced the PME schools’ A grim-faced Furlong turned over the AU command flag to at ten tion to Vietnam in their curric ula over the ATC commander in a ceremony of symbolic an 11-year span. From 1974 until 1979, Viet vassalage. nam found its way into the curricu lum only at AWC—and in a limited way at that. Then the other schools followed suit. The higher num ero us studies. Corona Harvest, however, the level, the more profound the exami na dis ap pointed General Gillem, who felt it had tion of Vietnam. been watered down. Like the Vietnam con In creas ingly, the schools added hours and flict, which was winding down, it was soon depth. Up through the mid-1980s, as the phased out.10 1985 study il lus trated, all schools made a se ri Viet nam’s mate rial impact on AU ebbed. ous attempt to exam ine causes and effects. The psycho logi cal and educa tional impact While not totally disavowi ng the stabbed-in- was an other mat ter. Af ter North Viet nam’s tri the- back thesis, they focused more and more umph, all US armed forces were in a state of at ten tion on military mistakes, suggesti ng shock. Accord ing to Dr. Richard P. Hallion, that “American military partici pa tion in low- the Air Force histor ian, a “restrospec tive lick level con flict may be un avoid able [and] it will ing of wounds” ensued.11 most likely be executed within stringent po In the long resto ra tion, a debate—some liti cal constraints.”13 times ugly—raged about the “whys” and im Til ford observed that by the late 1980s, pli ca tions of defeat. Initially, within the stu dents were willing to exam ine the Air For- AIR UNIVERSITY RECOVERS FROM VIETNAM 65 ce’s own respon si bili ties for defeat in Viet nam. The colonels at AWC led this open- mindedness.14 Strate gies and weap ons such as the bomber and the atomic bomb, although success ful in World War II, weighted down Air Force plan ning and performa nce. “As a result,” wrote Hal lion, the United States “essent ially dis es tab lished its tacti cal air forces between 1945 and 1950. . . . One might have expected that Ko rea would have restored a measure of ra tion al ity to postwar defense thinking, but, alas, it did not,” for Ko rea “gen er ally was con sid ered the ‘e xce ption’ to the an tici patednor mat ive war of the future— atomic conflict.”15 Air power scholar Dr. Stephen L. McFar land, in a one-volume history of the United States Air Force to be published by the Office of Air Force History, describes how an inap pro pri ate strategy from World War II re mained in place at the beginn ing of US in volve ment in Viet nam. The fo cus was “al most ex clu sively on the strate gic bombing of choke points without regard to the soci ety to be bombed or the type of war to be fought.”16 McFar land, who spent a year at AWC as a vis it ing profes sor, credited the success ful use When Secretary of the Air Force Verne Orr asked him how of precision-guided missiles and “smart” he felt about returning AU to MAJCOM status, Cleveland, bombs in Vietnam with sparking “a revi sion despite knowing that Headquarters USAF did not favor of the tradit ional doctrine of strateg ic bom such a change, replied affirmatively. bard ment.” The most signifi cant lesson learned by the Air Force, accord ing to McFar the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why, was land, was awareness of “the dangers of allow publ ished by Air Univer sity Press in 1991. ing ad her ence to doc trine to cloud its mili tary The author, Dr. Earl Tilford, a veteran of strat egy.”17 South east Asia, was a faculty member at A dec ade af ter the end of the Viet nam con ACSC, as mentioned earlier. flict, two major books appeared that were Both books caused consid er able grum highly criti cal of the Air For ce’s role in South- bling by people who still adhered to the east Asia. Per haps sur pris ingly, nei ther author stabbed- in- the- back thesis. Yet, one finds no was an indep ende nt scholar with a leftist, clearer symbol of the Air Force’s—as well as paci fist, or an anti–Air Force orient at ion. The AU’s—re cov ery from Vietnam than the fact Lim its of Air Power: The American Bombing of that these books emerged from the Air For ce’s North Vietnam was published in 1989 by Free own ranks and that their authors were or be- Press, which often publishes conser va tive came part of the AU family.18 authors. The author, Lt Col Mark Clod fel ter, a The debate is not over. In 1996 Dr. John serv ing Air Force offi cer who holds a PhD, a Schlight authored A War Too Long: The His tory few years later joined the faculty of a new or of the USAF in Southeast Asia for the Office of gani za tion at AU—the School of Ad vanced Air- Air Force History. In its intro duc tion, power Stud ies. The sec ond book, Setup: What Schlight writes, “Due to question able politi- 66 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1997 cal policies and decision-making, only spo tics explained avoidance of the one and pref radic and relatively ineff ect ive use had been er ence for the other. Spe cifi cally, AWC gradu made of air pow er’s abil ity to bring great force ates had a higher passover rate, even in the to bear quickly and deci sively.”19 pri mary zone. National War College gradu One cannot make a simple analysis of the ates, however, had a higher selec tion rate, even below the zone. Change at AU had to come about through In an analysis of the military plan ning on the scene. But in the inter est of services’ war colleges in 1987, Dr. ob jec tiv ity, commande rs who had most or all of their schooling elsewhere could best carry Williamson Murray—a historian at out reform. Three such command ers led AU Ohio State and formerly a research succ ess ively. associate at AWC—characterized Lt Gen Ray mond B. Fur long as sumed com AWC “as one of the weakest of the mand of AU in 1975. He knew in ad vance that war colleges.” the PME schools’ curric ula placed too much stress on national policy making and mana ge rial and super vi sory aspects of the role of com mand—and too little on how to fight an rel at ions hip between the afterm ath of the US air war. He had re ceived ap proval from Head de feat in Vietnam and the reform of the cur quar ters USAF to “bring up the war in the Air ric ula, facul ties, and student bodies of AU’s War College. We are going to study our busi PME schools dur ing that pe riod. But one must ness.”21 Furlong quickly perceived that the con sider the re la tion ship a part of the pro cess new AWC command ant, Maj Gen Stanley M. of resto ra tion that all the armed forces pain- Um stead Jr., was of like mind and therefore fully under went. ideal as the point man in imple ment ing re- It is no coin ci dence that reform began in forms. ear nest in 1974 with a sympo sium of major Um stead took several far-reaching steps. comm and (MAJCOM) vice command ers at He initi ated the applic at ion of comput ers to Max well, called by Lt Gen F. Michael Rogers, war gaming, paving the way for a complex the last AU commander who was a veteran of World War II. The objec tive of the sympo gam ing exer cise designed to address tacti cal sium was to ex am ine the qual ity and fu ture of and strateg ic issues in NATO. Further, when the PME schools. Fur long turned his atten tion to overhauli ng Al though the confere es reaf firmed their the AWC cur ricu lum to re em pha size the busi com mands’ sup port for the PME schools, they ness of war, Umstead showed him a letter he made one ominous admis sion: while offi had solic ited from Dr. I. B. Holley Jr., air- cially the Air Force held that ACSC and AWC power histor ian at Duke Univer sity and then were equal to the senior PME schools of the a colo nel in the Air Force Re serve, which con other services, Air Force offi cers conside red tained advice on how to revise the curricu at ten dance at the Na tional War Col lege or the lum. Furlong later credited Holley “with be In dus trial College of the Armed Forces as ing enormously respon si ble for what more benefi cial to their careers. Graduates of hap pened in the Air War College.”22 the Army War Col lege and Na val War Col lege Fur long declared that Umstead had also had higher promo tion rates than AWC “rais[ed] the quality of the faculty.”23 Noting gradu ates.20 that the AWC faculty had a number of senior It was up to AU itself to change the com colo nels with their best years behind them, mands’ practice of sending less favored offi Um stead worked with the Air Staff to cull the cers to Maxwell—de spite the 1968 de dead wood and obtain compe tent replace cree—and favored offi cers to schools such as ments. He began a program of invit ing civil the National War College. Promo tion statis ian profes sors to spend a year in residence at AIR UNIVERSITY RECOVERS FROM VIETNAM 67 AWC and encoura ged the hiring of more and the Air Force’s main business was the estab bet ter qualified full-time civil ian faculty. lish ment of a real-world war-gaming center Moreo ver, the AWC comman dant did not with the most advanced technolo gy avail- ig nore the qual ity of the stu dents. He felt that able. Another was the estab lish ment of the re duc ing the size of classes would at tract qual Cen ter for Aero space Doc trine, Re search, and ity stu dents. Fur long gave him the green light. Edu ca tion (CADRE), whose mission was to They worked with the Air Staff to insure that fos ter think ing about air power in the mod ern AWC be gan to re ceive its fair share of the best world through research, publi ca tions, com of fi cers available. Furlong also wanted rated put er ized war gaming, and the exami na tion off i cers, reason ing that AU should educate peo ple who were most likely to see action in fu ture air wars. Headquar ters USAF finally al Events in the 1990s have shown the lowed 64 percent of a class to be rated. By the uncertainty of commanding respect. time Umstead left for an assign ment in the In 1994 AU again lost its MAJCOM Pen ta gon in 1977, Fur long could soon see evi status when it was placed under Air dence of the gradually increas ing quality among both faculty and students. Education and Training Command. The AU commander did suffer one stun ning setback, however. Over his objec tions, Head quar ters USAF termin ated AU’s status as a MAJCOM, placing it under Air Training Comm and (ATC). In 1978 a grim-faced Fur- of doctrine and theory. In 1983, when Secre long turned over the AU command flag to the tary of the Air Force Verne Orr asked him how ATC commander in a ceremony of symbolic he felt about return ing AU to MAJCOM vas sal age. status, Cleveland, despite knowing that Gene ral Fur long came to re al ize that, of all Head quar ters USAF did not favor such a AU students, those at ACSC voiced the most change, replied affirmat ively. Shortly there critic ism of their curricu lum. Conse quently, af ter, the AU command flag was re turned to a in his last year as AU commander, 1978–79, proud General Cleveland.26 the spotlight finally began to shift at ACSC to In an analysis of the military services’ war the Air Force’s main business.24 col leges in 1987, Dr. William son Murray—a Lieu ten ant General Umstead returned to his to rian at Ohio State and formerly a re- Maxw ell in 1979, replac ing General Furlong. search assoc ia te at AWC—charac ter ized AWC The new commander found that reforms he “as one of the weakest of the war colleges.” had initi ated, such as computer war gaming This was true, he claimed, despite “substan and the AWC curricul um area known as Mili tial ef forts to up grade it [in the] late 1970s. . . . tary Employ ment, had matured in his ab Max well saw a sig nifi cant in crease in the time sence. Expand ing the program of noted visit spent address ing war, strategy, and op era ing profes sors, he also increased the number tional art. But the reform ers eventu ally left of civil ians on the AWC faculty. Umstead Maxw ell.” 27 averted a move to close SOS, result ing from In 1987 the House Armed Services Com charges that it placed too much empha sis on mit tee’s Panel on Mili tary Edu ca tion, chaired ath let ics and that it was a waste of jun ior of fi by Cong. Ike Skelton (D-Mo.), exam ined the cers’ time; the general directed that its cur na tion’s PME school systems. It concluded ricu lum be overhauled.25 that the US system was equal to foreign sys Like his two immed ia te predeces sors, Lt tems but needed to improve “jointness,” em Gen Char les G. Cleve land, who re placed Um pha size stra te gic think ing, and en hance over- stead in 1981, had not attended any of the AU all quality. Several years later, the congress- PME schools in residence. Among his most man found that improve ments had been suc cess ful projects designed to reem pha size made. Un doubt edly due to the ef forts of Gen- 68 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1997 er als Furlong, Umstead, and Cleveland, as Com mand. Another event, however, had an well as his own panel’s recom men da tions, ame lio rat ing effect on this loss. Just as ACTS Skel ton found that at AU genera lly—and its trans ferred from Langley Field, Virginia, to facu lt ies particu larly—“the cream has finally Max well Field in 1931, so did the Air Force risen to the top.”28 Doc trine Cen ter trans fer from Lang ley AFB to By the end of the 1980s, AU’s PME schools Max well AFB in 1997. Even though this new- were also re ceiv ing their fair share of stu dents comer re ports di rectly to Head quar ters USAF, who rep re sented the cream of the crop. Grati it will use AWC and ACSC students as sound fyi ngly, promot ion rates for both faculty and ing boards for its devel op ing ideas.30 Thus oc stu dents exceeded 90 percent.29 curred a recog ni tion of the historic roles of But events in the 1990s have shown the un both the Air Corps Tac ti cal School and its suc cer tainty of com mand ing re spect. In 1994 AU ces sor, Air Univer sity, in educat ing future again lost its MAJCOM status when it was lead ers and in devel op ing funda men tal doc- placed under Air Educa tion and Training trine. Notes 1. “Welcoming Address by Maj. Gen. Muir S. Fairchild: 12. Earl H. Tilford Jr., interviewed by Wesley Phillips Commanding General Congratulates Students at Air War College Newton, 6 January 1997; and Maj Suzanne Budd Gehri, USAF, and Air Command & Staff School on Selection,” The Post, 13 “Study War Once More: Teaching Vietnam at Air University” September 1946, 2. (paper presented at the Southeast Conference on Asian Studies at 2. For a general treatment of these events, see Jerome A. Duke University, 19 January 1985). Ennels and Wesley Phillips Newton, The Wisdom of Eagles: A 13. Gehri. History of Maxwell Air Force Base (Montgomery, Ala.: Black Belt 14. Tilford interview. Press, 1997). 15. Hallion, 14–15. 3. Lt Gen Alvan C. Gillem II, USAF, Retired, interviewed by 16. Stephen L. McFarland, A History of the United States Air Wesley Phillips Newton, 15 November 1993, 4 April 1994, and 28 Force (forthcoming). May 1996. 17. Ibid. 18. Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American 4. Kenneth Schaffel, “Muir S. Fairchild: Philosopher of Air Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1989); and Earl Power,” Aerospace Historian, September 1986, 169–70. H. Tilford Jr., Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why 5. Gillem interviews, 4 April 1994 and 28 May 1996. (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1991). 6. Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of 19. John Schlight, A War Too Long: The History of the USAF in Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907–1964 (Maxwell Southeast Asia, 1961–1975 (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History AFB, Ala.: Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, 1971), and Museums Program, 1996), introductory statement. 725–26. 20. “Talking Paper on Vice Commanders,” PME Symposium, 7. Montgomery Advertiser, 1 September 1950 and 1 January 25–26 September 1974, and “Proceedings of the Vice Com 1951; Alabama Journal, 31 August and 1–2 September 1950; and manders,” PME Symposium, 25–26 September 1974, AU History Washington Post, 7 October 1950. Office, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 8. Marvin I. Cohen and Richard H. Jackson, “History of the 21. Lt Gen Raymond B. Furlong, USAF, Retired, transcript of Air Command and Staff College, 1946–1966,” Study no. 18 oral history interview by Hugh N. Ahmann, 1980– 81, Air Force (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AU History Office, 1966), 1–3; Robert W. Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Ala. Schmidt, “History of the Air War College, 1946–1966,” Study no. 22. Ibid. 17 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AU History Office, 1966), 11–12; 23. Ibid. “Operation New Home” (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AU History Office, 24. Ibid. 1955); and Jerome A. Ennels, “A Short History of Air University” 25. Lt Gen Stanley M. Umstead Jr., USAF, Retired, transcript (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AU History Office, 1996), 10–12. The of oral history interview by Capt Mark C. Cleary, 1983, AFHRA; standard account of the USAF in Korea is Robert F. Futrell’s The and Lt Gen Stanley M. Umstead Jr., interviewed by Wesley Phillips Newton, 21 February 1996. United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953 (New York: Duell, 26. Lt Gen Charles G. Cleveland, USAF, Retired, interviewed Sloan and Pierce, 1961). by Wesley Phillips Newton, 27 October 1993 and 27 February 9. Gillem interviews, 4 April 1994 and 28 May 1996. 1996. 10. Gillem interview, 28 May 1996; History, AFROTC, vol. 1, 27. Williamson Murray, “Grading the War Colleges,” The 1 July 1970–30 June 1971, 1–7; History, Air University, vol. 5, 1 National Interest, Winter 1986–1987, supplement on July 1970–30 June 1971, 1– 41; History, Squadron Officer School, “Education,” 12 February 1987; and Jerome A. Ennels, vol. 1, 1 July 1970–30 June 1971, 1–4; History, Air University, vol. “Evolution of Air War College Curriculum, 1946–1947” 1, 1 July 1970–30 June 1971, 1–13, 21–22, 31–32, 40–41; and (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AU History Office, 2 February 1988), 1–20. History, Air University, vol. 1, 1 July 1971–30 June 1972, 1–7, 28. Ennels, “A Short History of Air University,” 21. 19–22, 24–25, 30, 83– 84, 101. 29. Ibid., 20–21. 11. Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf 30. Frank Mastin Jr., “New Center Officer Answers to War(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 83. Pentagon,” Montgomery Advertiser, 18 January 1997, 1B.