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Russia’s Military Aviation Industry Strategy for Survival MAJ DAVID R. JOHNSON, USAF A T THE 1996 Farnboro ugh Air Show, zero. The same is true of orders from former Sukh oy’s SU-37 astounded intern a Wars aw Pact nations. Because RFAF pur tional observe rs with maneuv erability chases have nearly ceased, product ion lines prev io usly unseen in a combat air- have gone idle, and workers are laid off or craft. The thrust-vect ori ng SU-27 vari unp aid. A related problem, which may have ant stole show headlines with flight greater long-term impact than the closure of demo ns trat ions widely described in the avia some product ion lines, is a steady decline in 1 tion press as “spectacul ar.” One air show re- the number of new scient ists and engin eers porter opined that the SU-37 shows that the beg inn ing work in the military–ind ust rial Russ ian aviation indust ry “is still alive.” Suk comp lex. The trend points toward a future hoy’s new aircraft is convinci ng reaff irmat ion shorta ge of trained speciali sts in the of the world-class and, in some areas, unique science-i ntensive aviation indust ry. cap ab ilit ies of Russia’s military aviation indus It appeared during the first several years try. However, though still “alive,” Russia’s milit ary aviation indust ry is struggling for sur aft er the Soviet collapse that the governm ent vival. had no cohere nt policy on how to reform The situation is serio us enough that a and preserve the military aviation indust ry. comm itt ee of the Russian legisl at ure exam- The evidence now suggests that Russia’s fed ini ng the problem in 1995 concluded that eral governm ent and senior military leader- the aviation indust ry could collapse by the ship are not blind to the problems of the turn of the century if energ etic action to re- military-i ndustrial complex as a whole and verse current trends were not taken.2 The have outlined a policy for preservi ng its main source of the indust ry’s problems is high-t ech compon ents through the coun easy to find: orders from the Russian Federa try’s economic crisis. Because of its high- tion Air Force (RFAF) are down to almost tech orient at ion and its import ance to na- 45 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1997 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1997 to 00-00-1997 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Russia’s Military Aviation Industry. Strategy for Survival 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Air and Space Power Journal,155 N. Twining Street,Maxwell REPORT NUMBER AFB,AL,36112-6026 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 13 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 46 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1997 The policy pertin ent to the military aviat ion indust ry has two key elements. The first is an appare nt decis ion for the RFAF to forgo near-term aircraft and weap ons acqui si tion so that suffic ient funding can be channeled to aircraft and weapon- development projects to keep advanced- technology capab ilit ies alive. The second is to continue aggress ively marketi ng ad vanced aircraft and aviation-production cap ab ilit ies abroad and to use profits from fore ign sales to sustain advanced aircraft- development projects and product ion ca pab ilit ies. The result will be increased com pe ti tion on the world military avia tion market, the appeara nce of Russian ad vanced fourth- and so-called fourth-a nd-o ne-h alf-g eneration aircraft around the world, despite their not having ent ered service in the RFAF, and the prolif erat ion of aviation-production technol ogy. The Russian Federation Air Force: Wishes and Reality A Stalin-era aviation poster showing a Red Square pa The SU-37 shows that in some quarters rade. Aviation was a top prior ity of the Soviet Union. the creativi ty of Russia’s aircraft designe rs is The poster caption reads “Long Live the Mighty Aviation of the Sociali st Countries!” tional secur ity, aviation is given priori ty cons ide rat ion in the new policy. The emerging government-military policy on the military aviation indust ry and its scientific-t echnical base is part of a develo p ing policy on the military-industrial com plex as a whole. The overall policy is aimed at slowing and reorie nting defense conver sion, clearly identif yi ng what elements of the military-industrial complex are neces sary to Russia’s national secur ity, and supporti ng high-tech dual-use indust ries which can be profitab ly sold abroad or can attract inv estment in the near term and can pro- vide the technic al base for a moderni zed The entrance to the test-pilot school at Gromov Flight milit ary once Russia has weathered its Res earch Instit ute. In 1995 Russia’s test-pilot school economic crisis. graduated only three new test pilots. RUSSIA'S MILITARY 47 una bated. Nevert hel ess, Russia’s military budget has been hard hit by the country’s econ omic crisis, and this has translated to sev ere reduct ions in aircraft orders. Conse quently, neither the SU-37 nor any other new aircraft will enter service in the RFAF in subs tant ial numbers in the foreseea ble fu ture. In 1995 the RFAF’s chief financ ial offi cer described the status of pay for aviation prod uct ion as catastrophic. Accordi ng to his figu res, the Minist ry of Defense (MOD) budget in recent years has supplied no more than 35 percent of requirem ents for pur chase of new weapons, research, design, and testi ng.3 This translated to the purchase of just 32 aircraft for the RFAF in 1994, and the 1995 budget provided for no new aircraft purc hases.4 By 1996 the RFAF leaders hip as The new MiG-AT. MiG has high hopes for domest ic and serted that the defense budget was meeting fore ign sales of its new trainer. (Photo by Artur Sarki syan.) only 30 percent of its actual budget require- ment.5 This low funding has forced the RFAF The Military Aviation to alloc ate its scant resources toward mini- Industry and Its mum operat ional requirem ents and bare Scientific-Technical Base surv ival, leaving little for purchase of replacem ent aircraft or develo pm ent of new The aviation indust ry’s extern ally driven airc raft types. The effect on the RFAF is ob probl ems are compounded by its own lack vio us, and the devast ati ng effect on Russia’s of purposef ul reform, which has left its de milit ary aviation indust ry is also increas velo pm ent, testing, and product ion complex ingly clear: design bureaus and product ion nearly as large and disjointed as it was in So fac ilit ies are largely idle, their employe es laid viet times, despite the steep decline in state off or unpaid. ord ers. An indiv idu al who had closely ob The RFAF’s curtailm ent of combat-aircraft served the Soviet aviation indust ry from purc hases has been forced by a lack of 1945 to 1991 and then had taken a five-year funds, not for lack of a requirem ents road sabb atic al would find the Russian aviation ind ust ry comfortab ly famili ar. Russia inher map. Gen Pyotr Deynek in, RFAF ited 85 percent of the Soviet Union’s avia commander-i n-c hief (CINC), has clearly out- tion indust ry. All the famili ar design lined force requirem ents for the next 10 to bur eaus, MiG, Sukhoy, Yakovl ev, Tupolev, 15 years. These include a new next- and Ilyushin continue, at least nominally, to generation fighter, a new frontal-aviation funct ion in Russia. The assoc ia ted engine- bomber, a new theater bomber, and substan and radar-design bureaus and compon ent tial transport acquis it ions. Deynek in and manuf act ures also remain in operat ion. All other RFAF senior offic ers have been equally told, the military compon ent of the aviation frank in admitt ing the financ ial problems ind ust ry comprises half the country’s vast which prevent timely enactm ent of the mod military-i ndustrial complex of sevent een erniz at ion and acquis it ion plan. The domino hund red indust rial enterp rises and research eff ect of the RFAF’s woes on the military ins tit utes and their 3 million employe es.7 In aviat ion indust ry is increasi ngly clear.6 Sov iet times, they were subord in ate to the 48 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1997 A SU-30MK. Sukhoy has enjoyed a major success with the sale of this aircraft to India. Future versions will include thrust-v ectoring engines. Mini st ry of Aviat ion and now answer to its tion, guidance and control systems, aeroe succ ess or, the Departm ent of Aviat ion in the last ici ty, gas dynami cs, aviation mater ia ls, Mini st ry of Defense Indust ry. dur ab ili ty, and testing methods.8 These are Russ ia probably inheri ted an even greater joined by a large cadre of instit utes engaged perc enta ge of former Soviet aviation test fa in advanced research that ultim ately contrib cilit ies and research instit utes since that utes to aviation develo pm ent. comp on ent of the indust ry was heavily con Though the aviation indust ry retained its cent rated in the Moscow and Lening rad mass ive size, aircraft orders have declined (Saint Petersb urg) regions. Certainly, the drast ic ally. In January of 1996, indust ry out- core group of State Scient ific Centers which put showed a 33.7 percent decline compared overs ee various aspects of develo pm ent and to January 1995 levels—the sharpest decline testi ng remained in Russia. The six insti for any sector of the military-industrial com tutes primari ly assoc ia ted with aircraft de plex. Eight months later, indust ry figures for velo pment are the Central August showed product ion at 61.8 percent Aeroh yd rod yn ami cs Instit ute (TsAGI), the of product ion in August 1995.9 Overall, avia Cent ral Instit ute of Aircraft Engine Building tion product ion in 1994–1995 showed a (TsIAM), the All-Russia Instit ute of Aviat ion 60–70 percent drop compared to output in Syst ems (GosNII AS), the Gromov Flight Re- the mid-1980s. The resulti ng situation at the search Instit ute (LII), the All-Russia Instit ute Komsomolsk-N a-A mur product ion plant, of Aviat ion Mater ia ls (VIAM), and the Sibe which produces Sukhoy fighters, was typical rian Aeronaut ic al Research Instit ute of the aviation indust ry throughout the (SibNA). They conduct fundam ent al research count ry.10 The plant’s three thousand air- in aerodyn ami cs, strength, flight dynami cs, craft workers suffered a six-month layoff in airc raft stabili ty and controll ab ili ty, naviga early 1995. Even workers engaged in the RUSSIA'S MILITARY 49 plant’s defense convers ion program produc gradua te classes of 11–13 test pilots on aver- ing color televis ions worked only part-time age. With design bureaus and product ion fa in the first half of 1995.11 cilit ies occup ied at a fraction of their The indust ry’s financ ial problems are cap aci ty, funding for test-pilot training has comp ounded by governm ent nonpaym ent dropped as well.13 As a result of the precipi for some of the few orders which are placed. tous decline of aviation product ion, the vol RFAF debt for unpaid 1994 orders amounted ume of work at scient ific and test facilit ies to 500 billion rubles (the 1996 exchange rate has been reduced to critically low lev was approxim ately 5,550 rubles to the dol els—one-t welfth of pre-1991 activi ty.14 lar). Intere st payments ate into the 1995 In addit ion to the aviation design bu RFAF budget and still the debt rose to 765 reaus, product ion plants, and five main test bill ion rubles by mid-1995. Not surprisi ngly, res earch facilit ies, hundreds more instit utes some enterp rises began to refuse to fill or eng age in fundam ent al, advanced, and ap ders under such condit ions. In 1995 the plied research contribu ti ng to the advance Perm Motor Company refused to fill further ment of aviation. These organiz at ions have ord ers from its biggest debtor, the MOD, for found themselves in even more serio us fi MiG-3 1 engines. The plant was forced to lay nanc ial diffic ult ies than have the core avia off one thousand employe es and go to a tion enterp rises.15 Work is at a near three-d ay work week.12 stands till, and pay was several months in ar The scientific-technical base of the avia rears by Octob er 1996 before large protests tion indust ry—its design bureaus, test facili forced governm ent action. Hunger strikes by ties, and research instit utes—has suffered as promin ent scient ists protesti ng pay arrears well. One telling sign of signific ant decline have further unders cored the problems in in their funding was the reported graduation Russ ia’s scient ific commun ity. of the 32d class of test pilots by the Gromov Flight Research Center’s test-pilot school in mid-1 995. The class comprised just three pilots. By comparis on, the school used to The SU-37. Sukhoy’s thrust-vectoring fighter created a sensat ion at its debut during the 1996 Farnboro ugh Air Show. 50 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1997 the aviation indust ry’s profess ional cadre will soon reach the end of its product ive life witho ut a cohort of young replacem ents. The Minist ry of Defense (MOD) The supply of new scient ists and engin eers budget in recent years has supplied needs to adjust to a shrinking aviation in no more than 35 percent of require dust ry. However, current trends seem more ments for purchase of new weap in line with collapse than contract ion. Fur therm ore, the qualitat ive question may ons, research, design, and testing. prove more severe than the quantit at ive one This translated to the purchase of as bright youths with initiat ive are forced just 32 aircraft for the RFAF in to choose between the relatively lucra 1994, and the 1995 budget provided tive business profes sions and life in Rus for no new aircraft purchases. sia’s struggling scientific-technical comm un ity. The appare nt lack of opport un ity in sci The New Policy for Survival ent ific work and the strong financ ial attrac tion of Russia’s develo pi ng business sector Given the facts outlined above, unanim are creati ng a problem which could have ity regardi ng the critical state of Russia’s long-t erm effects on the aviation indust ry. milit ary aviation indust ry formed early in Fewer and fewer young people are choosing gove rnm ent, military, and indust ry circles. to go into science, opting instead for more Less easy to arrive at was a consens us view luc rat ive fields. Accordi ng to statist ics pub of how to deal with the problem. Most ef lished by Russia’s Science Minist ry, 61 per- forts fell roughly under the catchall phrase cent of people working in scient ific research “def ense convers ion.” In most cases, this are 40 years of age or older. Twenty-five per- amounted to some easing of governm ent cent of scient ific researche rs are between 31 cont rol on aviation enterp rise facilit ies and and 39, and only 13 percent are under 30. unc oo rd in ated efforts on their part to pro Meanw hile, Science Minist ry statist ics show duce consumer goods for the domest ic and a steady decline in output of new scient ists exp ort market. Televis ion product ion by the by Russia’s univers it ies and scient ific insti Komsomolsk-N a-A mur aircraft-production tutes. Other figures also appear to indic ate plant is one examp le of this policy in action. that people with less than Russia’s most ad It is now clear that a new policy of key vanced degrees (and hence less time invested imp ort ance to the future of Russia’s mili in their field) are abandoni ng scient ific tary aviation indust ry emerged during 1996. work.16 The trend indic ates that the scient ific The new policy is based on recogn it ion fields supporti ng the aviation indust ry and early in 1996 of the failure of existi ng the scientist-and-e ngineer-d ependent design defense-c onversion policy and the resulti ng bur eaus, where avera ge salaries are half the desp era te state of the military-industrial nat ional avera ge and one-tenth the salaries comp lex. The policy repres ents the consen in some develo pi ng commerc ial fields, will sus view of key governm ent, military, and have an increasi ngly diffic ult time attracti ng military-i ndustrial leaders of the long-term the best and the brightest of Russia’s imp ort ance to Russia’s national secur ity of youth.17 The qualitat ive aspect of this prob the “science intens ive” advanced-technology lem would be diffic ult or imposs ib le to sect ors of the military-industrial complex. It measu re. However, the quantit at ive problem also recogn izes the marketa bili ty of high- is straightforw ard in a country where the av tech military capab ilit ies in the near term. era ge male life span is down to 57 years. If The import ance of the military aviation in the trend continu es, a large percenta ge of dust ry and its scient ific base to national se- RUSSIA'S MILITARY 51 cur ity and the import ance of nursing its cap aci ty through Russia’s economic crisis are a major compon ent of the policy. Sukh oy’s new aircraft [the SU-37] is Seve ral events during 1996 appear to have cont ribu ted to the evolut ion of this policy. conv inci ng reaff irmat ion of the First, an expanded session of the air force’s world-c lass and, in some areas, milit ary council was held in Februa ry. RFAF unique capab ilit ies of Russia’s mili comm ander Deynek in, other senior offic ers tary aviation indust ry. of the air force, Air Defense Aviation, and Nav al Aviat ion particip ated, as well as lead ers of the aviation indust ry and repres ent a tives of the State Committ ee of Defense Ind ust ry. Nikolai Yegorov, President Boris conc erns raised at the Februa ry council Yeltsin’s chief of staff, also attended. A meeti ng resonated with governm ent leaders. broad range of issues was discussed at the First, appare ntly in response to widespread meeti ng, but press reports make clear that diss ati sf act ion in the governm ent and the the problems of the military aviation indus military-i ndustrial complex with the course try were at the forefront. The three main of defense convers ion, President Yeltsin is- quest ions relati ng to the aviation indust ry sued a decree on 8 May turning the State and its scientific-technical base included: Comm itt ee on Defense Indust ry (GosKom- pres ervi ng design, research, and product ion OboronProm) into the Minist ry of Defense cap ab ilit ies despite funding cuts; choosing Ind ust ry.19 The decree put Zinov iy Pak, then are as to which the air force and the aviation chairm an of GosKom Ob or onP rom into the ind ust ry should give priori ty; and determ in cabin et as minist er of defense indust ry and ing Russia’s aviation export policy. exp anded his organizat ion’s authority. It appears that during this council session The move, taken during the run-up to the decis ion was made to forgo substant ial Russ ia’s president ial elections, signaled gov purc hases of existi ng aircraft in the near to ernm ent concern for the state of the defense midt erm in favor of supporti ng the ind ust ry and its millions of workers but was scientific-t echnical base and new aircraft de scoffed at in some quarters as electione er velopment. The council also reached the con ing. However, it soon became clear that the clusion that the critical period for the dec ree creati ng the new minist ry was more surv ival of the aviation indust ry and its than politic al window dressing. In a series of scientific-t echnical base is the nine-year pe int erv iews subseq uent to his appointm ent as riod from 1996 to 2005. This is based in part mini st er of defense indust ry, Pak indic ated on the anticip ated service life of the RFAF’s that the creation of his minist ry was part of fourth-g eneration fighters the MiG-29 and a governm ent plan to reorie nt defense- SU-2 7 to which the council specific ally re conversion policy. Signific antly for the mili ferred. The council concluded that the avia tary aviation indust ry, Pak immed ia tely tion indust ry’s downward trend would mean made clear that a major part of the policy re that in 10 years no capaci ty would remain to orie ntation was renewed empha sis on pre equip the RFAF with modern aircraft, even ser-vat ion of the “science intens ive” and if acq uis it ion funding returned to normal lev- advanced-t echnology sectors of the els.18 military-i ndustrial complex. He also re- Press statements by the council indic ated ported that, since the offic ial adoption of a that one aim of the meeting was to inform post-S oviet military doctrine in 1993, the the governm ent, MOD, and State Committ ee first time the Economic Minist ry, MOD, and for Defense Indust ries of the need to pre- the State Committ ee on Defense Indust ry serve the aviation indust ry. In fact, subse pres ented a coord in ated weapons develo p quent events during 1996 indic ated that the ment plan to the governm ent was early 52 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1997 1996—the time frame of the RFAF council creat ion of “future weapons” and defense sess ion outlini ng air force and aviation in scientific-r esearch test and design work.22 dust ry priorit ies.20 The governm ent validated the policy ad Pak has outlined a policy which will re voc ated by Pak and Kokoshin in a resolut ion orie nt the course of Russian military- iss ued during August 1996 on “The National industrial convers ion if he succeeds in put Techn ic al Base.” The resolut ion was reiss ued ting it into practice. He has said that his first as a president ial decree the followi ng Octo prio ri ty is identif yi ng which of sevent een ber. A key element of the resolut ion/dec ree thous and military-industrial enterp rises re- was the conclus ion that defense convers ion main necess ary to fill state defense orders. had failed because it was based on obsol ete Those enterp rises that do meet state defense techn olo gy. The document directs a reorie n acq uis it ion requirem ents will be separated tat ion of convers ion to exploit modern into two groups: enterp rises so heavily spe dual-use technolo gy. It defines dual-use ciali zed in defense work that they will re- technolo gy as suitable to equip the military main purely governm ent owned, and those with the most modern equipment and also which can be partially privati zed due to the to use in high-tech civili an products that dual civil and military nature of their pro can compete on the world market.23 duct ion. What Pak calls the governm ent’s Key governm ent figures voiced support former policy of unnatur ally cultiv ati ng de for the “National Technic al Base Policy” in fense indust ry privat iz at ion will be halted. the critical period of legisl at ive conside ra Pak frankly states that a third category of en tion of the 1997 federal budget. Yakov Urin terp rise, those which are found to be obso son, Russia’s deputy minist er of economi cs, lete or unnece ss ary for defense acquis it ion laid out his minist ry’s rationa le for husband needs, will be left to sink or swim on their ing scarce resources in order to support own. In his opinion, the eventual evolut ion high-t ech military-industrial enterp rises. Like of Russia’s military-industrial complex to a other import ant figures involved in formu mix of a limited number of very large state- lati ng the policy, he singled out aviation as owned enterp rises supplem ented by a cadre one of the priori ty defense-industry sectors. of military-industrial commerc ial firms Duri ng the same period when the budget would best serve the country’s defense was being conside red by a reconc iliat ion needs. Signific antly for the military aviation comm itt ee, Prime Minist er Viktor Cherno ind ust ry, he has singled out as effect ive myrd in also supported increased funding for mode ls for this policy the Voenno- scie nt ific research and develo pm ent and in- Promyshlenniy Kompleks MAPO (the con creased governm ent support for enterp rises glome ra te now produci ng MiG aircraft) and prod uci ng high-tech goods able to compete the Sukhoy OKB (design bureau), which on the world market.24 have both moved toward consolid at ion of With the Russian governm ent struggling des ign and product ion facilit ies but along to meet huge needs with a very limited diff ere nt organi zat ional princip les.21 budget, the 1997 budget debate was conten The views Pak has expressed closely agree tious. Despite this, the air of unanimi ty with those of First Deputy Defense Minist er among key governm ent and military leaders And rey Kokoshin, whose portfol io includes on preservi ng the scientific-technical base of military-t echnical policy. Kokoshin is a long- high-t ech indust ries seemed to carry the day. time advoc ate of finding ways to preserve ad Inc reased funding for scientific-technical vanced technic al capab ilit ies through the and design work was announced as the curr ent economic crisis. He also weighed in budget debates drew to a close. The budget duri ng 1996 in favor of short-term-a cquisition figu res also made it equally clear that the belt tighteni ng for the sake of preservi ng the RFAF’s budget problems and long dry spell milit ary’s scientific-technical base, saying that of new aircraft acquis it ion would continue. the MOD’s main budget focus would be on Howe ver, the key policy issue for the MOD RUSSIA'S MILITARY 53 The Russian air force plans to rely on the MiG-29 and SU-27 until at least 2005. The slogan on the wall behind the airc raft reads, “In war, he who has the most powerf ul equipment and best machines wins.” Above, a MiG-29; below, an SU-27.