DTIC ADA529670: Origins of Airpower. Hap Arnold's Command Years and Aviation Technology, 1936- 1945

21 Pages·3.2 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

Orig ins of
Airp ower
Hap Arnold’s
Comm and Years and
Aiv at ion Technolo gy,
1936-1 945*
MAJ DIK DASO, USAF
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1997 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1997 to 00-00-1997
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Origins of Airpower. Hap Arnold’s Command Years and Aivation
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Technology, 1936- 1945
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Air and Space Power Journal,155 N. Twining Street,Maxwell REPORT NUMBER
AFB,AL,36112-6026
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ORIGINS OF AIRPOWER 95
IN JANUARY 1936, Brig Gen gram’s pri mary con cern was to save dol lars in
Henry H. Arnold was trans­ all areas except purchas ing airplanes.
ferred back to Washingt on, In Septem ber 1937, Arnold modified the
D.C. Maj Gen Oscar F. Wes­ con ser va tive ap proach which his Bal anced Air
to ver had taken over as chief Prog ram report had taken. While address ing
of the Air Corps and had con­ the Western Aviation Planning Confere nce,
vinced Gen Ma lin Craig, chief of staff, that he Ar nold summa rized his philosop hy for creat­
needed Arnold as his assis tant. Another can­ ing a top-notch aeronau ti cal instit ut ion in
di date for that job was General Headquart ers Amer ica:
(GHQ) Air Force commander Brig Gen Frank
Remember that the seed comes first; if you are
M. Andrews. Andrews and Westo ver had
to reap a harvest of aeronautical development,
clashed regard ing indep ende nce of the air
you must plant the seed called experimental
arm. Westo ver, who had opposed separat ion research . Install aeronautical branches in your
from the Army through out his ca reer, and Ar­ universities; encourage your young men to take
nold, perhaps having learned a lesson about up aeronautical engineering. It is a new field
buck ing the sys tem at too high a level, agreed but it is likely to prove a very productive one
that re main ing part of the Army held defi nite indeed. Spend all the funds you can possibly
ad van tages for the Air Corps, particu larly in make available on experimentation and
research. Next, do not visualize aviation merely
the area of logis ti cal support. From that
as a collection of airplanes. It is broad and far
point, Andrews’s career took a differ ent path
reaching. It combines manufacture, schools,
from Arnold’s. By 1939, Andrews had moved
transportation, airdrome, building and
over to the Gen eral Staff un der Gen George C.
management, air munitions and armaments,
Mar shall, and Arnold held command of the metallurgy, mills and mines, finance and
Air Corps. Arnold used this posit ion to en- banking, and finally, public security–national
sure, among other things, contin ued scien­ defense. (Emphasis in original)3
tific and technol ogic al advances in his com-
In this statement, Arnold had issued the
mand.1
broad est descript ion of the evolving techno­
Even before assumi ng command, Arnold
logi cal system of airpower, even if he didn’t
chaired a com mit tee formed in 1936 to ex am­
make a distinc tion between empiri cal (based
ine how best to create a “Balanced Air Pro-
on obser va tion) versus theoretic al (based on
gram.” There was noth ing un usual in his fi nal
cal cu la tions) re search. If the Air Corps had lit­
re port; in fact, it fol lowed very closely the rec­
tle money for research and devel op ment
om men da tions made pre vi ously by the Drum
(R&D), then perhaps univers it ies and indus­
Board (a com mit tee headed by Maj Gen Hugh
try could be persuaded to find some. After all,
Drum that was ap pointed to re view and re vise
it had been the Gug gen heim Fund for the Pro­
the Air Corps’s five-year procure ment plan).
mo tion of Aeronau tics that had funded the
The numbers reflected in each report for per-
fledg ling depart ments in that disci pline at
son nel and planes were simi lar. Sur pris ing to-
sev eral univers it ies almost a decade earlier.4
day but reali st ic at that time, the forecast for
No matter the source, experim ent al research
air planes re quired was only 1,399 in 1936, in­
was the key to future airpower. Arnold had
creas ing to a meager 2,708 in 1941.2 Al­
very clev erly linked Air Corps de vel op ment to
though Arnold’s report was primar ily an at-
ci vil ian prosper ity in the aviation indus try,
tempt to reckon with depres sion budgets, no
hop ing that civil ian insti tu tions would pick
men tion was made of scien tific research or
up the fumbled research ball while the Air
tech no logi cal devel op ment. Rather, the pro-
Corps was struggling just to acquire planes.
His ideas re flected the “Mil likan phi loso phy,”
*This article is the second part of a study of Gen H. H. Arnold and aviation technology, which began in the Winter 1996 issue.
96 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1997
Capt Homer Boushey in the Ercoupe at March Field.
Wright Field and at the National Advi sory
that of bring ing the cen ter of aero nau ti cal sci­
Com mit tee for Aero nau tics (NACA) fa cil ity at
ence in America to the Californ ia Insti tute of
Lang ley: ra dar, air craft wind shield de ic ing, jet
Tech nol ogy (Cal tech), which had shaped that
as sisted take off (JATO) sys tem (which was ac­
univ ers ity since the 1920s. This philosop hy,
tu ally a rocket), and a host of aircraft and en­
cou pled with Arnold’s reali za tion that air-
gine design modifi ca tions. Many of these
power was a com plex sys tem of lo gis tics, pro-
proj ects were related to the brand new B-17,
cure ment, ground support bases, and opera­
an aviation technol ogy leap in itself.7 Arnold
tions, guided his vision for future growth.5
wasted no time in calling the “long hairs”
Ar nold’s approach to airpower devel op ment
to a meet ing at the Na tional Acad emy of Sci­
was actu ally the first notion of what became
ences (NAS) under the aus pices of the Com­
the military-industrial- academic complex af­
mit tee on Air Corps Research, to solve these
ter World War II.6
prob lems.8 It was no surprise that Arnold
As was all too frequent an occur rence in im me di ately accel er ated Air Corps R&D ef -
these early years of aviation, a tragic aircraft forts. In his first message as Air Corps com­
ac ci dent took the life of Gen eral Wes to ver on mander, Ar nold de voted a sepa rate para graph
21 Septem ber 1938. Arnold was now the top to the subject that reflected his public views
man in the Air Corps. Arnold’s expe ri ence in on airpower. “Until quite recently,” he said,
Army avia tion had pre pared him for the tasks “we have had marked su pe ri or ity in air planes,
which loomed ahead, and now he was in a po­ en gines, and access or ies. That supe ri or ity is
si tion to tackle these problems. now definitely challenged by recent devel op­
When Arnold “shook the stick” and offi­ ments abroad. This means that our experi­
cially took command of the Air Corps on 29 men tal devel op ment programs must be
Sep tem ber 1938, many military aviation speeded up.”9 But his views were al ready com­
pro jects were under consid era tion both at monly known to most airmen.
ORIGINS OF AIRPOWER 97
NACA’s William Durand (center) was
present for the initial JATO tests.
Later he would be sworn to secrecy
during development of the first
American jet aircraft.
#1, was estab lished by Dr. Kármán and Dr.
As sist ing the speeding-up process, the
Frank Malina, and exists today as the Jet Pro­
Gugg enh eim Aeronau ti cal Labora tory at the
pul sion Labora tory (JPL).11
Cali for nia Insti tute of Technol ogy (GALCIT)
It was after this NAS meeting that the Ar­
and the Massa chu setts Insti tute of Technol­
nold/Kármán as so cia tion of fi cially be gan. Ar­
ogy (MIT) sent repre sen ta tives to this NAS
nold saw Kármán as a use ful tool, a tap for rec­
meet ing. Vannevar Bush and Jerome Hun ­
og niz ing unde vel oped technolog ies. Kármán
saker of MIT grabbed the windshield deic ing
saw the Army Air Corps as a worthy recipi ent
probl em for their instit ut ion while openly
of his services. More impor tantly, however,
dis miss ing JATO as a fan tasy. Hun saker called
the funding Arnold made available seemed
JATO the “Buck Rogers” job. Bush explained
bot tom less and helped Caltech maintain its
to Rob ert Mil likan and Theo dore von Kármán
status as the leading aeronau ti cal univers ity
that he never under stood how “a seri ous en­
in the coun try. Kármán was dedi cated to help ­
gi neer or scient ist could play around with
ing the Army but was also dedicated to Cal­
rocke ts.” 10 Arnold knew that GALCIT had al­
tech, the GAL CIT, and Rob ert Mil likan. None -
ready demon strated some success in that
the less, this alli ance, above all others which
area. Bush’s conde scend ing atti tude did not
Ar nold held with scien tists and engi neers,
go over well with General Arnold. From that
proved one of the most sig nifi cant and en gag­
meeti ng onward, Arnold thought of Bush as
ing collabo ra tions in the early history of
some thing less than forward- looking, de spite
Ameri can airpower.
his ex cel lent, even pio neer ing, rec ord in elec­
This meet ing was just the be gin ning of Ma­
tri cal en gi neer ing. The case of Vanne var Bush jor General Arnold’s push to make science
was a classic exam ple of how a talented indi­ and technol ogy an inte gral part of the Air
vid ual had been dropped from con fi dence be- Corps. He even invited General Marshall to
cause of personal percept ions. a lunch eon with the vis it ing sci en tists. Mar-
On the other hand, Mil likan and Kármán, shall wondered, “What on earth are you do­
rep re sent ing GALCIT, eagerly accepted the ing with peo ple like that?” Ar nold re plied that
JATO challenge, an atti tude that Arnold no he was “using” their brainpower to develop
doubt appre ci ated. JATO repre sented po­ de vices “too diffi cult for the Air Force engi­
ten tial funding for the struggling GALCIT neers to develop themselves.” 12 The reali za­
Rocket Research Project, initi ated in 1936. tion that civil ian help was the only way to
This project, also known as GALCIT Project en sure that the Army Air Co rps had the best
98 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1997
Kármán calculates the number of engines for a JATO-only takeoff (above). Twelve canisters were needed, the
propeller was removed, and the nose was covered in safety posters (below). “What about tomorrow if I meet with an
accident today?”
techn olo gy available was typical of Arnold.
He didn’t care where the devices came from;
he only cared whether his Air Corps was util­
iz ing them. By includ ing Marshall in this cir­
cle of scient ists, Arnold began winning sup-
port for advanced technol ogy from the
high est ranking Army officers.
Not only did Arnold utilize the advice of
sci en tists, he gathered infor ma tion from ci­
vil ian avia tors as well. One in par ticu lar in flu­
enced Arnold’s commit ment to technolo gy.
In late 1938, Arnold had exchanged letters
with Char les Lind bergh, then tour ing Europe,
which expressed Lindbergh’s concern over
US lethargy in airplane devel op ment. “It
seems to me,” Lindbergh wrote, “that we
ORIGINS OF AIRPOWER 99
This view of the test run shows the test aircraft piloted by Clark Millikan.
should be devel op ing proto types with a top pean war on three major national radio net-
speed in the vi cin ity of 500 mph at al ti tude. . . works. President Franklin D. Roose velt tried
. The trend over here seems to be to ward very to dis suade him from tak ing his views di rectly
high speed.”13 This revela tion worried Ar­ to the nation. After Lindbergh’s historic
nold. In March 1939, Arnold estab lished a flight, the Guggen heim Fund had invested
spe cial air board to study the problems that
$100,000 to subsi dize a national tour ex ­
Lind bergh had addressed. By April 1939, Ar­
pressly designed to gener ate support for avia­
nold had convinced Lindbergh to accept an
tion. By the late 1920s, Lind bergh had toured
ac tive duty commiss ion as a member of the
over 80 cities and influ enced millions of
study group. This group, known as the Kilner
Ameri cans. “Lindy” was a skilled com mu ni ca­
Board, produced a five-year plan for research
tor. In many respects, he became the Ameri­
and devel op ment within the Air Corps. The
can spokesman for aviation.15 As such, his
rep ort was shortsighted in many respects but
words carried an inord in ate amount of influ­
did repre sent the immed ia te needs of the air
ence. Fearing a major effect on public opin­
arm. Jet propul sion and missiles, for exam­
ion, FDR promised Lindbergh a new cabinet
ple, were not even consid ered.14
post if he remained silent concerni ng Ameri­
Lind bergh’s impact was imme di ate but
short-l ived. In a written recom men da tion for can par tici pa tion in the Euro pean war. Ar nold
the NACA, Lindbergh gained support for an had been caught in the middle of the presi­
exp anded aeronau ti cal research facil ity to be den tial offer, but there was never any doubt
lo cated at Mof fett Field, Cali for nia. The fund­ in the gener al’s mind that Lindbergh would
ing was approved on 15 Septem ber 1939. turn down such an offer and speak his own
That same morning, Lindbergh spoke out mind. Arnold was right. Conse quently, Lind­
against American partici pa tion in the Euro­ bergh “re signed” his com mis sion, but Ar nold
100 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1997
A JATO rocket engine, about 18 inches long.
had already taken his earlier warnings to
heart.16
Ar nold’s public campaigns reflected Lind­
bergh’s warnings. In January 1939, while
speak ing to the Socie ty of Automo tive Engi­
neers in Detroit, Arnold— now the Air Corps’s
No. 1 man—reemp has ized that America was
fall ing behind in aircraft devel op ment. He at­
trib uted this fail ing to an in ade quate pro gram
of scien tific research. He stated:
All of us in the Army Air Corps realize that
America owes its present prestige and standing
in the air world in large measure to the money,
time, and effort expended in aeronautical
experimentation and research. We know that
our future supremacy in the air depends on the
brains and efforts of our engineers. . . .17
His dedica tion to continu ous research, ex­
peri men ta tion, and devel op ment was more
fo cused, more defined than it had ever been,
and now he carried the message across the
In 1941, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal and Gen coun try.
Arnold arranged the transfer of the Whittle technology. Ar nold’s offi cial corres pond ence reflected
The photo was taken just prior to 6 June 1944. the same commit ment to R&D. In a memo-
ran dum to the as sis tant sec re tary of war dated
ORIGINS OF AIRPOWER 101
2 March 1939, Arnold vigor ously defended
pro posed funding for research and devel op­
ment:
The work of the large number of aeronautical
research agencies in this country should be
afforded government support and
encouragement only through a single
coordinating agency which can determine that
the individual and collective effort will be to
the best interests of the Government. The
NACA is the agency designated by law to carry
out basic aeronautical research and its own
plant and facilities cannot cover all phases of
development. Furthermore, there are many
public or semi-public institutions whose
students or other research personnel are willing
and anxious to perform useful investigation
that will contribute to a real advancement of
the various branches of aeronautical science.18
As a member of the NACA Main Commit-
tee since tak ing over the Air Corps, Ar nold at-
tended the com mit tee meet ings regu larly and
was famil iar with the workings of the group.
More impor tantly, he was acquainted with
the other Main Commit tee members who to­ Arnold departs for England in April 1941 on the “Clipper.”
gether read like a “Who’s Who” in American
avia tion. Van Bush, Orville Wright, Charles
“would be as stupid as trying to win the next
Lindb ergh, and Harry Guggenh eim were all
war with outmoded weapons and doc-
mem bers of the Main Commit tee in 1939.
trines.”20 While the out come of the war was in
Shortly after the 2 March memo was sent, Ar­
ques tion, and even though the United States
nold estab lished an offi cial liai son between
was not yet directly involved, Arnold empha­
the NACA facili ties at Langley Field and the
sized R&D only to improve weapons or air-
Air Corps Mate riel Divi sion at Wright Field.
craft by using technolo gies that were already
Ar nold assigned Maj Carl F. Greene to the
on the drawing board. Essen tially, from Sep­
post in an effort to tighten the relat ions hip
tem ber 1939 un til the spring of 1944, the ma­
be tween the two or gani za tions.19The at tempt
jor ity of Army avia tion R&D ef forts were dedi­
to consoli date R&D programs was valiant,
cated to short-term improvem ents in existi ng
but time was running short. Conflict in
Europe assured that the rela tion ship would tech nolo gies.21
never mature. The total American product ion effort that
The expand ing war in Europe indi cated fol lowed Arnold’s early fears and resign at ion
that a posture of readiness was prudent and shocked every one, in clud ing Ar nold. By April
nec es sary for the United States. From the day 1943, the four-star general wrote to General
that Germany invaded Poland in Septem ber An drews, now air commander in the Euro­
1939, Arnold real ized that all American pro­ pean theater, “By God, Andy, after all these
duct ion efforts would be needed just to build years it was al most too much—I don’t imag ine
enough air craft of ex ist ing de signs to cre ate a any of us, even in our most optim ist ic mo­
fight ing air force. “For us to have expended ments, dreamed that the Air Corps would ever
our effort on future weapons to win a war at build up the way it has. I know I . . . never
hand,” he wrote Gen Carl A. Spaatz in 1946, did.”22 Airplane produc tion became one of
102 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1997
the major reasons for American airpow er’s On 12 August, filled with newfound con fi­
evo lu tion into a massive technol ogic al sys­ dence, Boushey strapped himself into the Er­
tem by 1944. Until the early years of World coupe, now loaded with six JATOs, three un­
War II in Europe, the Ameri can air craft in dus­ der each wing. William Durand, long-time
try was still in its infancy. The war forced it friend of Kármán, NACA char ter mem ber, and
into early adoles cence. Despite the many chairm an of NACA’s Special Commit tee on
chal lenges in her ent in the mas sive buildup of Jet Propul sion, had been invited to witness
air planes, Arnold still found time to push for the JATO flight test. A test aircraft, a Piper
a few untested technolo gies that showed ex­ Cub, pi loted by Dr. Clark Mil likan, idled next
cep tional promise while also pressing his to the Ercoupe waiting for the soon-to- be-
field commande rs to use “science” to advan­ rocket plane to release brakes. Both aircraft
tage whenever possi ble.23 revved their engines and released their
The most spec tacu lar of these tech nolo gies brakes. In a mat ter of only a few sec onds, hav­
was the JATO program being pursued at Cal­ ing reached a prede ter mined speed, Boushey
tech since the NAS meeting in Novemb er ig nited his rockets. In a cloud of smoke, fol­
1938. Since it was most desira ble to build air- lowed shortly by the crack of the rocket igni­
craft that car ried heavy bomb loads, the prob­ tion, the Ercoupe catapulted into the air and
lems of high wing loading on initial takeoff over the 50- foot banner that marked the cal­
be came ex tremely im por tant. “In many cases cu lated height to be achieved after rocket ig­
the maximum allowa ble gross weight of an ni tion. The Piper Cub appeared to climb in
air plane was lim ited solely by take off con sid­ slow motion. The JATO launch had been a re-
erat ions. One of the many methods . . . pro- mark able success.26
posed for the elimi na tion of this dif fi culty in­ It was so success ful that Kármán decided
volved the use of auxil iary rocket jets to that it would be possi ble to launch the Er -
aug ment the available thrust during takeoff coupe on rocket power alone, sans propel ler.
and initial climb.”24 The net result was an in- To cover up the fact that the prop had been re-
crease in range for a desired payload. Frank moved, the Ercoupe nose was plastered with
Ma lina, “Homer joe” Stewart, and the rest of safety posters as if it were under go ing some
the “sui cide club” spent most of 1940 and the form of re pairs. “Be Alert, Don’t Get Hurt!” At
first half of 1941, devel op ing the JATO sys­ least the JATO team had a sense of humor. He
tem. By summer, Mali na’s team was ready to cal cu lated that 12 JATO engines would be re­
flight-t est the device. Capt Homer Boushey quired to accom plish the first American
flew an Air Corps Ercoupe from Wright to rocket- powered air plane flight. On 23 August,
March Field, the se lected spot for the test, late Boushey strapped in one more time. Kármán
in July 1941. After a failed static firing re­ had calcu lated that at least 25 knots ground
sulted in a spectacu lar explo sion, the rockets speed would be needed for the test to work
were af fixed to the un der side ofthe Er cou pe’s prop erly, so it was decided to accel er ate to
wings, near the wing roots. Despite the failed that speed and then fire the rockets. But how
test, it was decided to accomp lish an an­ to accel er ate to the required speed without a
chored test-firing of the rockets attached to work ing prop? A standard pickup truck fitted
the plane. Although this test was more suc­ with a long rope pulled out on the runway in
cess ful than the previ ous one, fragments of front of the propless Ercoupe. Boushey
burn ing pro pel lant and a small piece of a noz­ grabbed the rope like a rodeo bull rider and
zle still burned a forearm- sized hole in the un­ held on while the truck accel er ated to the cal­
der side of the Ercoupe tail. “Well, at least it cu lated 25 knots. Boushey released the rope,
isn’t a big hole,” one of the onlook ers ob­ fired the rockets, now twice as loud and
served. After the hole was patched, a success­ smoky, and hurtled 10 feet into the air on
ful air borne con fi dence fir ing test of the rock­ rocket power alone. He had enough runway
ets was completed on 6 August, but the big left to make a safe landing straight ahead. Ad­
test was yet to come.25 dit ional testing contin ued in both solid and