DTIC ADA529658: Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea, 1950

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

Perceptions and Reality
Two Strategic Inteffigence Mistakes in Korea, 1950
P. K. Rose
On 2~ June 9~O. the \orth K )rcaii iiunihier. dcfcnse spending was (Lit
I(cid:146)coplc S Ai~i1) of the I)iiiocr~itic ihraniaticaliv. and intelligcncc
PL~(iplcs Rcpuhlic of Korea (I)PRK) rcsources iliet a siniilar fatc. (cid:145)l(cid:146)hc
S\\cpt acr( ss thc ~3H.(cid:146) par,iItch anch louiming conflict with (~)mniuinismii
((cid:145)~Ii1i((cid:146) ii S( to uniting the Korean \Vas toctisod on l:uii)pc. our(cid:146) tradi(cid:151)
I)cT1i1s11I~I under the Conirnanist tio)nal gcographic area of mntcrcst.
regime of Kim il(cid:151)sung. Aiicnctn
niilit:irv and civilian leaders were (cid:145)the ~var had produccd a crop of
catight liv surprise, and univ t ic largcr than(cid:151)life military hcroes. and
(cid:147) int(rccssiofl of poorl~. trained 111(1 perhaps tire biggest was Gen. I)oti
e(upped I. S garrison tro()lis honi glas MacArthur, I(cid:151)ar ast
The dominant theme in Japan nianaged to hiatt the \ortti Conimander and virtual ruler of a
inteffigence analysis Korean advance at a hugh price in dclcated Japan.
Arrierican dead and ~v uiik(cid:146)d. Four
from Washington that
nuintlis later. the Chiincsd Pc()J)les \X(cid:148)hilc nianv oonsidcrcd ~lac~\rihicir
accounts for the failure Liberation Army (Pl,\) intervened hrilhiamit, Ins militam-v career also
to predict the North in lThLssiVe nunihiers as (cid:145)\(cid:145)nerictn cont:iincit iitiiiicroiis examples of
Korean attack was] that and tN t(irces pushed thc North poor military judgment. tic had fe~
K ~reans hack across lie ~8! puraI doubts about his own udgmiicnr,
the Soviets controlled
let. t S riiilitarv and cr\ ilian eaders hrowc~er and fi~r ir~(cid:146)cr a decade
North Korean ~vcre again caught by suirprisc. and had surrounded iuiiisu(cid:146)lf with staff
decisionmaking. amiothcr costly price was paid in officers holding a siniilar opinion.
Aiiicrican casuatties. MacArthur ~~as confident ott us
,,
capabilities to reshape Japan. but
Iwo Strategic intclligcnce blunders lie hutch little knowledge oil Chinese
~vithtiit siX months: \ct tlii.(cid:146) civilian Coinniunist forces or mihitar~ doe(cid:151)
and mititai(cid:146)v leidcrs involved \(cid:147)crc trinc. lie had a well-known
all products of \Vortd \\ar II. v~Iicn disregard r ttic (:1unese as s()l(cid:151)
thic attack on Pearl Iharbor had dicrs. and this heca ire tlie tenet i)f
cle~ii(cid:146)I~(cid:146) dcflu)nStr:tted tlu,(cid:146) rc(Iui;c tire Far Las:ern Connuand (FFC).
meut for intclligcncc cotlecton aiid
analysis. (cid:145)I tic ans~vcrs to ~vhiy ii In Januan I9~O, Secretary of State
happened are siriiplc. and thc) I)can Aclieso ri Irad puhliclv
inild i(cid:146)~s ms thit arc relcvant t )d.i\. cleclared a dciensi\c containment
line against the Conimuuunist mrlen(cid:151)
tic rotc of intchhigcncc in Amcr(cid:151) ace in Asia. I)ascd upon an island
ica~ national sccurit\ is oltcn defense line. he Ki)rean penirl
niisuindcrs~ood. lntclhigencc imif~)r(cid:151) sula was ()utsio.he t tat Iinc.
mition has to cxist within thic
grcaicr i.()ntcxt (if d )niestic t ~i Still. America viewed K()rea as one
pi hrical percep~iOfl. With the defeat of several oe~ek pirig chemi)cralic
of Japan, 0(11 hIisi()rically solati )n(cid:149) nations that could serve as counter
ist nation riio~ed quickly to lou k balances to Comnuinist expansion
P. K. Rose w irks in ttic I)ircctoratc in~\ ird again. (cid:145)I tic armcch forces In ,\larchi 19i9, President Iruiman
~ )per~iL \vcrc inimcdiatclv rcduiccd in appro~cd Nathmat ~cccirh~
57
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1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
2001 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2001 to 00-00-2001
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea, 1950
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
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Center for the Study of Intelligence,Central Intelligence REPORT NUMBER
Agency,Washington,DC,20505
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13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
Studies in Intelligence. Volume 45, No. 5, Fall-Winter 2001, No. 11
14. ABSTRACT

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16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF
ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 9
unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR)
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
Korea
Council Memorandum 8/2, which Republic of Korea (ROK). (cid:145)Ihe Summary states that a North
warned that the Soviets intended to office also noted that many of the Korean attack on the South is (cid:145)pos
dominate all of Korea. and that this guerrillas were originally from the sible(cid:148) as earls(cid:146) as 1949, and cites
would he a threat to US interests in South, and thus were able to slip reports of road improvements
the Far East.1 That summer, the back into their villages when hid towards the border and troop
President sent a special message to ing from local security forces. movements there. It also notes.
Congress citing Korea as an area Willoughby also claimed that the however, that Moscow is in control.
where the principles of democracy KLO had 16 agents operating in the
were heing matched against those North. KLO officers in Seoul, how These reports establish the clomi
of Communism. lie stated the ever, expressed suspicion regarding mint theme in intelligence analysis
United States (cid:147)will not fail to pro the loyalty and reporting of these from Washington that accounts for
~(cid:145)ide the aid which is so essential to agents. the failure to predict the North
Korea a~ this critical time.(cid:146) 2 Korean attack(cid:151)that the Soviets
These questionable FEC agents controlled North Korean decision-
were not America(cid:146)s only agents in making. The \Vashington focus on
US Intelligence Collection and the North. At the end of World War the Soviet I.~ as (cid:145)the(cid:148) Commu
Analysis 11. then-Capt. John Singlaub had nist state had become the accepted
established an Army intelligence perception within US Govern
About the same time, US and Soviet outpost in Manchuria, just across ments political and military
troops withdrew from their respec the border from Korea. Over the leadership circles. Any scholarly
tive parts of Korea. The Soviets left course of several years. he trained counterbalances to this view, either
behind a well-equipped and trained and dispatched dozens of former questioning the absolute authority
North Korean Army. while the Korean POWs. who had been in of ,\loscow over other Communist
United States had provided its Japanese Army units, into the states or noting that cultural, his
Korean military forces with only North. Their instructions were to toric, or nationalistic factors might
light weapons and little training. As join the Communist Korean mili(cid:151) come into play, fell victim to the
US forces withdrew, MacArthur political atmosphere.
tarv and government, and to obtain
instructed Gen. Charles A. Wil
information on the Communists(cid:146)
loughby. a longtime loyal staff plans and intentions. Fears of another ~var in Europe
member and his G-2, to establish a against the mighty Red Army and
secret intelligence office in Seoul. These and other collection capahili the exposure of Soviet spying
Known as the Korean Liaison ties contributed to CIA analytic against America created an atmo
Office (KLO), its responsibility was reports, starting in 1948, regarding sphere in which the anti-
to monitor troop movements in the the Communist threat on the penin Communist fervor and accusations
North and the activities of Commu sula. The first report, in a Weekly of McCarthyism silenced any debate
nist guerrillas operating in the regarding the worldwide Commu
Summary dated 20 February, iden
South. tifies the Soviet Union as the nist conspiracy. In addition, the
Chinese Communists(cid:146) rise to inter
controlling hand behind all North
By late 1949, the KLO ~ report Korean l)olitical and military plan(cid:151) nal power created a domestic
ing that the Communist guerrillas ning.5 In the 16 July Weekly political dispute over who had
represented a serious threat to the Summary, the Agency describes (cid:147)k)st(cid:148) China. (cid:145)I(cid:146)he result was a
I Ioreign Relations ofthe ((cid:145)~k~ States. North Korea as a Soviet (cid:147)puppet(cid:148) I niess other~vise specified. references to
D:j)Iomatic PaJx(cid:146)rtc (hereafter FRLS). (t S regime. On 29 October, a Weekly CIA suoltoarics are from: \Voodrow J.
(,vernmcnt I(cid:146)rintin~ Office: \Vashington. Kulmns .4ssessin,~(cid:146) the,rom(cid:146)iet (cid:145)/lreat: The
,
DC. 19s9), vol. 7. pan 2, pp 760-7ft William ft Breuer hadou Warrior~: The &~rlt(cid:146) Cold lt(cid:146)ar })(cid:145)ais (Washington, DC:
RobertJ. Donovan..\~mesis- Tru~nanand (~,is(cid:146)fl Wariii Korea (New York: John Center for the Study of Intelligence. 199~).
/ohn~on in theCoj/~(?/ VVcirin Asia (New \Vile~(cid:146) & Sons, Inc. 1996), pp~ 20-21. (cid:145)that publication lists CIA reports in clmro
(cid:145)York: St. Martins-.\larek. 19~4), p. 18. lbiL. p. 23. n 11< gicaI order
58
Korea
(cid:147)
Mao agreed that the
South weak enough
was
to be conquered, and
silencing of Anterican scholars on authorized the use of S ground
Stalin also approved the
China who might have persuaded force(cid:146)s in Korea.
the country(cid:146)s leadership that China invasion.
would never accept Soviet control 9,
of its national interests. Faulty Perception
(cid:145)Ihe t(cid:145)nited States was caught by
Preparations forWar surprise hccause. within political
1(cid:146)hroughout June, intelligence
and rnilitary leadership circles in
report.s from South Korea and the
Meanwhile, in early 1950. North Washington, the perception existed
CIA provide clear descriptions of
Korean leader Kim II sung traveled that only the Soviets could order an
DPRK preparations for ~var.~ (cid:145)Ihese
to Moscow for a meeting with Sta invasIon 1w a (cid:145)client state(cid:148) and that
reports noted the removal of civil
lin. (cid:145)l(cid:146)hey discussed Kim(cid:146)s plans to such an act would he a prelude to
ians from the border area, the
invade the South, and Kim asked restriction of all transport capabili a world war. Washington was confi
wexhpaetctSeodv.ietStaalsisnisatdavnicse~dcohuildm htoedis ties for military use only, and the dreenatdythtaotttahkeeSsouvcihetsa swteerp,eannodt,
cuss the invasion plan with Mao m()ventents of infantry and armor therefore, that no invasion woukl
Zedong, who also happened to be units to the border area. Also, fol occur.
lo~~ing classic Communist political
in Moscow. After discussions, Mao
agreed that the South was weak tactics, the l)l(cid:146)RK began an intcrna (cid:145)Ibis perception, and indeed its
tional propaganda campaign
enough to he conquered, and Sta broad acceptance within the Wash
against the ROK (cid:145)police state.(cid:148) On
lin also approved the invasion.~(cid:146) ington p )licy community, is clearly
6 June. CIA reported another inter
stated in a 19June CIA paper on
esting international development:
By the spring of 1950 North I)RPK military capabilities. The
all East Asian senior Soviet diplo
Korea(cid:146)s preparations for war had paper said that (cid:147)The l)PRK is a
become readily recognizable. mats were(cid:146) recalled to Moscow for firmly controlled Soviet satellite that
Monthly CIA reports describe the consultati()ns. The(cid:146) CIA believed the exercises no independent initiative
military buildup of DPRK forces, purpose of the recall ~~(cid:145)as to and depends entirely on the sup
but also discount the possibility of develop a new plan to counter anti- port of the USSR for existence.(cid:146) The
Communist efforts in the region.
an actual invask)n. It was believed report noted that while the DPRK
that DPRK forces could not mount could take control of parts of the
On 20June 1950, the CIA pub
a successful attack wiibout Soviet South. it probably did not have the
assistance, and such assistance fished a report, based primarily on capability to destroy the South
would indicate a worldwide Coin human assets, concluding that the Korean government without Soviet
munist offensive. There were no DI~RK had the capability to in(cid:146) ade or Chinese assistance. (cid:145)l(cid:146)his assis
indications in I~urope that such an the South at any tinte. President tance would not he forthcoming
Truman. Secretary ofState Acheson,
offensive was in preparation. On 10 because the Soviets did not want
and Secretary of Defense Johnson
May, the South Korean Defense general war. (cid:145)l(cid:146)he Department of
all received copies of this report.(cid:146)
Ministry publicly warned at a press State and the militaty intelligence
conference that DPRK troops were Five days hater. at four ant., the organizations of the Army, Navy.
DRPK invaded the South. Both
massing at the border and there and Air Force concurred.
Washington and the FEC in Tokyo
was danger of an inv~Ision.
were surprised and unprepared. On
Washingt )n(cid:146)s sttategic theme also
Nikira Khrushchev, Khrosbcbei(cid:146) Remc,n(cid:151) 30 June 1950, President Truman
played well in (cid:145)I(cid:146)okyo, where Gen
ber.c, translated by Strobe Talbott (Boston:
eral MacArthur and his staff refused
Little, Br r,vn. 197p)~ pp. ~67-7O. 1(cid:146)Ite reports (cid:145)~(cid:145)ere noted in Congres~ion:il
(cid:149) Stone, 71n(cid:146) lie/c/enI/storyoftheKore testimony that was made public. Sit to believe that any Asians would
an t~ir(\ew York: ~ctontF ly Review l(cid:146)ress. Donovan, p. 9.
19(cid:146)t2). p. 7. ltrcuer. p. 4ft Kuhns. p 396.
59
Korea
(cid:147)
It had become an article
of faith..,personally
testffied to by MacArthur,
risk facing certain defeat by threat ler region b~(cid:146) the end of the
ening American interests. (cid:145)l(cid:146)his that no Asian troops m mtIi.
belief caUsed them to ignore warn could stand up to
ings of the I)PRK military buildup on 25 July. the (.(cid:145)Iit tt(cid:146)UL(cid:146)kll(cid:146)
American military might
and mobilization near the border. Sioniiiar~(cid:146) stated tfiat 10.000 t
without being
clearly the k)rce protection intelli 50,00(1 ethnic Korean soldiers from
gence that should have been most annihilated. iinits might 5O(in reinf rce
alerting to military minds. It was a I)PRK forces. (cid:145)lime article con(cid:151)
9,
strong and perhaps arrogantly held cludc(cid:146)cl. however, that there ~~(cid:145)ere
belief, ~vlucli did not weaken even no indications that the Soviets were
in the face of 1)1(cid:146) RK military suc Intelligence Memorandum 301, Ecu(cid:151) prepared to use Chinese mcinforce
cesses against US troops in the 111(111? 0/ .Soi(cid:146)ic(cid:146)t Iiite,il:o,is ci~id memi1(cid:146)~. (cid:145)Ibis blending of(cid:146) tactical
summer of I9S0. It grew even ((cid:145)cipabi1iuies/~r .lhhirai-j(cid:146) Agi~rc~cs(on. warnings about possible Chinese
stronger within military circles in units(cid:151)first composed of etlmnic
stated that the Soviets had large
Tokyo as American and UN forces Korean soldiers and then of Chi
numbers of Chinese troops, winch
pthueshfaeldl obfacIk950t.heI~DPtRheKn,tritoohpasdin cionuvlodlvbeemeunstedcosintlyKoarneda dtioffmicauklte. 1 15 anneasle~(cid:147)\sisoltuhantteneorsi(cid:151)andnicdatiosntsrateexgiiscted
btheecoFEmCe.apnerasrotnicallelyoftefsatiitfhiewditthoibny Tl~hiJuslywabryniCnIgA wIantselfloilglenocweedMoenmo onfesSe(iivinetterivnetennet.i(b)enscatomehatvhee the Ch
MacArthur, that no i\sian troops prek(cid:146)rred art form for most Agency
randum 302. which stated that the
ctaaonrLnyiilhdmiilsagtthaetndd.wiTuthphiostuotatAtbmieetiurndiegc,acnonmsiliid Sionvviaestiosn,wearnedrtehsepyoncsoiubllde fuosretChhei ccr(cid:146)ee(cid:146)oppnt~tli())urntiiendgthtatthorSobouevgihebtalsapetredioNroint)iveteshmeabenIrxd(cid:146)r.(cid:151) It
ered a fact(cid:146) within the FEC and nese forces to intervene if DPRK objectives would dii(cid:146)ect an Chi
constantly repeated to the Washing(cid:151) forces could m)t stand up to IN
nese actions.
ton political and military leadership, forces.
resulted in the second strategic Hv the end of July, tactical intelli
blunder(cid:151)the surprise Chinese On the same day. the Chinese were
intervention in the war. also addressing how to react to a gbeecnocmeniconlgleocrtgiaonniz(iend.tImAergmreodunFdorwcaess
DPRK retreat. The first days of July
Security .(cid:145)~gency (AFSA) detach
represented the high-water mark of
The Chinese Factor the DPRK invasion, and, by the end ments were collecting DI(cid:146)RK and
(;hiind(cid:146)sd(cid:146) communications, and US
of that first week, t(cid:145)S. South
CIA intelligence reports during the Korean. and t N troops were solidi aSmn)dcitIIi(cid:145)NKofroeracnesewleenrieenwtosrtkoindegbrwiietfh
first month of the conflict contin fying a defense line around the port
local residents and send ocit agents
ued to echo the theme of Soviet of Pusan. near the eastern tip of the
control of the l)PRK. but they also peninsula. Recognizing that the to assess DI(cid:146)RK positions and
strength. I nder the control of the
began to address the potential for DPRK moinentuni had been
CIA in (cid:145)l(cid:146)okvo. Marine l.t. Col.
Chinese intervention. On 2( June, blunted, Chinese Foreign Minister
I)utch(cid:148) Kramer established bases
the day after the invasion, thie ((cid:145)IA Zhou En(cid:151)lai called a national secu
1)ai/t(cid:146) .Summarv reported that the rity Illeeting to discuss on islands offthe southeast coast of
Korea to train local irregular troops
Agency agreed with the US strengthening the Chinese-Korean
Embassy in Moscow that the North border area. At the meeting. it was for missions behind enemy lines.(cid:146)
(cid:145)l(cid:146)hiese activities quickly began to
Korean offensive was a (cid:147) lear-cut agreed that the ~jth Field Army. the
Soviet challenge to the United most experienced Pl.A combat (ii:ing /.hang SI,ci. .iJa(,5 ,tIjlit(fm(cid:146)i(cid:146) /(cid:147)u(cid:146)
States Four days later, as Presi z(cid:146)ce. sh(~uId be m()ved to the Ix r(cid:151) 111(10/ICIS/I?: (hIl/cl (1)1(1i/Ic(cid:146) Ao;(cid:146)ca 1?
dent (cid:145)i(cid:146)ruman auth(irized the use of /1)50 /95 (t.,iwreno..(cid:146). KS: t(cid:145)nivc(cid:146)rsity Press
US ground troops in Korea. CIA Kuhns. p~ mci ol K~iris.i(cid:146)~. t995). pp. 55-59.
60
Korea
(cid:147)
This blending of tactical
warnings about possible
Chinese units...and
provide vatuable infotmation. Clii(cid:151) J~)~)h(i/~j/i/)(cid:146) q/ i)i,(cid:146)c(cid:146)cI (,(cid:145)bi,u(cid:146)sc(cid:146) (,(cid:145)uni
flese ~m1n1unicati()ns indicated in strategic analysis that no )111I)IIS( I1itC(cid:146)?7((cid:146)IltiOlI iii korea.
July that elenicnts of Clnese indications existed of which assunicd tltit the Chinese
Field Army had movciI to ManchLi(cid:151) Soviet intentions to have were already providing covert assis
na. and that Gen. Lin F~iao was the the Chinese intervene, tance to the l)PRK, including sonic
PI,,\ commander ~~(cid:145)lio would inter replacements for combat troops.-(cid:145) It
vene in Korea(cid:146) became the preferred art stated, however, that overt assis
form for most Agency tance b(cid:146), the Chinese wouki require
Ry August. the (R)nim~inist leaders reporting. Soviet approval and a Communist
in the L SSR, China, arid Korea rec~ willingness to risk general war. The
(cid:145)9 memorandum concluded that there
()gnized that the large scale
intervention h~(cid:146) I.S forces would was no direct evidence of indica
lead to the defeat of the I)I(cid:146)RK fly late August. China ~as itlo\ ing tions as to whether China would
forces. his realization was partic aggressively on all 6(cid:146) )nts to demon(cid:151) intervene, hut it ni te(cid:146)d that rept)rts
ularly threatening to ( hina. on 4 stt(cid:146)ate its concerns regardi ig a of(cid:146) Chinese troop buildups in the
APaurgtuyst(,C(atP)a lC(cid:146)ollliitnbeusroe (~m)ene1tni1nugn.isMtao d(cid:145)Nefeaotccoufpattheio1n)lo(cid:146)RfKth6at)rccoeLsmnatnrdv.Io~Sn Minatnecrhveinutniaonn Iwieolrldewritahricna Cmhaidneese
stated that if the t(cid:145)nitcd States won t~hoe,(cid:146)/idnteCritn/altuiroen.alChpirnoap(cid:146)sagoa1fnidcia~ilsi.ene, cCahpianbeilsietiaecscuIstaatidodnesdotfhaatggrreecsesniton
in Korea, it ~~(cid:145)ould threaten China. organ. featured an article ecfuating against the Manchurian hi)rder area
Thercf~re, China had 0 C))me to a I)PRK defeat as(cid:146).i defeat for Chi(cid:151) could he a setup 6 r an imminent
the assistance of tlie I PRK and neSt(cid:146) policy.(cid:146) At the same tone, Overt l1(cid:146)i( )\(cid:145)e.
inter(cid:146)\(cid:146)enc. (cid:145)(cid:145) This decision set in Foreign Minister Zhiou Fn(cid:151)lai sent
motion China(cid:146)s (cid:145)fhrts on diplo several diplomatic notes to the (cid:145)N his warning, one(cid:146) of the strongest
matic. nh litary, and pr paganda Security Council protesting alleged issued by the CIA before Chinese
fronts to defend itself from US US air attacks on Manchuria just intcrvi(cid:146)ntn in, reflected the(cid:146) analytic
aggression. \Vhiile Ma( (cid:145)s concerns ninih of the Yalu river.(cid:145)-~ I)omesti approach the(cid:146) .(cid:145)Ngenc~(cid:146) would stress
were based on survival of his Com call~. Chinese titedia began to focus from September to Ni)velnlx(cid:146)r: that
munist regime in China, certainly a pi ptilai(cid:146) attenti(in on thu.(cid:146) \(cid:145)ulneral)il (cid:151) the Chin.(cid:146)se(cid:146) capability to intervene
shared objective with he USSR, his ity of the Yalu river lx)rdlcr arca. was pre(cid:146)scn~, but the(cid:146) political deci
motivation in acting hid more to And, militarily, I1LA 6 rees near the sion to do so hinged on acceptance(cid:146)
do with China(cid:146)s traditi )nal con border area were strengthened in of a worldwide conflict, which only
cerns at)out its Ix)rdeN, and k(cid:146)iii(cid:146)s an ()verl show of force. fly late Soviet leadership ci)uld decide.
based upon previous t S involve August. FEC intelligence rt(cid:146)port~ Meanwhile, General MacArthur was
inent with (;hine(cid:146)se Nationalist estiinated 246.001) PEA and 374.000 putting the final ele(cid:146)nw(cid:146)nts in place
forces, than it did ~vitl any Com(cid:151) mnielairtiathteroKooprsea~ncrbcoridner..(cid:145)vla1nchuur;a hlarndainnogthteharts~i~g-noautldurseplaitmpthhiebiI())RtP15K
mufist world~~ide strategy. forces(cid:146)(cid:146)~in(h force the(cid:146)ir retreat.
I-:d~~-.ird F~jnlioi,(cid:146). I)cii(cid:146)h(cid:146) limO? /:(cid:145)jm~ht On 5 September. the CIA issued
,ti(cid:146)nzt(cid:146) .S/s(cid:146)c(cid:146)ia/ ()f~(cid:146)1a!i(m4zs ii I/ic(cid:146) J<o,(cid:146)ea~i Intelligence Me(cid:146).(cid:146)norandu m 321.
lt.ar(Anriapo!is,.(cid:146)~tt). \av~-I ln(cid:146)litiite t(cid:146)rei.(cid:146).. Military and Dipiomatic Moves
995). p. 8 .\lIcn S. \\(cid:145)Imitirig. c/mum (.i(cid:146).(cid:146)soc /1)1 la/u
)avid .\~ It:ttcli iiicl Ito)-cr1 t_o,in. Iten(cid:151) Nc(cid:146)t (cid:145)i(cid:146)ork: \t,im,(cid:146)Ilh iikmii, 96))). fl On 15 September, t.S Marine(cid:146)s
son. (cid:145)tic Iso)rcari \\(cid:145)ar: (cid:145)!(cid:145)he SI(tN(cid:146)l(cid:146) Rack(cid:151) olin \\. Spaniei. (cid:145)I/ic(cid:146) iiliimic!im(cid:151).ilac - rushed ashore, captured the \ve(cid:146)st
gonincl, NSA ,\limiigrapli June 2000 ,.I,iI~mr(.(cid:145)o;mI(cid:146)oei(cid:146)rs,(cid:146) )(:~u1hhridgi..\l..\: liar(cid:151)
it(cid:146) rgeii ) mimics /(cid:145)m(cid:146)n,c~ ~/c(cid:151)b mmcmi. (cid:145)Ibe I(cid:237)a ii vaid 1(cid:145)rum~ cOitv l(cid:146)rcs(cid:146),. I95~,i), p. 85 coast city ot Inchon. and began
(110/I/ic(cid:146) /imma,i~c(cid:146) )St,mntimrcl, ( A: Stanford t(cid:146)ni (liarlc(cid:146), A. \\illoiiglihv mdjimli(cid:146)i (iani(cid:151) driving Dh(cid:146)RK forces north toward
\crsitv t(cid:146)ress. I985I. ~ herOin, ,l/ac,tm1hm,m~ 19-il-/95! (New
Slimi p. 63. (cid:145)m(cid:146)ork ~tcGra(cid:146),v-l ItH, 1954). p 486. Kuhn(cid:146),. t -~33-
61
Korea
their country. This strategic success and central China into the Sino(cid:151) that China will not allow a neigh
was a clear signal that the invasion Korean border areas..0 bor to lx(cid:146) invaded.2(cid:146)
from the North had not only failed.
hut also that the DPRK forces could Once again, these warnings were
be destroyed by the S-led UN Discounting the Chinese Threat ignored, and US-UN forces con
force. Two days later, a high-rank tinued to push the DRPK forces
ing Chinese delegation of In the face of these warnings, the northward. On 2 October, ,(cid:145)vlao
intelligence and logistics officers JCS instructed MacArthur to con cahk(cid:146)d Stalin advising that China
arrived in North Korea to evaluate tinue his advance north to destroy would intervene and asked for
the military situation and prepare the I)PRK armed forces as long as Soviet military assistance.~0 Three
the battlefield for Chinese military there was no threat of a major Chi days later, the CCP Central Commit
action.21 nese or Soviet intervention. (cid:145)I(cid:146)hese tee officially decided to intervene.~
instructions were based upon a 1,5 intelligence, however, contin
By late Septemher. China had sent National Security Council decision ued its reporting theme that while
numerous dipk)matic signals made before the Inchon landing.2(cid:146) Chinese capability was present,
expressing its concern regarding a The Secretary of State also disre Chinese intent was lacking. On 6
US occLlpation of North Korea. The garded these warnings, telling the October. the US Joint Intelligence
Acting PLA chief of staff told the press that Chinese intervention Indications Committee stated that
Indian Ambassador in Peking that would be (cid:147)sheer madness.(cid:148) the Chinese capability to intervene
China would never allow CS forces had grown. but the Chinese threat
to reach Chinese territory.22 (cid:145)l(cid:146)he By the end of the month, the S to do so was questionable.42 That
Indian Foreign Minister conveyed Ambassador in Moscow reported same day, the ciA WeeklySum
this message to the US Ambassa that Soviet and Chinese contacts man(cid:146) advised that the possibility of
dor in New Delhi; in Washington. told both the British and Dutch Soviet or Chinese intervention con
the British Ambassador passed the Ambassadors that if foreign troops tinued to diminish. It also restated
same message to the State 1)epart- cross the 38(cid:146)~ parallel. China would the belief that Soviet requirements
ment.23 These private notices were intervene.2 This specific warning would drive any such decision,
matched by a 22 September public was also repeated to various jour
announcement in which the Chi nalists, and on 29 September. the (cid:145)Iwo days later, the Soviet position
nese loreign Ministry spokesman Associated I(cid:146)ress in Moscow was delivered to the Chinese. Sta
issued the statement (cid:147)We clearly reported that both China and the lin advised Mao that the USSR
reaffirm that we will always stand Soviet Union would take a (cid:147)grave could not provide the military sup
on the side of the Korean peo view(cid:148) of US krces crossing the 38(cid:146)~ plies and air cover over Manchuria
ple. and resolutely oppose the parallel.2~(cid:146) Finally, at the end of the that Mao had requested. Fle also
.
criminal acts of ,~merican imperial month, in a major public policy asked Mao not to engage in a large-
ist aggression against Korea and address celebrating the first anni scale offensive against US troops,
their intrigues for expanding the ~(cid:145)ersary of the establishment of the because such an action might lead
war.(cid:148) 2-. Also during this period. People(cid:146)s Republic of China, Zhou to a war between the United States
communications intercepts En-lai branded the United States as and the Soviet Union.43
continued to identify massive PLA China(cid:146)s worst enemy and stated
troop movements from southern 71w.\~(cid:145)u(cid:146) }drk Times. 10 October 1950.
Ilatch and Benson, (cid:145)The Korean War.(cid:148) 4)5 ~
Shu. p. 74. /liStOfl oftheJoint ChtLjS of5taj/: The Situ. pp. ~8-(cid:146)9.
22 Kavalam Madhava l(cid:146)anikkar. in Two Chi Chiefso/.S(cid:146)taj/(cid:146)and .\atwna/i(cid:146)oliC3(cid:146). toL (cid:145)I Edwin I(cid:146). Iloyt. TheDaythe ChineseAt
.
nas. tie flairs ofa Diplomat (I,ondon: TheKorean War, part I (Ilistorical Divi tacked: Korea. 1950(New York(cid:146). McGraw-
George Allen and t(cid:146)nwin. 1955). pp. 108-9. sion.Joint Secretariat.JointChiefs ofStaff). liii!. 1990). pp. 80-81.
~(cid:145) Edwin P. Iloyt. On io The ia/u(Briarctiff p. 230. e I~Iiot A. Cohen, (cid:145)I(cid:146)he Chinese Interven
Manor. NY: Stein and I)ay. 1984). p. 198. IIOVt. p. 19ft tion in korea, 1950,(cid:146) Studies in Intel/i
2. Sho. p. 77 Stone, p 120. ,c(cid:146)enCe. ~(cid:145)ol. 32. no. 3, FaIl 1988. p. 56.
62
Korea
The Chinese not only
made unilateral
a
decision to intervene for
On 12 October. CIA Office of of a large-scale Chinese interve(cid:146)n
nationalistic purposes,
Records and Estiiuate~ Paper 5~(cid:151)5O. tion. And, he noted, should it
but also intimidated the
entitled Critical Situations iii The occur, his air power would destroy
or l:ast(cid:151) ib,(cid:146)ecut (?11111l ((cid:145)i7iuzese Soviets into supporting any Chinese forces that appeared.
((cid:145)onu;nuuun.ct Iuu!((cid:146)!(cid:146)1(cid:146)(~J/!i~))1 lii I)orea, them.
cOfldU(.Ied that. (cid:147)While full(cid:151)scale (cid:145)Fhie next clay, the (LI J)aTh(cid:146) Sum
Chinese Communist intervention ifl (cid:145)9 nua;(cid:146)t(cid:146) repoi(cid:146)tecl that the I(cid:146)S Embassy
in The(cid:146) I lague had been advised
tKi(n)urieangmpuosstsibbielitrye,gaardceodnsaisdearactci)onn- China Intervenes that Chinese troops had nioved into
Korea. At this point, the analytic
of all known factors leads to the
cdisoencnciolstiLoipsnirco)ffbolartbhglahet)bbianalrr1wi9na5tr(~),.(cid:148)asuScoShvoi.aect1t)i0(t)hn ntiiunorcnnnlseu).rduciginnhwgdsitcihianenttteene(cid:146)tdrlicdlCe-i(phgtie)enncdceoes)ce(br)eerpmonprlteusn.nixlc.a sphneeoarsmdseepbwetehrceoat(nit)v.penumItmofnne)torvheoewmL(cid:146) niaAesgngtrreseenpeciodnyrtttosshhaKoti(fntt)rehCedeahr.ei
the nited States and the Soviet preparations for military nter\(cid:146)cn but it continLied to believe that the
I nion saw an~(cid:146) large-r~cale Chinese ti()n (cid:145)Ihe CIA reported that Clima Chinese would not openly inter
ifltei(cid:146)\ etition as potent ally stimulat was.purchasing medical supplies vene. (cid:145)l(cid:146)he(cid:146) Agency also abandoned
ing a global war, and the 5 abroad for future military activi the p )sition that tic(cid:146) Chine(cid:146)se had
understanding of the So~ tet posi ties.~ CIA reporting from 10k)o. the capabilit) to intcrve(cid:146)ne but
tion ~vas, indeed. s()und. Internal based o)n inforination (ibtamed would not do so. and began to
Chinese pm )ritles, however. cc)ntin(cid:151) from a former Chinese \ation~ilist accept that the Chinese(cid:146) had entered
Lied 10 I)C di.~countcd by officer sent into .\lanchiiria to con Korea. But it held firm to its view
\\?aslunc.ton which still belie~ed tact former colleagues now in the that China had no intention of
that the(cid:146) Soviets contodied overall l(cid:146)l.A, stated that the I(cid:146)l.A had 0(cid:146). er entering the war in any large-scale
Communist act ils ~()rld\vide. 300.000 troops in the border area. fashion.
And, on 15 October. a CIA-led
(cid:145)Ihe next day, the CCP Politburo irregular R()K force operating on By 20 October, the Agency had
decided that China should inter(cid:151) the \vest coast near the (cid:145)yalia river develope(cid:146)d anotiicr line of reas()n(cid:151)
~(cid:145)enc in the ~var even without reported that Chinese tr()(ips we(cid:146)re ing to e(cid:146)xplain the(cid:146) entry of Chiine(cid:146)se
S )viet mu itar\(cid:146) support. Based on rn( ving into Korea. force(cid:146)s in Kore(cid:146)a(cid:151)(cid:151)(cid:146)the(cid:146)y were(cid:146) there to
this decision, it was Sialin who protect the hydroelectric plants
relented on his c(cid:146)arliem request and All this intormation suhscqLtentlv ak)ng the(cid:146) Yalu river that provide(cid:146)
agreed to provide mu tar) supplies turned out to be accurate. ()n 13 power to the(cid:146) ,\Ianchurian industrial
against a Soviet loan extended to and I OcO)ber, the 3~(cid:146) 39(cid:146)., .incl area. (cid:145) (cid:145)l(cid:146)hiat same day, however.
IC) Chinese Field Armies ente:(cid:146)ed intelligence reports citing massive
the (:1)1nese. I Ic also ;igreecl to turn
over Soviet aircraft in China to the Kinorbeoat.h(cid:145)Fl\iXe(cid:146)asliinitnegltloingenacnedl(cid:145)Ieaodkevrshdiipd nbourmdbeerrsre(cid:146)goifonPLwAetrreocaplssoinditshse(cid:146)e(cid:146)mi
PL(cid:146)\ and to mo~e Soy et air units not alert either President (cid:145)l(cid:146)nim.in or nated. Re(cid:146)pom(cid:146)ting fr )ilt FEC
into position to defend Chinese ter MacArthur. who were abc ut to
riti rv. Thus, the Chiilese not only rnee(cid:146)t on Wake Island to discuss the (cid:147)Hc.(cid:146)xi 1)10ccil&(cid:146)rc(cid:146)n,c(cid:146) qLIotc(cid:146)cI in Richard II-
made a unilateral decision to inter conduct of the war. At that RI)(cid:146). crc and ~\rth1ur \t 5cIiIc:(cid:146)~iiiger. Cr lice
vene for nationalistic :(cid:145))lirposes. but meeting. on 15 October. MacArthur .c1(cid:146)i,!i,o(cid:146)icc..1I(cid:146)ocllu/(cid:146)in(cid:146)c (I.\oc(cid:146)wufOO(cid:145)iocr(cid:146),kS:1 (\oolodnAdcamv(cid:146)c(cid:146)icla(cid:146)rc.(cid:146)scsc/o~(cid:145)cf(cid:146)(cid:151)
also intimidated the S )\ jets into told (cid:145)l(cid:146)runian there was little(cid:146) chance I:crrar. Stra,cr~ and (drocix. tO0~). tip 2~-
supporting them.
Ri(cid:146)c(cid:146)iic,(cid:146)i, i, I0 Ilair(cid:146).(cid:146) S. tiucciaci .th(cid:146)cooi;s I,~(cid:146) lI(cc(cid:146)fl(cid:146) S
.
~In. p ~3 I/ndL, p tOft /,(cid:145),oinici. lot. II ~i(cid:146)cic(cid:148)~ o/ I,(cid:146)iaI udui Ilo/~(cid:146)
KciIinr~. p. 45CC Jolill (cid:145)toLuicl, Id, tlc,iicd (,ombc,! C\c_(cid:146)(cid:146),~ (Carclc(cid:146)n (~ii\(cid:146). (cid:147),\(cid:145): t)oLIhIc(cid:146)ckc\(cid:146). t~)~(
/1)1(1 ft ~ (cid:145)cork: (cid:145)ctorrow. t(cid:146)5)t C, p 2~. I). yr
63
Korea
Intelligence stated that 400,000 I(cid:146)LA rather than as replacements for intent to intervene openly or
troops were ready to cross the I)PRK losses. ~ That same day, directly in the war.
Yalu.(cid:148) The CIA I)ailySummary however, the FEC(cid:146) ]nte1li,c~enceSum
reported that a US military liaison ma?)(cid:146) advised that Chinese forces
officer in Hong Kong had stated had little combat potential against a Admitting the Obvious
that 400,000 l(cid:146)LA were to enter modern army. While this view
Korea. The Summary concluded, was acceptable in Tokyo and Wash By early November, field reports
however, that the Soviets and Chi ington. combat units in Korea were from Korea could no longer he
nese were not ready to accept a considerably less comfortable with ignored in Tokyo and Washington.
global ~var, which any large-scale it. In addition to l(cid:146)OW reporting from
intervention would trigger. Appar 1)0th the 81 Army and X Corps,
ently no one in either the FEC or During the next two days, Tokyo Marine Corps pilots reported mas
the CIA thought 400,000 I~LA troops and Washington continued to doubt sive truck conveys moving from
a rather large number for a defen the intelligence reports from the Manchuria into Korea. ~(cid:145) Also, a
sive force. front. On 30 October, MacArthur(cid:146)s regiment of the 1(cid:146)~ US Cavalry Divi
G-2, General \Villoughby, flew from sion, the first American unit to
l(cid:146)okyo to X Corps Heaclquarters to engage the PI.A, took heavy casual
Launching an Offensive personally interview 16 Chinese ties. By 4 l\ovcmher. the 1(cid:146)~ Cavalry
POWs. After this session, he pro identified five Pl.A divisions oppos
On 25 October, the first phase of
nounced them to lx.~ (cid:147)stragglers(cid:148) ing it, and the 1~ Marine Division
the Chinese offensive began with
rather than members of an orga identified three PLA divisions oper
the ROK 1(cid:146) Division in contact with
nized I(cid:146)LA unit.(cid:146)5 That same day. ating against it. (cid:145) Intercepted
l(cid:146)LA units. Chinese POWs. interro
the SIll Army reported that Chinese communications disclosed
gated that evening by US 811 Army
10 separate Chinese POWs stated an order for 30,000 maps of Korea
intelligence officers, told of a si,.
able Chinese presence. This was that several PLA divisic)ns were tor the forces in Manchuria~ US
reported to FEC G-2. Within the now in Korea. While reporting this Army military intelligence esti
next two days. PLA units deci in its DailySummary, CIA restated mated these were enough maps for
its belief that Chinese intervention 30 I1LA divisions.
mated two regiments of the ROK
611 l)ivision and forced the ROK II was unlikely, and that these troops
could be protecting the hyclroelec 1:ECs G-2 finally acknowledged
Corps into general retreat. Yet, on
28 October. the CIA 1)aily tric plants essential to the that the Chinese were in Korea in
Summary stated that only small. ManchLtrian economy. (cid:145)J(cid:146)he follow k)rce. But Willoughby continued to
independent Chinese units were ing day, the CIA Daily Summary claim these forces did not repre
fighting in Korea. It totally dis carried a report from the 8h Army sent official Chinese intervention. 9
counted the possibility that major stating that its elements were in By 3 November, FEC had raised
Chinese forces were present. By contact with two PLA regiments, its estimate of Chinese strength
29 October. South Korean units on and that a PoW claimed the Chi in Korea to 34.000. hacked by
both coasts captured Chinese from nese entered Korea on 16 October. reserves in Manchuria of
regimental-sized PLA units, and The Agency commented that while
these prisoners convinced X Corps small numbers of Chinese troops Lynn .\lontress and Nicholas Canzona,
:s .ltanm(cid:146) Operations in Korea ((cid:145)A~ishing
intelligence that the Chinese were were operating in Korea. it did not ton. I)C: Government Printing Office.
being committed to battle as Linits, believe this indicated Chinese 9~(cid:146)~ P l2c
\tartin Licliterman. To the Yalu and
Roy Edger Appleman, (cid:145),zited States (cid:147) Appleman. p. 755. Hack, in Ilarold Stein, American COil-till-
ArmyintheKorean tt~ir(Washington. DC: Joseph (:~ (;o~iId(cid:146)n, Korea: 7)x(cid:146) I n/old i/an(cid:146) Decisions (Itirmingham. AL Universi
Department of the Arm, 1960), p. 761. Story (New York: .\(cid:145)1cGr~tw-t till. 1983). iv of Ala!oma Press, 1963). p. 601
I!ovt. iheDat(cid:146) the chineseAt/ached. pp. 287-88. Ilatch and Henson. (cid:145)(cid:145)the Korean War.(cid:146)
p. 95. Breuer. p. 108. Spanier, p~ 117.
64
Korea
(cid:147)
The ME stated...that
there were no
indications an offensive
~r98,000 l(cid:146)LA soldiers md 370,000 Chinese forces on both sides of the
Chinese security troops.~(cid:146)(cid:146) The ((cid:145)LA was in the offmg. That Korean-Chinese border.(cid:148)
day, the second
tVeekli(cid:146) .S(cid:146)zi,nmar~(cid:146) of t ~at date esti same
mated a similar numi er of Chinese Chinese offensive By mid-Ncrvember, FEC reported
troops a~t~rufly in K )rea. but con(cid:151) started, leaving the US 8t~(cid:146)I that, 12 PLA divisions lracl been
tinued to take the p ).Siti()fl that Army fighting for its life. identified n Korea.(cid:148) On
China(cid:146)s intention was to protect the 24 November(cid:146), however, National
Manchurian border and its hydro 9~
Intelligence Estimate 2/1 stated that
electric plants.
China had the capability for large-
Finally, on 5 Noveml er, Wil contradictory message caused some scale offensive operations hut that
loughlw admitted that (;hinese confusion among the \X(cid:146)~shingtori there were no indications such an
forces in Korea had t ~e potential to military leadership. ,(cid:145)vleanwhik(cid:146). Kim offensive was in the offing.(cid:148) That
C(>nduct a large-scale counteroffen Il-sung publicly admitted that Clii same day, the second Chinese
sive. l.ater that day, I owever. nesc troops were lighting in Korea. offensive started, leaving the
~vJacArthLIr advised the JCS that he and a ,Veu(cid:146) }(cid:145)ork (cid:145)limes article on
still did not believe the Chinese (i November said that the Ne~~(cid:146) 8(cid:146) Army fighting for its life and
would enter the war in force(cid:148) China News Agency had reported most of the I Marine Division stir-
that China had (cid:145)volunteers fi,~ht rounded and threatened with
ing there. 1~eliablc Chinese annihiiatkin
A BriefRespite Nationalist sources also reported
that China was preparing for urge(cid:151) It took seVeral daYs for MacArthur
Between 4 and 5 N )\(cid:145)cmbcr. the scale combat operations against the and his staff to face the fact that us
Chinese forces broke contact and UN forces.(cid:148) (cid:147)end of the war(cid:148) offensit(cid:146)e to~~zrrcl
Tmnihetilystefrodershp(cid:145)lia(cid:146)otkceykopirnotavonidtdheWedacsaohnuinOntgprytpsooinrdtet.uo O(cid:145)lInmesInrNeopvoertmebdert.hatThthee\St(cid:146)uo(cid:146)vie)t(cid:145)brkpress tnhoet Ynaealru.wFaisnalolvy,eronan2d8(cid:145)~Nioctvoermybwears,
evaluate the situation and assess described the Chinese as ready to MacArthut repcirted that Ire faced
the nature and size of the Chinese destroy any hrrce which posed a 200,000 l>I.A troops and a com
threat. MacArthur advised that tlireat to China, and on I6 Nc)vem(cid:151) pletely new war. MacArthur again
while the Chinese h~.d not inter her the newspaper reported that had the numbers significantly
vened in force, their strength in Chinese troops \~(cid:145)ere m(wing into wrong, but lie got tIre (cid:147)new war(cid:148)
Korea in large numbers, and that
Korea could force a retreat of his part right.
troops. liiis seemingly even more troops would follo~v
intelligence from the H(cid:146) Ar(cid:146)m~(cid:146) also
Ilovt, (cid:145)thu Dat/in(cid:146) (.iooru(cid:146)se ,4ttcoc(cid:146)I~(cid:146)eol,
Appk(cid:146)ruin. p (cid:145)62. reported massive buildups of P(cid:149) 122.
II ))(cid:145)t ()fl to !(tO)?TVcu thu (cid:145)cilzi, p. 26 ~(cid:145) ~tontre(cid:146)s ml! tan/aria. p. 129.
.
(cid:145)t(cid:146)run,an. ~(cid:149))- .i(cid:146)~7~ c:ulL(cid:146)n, p. ~o8. /R( S(cid:146), pr. I220.2(cid:146)
65