DTIC ADA529571: Interservice Rivalry in Action. The Endless Roles and Missions Refrain

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

INTERSERVICE
RIVALRY IN ACTION
*

THE ENDLESS ROLES AND MISSIONS REFRAIN?
COL RICHARD SZAFRANSKI, USAF
R
EFRAIN HAS two meanings. As a central issue in the roles and missions debates of
noun, it means a regularly recurring the recent past has been the role of air and space
phrase or stanza or an oral repetition.
forces in the future, and that issue will remain
As a verb, it means to defer action, to
pivotal in any review to come. 1 At least two pos ­
restrain oneself from doing something. Both the
sibilities exist for such a review. A strategy re -
noun and verb forms may apply to the capstone
activity of interservice rivalry: debates over roles view, should it become enshrined as a permanently
and missions. This article illuminates and ex ­ recurring process, promises to accomplish little be ­
plores what may become a central issue of the yond making the refrain of endless, prolonged,
upcoming and first refrain (the Quadrennial Strat ­
and low-level debate the theme song of the mili ­
egy Review**), some surrounding issues, and the
tary services. The four major services likely see
range of likely outcomes of such a process. The
the first case, which continues a tradition of
*This article is based on a paper presented at the Conference on Interservice Rivalry and the American Armed Forces, held at the Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 4–7 March 1996.
**Now called the Quadrennial Program Review.
48
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INTERSERVICE RIVALRY 49
dodging contentious issues whenever possible, as copy of Secretary of Defense William Perry’s let ­
the more benign one. ter of response to the report that went to Sen
The second possibility is that the first re - Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.). In this letter of 24
view may step up to the responsibility of ex ­ August 1995, the secretary of defense wrote that
amining our strategy, national security “DOD [Department of Defense] strongly agrees
processes, the number and structure of the uni ­ that a comprehensive strategy and defense pro -
fied commands, and our entire armed forces in gram review should be conducted in the opening
the harsh light of the post-cold-war, post–Desert months of each administration.” 4 Although DOD
Storm world. The results could be dramatic. An
authentically courageous review would examine
the multitudinous issues of providing for na ­
tional security with the processes and organ ­ “As the United States thinks about its

izational forms appropriate for the next
national security responsibilities far

century. If a comprehensive and authentic re -
into the future, do we realize

view occurs, it must put the spotlight on the role
of airpower and space power in the future. In this a greater return on investment from

case, the central debate will focus on differing surface maneuver forces or from air

views of the utility of surface maneuver forces.
and space forces?”

The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps—services
whose principal responsibilities are to organize, The answer will be garbed in

train, and equip surface maneuver forces—will face the usual platitudes about the value of

the Air Force, the steward of our country’s air and
jointness.

space forces. In a world of uncertainty, such a de -
bate would rely heavily on theory and doctrine.
This article examines the latter case in greater de -
tail but does not ignore the possibility that very lit ­
tle might happen in a recurring quadrennial review .
merely might have agreed, it chose to
“strongly” agree, thereby opening the way for the
next great potential crisis of interservice rivalry:
Genesis of Strategy Review the first Quadrennial Strategy Review (fig. 1).
Thus, sometime between the election of No ­
What sparked the need for a strategy review in vember 1996 and the budget submission for fis ­
the first place? A speech by Sen Sam Nunn (D- cal year 1999, the services likely will face one
Ga.) on 2 July 1992 seemed to be the point of ori - another once again on the formal and visible bat ­
gin for what followed: a “bottom-up review”
tlefield of internecine squabbling and interservice
and, in its wake, the law that created the Com -
rivalry. Believing as they do in the intelligence
mission on Roles and Missions of the Armed
preparation of the battlefield, we would be wise
Forces (CORM), chaired by John P. White. 2 Pur­
to accept that fighting among the services already
suant to the law, the commission did its work and
has begun as low-level skirmishing. The skir ­
wrote its report. Directions for Defense: Report
mishers aim to assess the strengths and weak ­
of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the
nesses of the competitors, to assay any
Armed Forces (May 1995) recommended—among
opportunities for making or breaking contingent
many other things—that a “quadrennial strategy
review, [a] comprehensive force and strategy re - alliances, and to prevent surprises when the battle
view be conducted at the start of each new Ad - commences in the spring or summer of 1997.
ministration.” 3 On 25 August 1995, the new Whether the services anticipate a big battle or a
deputy secretary of defense—the same John P. little battle, they aim to be ready. It could be a
White—transmitted to the services and Joint Staff a very little battle.
50 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1996
SENATOR NUNN’S SPEECH
BOTTOM-UP REVIEW
SECTION 954(c)
COMMISSION ON
ROLES AND MISSIONS
QUADRENNIAL
STRATEGY REVIEW
STRATEGY REVIEW THE ENDLESS REFRAIN
STRATEGY REVIEW
THE UTILITY OF SURFACE FORCES
QUADRENNIAL
versus
STRATEGY REVIEW
THE UTILITY OF AIR AND SPACE FORCES
Figure 1. At Least Two Options
Legitimizing Inaction ends,” as former secretary of state George Shultz
observed. Quadrennial reviews, especially those
One of the dangers of espousing “strong” sup - tied to election years and conducted by the or ­
port for a quadrennial review is that recurring re - ganization most likely to be affected by the
views may invite—and might even findings, may not deserve strong intellectual sup -
institutionalize—inaction. One might view clo - port. A likely outcome in such a case could
sure on contentious issues as unnecessary since be little outcome at all.
one can study each and every issue in four-year Thus, the services might see an impotent and
blocks, only to reexamine them every four years. recurring review as the better case. Preparation
Yet, this approach is characteristic of the Wash­ for such a review would include all the attributes
ington, D.C., mores whereby “nothing ever already associated with the institutional “slow
INTERSERVICE RIVALRY 51
roll”: proposing an agenda so large and compre ­ security in a democracy. Stretch as one might,
hensive that it could not be completed in one or one cannot easily envision anyone in the system
two years; hiring a huge permanent staff and de - with the courage or time to summon forth such a
tailing scores of military officers to assist; schedul ­ radical reexamination, no matter how necessary
ing hundreds of interviews and dozens of and overdue. (One can envision it—it is possible
briefings; writing volumes of white papers; and, in theory—but one cannot envision it easily.)
in the end, publishing a slick, glossy report de -
tailing the work done and the issues remaining
for the next quadrennial review. Since the review
The majority of the CINCs (in this re­
would be internal, the report would go to the sec­
retary of defense, who could make any changes gard, the Army and the Navy
deemed appropriate. outnumber the Air Force by a wide
A problem with a recurring review done by
margin) very likely will support the
DOD is that our national security decision -making
Army and the Navy.
structures are bigger than DOD. If the cold war
is indeed over, at some point someone is likely to
ask why our country still remains wed to so many
cold war structures and processes. My colleague
Grant Hammond asks the questions in this way: Two cases, however, admit of such a pos sibil­
ity. In the first, one of the political parties has con­
If the cold war is over and the military, trol of Congress, and one of its members is in
businesses, and Congress are all involved in the White House. In the second, Congress is
downsizing, reengineering, reorganizing, and united in its willingness to conduct a comprehen ­
reinventing themselves—to varying degrees— why are sive review, and the executive branch agrees.
we so confident (versus “comfortable”) with a The key to both is close cooperation between the
national security apparatus inherited from the cold
legislative and executive branches of our govern ­
war? The National Security Act of 1947, the Key
ment. The more likely case is that most of our
West Agreement, the Department of Defense and
cold war structures, having served at least ade ­
National Security Council structures (even as
quately during the cold war, will remain in place
amended), and so forth, may not be the appropriate
ones within which to meet new challenges. At the under “the devil you know” rule.
heart of this is a program analysis and evaluation As an alternative to a comprehensive re-
(PA&E), Joint Requirements Oversight Council view of the system, one could focus on a single
(JROC), and a budget cycle and calendar which element in the system: the armed forces. An ex­
inhibit innovative thinking and reinforce
amination of this lesser-included case reveals just
interservice rivalry.5
how complex a larger review could be. At least
Whether or not one accepts this assessment in two alternatives present themselves: (1) a modest
its entirety, it illuminates how large— perhaps review wherein major changes are deferred until
overwhelmingly large—a comprehensive review the next quadrennial review (the alternative the
would have to be. The likelihood that DOD services probably would prefer) and (2) a com ­
would urge a larger review than the modest one en - prehensive review of the armed forces. Since the
visioned by CORM is, in my opinion, quite services might view the latter as the less desirable
small. A larger review very likely would require case, it bears closer examination—one which ad -
that the legislative branch collaborate with the ex ­ dresses a central question that a comprehensive
ecutive branch to conduct a comprehensive, review needs to answer.
muzzle-to-stock revie w. This would necessitate Such a question might be posed as follows: “As
a review of the congressional committee struc ­ the United States thinks about its national security
ture, the budget, federal acquisition regulations, responsibilities far into the future, do we realize a
the interagency process, the basing structure, and greater return on investment from surface maneu ­
almost everything else that contributes to national ver forces or from air and space forces?” 6 The
52 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1996
answer will be garbed in the usual platitudes first Quadrennial Strategy Review is to contem -
about the value of joint ness, the need to better inte - plate the possibility that serious and dramatic
grate capabilities, and so forth. Underneath the changes might be mandated. Understandably,
garb, however, the answer will stand naked. If the services are anxious .
airpower and space power win assent in the review There may be good reason for anxiety. Condi ­
as highly economical and higher-utility forces, the tions that will bound the coming disputation—or
size and investment in surface maneuver forces perhaps channel it to a very sharp point—could
will diminish. 7 If airpower and space power con ­ make it more vigorous than past ones on force
tinue to be viewed as useful adjuncts to surface structure or strategy. Four such conditions—fea ­
maneuver forces, the Air Force likely will con­ tures of the strategic environment, if you will—are
tinue to shrink. Continue is the correct word; the as follows: (1) the relaxation of accepted norms
Air Force has taken the larger share of cuts in for public debates over force structure and strat ­
service appropriations over the past several years. 8
egy; (2) the condition of the country’s purse; (3)
The right answers and perhaps even a predictable
the fact that the debate will occur during a rare
outcome reside somewhere between the neces ­
interval when the United States has no obvi­
sity ceiling and the pork floor.
ous enemies able to threaten its vital interests;
and, most importantly, (4) the great uncertainty
about the nature of a post-cold-war world. If we
consider all of these conditions and make modest
Environmental
assumptions about how service cultures will affect
Considerations the ways the services intend to fight in the up -
coming review, the summer of 1997 could find
The year 1997 will present a different en viron­ us—as the Chinese curse says—living in a very
ment than the one that existed when the Key West interesting time.
Agreement was forged in 1948. Today , the
power of the Joint Staff has increased because of
oversight groups like JROC and a joint war-fight ­ The Gloves Are Off
ing capability assessment architecture. The The next debate will occur in an environment in
power and authority vested in regional and func ­ which the services have relaxed norms to moder -
tional commanders in chief (CINC) are well es ­
ate their behavior in a public quadrennial force
tablished. The services are more sophisticated.
structure and strategy review. An existing and
Admonished by civilian leaders to better inte -
seated quadrennial review—the Eighth Quadren ­
grate the capabilities of the armed forces, the
nial Commission on Military Compensa ­
services and Joint Staff are in continual dialogue
tion—does its work shrouded in an aura of
regarding the apportionment of tasks and respon ­
almost blissful irrelevance to the services. Al -
sibilities. The potential for turbulence, upheaval,
though military compensation is important, such
and serious rivalry is normally controlled by a
issues simply do not provoke serious debate be -
grinding bureaucratic process that aims to moder -
cause they are crosscutting matters that fail to
ate, soften, and blur the sharp lines of disagree ­
strike at or undercut the central strategic purpose
ment. In the existing conflict-resolution
architecture, a dispute deferred or delayed is of each service.
deemed a dispute resolved. The Joint Staff and Pay is one thing, but force structure and strat ­
the services seem to resist serious change, if for egy reviews are another matter entirely. We al­
no other reason than the armed forces are among ready know that monumental force structure and
the more conservative institutions in our country. strategy deliberations—consider the “revolt of the
Our armed forces seem to dread extraordinary admirals” over the B-36 aircraft— can incite seri­
commissions and reviews such as the Base Realign ­ ous fighting. The service chiefs usually prefer to
ment and Closure Commission (BRAC) and the do their fighting in camera in the “tank” 9 or
Bottom-Up Review (BUR). To contemplate the through their operations deputies and staffs.
INTERSERVICE RIVALRY 53
Yet, direct and public confrontations—sorties Thus, in the upcoming review we might ex ­
launched by one service or its chief directly pect the Army and the Navy to feel free to ad -
against another—are also a possibility. Before he dress, however reluctantly, such things as the
retired, Gen Merrill A. McPeak, chief of staff of added value and cost of the F-22 aircraft in rela­
the Air Force, may have created a new model tion to threat and capability, alternative technical
when he took the fight over apportionment of the solutions for the delivery of precision weap­
battle space directly to the Army and the Navy ons, the proper apportionment of responsibility
in testimony to CORM. His successor, Gen for theater ballistic missile defense, and the short -
Ronald R. Fogleman, probably is not similarly age of strategic lift. If the Army and the Navy
disposed, but the other service chiefs may believe find direct attacks on the Air Force necessary or
that the head of the institutional Air Force “broke even highly useful, we might also expect them to
the rules” during the testimony of the service attribute their behavior to the Air Force’s pre ­
chiefs to the commission. The Army and the vious behavior. Service chiefs within one year of
retiring may be less constrained in this combat than
Navy have long institutional memories.
more recently appointed chiefs. Very senior
Very likely, the Army and the Navy chiefs— or
chiefs also might be affected by what others have
at least their staffs—viewed the Air Force’s be ­
called “the arrogance of long command.”11 The
havior as egregious and unnecessary. Some ana ­
press—the unorthodox and often unwitting troops
lysts would have counseled the Air Force that
of the services—also might enter the fray, increas ­
CORM was, after all, just another commission in
ing the possibility that the upcoming fight could
the life of our post-cold-war democracy. Others
be especially caustic. The fifth column of retir ­
would have cautioned that CORM was an armed
ees and lobbyists—the Retired Officers Associa ­
reconnaissance probing for roles and missions tar -
tion, the Marine Corps Reserve Officers
gets for later attac k. (It was, as the Chinese strate -
Association, the Navy League, the Air Force As ­
gists would say, “beating the bush to find the
sociation, and other such groups—will work be -
snakes.”) Some would assert that the Air Force
hind the scenes and behind the lines to enliven
took CORM much more seriously than its charter
the debate. What would precipitate such a
should have suggested. Others would argue that
pointed debate? Money .
the Air Force made itself and the other services
more vulnerable by closing on such key issues as
the apportionment of the battle space and invest ­ There Is No More Money
ments planned by the other services. Most com ­ Money—or the lack of it—suggests that the up -
mentators might opine that the Air Force coming debates might be especially keen. The
violated some of the norms of interservice ri - major political parties have more or less agreed
valry.10 that economic vitality underpins national
strength and that a balanced budget and deficit
reduction must become national priorities. As ­
Air Force doctrine has remained some-
sessing the effects of a balanced budget suggests
that each of the services could be subject to large
what fluid since the

cuts. Large in this case might be tens of billions
Air Force became a separate
of dollars each year until the deficit is reduced. 12
service, changing a dozen times in less
Thus, the upcoming review could face the chal ­
lenge of apportioning hefty cuts to the services.
than 50 years.

In this case, each service very likely will scoot
down Maslow’s pyramid to the survival level and
54 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1996
prepare arguments proving that another service is This new vision of national security must
more eligible for cuts. emerge during an era when our country is hard
put to pinpoint a credible, clear, and present dan ­
ger to its security. In the pres ence of the great
unknown—the identity of our next enemy—we
The Air Force has no metrics or war
will fall back on the knowns of history and our
games . . . to demonstrate
tested utilitarian models. Thus, the upcoming de -
the power of airpower.
bate naturally will carry the great weight of dif ­
ferent political science theories and military
theories. It will focus on the ways in which the
A Pentagon admiral, speaking under the prom­ US might synthesize a new vision of national se ­
ise of nonattribution, observed that such fighting curity and military strategy from what we know
has already begun, acknowledging, “It used to be to be true, believe to be true, and expect to be
a race to the finish line. Now it’s more like a true.
demolition derby: to get your program across the
finish line, you have to convince others [the
JROC] to kill another service’s program.” 13 An Theoretical Enemies and
Hypothetical Responses
approach opposite the demolition derby tactic is
also effective: getting partners to support one Some political scientists will advance evidence that
service’s program in return for support of an - states are less powerful actors and threats than they
other’s program. These partners may be services once were, that national security in the next cen ­
or some of the CINCs. In this approach, a pro - tury will be inseparable from international secu ­
gram not on the bandwagon is a program walking rity, or even that a clash of civilizations is on the
to doom. Depending on how big or full a band - horizon.15 These arguments are interesting for the
wagon needs to be, production contractors, Con ­
services, but none are compelling. The armed
gress, retirees, the press, and state and local
forces place greater faith in the strength of their
governments can swell support .
doctrine and the repetitiveness of history—in
Cutting force structure or killing programs is
how they might have fought the last war better. 16
key, of course. According to some analyses, cut ­
During the upcoming debate, the services will
ting an active Army division or a Navy battle
appeal to doctrine, history, tradition, and reason to
group and its associated air wings saves as much
make their arguments. The major difference this
as $4 billion annually. These big-ticket, high-
time, I suggest, will be that the Army and the
visibility items are lucrative targets, and the serv -
Navy will ally to show the utility of investments
ices know it. Add to this the demise of some
in surface maneuver forces—including their al -
modernization programs—a new destroyer,
ready “organic” air and space capabilities—over
more B-2s, the F-22, or the V-22—and one need
address no smaller cost-containment issues. Some investments in Air Force air superiority and preci ­
people believe that killing the F-22, for example, sion strike far into the future. The majority of the
could save $3 billion annually. 14 Force struc­ CINCs (in this regard, the Army and the Navy
ture cuts disconnected from a reframing of the na ­ outnumber the Air Force by a wide margin) very
tional security strategy or the national likely will support the Army and the Navy, who will
military strategy are less rational than cuts that not do this by attacking Air Force programs or
follow naturally from a new vision of national se ­ even by directly refuting whatever airpower theo ­
curity—which, of course, is not to suggest that ries the Air Force advances. They will not even
strict objectivity is possible or even that rational ­ synchronize their attacks and launch them in col ­
ity is ever the dominant objective. lusion. Rather, the Army and the Navy will
INTERSERVICE RIVALRY 55
strive to assert superior theories, replete with his ­ no one can repulse an enemy army and retake or
torical examples that underpin their future vision. hold territory but an army.
The Army will testify both to its versatility and
to its strategic power. The versatility of disci­
plined, well-trained humans is being proven in
We Just Don’t Know
Bosnia—and more Bosnias rather than fewer
Overarching all these attributes of the environ ­ promise to populate the future. The Army can
ment is the unease springing from uncertainty. demonstrate its power by ana lyzing its war games
Never having lived in a post-cold-war world, we and exercises. The Army will document this data
are very uncomfortable living in it. We even are with the historical experience of the “certain vic -
uncomfortable postulating enemies against whose tory” in the Gulf War. 18 Air forces can help in ­
capabilities we ought to hedge or plan. To plan fluence events on the ground and can help shape
against the capabilities of a resurgent Russia is as the battles, but in and of themselves—and short
impolitic as planning against the capabilities of a of the omnicide of nuclear holocaust—they are
nation to which we have granted most-favored- incapable of winning a decisive victory or even
nation status for trade and tariff. of controlling events on the ground, the Army
will argue. The air battle, the Army will suggest,
really is only an adjunct to the AirLand Bat ­
tle—thus was it always so; thus will it always be.
The Arguments
In the absence of a clearly identifiable enemy, Naval Necessity
we are driven even harder to rely on theory and
The Navy will assert that the United States is an
doctrine. Theory is about the how and why of
island nation and that the Naval Expeditionary
military action, and doctrine is about the precise
Task Force or the Marine Air Ground Task Force
ways in which enemies are defeated militarily.
is the key to national military success and survival.
Thus, everything seems to converge in debates
It will trot out John Keegan and assert that fight ­
about theory and doctrine. If this is so, it is pos ­
ing in the future will occur along the littoral. It
sible to anticipate the arguments.
will argue that “physical presence” is superior to
untested notions of “virtual” global presence.
America’s Army The carrier battle group is a self-contained air
base and can operate either in international waters
The Army will remind us that it is America’s
or fight its way in and out of closed seas, it will
army and that one ought not try to remain a su ­
perpower without an army equal to superpower declare. Because the carrier battle group is mobile
responsibilities. There is no form of equipment and instantly deployable, the Navy will argue that
more sophisticated than simple, all-weather, all- this unit is insensitive to foreign basing or even
terrain soldiers, who—the Army’s war games overflight rights. Past US presidents, it will sug ­
show—are the answer to the search for the elusive gest, acknowledged the power of the naval in ­
“reconnaissance-strike complex. ” The Army, the strument by using the Navy or the Marine Corps
Army will remind us, is vital across the spectrum as the force of choice for intervention. Always
of conflict. Our Army can engage in peacekeep ­ an extraterritorial force, the Navy can come and
ing, nation building, humanitarian operations, or go as the president pleases. When it moves to -
large-scale conventional conflict. It must be ward a crisis area, others attend to the signifi ­
heavy because enemies might be heavy and our cance of that movement. Why, the Navy will
own Marines are “light.” Our Army possesses (to ask, would anyone want to reduce the most pow­
steal a phrase from the Marines) certain capabili - erful navy on the planet to a position of impo­
ties for an uncertain future. Territory matters even in tence when we know that the remaining hermit
the “Third Wave,” the Army will assert. 17 And kingdoms of the world reside astride the littoral?
56 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1996
Most of the planet’s population, it will argue, is Theories of Airpower and
concentrated within a few hundred miles of the Space Power
littoral. It will reveal its analyses of naval war
Air Force doctrine has remained somewha t fluid
games to show the added value of an immensely
since the Air Force became a separate service,
potent navy and of its organic and combined-
changing a dozen times in less than 50 years.
arms light and expeditionary naval infantry as con ­
Even today (a cynic might opine “most days”), a
flict-resolution mechanisms for the future . change to Air Force doctrine is in draft. 20 Since
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the diminu ­
tion of what used to be called the “strategic nu -
The Air and Space Conundrum
clear deterrence mission, ” the Air Force appears
The Air Force will have—or could have—a to be searching for a post-cold-war raison d’être.
tougher row to hoe in the upcoming debates. If the Although a massive effort is under way to revi ­
Army and the Navy separately demon strate the talize long-range planning within the Air Force,
very high utility of surface maneu ver forces in the the prospects for such a revitalization are not good
unless it is driven by vision and as long as pur­
immediate and distant future, the Air Force has
pose and platform remain closely linked within the
two huge chores. First, it must dispute those very
minds of Air Force leaders. The Air Force has no
nearly indisputable arguments without further
metrics or war games—beyond simple or complex
provoking the Army and the Navy. Second, it
attrition models inherited from the Army—to
must contest the efficacy of surface maneuver
demonstrate the power of airpower. The Army
doctrine and theory by advancing a credible can use attrition or the movement of the forward
and superior theory illuminating the un- or un ­ edge of the battle area (FEBA) to show what ar ­
derappreciated power of airpower. In so doing, mies can do. The Army can assert that it has a
the Air Force also must avoid the trap of focusing system of internetted “battle labs” to continu ­
its argument on its air and space platforms, ously test and refine its doctrine. The Army can
assert that future competitor states will most cer ­
knowing that, given the opening, both the Army
tainly possess an army.
and the Navy—and the CINCs—are willing to
The Air Force can talk of the “enemy as a sys­
talk about platforms. Although Air Force chiefs
tem” or of striking plural strategic “centers of grav­
of staff, like all the service chiefs, have the statu -
ity,” but few people in the Air Force know
tory obligation to organize, train, and equip precisely what those phrases mean. 21 Metrics,
forces for the combatant CINCs, the Air Force the imprecision of Air Force models, the quest
might be lulled, Icarus-like, into focusing only on for space, information-warfare dominance—all
equipage, incorrectly assessing that the debate is this is reminiscent of an overly diversified corpora ­
about equipment. 19 tion whose errant product divisions march to dif ­
ferent drummers while corporate headquarters
The debate, I suggest, will not focus on equip ­
focuses on manned air superiority fighters. 22 Is
ment as much as it focuses on political science,
this the kind of organization we would expect to
military theory, and doctrine emerging from
advance convincing arguments that air and space
theory. Here, the Navy will wield the hammer of
forces will have higher utility than surface ma ­
history and use it to pound awareness of the ines - neuver forces in the distant future? Will the Air
capable geography of the planet into the con ­ Force be able to demonstrate convincingly that
sciousness of the reviewers. America’s Army air superiority and airpower defeat enemies?
has the powerful weapons of history and doctrine Probably not.
and is well equipped to engage in a debate on po ­
litical science, military theory, and doctrine
At the End of the Day
emerging from theory. In this arena, the Air
Force could (or will) find itself at a disadvantage. So how will it all turn out? Only the naive do