DTIC ADA529520: Europe without the United States? Prospects for European Defense Cooperation after the 1996 European Union Intergovernmental Conference

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

EUROPE WITHOUT THE
UNITED STATES?
Prospects for European Defense Cooperation
after the 1996 European Union
Intergovernmental Conference
CHARLES KRUPNICK
EUROPE IS STILL organized Rome and the European Community (EC) sum ­
for the cold war. The North At­ mit in Maastricht that pointed to a less military
lantic Treaty Organization and more political role for NATO and toward
(NATO) remains the key security greater defense involvement by exclusively Euro ­
institution, and the United States pean organizations such as the EC—now known
is still deeply involved in European defense ac ­ as the European Union (EU)—and the Western
tivities. In 1991, however, a framework for European Union (WEU). This article provides a
change was approved at the NATO summit in brief history of autonomous European defense ef -
forts and focuses on the next big opportunity for
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Europe Without the United States? Prospects for European Defense
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EUROPE WITHOUT THE US? 49
institutional change in Europe, the 1996 EU in ­ plan of the early 1950s was a much more ambi ­
tergovernmental conference (IGC). While con ­ tious initiative toward a united Europe. Proposed
ventional wisdom suggests that the conference as a way to rearm western Germany without
will bring about only modest modifications to ex ­ alarming the rest of Europe, the EDC was to be a
isting arrangements, more significant advances European army composed of national forces inte -
are possible. The Euro-Atlantic unity forged by grated at low unit levels and controlled by a su ­
the cold war is now a distant memory, and pranational European political community. In the
American interest in European problems is flag ­ end, France would not give up control of its army
ging despite NATO’s recent vitality and the cur- and triggered the abandonment of the plan in
rent US political and military commitment to 1954. With American leadership anxious for
Bosnia. Western Europe’s developing ties with military help in central Europe, the European al -
the former Soviet bloc and increasing recognition lies allowed Germany to rearm within a NATO
of common interests encourage a new look at framework; to express European solidarity, they
Europe’s security architecture. “Maastricht II,” as created the WEU alliance. 2 The WEU used the
the upcoming IGC is sometimes called, could be strong Brussels Treaty as its legitimizing docu ­
the break from past arrangements that some ment, but ended up as a much looser and weaker
scholars and political leaders have been predict ­ organization than the EDC would have been. Its
ing ever since the cold war ended. 1 military functions were subordinate to NATO,
and it never became a very important part of the
Cold War Stepchild European unity movement. By the early 1970s,
WEU activity had virtually come to an end.
Following World War II, the threat of a Soviet
The European Community, founded in 1957,
or communist takeover of Western Europe led to
was a much more successful integra tion experi­
an unprecedented degree of American engage ­
ment. Based on the supranational European
ment in European affairs. In defense matters, the
Coal and Steel Community, the EC’s founding
US commitment took form in the NATO alliance
members decided to concentrate on economic is -
of countries from Europe and North America.
sues and to keep security and defense outside the
The nuclear weapons and deployed conventional
organization’s original charter.3 The exclusion of
forces of the United States helped to establish a
security and defense issues was an under­
tense but remarkably peaceful stalemate with the
standable reaction to the EDC debacle. However,
Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. While
the pursuit of influence—whether economic or
Europeans welcomed the new transatlantic rela ­
political—was always part of the EC agenda and
tionship, many of them also believed that their
suggests why the organization was so often cen ­
countries should pursue more exclusively Euro­
tral to designs for European security and defense
pean arrangements that might lead to a united
cooperation separate from NATO.4 During the
Europe and perhaps recapture the “peace of Char­
lemagne.” Hence proposals for autonomous Euro­ Fouchet debates of the early 1960s, for example,
pean security and defense French president Charles de Gaulle pushed un -
cooperation—meaning independent of NATO successfully for an EC-member defense authority
and the United States—have been periodic fac­ to help counter US military and political influ ­
tors in Europe’s institutional development. ence in Europe. His continued displeasure with
In 1948, France, Great Britain, and the three US predominance and policies prompted him to
Benelux countries signed the Brussels Treaty and withdraw France from NATO’s military functions
made a 50-year commitment to mutual defense. in 1966.
Although a strong alliance on paper, the agree ­ Later in the 1960s, Europe’s growing eco ­
ment’s more immediate purpose was to encour - nomic strength and collective unhappiness with
age US participation in Europe’s US security and monetary policies encouraged
defense—indeed, NATO followed shortly there - EC members to coordinate on additional issues.
after. The European Defense Community (EDC) To facilitate common foreign policy positions,
50 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPECIAL EDITION 1996
European Political Cooperation (EPC) emerged Rome and Maastricht
and developed into an extensive set of intergov ­
ernmental meetings and information-sharing The European defense cooperation became a
processes. The EPC languished in the 1970s, big issue again as the cold war was ending. In
along with other integration efforts, as Europe the late 1980s, the Single European Act, which
struggled with a prolonged economic recession streamlined EC procedures, and the “Europe
and with a general pessimism about its future. 1992" project, which reduced EC nontariff barri ­
Enthusiasm for Europe was rekindled during the ers to trade, were part of a growing momentum
next great crisis in US-European relations—the for European integration that had developed just
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) dispute as the Soviet bloc began to fall apart. The WEU
over deployment of Soviet and US intermediate- also showed signs of life when it conducted ac ­
range missiles to Europe in the late 1970s and tual military missions with mine-clearing and
early 1980s. European official and public con ­ surveillance operations during the Iran-Iraq War
cern over US handling of this and other issues and the Gulf War. Integration enthusiasts seized
encouraged various initiatives—such as the Gen ­ the opportunity and pushed vigorously for in -
scher-Colombo and Spinelli proposals—that ex ­ creased EC-WEU competence in security and de ­
plicitly called for defense cooperation among EC fense affairs. NATO advocates opposed this
countries.5 When these proved too forward-look ­ expansion of European activity, however, and
ing for several EC members, France shifted the hoped to keep the alliance as the primary Euro ­
initiative to the moribund WEU and, in 1984, ef­ pean defense organization into the post-cold-war
fected the organization’s revival. 6 period with an expanded political role, an out-of-
area mission, and perhaps a reengaged France.
The two sides found a middle ground eventu -
ally, but only after surprisingly divisive bargain ­
ing. At their Rome summit in November 1991,
The EC/EU failure in Yugoslavia was

NATO members approved significant force re ­
symptomatic of the

ductions and announced a more pacific new strat ­
ineffectiveness of the common
egy that, nonetheless, continued the alliance’s
foreign and security policy process.
central role in Europe. The reorganized structure
included a new Allied Command Europe Rapid
Reaction Corps (ARRC), a British-commanded
multinational force with about 70,000 troops but
without the explicit out-of-area mission for which
European defense cooperation received an it was so obviously designed. NATO gained a
added boost from the US Strategic Defense In ­ new political role with an Eastern liaison mission
itiative (SDI) in the mid-1980s and from the and creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation
US/Soviet Reykjavik summit between presidents Council (NACC), composed of representatives
Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. The from the alliance and the countries of the former
United States seemed ready to move away from a Warsaw Pact. These initiatives committed the alli­
nuclear deterrent strategy that had provided dec ­ ance to working with its former foes on a wide
ades of reasonable peace in Europe and toward range of political-military issues such as defense
an untested theory of space-based defense. Euro ­ planning and civil-military relations. The Rome
pean displeasure was reflected in the Hague summit, however, failed to induce France to re -
Declaration of 1987 that committed WEU join NATO’s military side, although French rep ­
mem- bers to move toward a more European resentatives had helped author the new alliance
context for security and defense. At the same strategy. In a key concession to France and other
time, France and Germany decided to create a mul­ enthusiasts of autonomous European defense, the
tinational military unit outside of NATO: the 4,000- allies sanctioned the creation of autonomous
man Franco-German Brigade. European military structures outside of NATO
EUROPE WITHOUT THE US? 51
and endorsed the WEU as the “European pillar electorate rejected the Maastricht Treaty in May
of the alliance.”7 1992.l0 After a year of painstaking renegotiation,
At Maastricht a month later, the EC leadership the Danes finally approved the treaty in a second
agreed to change their organization into a Euro ­ plebiscite but only after their government had ob ­
pean “union.” The new framework would have tained opt-outs similar to those granted to Great
three pillars: the first including those functions Britain in the original bargaining. An even
and institutions developed under the Treaty of greater shock to Europe was the monetary crisis
Rome (the old EC), but with an added commit ­ of September 1992. International currency trad ­
ment to economic and monetary union (EMU) by ers gambled that, if faced with intense selling
1999; the second, an intergovernmental pillar for pressure, the British pound and the Italian lira
a common foreign and security policy (CFSP); could not be maintained within the parity bands
and the third, another intergovernmental pil ­
of the European exchange rate mechanism
lar—this one for judicial and internal affairs
(ERM). They guessed right, and both currencies
(such as asylum and immigration policy) and for
were soon forced out of the ERM, foreshadowing
cooperation against organized crime. To appease
enormous difficulties ahead in establishing a sin ­
British domestic opposition to European integra­
gle European currency.
tion, Great Britain was given opt-outs from EMU
But Europe’s most severe crisis was certainly
and from a separate social charter.
the ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia—the
The common foreign and security policy was a
first real war in Europe since World War II.
further development of EPC and was created to de -
When fighting broke out in mid-1991, the EC
fine common positions for European interaction
took a leading role and negotiated agreements that
with other world actors. Virtually all the issues a
temporarily reduced the level of violence. These
sovereign state might face in the international
efforts began to unravel as EC members debated
arena were listed as possible areas of CFSP com­
the various political options and how deeply to
petence, including nonproliferation, arms control,
get involved. The EC’s mediation role ended in
UN peacekeeping operations, humanitarian inter­
early 1992 with the decision of its members to
ventions, and relations with the Soviet Union and
formally recognize Slovenia and Croatia as sover ­
North America. The Maastricht Treaty affirmed
eign states, thereby alienating Serbian leaders and
that “the common foreign and security policy
populations throughout Yugoslavia. The United
[would] include all questions related to the security
Nations assumed institutional leadership in the re ­
of the European Union, including the eventual
gion; later, NATO took over.
framing of a common defense policy, which might
in time lead to a common defense.”8 For the first The EC/EU failure in Yugoslavia was sympto ­
time, defense was established as a goal of the signa ­ matic of the ineffectiveness of the common for ­
tories of the Treaty of Rome. Also at Maastricht, eign and security policy process. As an
WEU members declared that their organization intergovernmental process, CFSP was subject to
would function as the “defense component of the the problems of consensus where a single deter -
European Union and as the means to strengthen the mined member could prevent common action by
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.” 9 The the entire group. Greece, for example, held up
WEU was clearly leaning toward the EU and not EU recognition of Macedonia over a name
NATO because full membership in the WEU was squabble. CFSP also had little in the way of
open only to EU members, leaving out non-EU analysis capability and had no easy way to en-
NATO countries like Turkey and Norway. force its decisions with coercive action.
With about 120 foreign policy declarations
European Union Blues since its inception, CFSP has developed positions
on crises from Haiti to Rwanda, sent observers to
The brightest hopes of European enthusiasts monitor elections in Russia and South Africa, and
quickly faded. In one of the few scheduled pub ­ (with the WEU) helped police the Bosnian town
lic decisions on further integration, the Danish of Mostar. It has had little impact on the big
52 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPECIAL EDITION 1996
questions facing Europe, however, such as what Table 1
to do about the former Yugoslavia. The recent European Security Organizations
EU expansion (adding Austria, Finland, and Swe -
den on 1 January 1995) has increased the number
COUNTRY NATO EU WEU

of traditionally neutral members to four (with Ire -
Austria X

land), making foreign policy coordination poten ­
Belgium X X X

tially even more difficult. (See table 1.) On the
Canada X

positive side, EU experience with security and
Denmark X X

defense issues has substantially broadened, and
Finland X

the habit of European cooperation in foreign af -
France X X X

fairs has certainly deepened.
Germany X X X

Greece X X X

NATO Revived Iceland X

Ireland X

Compared to the EU, NATO has enjoyed a
Italy X X X

virtual renaissance. NATO’s role in Bosnia came
Luxembourg X X X

about after EU and UN failure, but also following
Netherlands X X X

a 1992 decision to allow NATO to act as a surro -
Norway X

gate for the Conference on Security and Coopera ­
Portugal X X X

tion in Europe (CSCE)—the region’s nascent
Spain X X X

collective security or- ganization. 11 In other
Sweden X

words, NATO members finally gave their or­
Turkey X

ganization the authority to conduct out-of-area
United Kingdom X X X

missions. On the political front, NATO’s East -
United States X X

ern liaison function grew into the Partnership for
Peace (PfP) program in 1994—a halfway house
toward full NATO membership for Central/ velopment of the Franco-German Brigade) might
Eastern European countries and a promising deploy from NATO bases with NATO equip­
mechanism for increased engagement with Rus ­ ment—but under WEU operational control. Thus
sia. Of historical significance is France’s De ­ CJTF is closely linked to autonomous European
cember 1995 decision to rejoin some of NATO’s defense issues and to discussions anticipated at
military apparatus. the upcoming IGC.12
The NATO Combined Joint Task Forces NATO’s possible enlargement to include
(CJTF) initiative may also have far-reaching con - countries of the former Soviet bloc would bring
sequences. Endorsed at the January 1994 alli ­ profound changes as well, transforming the char ­
ance summit, the CJTF is based on the US joint acter of the alliance and its role in Europe. Some
task force concept and would modify alliance policymakers believe that NATO’s plans must be
procedures so that military units, staffs, and in place before the EU can decide on its own en ­
equipment could be separated from the integrated largement scheme, either at the 1996 IGC or at
command and force structure to meet anticipated some other venue. According to Alexandra Von ­
post-cold-war requirements more effectively. dra, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of
CJTF missions might include peacekeeping and the Czech Republic, “NATO first” is based on
peacetime contingency operations such as hu ­ the belief that Central Europe can be “anchored
manitarian aid, disaster relief, and minor crisis and stabilized” only with the assistance of the
intervention. Participation would be optional and United States.l3
driven by national interest and domestic political
considerations. For situations considered vital to
More Western
Europe but not to the United States, Europe-only
European Union
forces such as the European Corps (a further de -
EUROPE WITHOUT THE US? 53
The WEU also has been changing. Like and neutrality problems of the EU. As they go
NATO, it has added membership categories and into the 1996 IGC, the major countries of Europe
now has agreements with non-EU NATO coun - must decide on the role the WEU should play in
tries, non-NATO EU countries, and with coun - Europe’s future security architecture.
tries from the former Soviet bloc. l4 It has
expanded its functions, such as taking over public
Great Britain
relations, long-range planning, and some techni ­
cal issues from NATO’s EUROGROUP. With its British leaders have had a difficult time with
Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), European integration ever since they failed to
the WEU has taken over the European arms pro ­ join the European Coal and Steel Community
curement coordination function of the Inde - in 1952. Although probably convinced that Brit­
pendent European Program Group (now ain’s future lies inexorably with continental
disbanded).l5 For more efficient coordination with Europe and the EU, Prime Minister John Major
other important international actors, the WEU has supported only a minimum European agenda
changed its headquarters from London and because of the vehement opposition to integra­
joined NATO and the EU in Brussels. tion from portions of his Conservative party.
In June 1992, WEU members approved the But unlike domestically sensitive issues, such
Petersberg Declaration that listed the types of as monetary and social policy, security and de­
missions the WEU could pursue on its own. fense concerns have allowed Major some ma ­
These included “humanitarian and rescue tasks; neuvering room.
peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces
in crisis management, including peacemak­
ing.”16 These missions would obviously com­
plement anticipated NATO CJTF operations and
Nonetheless, the WEU has become a

are good examples of the types of missions that
convenient way for Europe to

Europe could pursue routinely without US sup -
port. The WEU is also working with a number of examine new security and defense

European multinational military organizations ideas and, occasionally, to take

like the European Corps on how each might par­ action independent of NATO, but with-

ticipate under the WEU aegis as so-called
out the bureaucratic and

“forces answerable to the WEU (FAWEU).”17
neutrality problems of the EU.

Operationally, the WEU has added to its mari -
time experiences in the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars
by engaging in activities in and around the for ­
mer Yugoslavia, by helping to enforce the arms
embargo on the Adriatic Sea and the Danube British policymakers are acutely aware of the
River, and by working with the EU in Mostar. American pullback from Europe and have been
pursuing practical alternatives elsewhere. For
Major Players example, Great Britain has begun to conduct a
surprising amount of defense activity with
For all of this, the WEU’s contribution to France. In 1993, the Anglo-French Joint Com­
European security and defense is still quite small. mission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine was es­
With only 120 people at its headquarters, it is bu ­ tablished to coordinate nuclear policy. The two
reaucratically dwarfed by the thousands of diplo­ countries have moved toward a combined air
mats and officials at NATO and the EU. operations command and now conduct joint ex­
Nonetheless, the WEU has become a convenient ercises between the British Field Army and the
way for Europe to examine new security and de ­ French Rapid Action Force (FAR). British and
fense ideas and, occasionally, to take action inde­ French forces also participated actively in the
pendent of NATO, but without the bureaucratic United Nations phase of military operations in
54 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPECIAL EDITION 1996
Bosnia—in stark contrast to US noninvolve­ have ended or been replaced by interest-based co -
ment. The joint activity has systemic compo­ ordination. France has created specific concern
nents as well: both countries have worldwide among integration enthusiasts because of its diffi ­
interests and capabilities, and, when they act culty in reaching EMU convergence criteria and
together, they also form a credible political its resistance to “open-border” commitments with
counterweight to a united Germany. Germany and the Benelux countries. German
In the Maastricht negotiations, British leaders Social Democratic Party (SPD) official Heide ­
accepted substantial movement toward Euro­ marie Wieczorek-Zeul declared that Chirac’s na ­
pean defense cooperation in exchange for con-
tionalist tone was designed to court
cessions elsewhere (the EMU and social charter
anti-European sentiment on the far right and
opt-outs). If pushed toward autonomous de­
was a threat to Franco-German relations. 20
fense cooperation by the rest of Europe, Great
Yet Chirac probably supports European inte ­
Britain would prefer the intergovernmental
gration for the same reasons as his predecessors:
WEU to the more supranational EU. In March
to anchor Germany within a dense institutional
1995, Major proposed that, in addition to the Pe ­
framework, to increase France’s world voice
tersberg missions, the WEU should assume more
through leadership in the larger EU grouping,
of the basic defense functions of NATO and
and to invigorate France’s domestic economy.
should be able to conduct every military opera ­
French officials have been coordinating more
tion “short of full-scale war.” 18 But British en­
closely with Germany but still have not revealed
thusiasm for the WEU is measured, and Great
how they want European security and defense ef -
Britain would undoubtedly support NATO as
forts to develop. They are clearly reluctant to
long as the United States remains actively en -
surrender much more sovereignty to the suprana­
gaged. The British army is committed to its
tional institutions of the EU, but would un­
NATO ARRC command role and has not joined
doubtedly support more intergovernmental
the predominantly French and German European
cooperation on defense issues —perhaps through
Corps. Recent disputes over armament procure ­
some sort of EU variable geometry with a mili ­
ment, such as the British purchase of American
tary option.
Apache helicopters instead of European Tigers,
have reinforced the view in Europe that Great
Britain is still a stalking-horse for US interests. Germany
British defense minister Malcolm Rifkind (now
Unlike France, Germany has not been silent on
foreign minister) recently reaffirmed his coun -
what it wants from the IGC. They have been dis -
try’s transatlantic orientation, arguing that “we
appointed with progress on the current EU
must not undermine NATO by pretending that its
agenda as well and urgently want reform. At
core tasks are going to be transferred to a European
body.”19 Maastricht, Germany acceded to EMU and to
giving up its valued deutsche mark in exchange
for progress on European political union (EPU).
France While EMU has moved forward, however halt ­
France recently acted like Great Britain in its ingly, political union projects such as CFSP have
skepticism toward European integration. Jacques faltered. With enlargement of the EU a virtual
Chirac became president in May 1995 with a Gaul- certainty, German officials believe it essential to
list legacy of independence and an administration restructure EU institutions and to rationalize EU
unfettered by the universalist appeal of European procedures such as voting, rotating presidencies,
unity. The close Franco-German entente of the and the EU Commission’s national assignments.
1980s and early 1990s and the intimate personal Moreover, Germany’s influence within the union,
relationship between French president François regardless of future enlargement, is not commen ­
Mitterrand and German chancellor Helmut Kohl surate with its population or its economic and po -
EUROPE WITHOUT THE US? 55
litical importance since unification. Clearly, Ger - recommendations for the IGC. The group was
man officials want this to change. composed of representatives from the EU Com -
Their campaign began in September 1994 mission, the European Parliament, and from each
when Christian Democratic Union (CDU) official of the 15 member countries. Carlos Westendorp,
Karl Lamers revealed a “hard-core” p lan that the group’s leader, wanted to focus on fulfilling
would move Europe forward with at least two the issues that Maastricht had already be ­
speeds: one made up of those countries that gun—including CFSP, the EU-WEU linkage,
wanted more “Europe” and could meet EMU and internal security procedures—and on pre -
convergence criteria and the other made up of paring EU institutions for possible enlarge ­
those countries that did not. Although modified ment. Other group members wanted to go
in subsequent declarations, a multispeed Europe beyond this modest agenda to explore more
is probably still the essential German view. On far-reaching changes to the EU.
foreign policy, Wolfgang Schauble (CDU leader
in the Bundestag) proposed that all foreign policy
decisions—except those with direct military im ­
plications—should be subject to majority vote History does not often
among EU members, thus effectively doing away
favor attempts at
with the consensus rule. Where commitment of
European cooperation.
armed forces is required, countries would be able
to opt out of the action but could not stop a ma ­
jority from pursuing their military goals. 21 An-
other variation was introduced by Werner Hoyer
(a deputy foreign minister and Germany’s desig ­ The Reflection Group’s final report was re -
nated representative to the upcoming IGC) that viewed at the EU Madrid summit in December
called for the gradual integration of the WEU 1995 and contained generally minimalist expecta ­
into the EU and for the appointment of a Euro ­ tions. According to Westendorp, the report sup-
pean leader to be both head of the EU Council of ports actions to make the EU more relevant to its
Ministers and secretary-general of the citizens, such as improving internal security and
WEU—thereby creating a de facto foreign minis ­ promoting European values, and measures to
ter for Europe as a whole. The new position make EU institutions more efficient, such as sup -
would be supported by an enhanced CFSP bu ­ porting more majority voting. On CFSP, the re -
reaucracy that would act more like the US Na ­ port suggested that a planning and analysis unit
tional Security Council than a mere secretariat. 22 and a central leadership position be created to
While Hoyer’s ideas are fairly extreme and help give the EU a higher profile. 23 The group’s
will not be the end product of the IGC, they re - input will now be meshed with proposals from
veal Germany’s strong public commitment to the WEU and, more importantly, from the major
European unity. At the same time, German of­ European powers. In a sign of more collabora ­
ficials at the tactical level seem willing to use tion, France and Germany declared their joint
the threat of a more independent and assertive dissatisfaction with the report’s low expectations
Germany as a lever to get their favored changes and have pushed for a more ambitious agenda.
made in the EU. The IGC began immediately following the 29
March 1996 EU summit in Turin, Italy, but its
European Union completion date has not been established. While
Reflection Group Westendorp stated that the work could be done
by late 1996, almost everyone else believes the
Formal discussions on Maastricht II have be- IGC will continue until well after the British gen ­
gun. Following a string of summits and minis­ eral election in spring 1997. With the British La­
terial meetings, the EU established a “Reflection bor Party ahead in the polls and more clearly
Group” in June 1995 and tasked it with making committed to the EU than Major’s Conserva -
56 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPECIAL EDITION 1996
tives, integration enthusiasts will no doubt find a Parliament will no doubt be given up. Adminis­
way to delay the outcome.24 trative reform may also find a way to enhance the
rotating CFSP presidency and to make it a more
Europe’s Future and Ours plausible focus for decision making on foreign
policy. Changes might include a robust advisory
Some years ago, Luc Reychler at the Catholic council and a visible permanent secretary on the
University of Leuven in Belgium detailed what a model of the British civil service.
European security and defense arrangement The EU might gain some minor military role
might look like. The EU Council of Ministers of its own, such as taking on some of the WEU
would assume responsibility for European for ­ Petersberg missions. More importantly, Europe ­
eign affairs and would establish an EU security ans will have to address the Brussels Treaty. Its
council. There would be a yearly European secu ­ 1998 expiration was an important incentive for
rity assessment, a European arms control and dis - scheduling the IGC in 1996 in the first place. In ­
armament agency, a European defense budget, a tegration enthusiasts had hoped the EU would as ­
European nuclear planning group, and European sume all of the WEU’s defense functions. This
control over nuclear forces—including US nu - will not happen at this IGC, at least not for the
clear weapons in Europe.25 Other diplomats have EU membership as a whole. The year 1998 is
added that the EU Commission should have a an ambiguous deadline because the WEU will
predominant role in CFSP to make it more effi ­ not just disappear if its members fail to take
cient and that the European Parliament should be new measures. Article 12 of the treaty requires
granted a supervisory function to improve demo ­ specific action to terminate participation:
cratic accountability.
It [the Brussels Treaty] shall enter into force on the
More recently, Dutch defense minister Joris
date of the deposit of the last instrument of
Voorhoeve noted that the “expectation that the ratification [1948] and shall thereafter remain in
European Union will soon become a strong inter - force for fifty years.
national factor is wrong for the foreseeable fu ­
ture.”26 And indeed, Europe has been going After the expiry of the period of fifty years, each of
the High Contracting parties shall have the right to
through one of its periodic bouts of skepticism,
cease to be a party thereto provided that he shall
where elite enthusiasm for integration—now rei ­
have previously given one year’s notice of
fied by the Maastricht Treaty—outpaces objec ­
denunciation to the Belgian Government.27
tive realities and public opinion. Moreover, with
imperatives for NATO to play a major role in From a narrow legal viewpoint, little will change
Bosnia and with the importance attached to after 1998 if the treaty is not extended. 28 Security
NATO expansion by both NATO and the EU ad ­ issues are always much more political than legal,
vocates, little enthusiasm exists for an immediate however, because allies and polities must be con ­
transfer of defense responsibility from NATO to vinced of a nation’s defense commitments.
the EU and/or WEU. Nonetheless, I believe that Hence, WEU members will likely renegotiate at
important reform will occur at the IGC that will least those portions of the treaty dealing with expi -
make the exclusively European organizations a ration.
more realistic future alternative to NATO. The WEU will continue its role as the “de ­
German diplomats no doubt will succeed in fense component” of the EU and, through
obtaining EU administrative reform to prepare NATO’s CJTF, should increase its ability to carry
for new members and to reflect Germany’s out limited missions. Its compact membership
greater weight since unification. The IGC may and focused charter will keep the WEU a useful
well decide that majority voting of some form instrument for European defense cooperation; the
will be the normal means of decision making for EU will have difficulty enough integrating new
CFSP. In the bargaining, European integration ad­ members into its broad economic and political
vocates’ demands for a larger security and de­ agenda without taking on significant defense obli ­
fense role for the EU Commission and the gations. The EU will increase its linkages with