DTIC ADA529485: Peacekeeping at the Speed of Sound. The Relevancy of Airpower Doctrine in Operations other than War

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

Peacekeeping at the
Speed of Sound
The Relevancy of Airpower Doctrine
in Operations other than War*
DR. JOHN HILLEN
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Peacekeeping at the Speed of Sound. The Relevancy of Airpower Doctrine
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in Operations other than War
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PEACEKEEPING AT THE SPEED OF SOUND 7
A
S WITH MOST of its history, the through out this arti cle to inform the first
United States military has recently ques tion. In those instances (airpower in
been involved in many more opera­ OOTW), the impact of airpower remains sig­
tions other than war (OOTW) than nifi cant but becomes less deci sive in OOTW
wars.1 Since World War I, airpower has been, as one moves along the spectrum of conflict
more or less, an inte gral part of those many away from war and towards peace time uses of
op era tions. In deed, ear lier this year, the prin ­ the military (figs. 1 and 2). However, to hold
cip al military challenge to the United States to this is not to agree with military theorists
and its allies was how to respond to Yugo­ such as Martin van Creveld, who are dismis­
slavia’s heavy-handed repres sion in the prov­ sive about airpower in low inten sity conflict
ince of Kosovo—and airpower has been the or OOTW. Van Creveld fantas tic ally main­
mili tary tool of choice thus far. Mul ti na tional tains that “in a world where almost all wars
air exer cises were conducted over Alban ia are fought not between states, but within
and Mace do nia on 15 June 1998 in an effort them, many if not most of [airpow er’s] ele­
to dissuade Yugoslav president Slobo dan Mi­ ments have become useless and obso lete.”4
losevic from using more exces sive violence It is im por tant to note that the di min ish ing
on his own citizens. This attempt at coer cive ret urns from airpower in OOTW apply to the
dip lom acy through the air had to be particu­ co er cive elements of airpower only—the ele­
larly subtle, because the same signals meant ments ad dressed by much or most of air power
to cow Milosevic were not intended to em­ the ory and doctrine. Other elements of
bolden Koso var separat ist groups such as the Ameri can airpower, such as transport at ion,
Ko sovo Liberat ion Army. This set of signals lo gis tics and supply, intel li gence collec tion,
was quite nuanced—all implic itly coer cive comm and and control (C2), recon nais sance
and all meant to be received via airpower. It and surveill ance, and psycho logi cal opera­
ap pears at this point that the United States is tions (PSYOP) have proven decis ive in many
ex haust ing its air power op tions in Ko sovo be- OOTWs in which the United States could not
fore consid er ing other types of inter ven tion, use coer cive airpower. For instance, the Air
not be cause of air pow er’s proven track rec ord For ce’s 193d Special Opera tions Wing
in coer cive diplo macy, but because, as Eliot (PSYOP), which de ployed to Haiti prior to the
Co hen has written, airpower, “like modern 1994 in va sion, may have con trib uted more to
Ameri can courtship, offers instant gratific a­ the initial success of that operat ion than any
tion without commitm ent.” 2 other air as set. None the less, for the most part,
Be that as it may, the appli ca tion of Ameri­ this artic le takes the signifi cance of those
can airpower does repre sent a seri ous com­ mani fes ta tions of airpower for granted and
mit ment and has been an impor tant facet of con cen trates instead on airpower doctrine as
OOTWs since they were called “small wars” it applies to the use of force.
by the Marine Corps.3 The question under In the main, the artic le finds that airpower
con sid era tion here is the relevancy of air - doc trine, inas much as it exists as a body of
power doc trineto OOTW—the impact or lack doc trine for OOTW, is spare but well bal­
thereof of one on the other. This is a wholly anced and relevant. The problem areas for
diff ere nt question from the relevancy of air- doc trine are more likely to lie in standard
power to OOTW, although empiri cal judg­ OOTW doctrine, which is either flawed in
ments made from those expe rie nces are used some way to begin with and many times ig­
nores airpower as well.
*This article was originally presented as a paper at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)/VII Inc. Conference on
Dueling Doctrines and the New American Way of War, held in Washington, D.C., 24–26 June 1998. Special thanks to Halley Guren of
Duke University’s School of Public Policy for research assistance in the preparation of this paper.
8 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1998
Source: Adapted from Army Vi sion 2010 (Wash ing ton, D.C.: Head quar ters, De part ment of the Army, No vem ber 1996), 5.
Fig ure 1. The Military Spectrum of Conflict
Airpower Doctrine amor phous doctrine that is flexible and so-
phis ti cated enough to have great ap pli ca bil ity
The tempta tion in an arti cle such as this is to OOTW. Moreover, OOTWs are not such a
to paint a rigid Douhet-redux portrait of air- Gor dian knot of intensely deep human com­
power doctrine. OOTW would then be por­ plexit ies that the applic at ion of coer cive air-
trayed as an im pos si bly sub tle, ter rifi cally nu­ power in many differ ent ways cannot make a
anced, and tremen dously sophis ti cated de ci sive dif fer ence in OOTW. In other words,
dip lo matic en deavor that the in flexi ble ap pli­ blow ing some thing up from the air (or threat-
ca tion of airpower could never affect in pro­ en ing to) can sometimes make an immense
duct ive ways (e.g., Curtis LeMay solu tions to dif fer ence—even in a humani tar ian relief ex­
the Brcko corri dor problem). Select bits from er cise. This is a fairly rare circum stance,
air power doctrine, espec ially Air Force doc- though, and all services (and Special Opera­
trine, would be juxta posed against the emo­ tions Command [SOCOM]), which together
tive complexit ies of certain OOTW missions make up and share air power doc trine to a cer­
as a demon stra tion of trying to fit a square tain degree, recog nize that the princi ples of
peg into a round hole.5 OOTW are very differ ent from the princi ples
In fairness to both sides and with a nod to of war (e.g., restraint, perse ver ance, and le­
in tel lec tual integ rity, the arti cle does not do giti macy as opposed to offen sive, surprise,
this. Instead, one must recog nize that air- and mass). All services (although some not as
power, shared as it is by all the serv ices, has an much as others) also recog nize that airpower
PEACEKEEPING AT THE SPEED OF SOUND 9
Source: Adapted from Army Vi sion 2010 (Wash ing ton, D.C.: Head quar ters, De part ment of the Army, No vem ber 1996), 5.
Fig ure 2. Effec tive ness across the Military Spectrum of Conflict
plays a key role in OOTW. For instance, the All this makes for a curi ous state of affairs
one- hundred- page Army field manual on in terms of airpower doctrine and OOTW.
peace opera tions mentions airpower only The military commu nity seems genera lly to
five very brief times, and only two of those ap pre ci ate the funda men tal impact of air-
ref er ences are about the coerc ive applic at ion power on OOTW and vice versa. None the less,
of air power.6 Given the per ceived im por tance ap pre cia tion is not strateg ic and operat ional
of Apache helicop ters to recent peace op­ un der stand ing codified in doctrine. In the
erations, I would hope that the Army is up­ main, airpower doctrine applied to OOTW is
dat ing this doctrine. sound but spread around the services and the
joint level in bits and pieces, thereby lacking
10 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1998
the coher ency that regular OOTW doctrine air power in peacekeeping and peace enforce­
has achieved. The holes in the doctrine also ment, areas that have caused much angst for
match in many ways the dilem mas airpower the United States and its allies over the past
has expe ri enced in OOTW over the past few five years.
years, but causal ity is tough to pin down. It
would be quite a stretch to say that good doc-
Enforcement of Sanctions
trine formu lated before Bosnia and Soma lia
might have precluded some of the problems Sanc tions have been a popu lar foreign- policy
dis cussed below. For the most part, doctrine tool for American deci sion makers, and it is
has learned from ex pe ri ence as much as ex pe­ the mili tary’s duty to en force them. Most re­
ri ence from doctrine. cently, airpower has been used exten sively
to enforce sanctions in the Balkans and the
Per sian Gulf. Such use of air power is usu ally
Airpower in Operations
se lec tively employed, in that “an air quar­
other than War an tine is dif fi cult to achieve be cause the en-
force ment is an ‘all or noth ing’ propo si tion.
US joint doctrine specifies 16 differ ent . . . Shooting down an aircraft may be the
OOTWs: only way to truly enforce an air quaran tine,
Arms Control but that ac tion may not be mor ally or po liti­
cally accept able.”8 This is an exam ple of a
Com bat ting Terror ism
po liti cal intent/rules of engage ment (ROE)
Coun ter drug Opera tions is sue discussed below. Current doctrine is
En force ment of Sanctions/Mari time Inter­ weak on other strate gic issues that arise in
cept Operat ions re gard to this mission. These include C2
prob lems with partner states or organ­
En forc ing Exclus ion Zones
izations (unilat eral sanctions are rare) and
Hum anit ari an Assis tance force-man age ment/readi ness problems
En sur ing Freedom of Naviga tion and stem ming from the protracted, inde ci sive,
Over flight and—many times—monoto nous nature of
this task.
Mili tary Support to Civil Authorities
Na tion Assis tance/Sup port to Counteri n­
sur gency Enforcing Exclusion Zones
Non com bat ant Evacuation Opera tions “No- fly zones” have been another hot arrow
Peace Opera tions in the diplo matic quiver in recent years. US
air power has estab lished and enforced them
Prot ect ion of Shipping
in the Balkans, northern and southern Iraq,
Rec ove ry Operat ions and elsewhere. Other than some multi na­
Show of Force Opera tions tional C2 is sues in volved (be low), they are not
a doctrinal enigma. However, in Bosnia and
Strikes and Raids
northe rn Iraq, the concept of air-exclusion
Sup port to Insur gency7
zones was stretched to deny move ment on the
ground to certain military forces. The heavy-
This arti cle cannot possi bly treat the air- weapon exclu sion zones estab lished by the
power dimen sion of all these opera tions in North Atlant ic Treaty Organi za tion (NATO)
de tail but makes some obser va tions on sev­ around Sara jevo and Bi hac are an ex am ple, as
eral that are the most relevant to the US is the virtual demili ta rized zone estab lished
mili tary in recent years. Moreover, the arti­ in 1991 north of the 36th paral lel in Iraq to
cle focuses on an extended discus sion of pro tect Opera tion Provide Comfort. The en-
peace opera tions—spe cifi cally, the role of force ment of these zones, an implic itly coer-
PEACEKEEPING AT THE SPEED OF SOUND 11
The business end of an Apache. Spread as it is over many manuals, [airpower doctrine] does not comprehensively cover
airpower employment in OOTW. What doctrine does exist, however, is fairly sound but dated (one finds hardly a word
about the role of attack helicopters).
(PVO) or other agencies (such as the United
cive activi ty, has sometimes comprom ised Na tions High Commis sioner for Refugees
the neu tral ity of peacekeep ers on the ground [UNHCR]) that will be part of the relief ef fort.
and has caused friction between passive This is also discussed below.
peacekeep ing on the ground and peace en -
force ment from the air. This is discussed in
greater detail below. Show of Force Operations/Coercive Diplomacy
One should note the princip al doctrinal di­
lemma. On the one hand, shows of force rely
Humanitarian Assistance
on implic itly coer cive signals that are blunt
Supp ress ion of enemy air defenses and other and might not be suited for the more nu anced
co er cive airpower used in coor di na tion with dip lo matic strate gies of ten needed in OOTW.
hu mani tar ian assist ance opera tions can be a On the other hand (as in the Philipp ines in
double- edged sword—and proved so in Bos­ 1989), shows of force will of ten com mu ni cate
nia and So ma lia. On the one hand, it can pro­ mar tial intent in a construct ive way. The en­
tect humani tar ian assist ance; on the other dur ing prob lem is that the ini tia tive of ac tion
hand, such pro tec tion can poli ti cize the re lief rem ains in the hands of the bellig er ents— al­
aid and compro mise its neutral ity. A particu­ though this is no differ ent from other
lar weakness yet to be seri ously addressed by OOTWs. More problem atic from a cultural
air power doctrine is the coor di na tion of air- view point is that these opera tions suggest an
power support ing humani tar ian assis tance over all strategy of indec is ive, graduated pres­
with the many nongove rnm ent al organiz a­ sure—a much- maligned way of do ing busi ness
tions (NGO)/private volun tary organiz at ions in the Vietnam War.
12 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1998
Strikes and Raids how ever, the US military and other air forces
have often exhibi ted a doctrinal vacuum.”9
Doc tri nally, these are the most straightfor­
But the search to fill that vacuum has
ward of all OOTWs with respect to air-
caused a funda men tal discon nect between
power. More than any other OOTW listed,
most of the world and the US military
stan dard air power war- fighting doc trine ap-
concern ing the compati bil ity of these tech­
niques with one another. For its part, joint
and other US military doctrine maintains
that peace enforce ment and peacekeeping
can be used simul ta ne ously or even mixed
in the same missions. Joint Pub 3-07, Joint
Doc trine for Military Opera tions other than
War, states that “noncom bat MOOTW may
be conducted simul ta ne ously with combat
MOOTW, such as HA [humani tar ian assis­
tance] in conjunc tion with PEO [peace en-
A C-130. Elements of American airpower, such as force ment opera tions].” 10 The Navy War
transportation, logistics and supply, intelligence
Col lege even created a hybrid sort of opera­
collection, command and control (C 2), reconnaissance
tion called an “induce ment opera tion,” in
and surveillance, and psychological operations (PSYOP)
have proven decisive in many OOTWs in which the which peacekeepers use coer cive force with
United States could not use coercive airpower. “the light est touch pos si ble in the hope that
the par ties on the ground will, in the end, as-
sent to the UN’s mandate.”11 Most allies,
plies, although a compe tent body of spe­
how ever, vig or ously main tain that the use
cial ized doc trine ex ists for these types of op­
of active force by peacekeep ers or air forces
era tions.
op er at ing in sup port of their mis sion is a Ru bi­
con that, once crossed, completely compro­
mises the mission.12 This issue came up con­
Peace Operations stantly in Bos nia from 1993 to 1995, with the
United States alone trumpet ing its role as en-
Peacekeep ing, for rea sons of stra te gic cul ture,
forcer from the air and all other allies greatly
was for many years an un known sci ence as far
re sist ing the idea of NATO-UN as an
as the Ameri can mili tary was con cerned. Clas­
air/ground, active/pas sive team.
si cally defined, it required impart ial and pas­ This became an espe cially conten tious is-
sive troops working with the consent of the sue when in the summer of 1995, US air
bel lig er ents—all qualities for which the US strikes on targets in the Bosnian Serb capital
mili tary of the past 50 years was not well of Pale precipi tated the Serb shelling of Tuzla
known. Nonethel ess, its basic tenets have (71 civil ians killed) and the taking of hun­
come to be appre ci ated and even put into dreds of UN peacekeepers as hostages. It be-
prac tice by the US military in the past several came an artic le of faith at NATO that peace
years. The military has also moved forward en force ment and peacekeeping did not mix,
on putting into practice and formu lat ing a cont rary to US doctrine. The NATO secretary-
doc trine (in that order) for peace enforce­ general stated, “I do not believe that we can
ment. Unlike peacekeeping, peace enforce­ pur sue decis ive peace enforce ment from the
ment makes less of the need for all-out neu­ air while the UN is led, deployed, and
tral ity and allows for the measured use of equipped for peacekeeping on the ground. If
co er cive force to shape the behav ior of recal­ we have learned anything from this conflict,
ci trant bellige re nts. Even so, observ ers such it is that we can not mix these two mis sions.”13
as James Corum maintain that “within the The dep uty com mander of the UN peacekeep­
cont ext of a peace-enforcement opera tion, ers added that “there can be no gray area, no
PEACEKEEPING AT THE SPEED OF SOUND 13
overl ap of peacekeeping with peace enforce­ means at their dis posal.17War time com mand­
ment.”14 A simi lar di lemma was at work in So- ers usually have the operat ional freedom to
ma lia, where re sent ment and mis un der stand­ cre ate the condi tions under which they will
ing between American forces and UN suc ceed. OOTW command ers do not. They
peacekeep ers came to a head over the use of must oper ate in the envi ron ment that they
US airpower (helicop ters and fixed wing) in are given (although the good ones can shape
an ac tive cam paign against one side in the So­ it somewhat). In addi tion, the aforemen­
mali conflict. tioned argu ment over the compati bil ity of
Many countries in the UN mission in peacekeep ing and peace enforce ment often
Somalia (the French and Italians in par­ strains strateg ic coher ence.
ticu-lar) felt that they and other UN
peacekeep ers would pay the price when the
Institutional Coordination
US peace-enforcement effort and heavy use
of coerc ive airpower backfired—which it did. Stra te gic co her ence be comes more dif fi cult to
As Dr. Mats Berdal wrote of that mission and achieve when differ ent insti tu tions in charge
Bosn ia, coerc ive force used in conjunc tion of various facets of an OOTW are pursui ng
with peacekeeping techniques tended to ob­ dif fer ent politi cal agendas. Adm Leighton
fus cate “the basic distinc tion between Smith has much to say about the coor di na­
peacekeep ing and en force ment ac tion . . . and tion of politi cal guidance between the UN
high lighted the par ticu lar risks of at tempt ing and NATO. Air power doc trine is not fully cog­
to combine the coerc ive use of force with ni zant of the char ac ter, na ture, and core com­
peacekeep ing objec tives.”15 pe ten cies of various inter na tional organi za­
tions with whom US airpower will have an
as so cia tion. For instance, airpower doctrine
Points of Friction treats US airpower in the US-led multi na­
tional task force to Soma lia (1992–93) the
Air power doctrine, for OOTW and other- same as in de pend ently used US air power sup-
wise, has lagged be hind fast- moving de vel op ­
port ing the UN mis sion to So ma lia (1993–94).
ments in the US OOTW exper ie nce. As a re­
But the wholly differ ent politi cal charac ter of
sult, it must “grow” to cover certain points of these organi za tions greatly changed the cir­
fric tion. cum stances and condi tions under which air-
power was used, even though US air units did
not see a sea change in chain of command or
Strategic Coherency
op er at ing proce dures at their level. These is-
OOTWs often lack a cohere nt link between sues go well beyond the C2 diffi cul ties dis­
mili tary means and politi cal ends. For in- cussed below. US doctrine has not fully ex­
stance, in the current attempt at coer cive di­ plored the politi cal charac ter and military
plo macy over Kosovo, how exactly can the com pe ten cies of or gani za tions such as the UN
United States apply airpower to bring about and the Organi za tion for Secu rity and Coop-
the complex politi cal solu tion desired? As erat ion in Europe in airpower doctrine, as
John Bolton said at the CSIS/VII Inc. Confer­ well as the role of NATO or US-led coali tions
ence on Duel ing Doctrines in June 1998, the as airpower subcon trac tors.
Air Force will have to drop “auton omy bombs
ins tead of indep ende nce bombs” on the Ko­
Command and Control
sov ars.16 In other instances, US airpower is
asked to assist in the fulfill ment of mandates Ad mi ral Smith’s paper for the CSIS/VII Inc.
well beyond its control. This was very much Con fer ence on Duel ing Doctrines joined
the expe ri ence in Bosnia, where military many reports in properly criticiz ing NATO’s
comm ande rs grew increas ingly frustrated by and the UN’s dual-key approach to the C2 of
the gap between mandated ends and the NATO air forces oper at ing in support of UN
14 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1998
Source: David S. Al bert and Rich ard Hayes, Comm and Rela tion ships for Peace Opera tions (Wash ing ton, D.C.: Na tional De fense
Univ er sity Press, 1995), 63.
Fig ure 3. Command Rela tion ships in Opera tion Deny Flight
peacekeep ers in Bosnia.18 One report euphe­ nel or facili ties to oper ate as the air space con­
mis ti cally referred to the C2 system as con­ trol agency for the unified task force that de­
structed (fig. 3) as “a shambles.” 19 Other ployed there from Decemb er 1992 to May
OOTWs (nota bly Soma lia) expe ri enced simi­ 1993.20
lar C2 prob lems, some caused by in sti tu tional
co or di na tion, some by “normal” multi na­
Other Multinational Issues
tional C2 dif fi cul ties (such as stan dard con trol
pro ce dures and clear chains of command), Dif fer ences in force structure, interoper abil­
and other problems expe ri enced completely ity, training, doctrine, modus oper andi, and
within the US military commun ity. For in- stra te gic culture can greatly affect airpower
stance, in Somal ia the 3d Marine Air Wing coa li tions above and beyond multi na tional
found that it did not have the trained person­ C2 issues. Airpower doctrine should not only