DTIC ADA529225: Police or Military Police?

42 Pages·0.08 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

Police or Military Police
CSC 1998
Subject Area - Genreal

CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE

ACKNOWLEDGMENT ............................................. i

TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................... ii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................... iii

I INTRODUCTION
PROBLEM ..................................... 1

II BACKGROUND
HISTORY ..................................... 3
CURRENT SITUATION............................ 8
ASSUMPTIONS ................................. 11
CURRENT DOCTRINE............................. 12

III CURRENT EMPLOYMENT
LAW ENFORCEMENT ............................. 17
COMBAT SUPPORT .............................. 20

IV POLICE OF MILITARY POLICE
ARGUMENTS ................................... 21
FIXES ....................................... 24

V LEADERSHIP REQUIREMENT............................ 34

VI SUMMARY
POLICE OR MILITARY POLICE.................... 35

VIII BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................... 38
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1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
1998 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1998 to 00-00-1998
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Police or Military Police
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps REPORT NUMBER
University,2076 South Street, Marine Corps Combat Development
Command,Quantico,VA,22134-5068
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Police or Military Police

Author: Major Rand A. Brinkman

Thesis: Military police can no longer focus on performing law
enforcement duties to the neglect of the battlefield mission of
combat support. Marines must be relevant and support the mission
of winning the nation's battles. The Marine Corps does not need
only police in their inventory; they need military policeman
providing combat support to the warfighter.

Discussion: Since the conception of the Military Occupational
Specialty, 5800 Military Police, the focus of effort has been on
performing law enforcement duties at Marine Corps bases and
installations. Sending the FMF military police to perform
strictly law enforcement duties on military bases has stripped
the capabilities of the FMF military police to perform their
battlefield missions. The Marine Corps must restructure the 5800
career field to integrate the capabilities of military police
into the battlespace functions of the MAGTF. Military police
personnel must return to the FMF forces and integrate into all
training and exercises to develop their skills and enhance the
capabilities available to the commander conducting military
operations.

Conclusion: The force structure of the military police field can
change without increases in personnel or line numbers. A
critical look at the missions and functions performed by law
enforcement units within the field will increase manpower
available for the MEF. Creating a planning cell for the MEF
Provost Marshal will integrate the core missions of the military
police with a unity of effort focused on supporting the battle
and enhancing force protection.

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INTRODUCTION
The Problem.
The world has drastically and irrevocably changed since the
end of the Cold War. The forces that the United States employs
to meet future threats to our nation must be well trained,
proficient, flexible, intelligent, and capable of acting on the
commander's intent independently. Most importantly, the United
States must employ tailored forces to meet the needs of the
commander and the environment in which they operate in.
Marine Corps Military Police (MP) provide a viable tool for
commanders to use to meet many of the challenges that the
military will face in the future. The MP doctrinal missions,
skills, and capabilities provide a trained force that is
perfectly suitable for operations in low intensity small scale
contingencies. The MP assets can not support the Marine Air
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) in its doctrinal missions the way they
are currently organized and structured. Dwindling personnel and
resources in the Marine Corps will require leaders to support a
structural change in the organization and employment of MP; it
will require action.
If the MP are to be a viable, combat support force for the
Marine Expeditionary Force Commander, the Marine Corps must
affect a paradigm shift in employment, leadership, organization
and structure. The tools and skills of a well-trained MP Company
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provide a commander with a tremendous force multiplier, but only
if units train and restructure to meet the commanders needs on
the battlefield of the future.
The Marine Corps must restructure the Fleet Marine Force
(FMF) MP and decide which role to emphasize, a combat support
role or an enhanced law enforcement role at Marine Corps bases
within in the United States. MP can provide a combat support
role that significantly enhances and supports the warfighter
while performing a variety of essential tasks on the battlefield.
Currently, this capability is hampered by the over-emphasis on
law enforcement within and outside the Military Police
occupational specialty. MP can be a positive factor on the
battlefield and the force of choice for employment in small scale
contingencies, primarily peacekeeping and humanitarian operation
roles. To do this, more emphasis and focus on the combat support
role is essential.
If properly structured and employed, MP can meet many of the
capabilities required while fighting in the battlespace of the
21st century. Their training in physical security,
antiterrorism, and counterterrorism provides experienced
personnel that will enhance the force protection posture of a
command. MP combat support significantly increases the
capabilities available to a commander.
If the future battlespace will be in the littorals, what
better organization than the MP is there to conduct peacekeeping,
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humanitarian, disaster, and civic assistance operations? Their
extensive training in law enforcement in built up areas, their
tactical training, disaster relief training, antiterrorist
training, counterterrorist training, and force protection
training make them an ideal unit for employment in these specific
operations. In a low intensity environment or as a follow-on
force, the MP bring the combat tools necessary to accomplish
missions that a combat fighting unit should not have to perform.
A MP unit is not the force to deploy forward in situations
where armed hostilities occur or where the expectation of armed
hostilities with enemy troops is high. In high intensity
conflicts the ground combat element is the force of choice. MP
should operate in a combat support role or in the rear area to
allow the commander to focus his combat power on the threat. The
MP provide rear area security, security to the main supply
routes, and assist in protecting high value targets.

BACKGROUND
History
The history of armed conflicts show that MP demonstrated
their capability to support commanders in past conflicts. In
past conflicts, MP employed to secure lines of communication,
provide security for supply convoys, and maintain discipline
within the armed forces. Throughout modern history, MP units,
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performing their battlefield missions, have assisted commanders
in accomplishing their operations. Napoleon Bonaparte stated,
"You cannot have a good army without a police force within."1 In
1945, Field Marshal B. L. Montgomery stated, "The Battle of
Normandy and subsequent battles would never have been won but for
the work and co-operation of Provost on the traffic routes."2
General der Flieger Speidel said, "The Feldjager [MP] have
fulfilled their psychological purpose. Their actions have
rapidly gained them a reputation ... their help and support were
much sought after."3
In the United States, MP units trace their lineage back to
the Revolutionary War when the Continental Congress authorized a
troop of police for George Washington on 27 May 1778. The
responsibilities of this unit were essentially the same as the MP
unit of today. "...[MP] were expected to patrol the camp ...
During combat the unit was to patrol behind the Army's so-called
second line where it also assumed what in later times would be
called the "early warning" responsibility..."4 In every major
contingency MP units were formed to provide support to the
commanders.

1Williamson, Gordon and Ron Volstad. German Military Police
Units 1939-45. London, Great Britain: Osprey 1989, 10.
2German Military Police Units 1939-45, 10.
3German Military Police Units 1939-45, 10.
4Robert K. Wright, Jr., "Military Police." Washington ,
DC:GPO, 1991, 91-22813, 3.
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The Marine Corps can trace its MP lineage back to World War
I when a contingent of MP formed to provide battlefield
circulation and law and order for the Marines sent to France. In
1944, the Marine Corps formed the 1st Provisional MP Battalion,
which served on Okinawa performing refugee and traffic control to
ensure the supply routes remained open for throughput of
ammunition and equipment. Redesignated the 1st Military Police
Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, it served in China until
they disbanded in 1946. In Korea, military police companies
performed area security, enemy prisoner of war operations,
refugee control, and battlefield circulation operations. The 1st
Military Police Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific and 3rd
Military Police Battalion performed area base defense, black
market, bridge security, and enemy prisoners of war operations in
Vietnam.5
Following Vietnam, significant changes occurred within the
MP field within the Marine Corps. In the late 1960's, personnel
who made up MP units lacked appropriate training and proficiency
to performing MP duties effectively. A Military Occupational
Specialty (MOS) did not exist for the MP MOS. Personnel assigned
to perform MP duties were from a variety of occupational
specialties and served as MP in jails and as base guard sentries.

5Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, Employment
of Military Police in Combat, Washington DC: GPO, 11 February
1992. FMFM 3-5, 1-1.
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At the end of Vietnam, the 1st and 3rd Military Police
Battalions deactivated and military police companies formed in
the Marine divisions (MARDIV) and Force Service Support Group
(FSSG) of the Marine Corps. Camp Guards turned into Base
Military Police Units and the MP ranks expanded with personnel
who laterally moved from every MOS in the Marine Corps.
The most significant change occurred as a result of the news
media. In 1969, the media attention, from Life Magazine's
article and Mike Wallace's television story on treatment of
prisoners at the Camp Pendleton Brig, contributed to a
Congressional Blue Ribbon Investigation on the abuse of prisoners
by the Marines. The investigation led to the formation of the
5800, Military Police Occupational Field. Another event that
influenced the MP field was the developing drug culture and the
civil rights movement of the early 1970s. This led to the Marine
Corps leadership putting more emphasis on law enforcement.
Crime, racial problems, and drug problems focused the MP
leadership on performing the law enforcement mission and away
from the focus of supporting the warfighter. Increased law
enforcement requirements for criminal investigations, physical
security enhancements, crime prevention, and increased security
patrols created the need to pull MP from the MARDIV and FSSG to
assist the Bases and Stations in performing the law enforcement
mission.

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The cost of the increase law enforcement mission was in the
diminished support of MP to the warfighter. The Marine Corps MP,
their own worst enemy, did not embrace the Army's concept of MP
acting as combat multipliers for the infantry, 'A Force of
Choice.' The Army's focus of effort for the MP Corps on combat
support in the late 1970s and early 1980s significantly changed
the future role of MP in the Army. They focused the Fort
McClellan, Alabama military police school's efforts on their
combat missions and de-emphasized the law enforcement. The Army
continued to perform law enforcement duties because it was a
doctrinal war time mission; however, their focus was on support
to the combat mission. The most significant aspect within the
Army MP leadership was the focused effort to educate the infantry
commanders and Army leadership on the effectiveness of MP and
their contribution to the warfighter's mission. Today MP in the
Army, with four brigades comprised of seventeen MP battalions,
deploy more than any other Army unit and perform a wide variety
of missions associated with combat support.
The Marine Corps' MP field chose to focus on the law
enforcement mission. They shifted from tactical training at the
Army school, Fort McClellan, to focusing on installation law
enforcement at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. This lack of
insight, not to emphasize combat support to the warfighter, put
the Marine Corps' MP field at a distinct disadvantage in the
contribution it could make to the Fleet Marine Force.
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