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1816PGS 10/3/97 10:55 AM Page 97 Information Warfare at the Crossroads By B R I A N E. F R E D E R I C K S Navy S. U. Information center aboard Aegis cruiser. T he issuance of DOD Directive S3600.1, against a full range of threats. It covers offensive “Information Operations,” in Decem- and defensive information warfare and states a re- ber 1996 opened a new phase in infor- quirement to collect, process, and disseminate an mation warfare. Ever since a highly uninterrupted flow of information to conduct in- classified, limited distribution directive was re- formation operations. leased over four years ago, information warfare has continued to mature within the defense es- Evolution of Information Warfare tablishment. The recent directive captures these DOD Directive TS3600.1 formally launched changes, including a concept of information op- the concept of information warfare in 1992. As erations to take us into the next century. with many other policies, it offered general guid- Information warfare has influenced strategic ance. Its broader implications have emerged over thinking and also received notable attention in time through studies, wargames, and confer- the literature. Joint Vision 2010 spells out a for- ences. From the outset, wider understanding of ward-looking conceptual template to establish a information warfare was limited by security con- force that can dominate the future battlefield siderations.1 The lack of authoritative details on its role in the public domain was underscored by the prolonged absence of an approved unclassified definition. Colonel Brian E. Fredericks, USA, heads the Information Operations In January 1994 the first significant govern- Division in the Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization Directorate at ment explanation of information warfare was Headquarters, Department of the Army. Summer 1997 / JFQ 97 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1997 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1997 to 00-00-1997 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Information Warfare at the Crossroads 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,260 REPORT NUMBER Fifth Avenue SW Bg 64 Fort Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 7 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 1816PGS 10/3/97 10:55 AM Page 98 n INFORMATION WARFARE contained in the annual report of the Secretary of While command and control warfare focuses Defense. Although not providing a definition, the on enemy military command and control when report stated that information warfare: military force is applied, it is that dimension of information warfare occurring outside the domain of consists of the actions taken to preserve the integrity the traditional battlefield that has generated the of one’s own information systems from exploitation, greatest attention and is widely viewed as having corruption, or destruction, while at the same time ex- the greatest promise. Technological developments ploiting, corrupting, or destroying an adversary’s in- in electronics, communications, electro-optic, and formation systems and, in the process, achieving an computer systems, together with the application of information advantage in the application of force.2 established disciplines like psychological opera- This description clearly underscored the of- tions and military deception, offer new ways to fensive and defensive aspects of information war- achieve national security goals. As has been noted, fare. Furthermore, the report stated that it is an information warfare could destroy the ability of a integrating strategy which enables a force to act society to wage war without firing a shot by wreck- more decisively, thus increasing the likelihood of ing its information infrastructure. In an era of in- success while minimizing both casualties and col- formation warfare territory offers no sanctuary, lateral effects. Perhaps the most comprehensive borders are traversed undetected and in millisec- discussion of this subject was contained in A onds, and targets are anywhere.6Future targets will Strategy for Peace: The include not only military systems but also bank- joint doctrine presents command Decisive Edge in War ing, telecommunications, power grids, transport, published by the Joint and pipeline networks. and control warfare as a subset Staff in 1996. It states The ability to deny an enemy the means to of information warfare that information war- conduct war by destroying its information sys- fare applies across a tems has a profound deterrent effect. Information range of military oper- warfare has the potential of filling a void between ations on every level of warfare. While it is only sanctions and lethal force. Its deterrent value in- one instrument of national power, information creases as a potential enemy grasps its effective- warfare contributes to deterrence by defusing ness and our willingness to use it. As one senior crises and delaying or eliminating the use of officer characterized the challenge of information force. Defensive information warfare integrates warfare: “[It] is to get inside [an enemy] decision and protects information and its systems though loop, to change his perception so that clearly be- offensive information warfare affects enemy in- fore he decides to start a conflict he knows deep formation and information systems.3 down he is going to lose.”7 Information warfare has critical links to com- Defensive information warfare has steadily mand and control warfare, which is defined in garnered recognition in recent years. As the De- CJCS Memorandum of Policy 30 (March 1993) as: fense Information Systems Agency found in 1996, The integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), more than 95 percent of DOD worldwide military deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), telecommunications needs are satisfied by com- electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction mu- mercial carriers, and the defense establishment is tually supported by intelligence to deny information an integral part of a growing global information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command infrastructure that transcends industry, media, and control capabilities, while protecting command and the military. Defensive information warfare and control capabilities against such actions. identifies and protects vulnerabilities that arise from this increased reliance on the worldwide in- Joint doctrine presents command and con- formation infrastructure. trol warfare as a subset of information warfare Creation of the Presidential Commission on employed in operations that specifically attack Critical Infrastructure Protection in 1996 under- and defend the command and control target set. scored heightened awareness of the need for a na- Designed as an essential part of overall theater tional strategy for assuring the continued opera- campaign plans, command and control warfare is tion of vital infrastructures. These include implemented during “joint military operations telecommunications, finance, electrical power, when U.S. military forces unilaterally or as part of water, pipelines, and transportation systems. An an allied/coalition force are opposed or threat- increasing reliance on high technology is the ened by an organized military or paramilitary thread linking these systems. The threats fall into force.”4 Its stated purpose is to “decapitate the two categories: the more traditional physical enemy’s command and control from his body of threats and those emerging from “electronic, force, to paralyze them and invalidate any poten- radio-frequency, or computer-based attacks on tial advantage the adversary may have.”5 the information or communications components that control [the] critical infrastructures.”8 The 98 JFQ / Summer 1997 1816PGS 10/3/97 10:56 AM Page 99 Fredericks of both opportunities and vulnerabilities resulting from the information explosion, DOD found that the concept transcends the military. If the real promise of offensive information warfare is in both peace and the initial stages of crisis, then its success will require direct National Command Au- thorities involvement and close coordination and participation by various government agencies. Similarly, the most daunting challenge is not the impact of defensive information warfare on military effectiveness, but rather the vulnerabilities of the national infrastructure. The global information explosion is a double-edged sword. Just as we can target an enemy, an enemy can target us. The Navy (Jeffery Viano) mnptaoerorryart eebs disyl oisitptnieeh ms1i.s 9stA9i cas4a n:tt hde“d eIfd wJaionetia snb ttebe acaSdosee mcosu efra itatnhyt te eaC ncgokreemimnamtgye rioas oustituroa rncm vk uirelelid--- S. U. our unprotected civilian infrastructure, the eco- Rimpac ’96. nomic and other results would be disastrous.”9 Another dimension of information warfare is stated goal of the President’s commission is to the influence of the media such as CNN. The in- propose solutions to keep pace with evolving formation revolution, with live reports from the threats in a rapidly changing technological envi- battlefield, has transformed warfare. The graphic ronment. An integral part of the commission’s portrayal of conflicts in near real time has intensi- charter is to establish a comprehensive outreach fied revulsion around the world to the death and program with the private sector which owns and destruction of war which an enemy can exploit. operates many of the critical infrastructures. The U.S. Government must remain fully engaged This civilian involvement gets to the core of in media wars by transmitting its own message, the recent evolution of information warfare. Con- ceived as an internal response to take advantage The Realm of Information Operations Military Operations C2W Flexible Deterrent Options Diplomacy Diplomacy Conflict Prevention Information Warfare (occurs during crisis conflict) Information Assurance (continuous) Stability Increased Pre-Conflict War War Stability Operations Competitiveness Termination Operations Information Operations (across the entire spectrum of operations) Summer 1997 / JFQ 99 1816PGS 10/3/97 10:56 AM Page 100 n INFORMATION WARFARE particularly early in a crisis. This is key to a suc- Under this new construct information warfare is a cessful information warfare deterrence policy. subset of information operations. Information Clearly information warfare is a national warfare is now specifically limited to activities issue transcending DOD, but no overarching na- conducted during “times of crisis or conflict.” In- tional policy exists. The national security strategy formation operations are intended to deter con- issued in February 1995 briefly touched on the flict, protect DOD information and information defensive component of information warfare: systems, and, if deterrence fails, attain specific objectives against an enemy. Clearly the promise of We also face security risks that are not solely military information operations as contained in the new in nature....The threat of intrusion to our military directive is in its potential to defuse crises. and commercial information systems poses a signifi- By adopting information operations, DOD cant risk to national security and is being addressed.10 has embraced terminology that is acceptable in Key Elements the interagency arena and promulgated a concept that can better ensure that its information opera- The Office of the Assistant Secretary of De- tions policies and plans are fully integrated into fense for Command, Control, Communications, national security objectives and strategies. Infor- and Intelligence (C3I) gave consideration to issu- mation operations take into account the fact that ing a revised version of DOD Directive TS3600.1 other agencies tended to distance or even disasso- in 1996 with three objectives. First, given the ciate themselves altogether from the term warfare. broad interest in information warfare, the goal Outside DOD the information warfare concept was to ensure its classification level did not limit was previously viewed as overly fixated on crisis widespread distribution. Sec- and conflict. By now embracing information op- clearly the promise of ond, the directive was de- erations, DOD, in partnership with other agen- signed to both accommodate information operations is in cies, can truly address the full range of military internal DOD requirements operations including what JV 2010 refers to as its potential to defuse crises and facilitate critical intera- peacetime engagement. DOD adoption of infor- gency coordination. Finally, mation operations is particularly relevant to the it clearly needed to empha- military’s role in addressing the vulnerabilities of size the full potential of information warfare our national information infrastructure and the throughout the range of military operations with need to develop a coherent national strategy to a primary focus on preserving the peace and de- improve our posture in this area. terring conflict escalation. Using these objectives Information assurance. The directive rein- as guidelines, the directive was rewritten, coordi- forces DOD interest in the protection arena by nated, and officially approved in December 1996 formalizing information assurance, defined as in- by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Key aspects formation operations: of it are as follows. Classification. Although the directive is classi- that protect and defend information and information fied, much of it is unclassified, including key defi- systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, au- nitions. The original classified definition of infor- thentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. mation warfare found in the previous directive This includes providing for restoration of information hampered initial DOD efforts to instill awareness systems by incorporating protection, detection, and re- of the military implications of reliance on infor- action capabilities. mation technology with growing sophistication The term originated within the Office of the and connectivity. This created a void that defense Secretary of Defense but has received widespread analysts and others filled with a myriad of unoffi- acceptance throughout the government and in- cial unclassified definitions. That effort led to the creasingly in industry. misperception that DOD lacked a coherent direc- Warfighters require instant, reliable access to tion in this area. As information operations ma- diverse information including secure video tele- ture, it is likely that the next version of the direc- conferencing, detailed imagery from national tive will in fact be unclassified. sources, and intelligence, logistics, and other data Revised conceptual framework. A basic change from various locations. There is a growing aware- in the new directive is the establishment of infor- ness among commanders—both those deployed mation operations vice information warfare as and in the CONUS deployment and sustaining the overarching conceptual framework. Informa- base—that it is no longer sufficient to simply es- tion operations now encompasses those activities tablish communications and automation links. across the full range of operations designed to ex- Now they must recognize and act to minimize in- ploit the opportunities and vulnerabilities inher- herent vulnerabilities in systems. While the mili- ent in military dependence on information. tary has traditionally secured classified information, particular attention is needed for unclassified 100 JFQ / Summer 1997 1816PGS 10/3/97 10:56 AM Page 101 Unmanned aerial vehicle. Navy (Jeff Viano) S. U. but sensitive information pertaining to personnel, between the civil and military sectors is blurred. logistics, and financial matters. Disruption of such Coordination across the government and with information can adversely impact on planned and the private sector must occur daily, not just dur- ongoing operations. ing crisis. Information assurance as a subset of in- Within DOD, each service has established a formation operations provides this framework computer emergency response capability and vul- with a comprehensive strategy that, through a nerability assessment teams to complement the team approach, protects not only DOD and gov- earlier efforts of the Defense Information Systems ernment equities but also proprietary interests of Agency. This has been driven by necessity, given the civil sector. the explosion of computers at every level of com- Sensitive information operations. The directive mand down to the tactical. The Army, for exam- terms information operations activities that de- ple, deployed teams from the Land Information mand special review and approval as sensitive in- Warfare Activity to Bosnia in order to identify formation operations. Such operations involve and help alleviate vulnerabilities in its deployed those activities that require either approval by the automated information systems. Secretary of Defense or coordination in the intera- DOD Directive S3600.1 recognizes that just gency arena. They can be offensive or defensive; as DOD is confronting the new challenges and and because they involve complex legal and policy perhaps leads the rest of government, a coherent issues, they require national-level coordination. vulnerability assessment and emergency response program is necessary which transcends the government and embraces the civil sector. The seam Summer 1997 / JFQ 101 1816PGS 10/3/97 10:57 AM Page 102 n INFORMATION WARFARE For example, an enemy attack on a commercial The focus is to generate opportunities to deter or system that manifests itself in a DOD network defuse a crisis by applying advanced information raises issues that call for both interagency coordi- technology to influence world opinion and the nation and improved links with the private sector. leadership of potential enemies. Although the sensitive information opera- Civil affairs and public affairs. Given the tions concept is in the formative stage with the lessons learned in Haiti and Bosnia, both civil af- specifics still under development, elements of the fairs and public affairs also contribute signifi- approval process exist. A psychological operations cantly to information operations. Coordination campaign must have interagency approval before of public affairs and information operations plans implementation by CINCs. In Haiti, prior to and ensures that public affairs supports the overall ob- during Uphold Democracy, all psychological op- jectives of a commander. The focus is on provid- erations products were approved through the Na- ing a timely, accurate flow of information to ex- tional Security Council process.11 As sensitive internal and internal audiences. Similarly, civil formation operations procedures evolve, they will affairs activities can supports the objectives of in- provide a better mechanism to synchronize all information operations by influencing or control- formation operations activities, both offensive ling indigenous infrastructures in foreign areas. and defensive, in support of national security. Civil affairs is particularly important to informa- Human dimension. As information warfare de- tion operations because such activities involve in- veloped, the role of people in general and indi- terface with key organizations and individuals. vidual personalities as a pivotal component of information systems emerged. An objective of The Way Ahead information operations is to shape the environ- We stand at an information operations cross- ment and influence decisions. Ultimately, it is roads. Now that the lengthy coordination and somewhat contentious process that went into formulating this new concept is over, emphasis must be put on developing a campaign for a full appre- ciation of information operations inside and outside of DOD. This must be a team effort involving the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, services, and CINCs. Several important steps must be taken. Draft joint information warfare doctrine must be revised to accommodate information operations. Thought should go into refocusing doctrine for information operations that includes the Morrison) fitusl lc rriatnicgael ionf temrailgietanrcyy oimpepralitciaotnios nasn. dT hriesc opgroncizeesss Squadron (Jerry iIsn fnoormTwha utein ocndo eWnrwcaearpfyat rweo.ift hc otmhem darnafdt oafn Jdo icnotn Pturobl 3w-1a3r-, mera fare served DOD well in applying the lessons of Ca the Gulf War. Now with the refocusing of infor- mbat mation warfare on crisis and conflict, it is appro- Co 1st priate to examine whether it should subsume and Preparing Patriot replace command and control warfare, which is batteries,Roving focused on a single albeit important target set, Sands ’97. people who make decisions based on information command and control. There are, however, other from information systems. In this regard, the im- important information target sets warfighters can portance of psychological operations to informa- attack and must protect to achieve the full impact tion operations has been recognized and its con- of information warfare. Having one term that tributions have been validated in operational captures the warfighting component of informa- deployments. As an integral part of every recent tion operations will simplify the explanation and contingency—Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and promote understanding of information warfare. Bosnia—psychological operations have been Vulnerabilities in the information infrastruc- called the flexible deterrent option of first choice. ture have a direct impact on national security. In- formation assurance would provide timely, accurate, and relevant information wherever and whenever needed. Protecting information is re- ceiving increasing attention in DOD as evidenced 102 JFQ / Summer 1997 1816PGS 10/3/97 10:57 AM Page 103 Fredericks by both standing computer emergency response agencies of government as well as the private sec- capabilities and vulnerability assessment teams. tor. The ongoing Presidential Commission on However, this mission transcends the defense es- Critical Infrastructure Protection holds great tablishment and even the Federal Government, promise. While DOD must actively participate in for most of the infra- this initiative and fully implement follow-on rec- information assurance recognizes structure is in the pri- ommendations, it does not have the lead. vate sector. The Presi- This directive requires change in policy and the need for collaboration dential commission is doctrine, and it is important that information op- in protecting infrastructures a first step toward de- erations be quickly and uniformly embraced veloping a national across DOD. Supporting documentation should strategy, and DOD be revised to incorporate the latest lessons of the must remain intensely engaged in formulating global information explosion. Terminology in the and implementing commission recommenda- new directive is easily understood, so the empha- tions. Information assurance recognizes the need sis should be placed on implementation, not infor collaboration in protecting national and de- terpretation. DOD must now focus on exploiting fense information infrastructures. DOD must new opportunities against potential enemies and focus on reducing its vulnerabilities each day as prevent exploitation of the Nation’s inherent vul- well as in time of crisis. The Assistant Secretary of nerabilities. JFQ Defense (C3I) has taken the lead in developing an information operations master plan which em- NOTES phasizes the importance of information assurance. 1Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science A range of organizations has emerged to ad- Board Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture dress information warfare. Each service has its for the Battlefield(Washington: Office of the Under Sec- own information warfare center, and several joint retary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Octo- agencies have been established including the ber 1994), p. B–16. Joint Command and Control Warfare Center. 2Les Aspin, Annual Report to the President and Con- These organizations have defensive as well as of- gress(Washington: Government Printing Office, January fensive responsibilities to broadly address infor- 1994), p. 244. mation operations and not simply information 3Joint Staff, Information Warfare: A Strategy for Peace: The Decisive Edge in War(Washington: Joint Staff, 1996), warfare. Redesignating some if not all of these or- pp. 4–5. ganizations to reflect this broader focus rather 4Joint Pub 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine for Command and than information warfare will help institutional- Control Warfare (C2W), p. I-6. ize information operations. It will also reinforce 5Jim Gray, “Turning Lessons Learned into Policy,” the goal of information operations, as expounded Journal of Electronic Defense, vol. 16, no. 10 (October in the new directive, to “secure peacetime na- 1993), p. 88. tional security objectives, deter conflict, protect 6Bruce Wald and G.A. Federici, Defending the Civilian DOD information and information systems, and Information Infrastructure: Does DOD Have a Role? (Alex- shape the information environment.” As part of andria, Va.: Center for Naval Analysis, April 1995), p. 4. the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments, 7John J. Sheehan, speech at the activation cere- mony of the Joint Command and Control Warfare Cen- the Joint Staff—in concert with the unified com- ter, San Antonio, October 13, 1994. mands and services—is examining how best to 8Bill Clinton, Executive Order 13010, Critical Infra- organize for information operations. structure Protection (Washington: White House, July 15, 1996), p. 1. The publication of an information opera- 9Joint Security Commission, Redefining Security: A tions directive sustains the momentum generated Report to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central by the development of information warfare. More Intelligence (Washington: Joint Security Commission, importantly, it builds on the realization that in- February 28, 1994), p. 103. formation warfare is not an exclusive DOD do- 10Bill Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engage- main. If the potential of offensive information ment and Enlargement (Washington: Government Print- ing Office, February 1996), pp. 12–13. operations lies in deterrence and defusing crises, 11Henry H. Shelton, PSYOP Support to Operation Up- interagency coordination is essential. Creation of hold Democracy (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: XVIII Air- sensitive information operations recognizes that borne Corps, May 4, 1995), p. 6. some activities entail legal and policy issues that transcend defense concerns and require national- level approval. Similarly, those aspects of defensive information operations—now known as information assurance—must involve other Summer 1997 / JFQ 103