DTIC ADA529065: NATO Chronicle: New World Disorder

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NATO Chronicle:
New World Disorder
By K O R I N. S C H A K E
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ATO institutions and prac- comfortable with the role of a unified diplomatic initiatives and exchange
tices were created to defend Germany, and institutions such as the programs. Its senior leaders fostered
against a large-scale, short- European Community, Western Euro- military-to-military contacts to build
warning attack by the War- pean Union (WEU), and Conference confidence and a sense of commonal-
saw Pact. When the Soviet Union with- on Security and Cooperation in Europe ity, helped professionalize former War-
drew from Central and Eastern Europe (CSCE) could be strengthened. The saw Pact militaries and subordinate
at the end of the Cold War, Germany United States wanted to remain a Euro- them to civilian control, and offered a
was reunited, the Warsaw Pact disman- pean power. Europe continued to con- way for the NATO military structure to
tled, and the Soviet Union dissolved stitute a vital group of allies, a major engage beyond Alliance territory to
into the Commonwealth of Indepen- economic market, and an ongoing se- shape the security environment. While
dent States. Amidst such rapid and dra- curity interest. The United States also continuing to advocate a common de-
matic change, it is not surprising that had a practical interest in retaining the fense, the stationing of American
some questioned the need to preserve troops in Europe, and
NATO. What is striking is that as the the Strategic Concept approved in 1991 both nuclear and con-
Alliance enters its second half-century ventional forces (but
identified significant risk from instability
in this very different security environ- with reduced reliance
ment, it is adapting to meet new chal- on nuclear forces), the
lenges while retaining key elements advantages of forward stationed U.S. London Summit also directed a review
that have defined it: consensus deci- forces and interoperable European mil- of strategy, command architecture, and
sionmaking, integrated military com- itaries for contingencies that might force structure.
mand, and commitment to a common arise in Europe or beyond. The new strategy resulted in a
defense. It has expanded its missions NATO always served purposes broader mission: extending stability
to include projecting stability across other than simply deterring and de- throughout Europe both by engage-
the whole of Europe and adapted its fending against a Soviet attack. It en- ment and projecting military power.
structures to facilitate new members sured American participation in Europe, The Strategic Concept approved in
and a stronger European identity. This provided a framework for Europeans to 1991 identified the new European secu-
resilient transatlantic commitment of grow comfortable with a strong Ger- rity environment as one of reduced
nations with shared interests and val- many, reduced defense requirements for threat of calculated aggression, but
ues was the vision of the founders of individual member nations, and estab- with significant risk from instability.
the North Atlantic Alliance. lished patterns of transparency and co- This justified moving away from large
operation in defense planning that built forces intended principally for defense
New Missions
confidence within the Alliance. How- in place and toward smaller and more
The initial survival of NATO at ever, even these added missions were agile forces that can be deployed
the end of the Cold War is attributable difficult to justify when the public per- throughout and beyond the NATO area
to a basic agreement among Europeans ception was directed at a quickly reced- in response to emerging crises.
and North Americans that even with- ing Soviet threat. Other purposes would The concept of projecting stabil-
out a Soviet threat, the residual insur- be required. ity was short of political approval for
ance of continuing U.S. involvement At the London Summit in 1990, out-of-area operations but provided a
was desirable at least for a transition NATO identified a new mission: out- critical first step in that direction.
period until Russian reform was well reach to and dialogue with former ad- NATO took another year to formally
along. Europeans would thus feel more versaries. It established extensive accept non-Article 5 collective defense
missions for several reasons: France
advocated Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Kori N. Schake is a senior research professor in the Institute for National Strategic
and European Union (EU) predomi-
Studies at the National Defense Universtiy and has served both on the Joint Staff
nance, Germany had not yet received
and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
18 JFQ / Spring 1999
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NATO Chronicle: New World Disorder
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Schake
the constitutional ruling to participate
in missions outside its territory, sev-
eral allies did not want to appear to be
rushing in where the Soviets had re-
treated, and wars in the former Yu-
goslavia were not yet dominating Eu-
ropean security issues.
Internal Adaptation
Projecting stability required
adapting NATO structures internally
and building relationships with na-
tions outside the Alliance. Condition-
ing structures to project stability was
more involved than preparing them
for participation by former enemies.
Implementing the strategy demanded
the negotiation of a detailed transla-
tion of political guidelines into mili-
tary priorities, improving capabilities,
reducing force size, reapportioning a General Ridgeway
assuming post of
smaller number of command slots
SACEUR,1952.
among members, and reconciling all
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these changes with the preservation of NAT
the integrated command structure.
The first and easiest change was
reducing reliance on nuclear forces.
The London Summit limited the use of
such weapons to a matter of last resort.
The Supreme Allied Commander Eu-
rope (SACEUR), and the High Level
Group of national political representa-
tives determined that without the War-
saw Pact, allied short-range nuclear
forces could be eliminated if the Con-
ventional Forces in Europe Treaty went
into effect. In October 1991, before
this strategy was formally approved,
NATO defense ministers agreed to re-
duce the nuclear arsenal by 80 percent.
Adapting the integrated military
command (IMC) proved more difficult.
The first issue was determining
whether peacetime military integration NAC members approving
was needed in an environment of re- Harmel Report,1967.
duced threat and expanded warning
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times. The Alliance is unique among NAT
international organizations in having a
standing peacetime military structure.
arrangements for reinforcement; stan- The second issue in adapting IMC
Routine interaction among militaries in
dards and procedures for equipment, was determining how many and what
IMC enables forces to conduct a broad
training, and logistics; joint and com- types of forces allied nations should
range of operations, from high-inten-
bined exercises; and interoperable in- maintain. Most NATO forces are de-
sity combat to peacekeeping in a per-
frastructure, armaments, and logistics. signed to defend their homelands,
missive environment. The Strategic
By adopting each of these critical ele- thus they take for granted private sec-
Concept outlined elements of common
ments, the NATO leadership effectively tor and local commercial support for
defense that were vital to operational
preserved the integrated military com- contract services. European forces have
coherence: common operational plan-
mand beyond the Cold War. three general shortfalls: lift, communi-
ning; multinational formations; sta-
cations, and intelligence. The Strategic
tioning forces on each other’s territory;
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JFQ FORUM
Concept required a capability to
Reforger Exercise,1984.
quickly reach a trouble spot from any-
where in the NATO area, which meant
improved power projection. If forces
could be moved, fewer troops would
be required overall and their stationing
location, predominantly in western
Germany, would matter less.
MC 400, the military implementa-
tion of the strategy, structured forces
into three categories: reaction forces,
intended to respond throughout the
NATO area; main defense forces, which
would constitute the bulk of European
armies and are meant to be lower-readi-
ness and in place; and augmentation
forces, intended as a reserve. Tiering
provided for a core of forces superior to
those of the Cold War and cascaded
down the capabilities of the rest. While
the reaction forces comprised only 10
percent of the overall structure, they
were considered sufficient to deter any
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limited attack and defend against AT
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short-warning strikes.
NATO also created multinational
forces that demonstrated continuing
commitment to common defense with-
out the former threat, made national
troop reductions more difficult, and
justified the presence of American,
British, and French troops in Germany
after unification. The initial tranche
consisted of two U.S.-German corps, a
German-Dutch corps, and the Allied
Command Europe Rapid Reaction
Corps (ARRC), containing forces from
up to twelve nations. ARRC was critical
because it was the only substantial
ground force likely to be deployable
throughout and beyond the NATO area
in the short term.
The third issue in adapting IMC
was revising NATO commands. Overall,
the restructuring reduced headquarters
strength by 25 percent (equal to the
initial forces cut), built a reaction force
command and supporting planning
staffs, adjusted command boundaries
to account for German unification, re-
duced the number of lower-level com- SALT talks beginning
mands, and eliminated funds for na- in 1970.
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tional commands below the principal NAT
subordinate command level.
The final element of initial inter-
nal adaptation to the end of the Cold
War was establishing resource primacy.
Defense leaders had been concerned
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Schake
that efforts to forge a European Secu-
rity and Defense Identity (ESDI) would
result in capabilities being siphoned
from NATO requirements. In 1992 the
Defense Planning Committee agreed
that the primary responsibility of al-
lied forces was to meet collective de-
fense commitments.
Within two years NATO developed
new missions, reduced reliance on nu-
clear weapons, restructured conven-
tional forces to provide a peace divi-
dend while improving the capability of
the part of the force it might actually
employ, built multinational forces to
demonstrate solidarity and retain forces
in Europe, streamlined commands, and
established the first call on resources. By
London Summit,1990.
the end of 1992, the Alliance had agree-
ments in place to maintain and even ATO
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strengthen its role in European security.
Translating them into full political ac-
ceptance would take another three common defense. NATO resisted calls into allied commands if membership
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AT years and the sad example of war in the for expanding membership with a for- was extended and into NATO-led oper-
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former Yugoslavia. mula devised by Secretary General ations regardless. It would also create a
Woerner that regarded expansion not closer link in the meantime, even
External Adaptation
as “a question of if but when.” How- though partners were not being offered
At the Rome Summit in 1991, ever, even with progress attained the defense guarantee. Moreover,
NATO created new institutions to through NACC, the Alliance seemed to NACC activities would be modified:
manage the engagement of former ad- be running out of activities short of nations could develop independent bi-
versaries. The North Atlantic Coopera- membership for prospective members. lateral relationships with NATO. While
tion Council (NACC) included all for- marketed as a de-
mer Warsaw Pact states and became a the PFP program extended NACCcooperation parture from pre-
forum for discussion and cooperation vious policy, PFP
to military exercises and operations
on defense issues. NACC formed paral- actually was a
lel structures for routine consultations continuation of
with allied defense, foreign policy, and The question was how to achieve the approach embodied in NACC and
military leaders. Enthusiasm by former closer relationships with democratiz- its work plans.
Warsaw Pact states to be involved in ing states in central Europe without PFP more fully paralleled the in-
NATO activities led to work plans for antagonizing Moscow. ternal functioning of the NATO de-
activities ranging from defense conver- The United States developed an fense planning process in order that
sion and civilian control of the mili- initiative to expand and marginally new partners could understand the
tary to the development of joint peace- change NACC activities to encompass kinds of information exchange and
keeping doctrine. The council exposed military-to-military contacts at lower evaluation which occur in allied de-
its former adversaries to the political levels, allowing nonmembers to move fense channels. Framework documents
and military culture of cooperation closer to the integrated military com- signaled national intent while individ-
and provided the first step towards Al- mand and defense planning process. ual partnership programs outlined spe-
liance expansion. Substantively, the Partnership for cific actions which partners and NATO
Although the council was an im- Peace (PFP) program extended NACC would undertake, liaison officers were
portant innovation for including for- cooperation to military exercises and assigned to begin planning at SHAPE
mer Warsaw Pact states, it failed to operations and gave it institutional headquarters, and numerous coopera-
meet the expectations of those nations structure through a coordination cell tive topics were identified.
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NAT which sought closer ties with NATO at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Military cooperation in PFP cen-
unhindered by Russia. By 1994 several Europe (SHAPE) that could be linked to tered on peacekeeping, because the as-
of these states seemed fundamentally the NATO military structure. Closer sociated tasks are less operationally
Western in character: they had demo- military cooperation would create the challenging than high-intensity combat
cratic regimes, militaries subordinate basis for their eventual incorporation and are of a sort that member and non-
to civilian control, market economies, member forces might come together to
and a willingness to participate in conduct. NATO then needed a way to
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JFQ FORUM
Inaugurating the Allied
Rapid Reaction Corps,
1992.
O
AT
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organize and command peace opera- going concern, with its first military Member nations did not even
tions that did not threaten the primacy exercise in the fall of 1994. CJTFs were share a common opinion of peace-
of its integrated military command. more difficult to get off the ground, in keeping. Several militaries had sub-
SACEUR developed a proposal to part because of technical reasons and stantial background in monitoring ex-
link PFP activities to the military in part because allied political leaders isting peace agreements as part of U.N.
structure and provide more room for a did not fully embrace the concept forces, others had constabulary experi-
separable-but-not-separate ESDI. The until details of its application to ESDI ence in working closely with civilian
idea was to build individual command were worked out at the North Atlantic authority to enforce colonial will, and
cells within existing NATO headquar- Council meeting held in Berlin during the United States viewed such opera-
ters for planning and commanding June 1996. tions as low intensity conflict. As a re-
combined and joint operations. Re- sult, the North Atlantic Cooperation
The Former Yugoslavia
sulting combined joint task forces Council had an agreed peacekeeping
(CJTFs) could be pulled from the over- Involvement in the former Yu- doctrine more than four years before
all structure for non-NATO operations, goslavia necessitated further internal NATO itself could agree on the military
either under WEU or another organi- adaptation since NATO practices (con- parameters of peace operations. The
zation with Alliance support. Because sultations, initiating military planning, military command had to settle for
they were indigenous to the integrated identifying suitable available national identifying useful assets.
command, they would be assured sup- forces, approving operational plans, As it considered deploying allied
port and would not compete with transitioning forces from national to troops to Bosnia, initially to monitor
IMC for resources. allied command, and conducting oper- U.N. sanctions and the no-fly zone
Both the PFP and CJTF initiatives ations) were all formally keyed to an and subsequently to enforce the Day-
were approved at the Brussels Summit Article 5 threat. ton Accords, NATO had to develop the
in 1994. NATO leaders and nonmem- ability to authorize, oversee, and em-
ber nations eager to be included in al- ploy combat forces outside its area. It
lied operations quickly made PFP a
22 JFQ / Spring 1999
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Schake
alone could collect and analyze the in-
telligence to assess violations of U.N.
resolutions, mount multinational mar-
itime and tactical air operations to re-
spond, and provide close air support
for U.N. Protection Force (UNPRO-
FOR). These were the first out-of-area
operations and occasioned the first
participation of French forces in the
NATO command structure since 1966.
The Alliance needed to resolve
two internal issues prior to its involve-
ment in the Balkans: determine the
role of SACEUR and establish the ap-
propriate political level of operational
oversight. While a debate over the role
of the commander might seem arcane,
it is crucial to understanding NATO. Ukraine signing PFP
The French accepted the position out- framework documents,
lined in Article 5 operations but did 1994.
not believe these responsibilities O
AT
should extend out-of-area. They ar- N
gued that the subordinate operational
commands were the proper echelon
for organizing out-of-area operations, practices may be appropriate for deci- appeared set to achieve their war aims
which would likely be smaller and in- sionmaking when NATO must defend even with UNPROFOR on the ground
volve more limited tasks than defend- itself against a large-scale, short-warn- and before terms for a NATO operation
ing NATO territory. ing threat, some felt that they were not could be reached. But several factors
For most allies in IMC, SACEUR is appropriate to the sensitive out-of-area converged in 1995 to prevent the Serbs
the glue that maintains the credibility peacekeeping and peace enforcement from consolidating their gains in
of allied military operations. He runs operations. Bosnia and Croatia: clandestine arm-
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AT NATO planning and the evaluation of Ultimately both issues were re- ing of the Bosnian army, collusion be-
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force capabilities, translates military re- solved. France accepted the legitimacy tween the Croat and Bosnian forces, an
quirements into policy terms, and ne- of the integrated military command to effective offensive by those forces to
gotiates such terms with contributors conduct out-of-area operations on the roll back Bosnian Serb gains and “sim-
to ensure adequate assets for a mission. same military terms as Article 5 simply plify” the negotiating map, sanctions
He shields subordinate commanders because there was no other way to get against Serbia leading Belgrade to con-
from political pressure, allowing them the job done. In return, it received four strain the Bosnian Serbs, and interna-
to focus on operational requirements. key concessions: acknowledgement tional outrage over tactics employed
That role within NATO is in some ways that NATO needed to develop new po- by Bosnian Serbs in the spring offen-
comparable to the role of the Chair- litical practices for operating out-of- sives of 1995.
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With- area; establishment of an ad hoc politi- The United States led efforts to
out such a supreme commander, many cal military coordinating group negotiate a cease fire consistent with
allies would lose confidence in the Al- consisting of political representatives territory held by each party to the con-
liance’s ability to organize and conduct from troop-contributing nations to re- flict in Bosnia. Dayton produced a de-
operations. Members including the view plans for out-of-area operations; tailed schedule for demobilization,
United States believe that national the right of the North Atlantic Council confidence building, and civilian re-
contributions can only be melded into to approve all military plans and oper- construction and re-enfranchisement,
a multinational force, inhibiting na- ations; and representation in senior much of which was placed under the
tions from pursuing divergent policies, command positions when France com- authority of the United Nations and
under the leadership of SACEUR. mitted troops to individual operations. Organization for Security and Coopera-
The other issue raised by out-of- With this agreement NATO pro- tion in Europe (formerly CSCE). NATO
area missions was the extent of politi- ceeded to plan for major ground in- agreed to take over UNPROFOR func-
cal control exercised over operations. volvement in the former Yugoslavia. In tions and its 60,000 troops, disbanding
Some allies argued that the Alliance late 1994, the Serbs and Bosnian Serbs elements not folded into the allied op-
structure was too dominated by the eration. While a sustainable peace in
military and inadequately controlled Bosnia is still by no means assured, the
by political authorities. Though allied Implementation Force (IFOR) and sub-
sequently the smaller Stabilization
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JFQ FORUM
Force (SFOR) created an environment of first refusal over missions and com- NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.
in which the real work of rebuilding mitting to improve their forces, Euro- That council does not provide Russia
Bosnia through fostering a civil society pean allies could rely on NATO and with a veto over NATO action, but it
can begin. the United States to supply assets does acknowledge its importance in
NATO demonstrated many needed for European operations. But the European security landscape and
strengths in Bosnia: the resilience of its even the Berlin agreement has not set- provide for joint action when there is
political institutions in developing prac- tled the ESDI debate. European allies consensus.
tices for non-Article 5 operations; the continue to search for ways to better The Czech Republic, Hungary,
value of an integrated military structure coordinate defense programs and insti- and Poland were admitted in March
to plan, organize, and command a tutional structures to build a stronger 1999. Although NATO seems commit-
multinational force; the flexibility of profile on defense issues. ted to an open door policy, no new
commands to incorporate the forces of candidates are expected in the near
NATO Expansion
nations outside IMC, including 16 non- term. Russia is not enthusiastic about
members; and the practicality of PFP The final major adaptation since expansion but appears to have ac-
and CJTF initiatives in bringing an ef- the Cold War has been extending cepted it without a major rift in its re-
fective European force into being. NATO membership to nations of the lations with the Alliance.
former Warsaw Pact. The process began Managing relations with Russia
A European Identity
shortly after the establishment of the while expanding both membership
European allies have consistently PFP program. Both Bonn and Washing- and responsibilities will be the pre-
pressed for a broader role in their own ton believed that the new democracies dominant challenge to NATO. The Al-
security since the end of the Cold War. of central Europe risked setbacks unless liance will also continue to deal with
Virtually every allied document pub- the West validated the sacrifices which internal disagreements over how to ad-
lished since 1990 refers to the benefits they had made to transform their soci- dress security concerns that arise in Eu-
of a stronger ESDI. To enhance the eties and economies. They also came rope and beyond. However, such chal-
to believe by 1995 lenges by no means diminish the
European allies have consistently pressed that the process could incredible achievements during and
be managed without after the Cold War. The Alliance has
for a broader role in their own security
any damage to rela- succeeded in redirecting its efforts and
tions with Moscow its institutions from a large-scale,
role of Europeans the Alliance is re- provided the process was carried out short-warning attack from the East to-
ducing U.S. representation in its com- slowly and transparently and was ward new and diverse security threats.
mands, making its assets available timed to follow the 1996 Russian presi- In only ten years it has built consensus
through combined joint task forces, dential elections. on new missions, adapted its political
increasing support for WEU or EU to Determining which states would and military processes and structures
act as the institutional basis for ESDI, be invited to join began in 1995 with a to shed the vestiges of the Cold War,
holding joint NATO–WEU meetings, study of the terms which new mem- contributed to a durable peace in the
and using allied staffs to review WEU bers should meet to ensure that they Balkans, and built institutional rela-
contingency plans. would be contributors to the common tionships with other organizations and
The stark differences between U.S. defense rather than just consumers of major outside nations. It is a record
and European power projection capa- the security guarantee. The study stip- the Alliance can be proud of and that
bilities generates an intractable prob- ulated that new members must meet would both surprise and please its
lem for developing ESDI: Europe lacks both political and military criteria, the founders. JFQ
the assets to be truly independent of most important of which were to (1)
the United States. And while some Eu- resolve ethnic and extraterritorial dis-
ropean leaders believed that high-end putes by peaceful means, (2) establish
military capabilities were no longer re- civilian control of the military, (3)
quired in the post-Cold War era, the share roles and risks of a common de-
Chairman of the Military Committee, fense, (4) subscribe to the Alliance
Field Marshal Vincent, noted “We strategy, and (5) work toward interop-
learned the hard lesson from NATO’s erability of forces with other members.
increasing involvement in Bosnia that The terms ensured that all new mem-
a surprisingly wide range of very ad- bers shared the political values of the
vanced military capabilities were even- Alliance and would eventually make a
tually needed.” In 1996, the allies contribution to its defense capabilities.
agreed that in return for a NATO right As relations with the first group of
candidates—namely, the Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary, and Poland—intensified,
the Alliance institutionalized its rela-
tionship with Russia through the
24 JFQ / Spring 1999