DTIC ADA528979: Single Port Management

6 Pages·0.26 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

1614Kross 5/6/97 2:03 PM Page 53
Let our advance worrying become advance thinking and planning.
Out of intense complexities intense simplicities emerge.
—Sir Winston Churchill
Single Port
mpis)
Ge
Val
magery (
mera I
Ca
mbat
Co
Management
Unloading equipment at
Port-au-Prince,Haiti.
By WA LT E R K R O S S
W
hile joint doctrine
EDITOR’S Note
evolves, the Secretary
TRANSCOM serves as the DOD single worldwide manager for common user of Defense has desig-
ports of embarkation and debarkation. Single port management is necessary nated U.S. Transporta-
to ensure the seamless transfer of cargo and equipment in any given theater. tion Command (TRANSCOM) as the
However, single port management is a doctrinal concept that has not been in- single worldwide manager for common
stitutionalized by geographical CINCs. The consequences were revealed in de- user ports of embarkation and debarka-
lays that hindered port movements during operations such as Desert tion. Yet this doctrinal concept has not
been fully embraced by the theater
Shield/Desert Storm, Joint Endeavor, and Uphold Democracy. To ensure that
warfighters, the geographic CINCs in
future deployments are conducted successfully, guidance on the responsibili-
whose areas of responsibility the ports
ties of the single port manager must be clearly defined in joint doctrine.
lie. As TRANSCOM endeavors to exe-
cute its charter to provide strategic
land, sea, and air transport across the
General Walter Kross, USAF, is commander in chief, full range of military operations, it is
U.S. Transportation Command, and previously served as imperative that the geographic CINCs
director of the Joint Staff.
Winter 1996–97 / JFQ 53
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1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
1997 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1996 to 00-00-1997
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Single Port Management
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,Fort REPORT NUMBER
Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT

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ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 5
unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR)
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1614Kross 5/6/97 2:03 PM Page 54
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JFQ FORUM
be well informed on the validity, perti- The issue is educating users and operates seaport management systems,
nence, and value added of single port following doctrine. In Joint Endeavor, and conducts surveys of seaport capa-
management doctrine and be commit- controversy over aerial port manage- bilities around the world. In spite of
ted to implementing it.1 ment and airlift staging/support re- proven MTMC expertise in global sea-
Single port management doctrine quirements resulted in the theater port management and the assignment
will provide the continuity and seam- command not providing the personnel of that mission to TRANSCOM under
less transfer of cargo and equipment at needed for ALCC to effectively coordi- the unified command plan, theater
seaports and aerial ports, an important nate with DIRMOBFOR and AME. Con- CINCs have not routinely employed
consideration largely missing in con- sequently, AME struggled to perform MTMC to manage seaport services in
tingencies such as Desert Shield/Desert the missions. DIRMOBFOR was as- the past, especially in contingency the-
Storm, Uphold Democracy, and Restore signed to Vincenza, Italy, isolated from aters where it lacks permanent peace-
Hope. The principles contained in Joint the theater command in Stuttgart, Ger- time presence. Recent deployments il-
Pub 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense many. That compounded coordination lustrate why MTMC and TRANSCOM
Transportation System, have been tested problems and hampered the interface have made integration of the single
in exercises conducted in the Pacific by between theater and strategic airlift. seaport management concept into
the Army component of TRANSCOM, Army commanders, in their rush to joint doctrine and the defense trans-
Military Traffic Management Com- put forces on the ground, consistently portation system such a priority.
mand (MTMC). However, three major pushed tactical vehicles and personnel
challenges remain. First, the geographic ahead of airfield operations equipment Operational Experience
CINCs have not fully accepted the doc- and operators resulting in a 3-5 day Desert Shield was the first of many
trine in contingency plans. Second, delay of airflow into the theater. Addi- contingency operations in which ad
doctrine on single port management tionally, Army cargo was not moved hoc arrangements resulted in ineffi-
must be included in revisions of all per- off the airfield in a timely manner at ciencies and confusion. For example,
tinent joint pubs. Third, the concept 24th Infantry Division
must be included in all joint training as a result of Joint Endeavor, problems equipment initially ar-
and theater level exercises. rived by sea at Ad
with aerial port management doctrine
TRANSCOM, through its Air Force Dammam, Saudi Arabia,
component, Air Mobility Command are being addressed in September 1990. Mem-
(AMC), operates strategic aerial ports in bers of the 7th Transporta-
both established theaters where forces Taszar and Tuzla, and encampments tion Group offloaded cargo and man-
and infrastructure are permanent and were built on valuable staging and air- aged the seaport of debarkation.
contingency theaters where forces and field parking areas. Although its primary expertise lies in
infrastructure are temporary. Current As a result of Joint Endeavor, transportation operations, the group
doctrine has the unified CINCs plan- problems with aerial port management continued to manage the port during
ning on well-defined support for con- doctrine in areas such as DIRMOBFOR the operation. Military standard trans-
tingency aerial port operations, a mis- have been recognized and are being portation and movement procedures
sion TRANSCOM meets by using AMC addressed. In the interim, lack of doc- cargo records were incomplete, and in-
deployable tanker airlift control ele- trine and formal agreements between transit visibility to the theater CINC
ments and mission support teams for TRANSCOM and unified commands was not readily available. Cargo contin-
contingencies. But challenges remain over seaport management in the the- ued to be offfloaded from ships and
in their execution. For example, the di- ater means seaport operations have stockpiled on docks. Accountability
rector of mobility forces (DIRMOB- been conducted on an ad hoc basis. was lost and onward movement to the
FOR)—a key player in aerial port man- TRANSCOM, through MTMC, troops was sometimes frustrated.
agement—is addressed in Joint Pub usually manages seaports of embarka- Through summer and autumn 1991,
3-17, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Pro- tion and debarkation in any given the- MTMC gradually assumed the seaport
cedures (JTTP) for Theater Airlift Opera- ater. However, when deploying forces management mission during redeploy-
tions, and Joint Pub 4-01.1, JTTP for and sustainment to a contingency the- ment, freeing the 7th Transportation
Airlift Support to Joint Operations: ater, the command is not always se- Group to redeploy to the continental
lected to manage ports of debarkation, United States.
DIRMOBFOR exercises coordinating au-
a mission that MTMC efforts have A year later, our troops were de-
thority between the airlift coordination
sought to clarify and improve over the ployed to Africa twice. During Restore
cell (ALCC), air mobility element (AME),
past several years. Hope in Somalia, the joint task force
or tanker airlift control center (TACC) if
MTMC operates 25 common-user (JTF) commander initially assigned sea-
no AME is deployed, joint movement cen-
water seaports worldwide. It books mil- port management to the Navy and
ter (JMC), and the joint air operations cen-
itary cargo with commercial carriers, later to the Army. Shifting responsibil-
ter (JAOC) in order to expedite the resolu-
contracts for terminal services, inter- ity resulted in confusion over who was
tion of any airlift problems.2
faces with host nations on seaport-re- in charge and on at least one occasion
lated issues, prepares documentation
such as ship manifests, develops and
54 JFQ / Winter 1996–97
1614Kross 5/6/97 2:04 PM Page 55
mons)
m
Si
B.
Loading tanks onto mela
Cape Douglasat Pa
Antwerp,Belgium. my (
Ar
S.
U.
the operation into a model for subse- never be sure that they have proper
quent work on the single port man- support or that the sequence of ship
Loading vehicle into hold
ager concept. offloading reflects their priorities.
of President Adamsin
MTMC personnel were among the
Port of Oakland.
OD first to deploy to Haiti in 1994 for Up- Facing the Challenge
D
hold Democracy, but the seaport man- Several basic tenets must be ap-
agement responsibilities were split be- plied to improve the strategic/theater
tween MTMC and an Army composite interface. First, CINCs must know im-
enabled the service with seaport con- transportation group. The lack of clear mediately which organization will be
trol to give priority to its own require- roles for seaport management and sea- seaport manager and reflect that factor
ments while other cargo was delayed.3 port operating forces resulted in a du- in their plans. Second, the seaport
During a similar deployment, Support plication of effort, competition for re- manager must remain constant so that
Hope in Rwanda, MTMC played a key sources, and complicated relations changes in seaport operators are trans-
role in planning for seaport operations between the organizations. parent to the supported CINCs. Third,
at Mombassa, Kenya, and performing a Recent deployments clearly point CINC requirements must be foremost,
full range of functions. It provided to a need for improved planning and with priorities translated directly into
positive experience and lessons in de- execution of seaport management and workload instructions for seaport oper-
veloping single seaport management. ators. Fourth, CINCs must
U.S. forces were also deployed to seaport management and operations be aware of where their car-
southwest Asia in 1994 for Vigilant goes are in the defense
functions must be clearly defined and
Warrior because of an Iraqi threat. transportation system.
MTMC participated in the planning understood by everyone Fifth, to accomplish these
and was among the first units on the tasks, MTMC and an Army
ground. Here it performed the full composite transportation
range of seaport management respon- operations. Experience in Desert group must be deployed early, possibly
sibilities, to include documentation Shield/Desert Storm, Uphold Democ- even on the first plane.4 Finally, joint
oversight, information management, racy, and Restore Hope revealed the training should integrate and exercise
and liaison with the host nation. value of consistent joint doctrine. The different joint seaport operating force
When operating elements of 7th Trans- shift in responsibility from one organi- packages in various scenarios and geo-
portation Group arrived, MTMC con- zation to another created the need for graphic areas, testing joint forces to
tinued managing the port as the group working interfaces at critical times and plan, execute, and coordinate such op-
provided the seaport operations work resulted in loss of cargo visibility, doc- erations under realistic conditions.
force. During this event the manage- umentation, and accountability. With- To effect change, seaport manage-
ment and operations roles were better out a grasp of how operations work, ment and operations functions must
defined than in Desert Shield/Desert seaport personnel waste their time re- be clearly defined and understood by
Storm. Although imperfect, deconflict- solving organizational issues when everyone. This recognition must be re-
ing responsibilities and the overall they should be focused on CINC re- flected in both joint and Army doc-
success of Vigilant Warrior have made quirements. Finally, as each organiza- trine as well as in arrangements be-
tion is different, commanders can tween TRANSCOM and theater CINCs.
Winter 1996–97 / JFQ 55
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JFQ FORUM
is in the process of submitting changes
Loading tank
on aspects of single seaport manage-
onto USNS Cuatoin
ment within the joint publications re-
Saudi Arabia.
view cycle.
Building the Future
The single port manager concept
envisions MTMC as the theater seaport
manager through the use of manage-
ment cells with elements located under
theater CINCs or JTF staffs and at each
designated common-user seaport. The
management cell is part of a larger
joint strategic seaport operating force
package designed by U.S. Atlantic
Elliott) Command. It is comprised of elements
Robert pfroormta tTioRnA GNrSoCuOp,M M, iMlitTaMry CS,e a7ltihftT Craonms--
Army( mand (the Navy component of
U.S. TRANSCOM), Navy and Marine termi-
nal service forces, and Coast Guard.
Capabilities include command, con-
These responsibilities must also be re- embarkation and a hand-off to the the- trol, and communications; seaport
flected in operation plans, and ac- ater CINC and identifies seaport opera- preparation, operations, security, and
countable organizations must be tor functions required to move and safety; and logistics. Command and
trained. The TRANSCOM action plan, document surface cargo. Key aspects of control is built around an MTMC sea-
Defense Transportation System 2010, pre- the SPM concept are that MTMC—a port management cell.
cisely sets that goal: TRANSCOM component—will provide As MTMC establishes itself as
planners to supported CINCs to de- worldwide single seaport manager, it
An efficient and timely transfer of cargo,
velop seaport management and opera- must ensure that it can perform effec-
passengers (including patients) and infor-
tions requirements during planning. tively. A fundamental step is identify-
mation between strategic and theater ele-
MTMC, at the request of supported ing and training managers. The initial
ments is key to responsive force projection.
commanders and under the direction concept envisions seaport manage-
From the user’s perspective, this exchange
of TRANSCOM, conducts seaport as- ment cells with preselected military
must be “seamless”; that is, the responsible
sessments, establishes contact with and civilian personnel which would
procedures, systems, and organizations are
local seaport authorities, and deter- perform management functions simi-
“transparent” to the ultimate customer and
mines availability of host nation sup- lar to their peacetime jobs. They would
result in a fort-to-foxhole delivery system.
port. MTMC deploys a seaport manage- prepare for a wartime mission through
A plateau in doctrine develop- ment cell into theater that translates routine training exercises.
ment was reached in a 1995 agreement the requirements of theater CINCs into MTMC–Pacific, with headquarters
between the commanding general, workload instructions for seaport oper- at Wheeler Army Airfield in Hawaii,
MTMC, and the Army Chief of Trans- ators. Under this concept, MTMC implemented SPM training in 1994
portation who determined that a com- serves as the seaport manager in all sce- using management teams of military
mon understanding and clearly docu- narios, from the most primitive, requir- and civilian personnel from their head-
mented responsibilities are imperative. ing over the shore delivery, to the most quarters and each Pacific medium port
Their organizations developed a “con- sophisticated, such as in Saudi Arabia. command. Equipment to support sea-
cept of management and operations of Finally, MTMC acts as seaport manager port operations is now prepositioned
strategic, common-user contingency throughout an operation, beginning in Okinawa for quick transit to facilities
seaports,” more commonly referred to with planning and continuing until in the Pacific. The teams enabled
as the single port manager (SPM) con- the last cargo returns home. MTMC–Pacific personnel to tailor a sea-
cept of operations. Although the SPM concept of op- port management package to perform
This concept defines distinct roles erations was a real accomplishment, an the manager mission at seaports where
and responsibilities for seaport man- agreement between two Army organi- there is no U.S. military presence.
agers and operators. It outlines seaport zations does not make the single sea- In Europe as in the Pacific, MTMC
manager functions needed to control port manager concept a reality. It must has a long-established personnel struc-
the strategic flow of cargo and informa- also be advanced in joint pubs which ture which staffs seaport management
tion between the worldwide seaport of set forth doctrine, principles, and pol- cells that were successfully deployed in
icy to govern joint activities. As re-
flected in its action plan, TRANSCOM
56 JFQ / Winter 1996–97
1614Kross 5/6/97 2:04 PM Page 57
Kross
Support Hope and Vigilant Warrior. staff personnel, can effectively manage by providing these individuals with
The personnel, training, and expertise a seaport. valuable training at remote sites. The
are in place and able to conform to MTMC has worked closely with command will work in the future to-
CINC requirements. Forces Command to determine how ward creating a standard training pro-
The command also has estab- units can support the SPM concept. gram, building on the experiences of
lished a small permanent presence in The primary challenge is perceived the Pacific management teams.
southwest Asia to provide regional sea- doctrinal prohibition. Though not Because the command manage-
port management. Its personnel have strictly forbidden, units designed for ment cell is part of a larger joint sea-
the skills to perform contingency sea- deployment, such as the contract su- port operating force package, seaport
port management functions and offer pervision and cargo documentation personnel also need training beyond
continuity to ensure that theater detachments, are not normally aligned the MTMC-developed program.
CINC priorities and guidance are met to nondeploying units. MTMC is work- TRANSCOM asked for help in May
from the onset of a contingency. They ing with the U.S. Army Training and 1995 from the Army Chief of Trans-
are aware of host nation sensitivities Doctrine Command to clarify doctrine portation to develop and implement a
and port business practices; and they and change perceptions. training program. Once generated,
have the capabilities to train follow-on The line-up that MTMC seeks is training should be hands-on and inte-
active and Reserve component person- critical to training, which is the next grate joint forces, including active and
nel. New arrivals in theater will not phase of the single seaport manager Reserve components. It should exercise
have the corporate memory or institu- challenge. The wartime alignments es- joint seaport operating force packages
tional knowledge that senior MTMC tablished in operation plans decide under different scenarios around the
military and civilian personnel bring which organizations are responsible for world. In addition, much of this train-
to the table. unit training. In the last year, MTMC ing will occur under a joint deploy-
While pulling seaport manage- has established itself as seaport man- ment training center, a program under
ment personnel from the existing ager in operation plans. CINC reluc- development by TRANSCOM to pro-
command structure is viable for tance to relinquish control of forces vide joint training for a range of de-
smaller humanitarian contingencies, operating in theater to TRANSCOM ployment activities.
initially frustrated those ef-
re-engineering to reduce peacetime forts. Although the unified The road from seaport manage-
command plan specifically as- ment in Desert Shield to the MTMC
force levels complicates seaport signs TRANSCOM operational single seaport manager concept was
management planning control of its components, long. If the United States executes an-
theater CINCs have histori- other deployment like that to the Per-
cally viewed that as intruding sian Gulf in 1990–91, seaport opera-
re-engineering to reduce peacetime on their span of control. To further the tions still may not be flawless.
force levels complicates seaport man- single seaport manager concept, However, with defined responsibilities
agement planning for major regional TRANSCOM agreed to sometimes place and joint doctrine accepted and imple-
contingencies. In the ongoing struggle MTMC forces under the operational mented by theater CINCs and rein-
to reduce peacetime force structure control of theater CINCs to perform forced with trained and ready seaport
and maintain adequate readiness, single seaport management. That broke management personnel, MTMC can
MTMC is looking externally in order the impasse and enabled MTMC plan- support the geographic CINCs with a
to staff management cells. The Army ners to convince CINCs to include sea- seamless fort-to-foxhole joint manage-
currently uses contract supervision port management forces, still aligned ment team. JFQ
and cargo documentation detach- to MTMC, in their plans. MTMC can
ments which are not assigned to now focus on developing and imple- NOTES
MTMC during peacetime. However, menting a comprehensive seaport man-
1The author wishes to acknowledge the
they are designed to perform func- agement training program.
assistance of LTC William T. Brown, USA,
tions which MTMC envisions belong With regard to training, MTMC– Carolyn W. Brumbaugh, James K.
to contingency seaport management Pacific personnel have again been pio- Matthews, and Major Dana N. Willis, USAF,
cells. The contract supervision detach- neers. The management teams rou- in preparing this article.
ments provide transportation terminal tinely manage seaports in exercises and 2Joint Pub 3-17, JTTP for Theater Airlift
services through contracts for loading support unit rotations throughout the Operations, p. II-4.
and discharging cargo from ships or Pacific at both developed and remote 3Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations:
barges and clearing cargo from termi- sites in Thailand, Australia, and Hawaii. Lessons Learned (Washington: National De-
fense University Press, 1995), p. 48.
nals. The cargo documentation de- MTMC included individuals from its
4Ibid., pp. 41–42.
tachments perform functions required aligned units to augment these teams
to load and discharge cargoes or con-
tainers at terminals. Contract supervi-
sion and cargo documentation detach-
ments, augmented by existing MTMC
Winter 1996–97 / JFQ 57