DTIC ADA528973: Rethinking the Joint Doctrine Hierarchy

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

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n
RETHINKING THE
Joint Doctrine
Hierarchy
By J O S E P H W. P R U E H E R
man)
USS Raineralongside Guz
HHMawAaSi iSaynd Inselaynodfsf. Navy (John
S.
U.
A
s the joint community em-
EDITOR’S Note
barks on linking joint doc-
PACOM relies upon joint task forces (JTFs) to conduct a wide range of opera-
trine to the operational
tions in its area of responsibility. However, task forces are one level of joint concepts in Joint Vision
organization that has not profited extensively from defense reform and joint 2010, it may be helpful to consider the
doctrine initiatives over the past decade. Those efforts have not focused on joint task force (JTF) perspective. Ironi-
JTF needs and are not user-friendly to joint trainers. Doctrinal publications cally that is the level improved least by
are stovepiped—narrowly based on functions rather than on multi-functional reforms such as the Goldwater-Nichols
JTFs. It might be time to scrap the current system because of its waning util- Act, yet it has carried much of the
joint operational workload. JTFs have
ity. Moreover, this approach to doctrine might constrain thinking on future
driven operations from Sea Angel (ty-
operations and otherwise impede implementation of Joint Vision 2010.
phoon disaster relief in Bangladesh) to
Pacific Haven (Kurdish refugee recep-
tion and onward movement in Guam)
to Provide Comfort and Uphold
Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, USN, is commander in chief, Democracy in other regions.
U.S. Pacific Command, and formerly served as vice chief of
naval operations.
42 JFQ / Winter 1996–97
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1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
1997 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1996 to 00-00-1997
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Rethinking the Joint Doctrine Hierarchy
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National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,Fort REPORT NUMBER
Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319
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Prueher
Since U.S. Pacific Command Developing staff battle rhythm. Since
Figure 1. PACOM Mini-Library
(PACOM) adopted two-tiered command time is critical in crisis action planning,
and control in 1990, over 40 command how staffs manage it is key. This in-
Joint Pub 1,
post exercises, field training exercises, cludes integrating internal meeting Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces
and actual operations have employed
Joint Pub 0-2,
the concept. It includes
Unified Action Armed Forces
theater-level command as most JTF mission requirements call
the first tier and JTFs as a Joint Pub 3-0,
for a high degree of multi-functionality
preferred second tier—the Doctrine for Joint Operations
level that would likely
Joint Pub 5-0,
plan and conduct joint contingency op- schedules with the command decision
Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
erations throughout the PACOM area. cycle to ensure timely decisions.
The two-tiered model has a deliberate Forming JTF. Concurrent with Joint Pub 5-00.2,
Joint Task Force Planning Guidance
training protocol; pre-identified JTF planning and at times deploying to
and Procedures
commands; a designated and trained forward locations, JTFs flesh out single-
cadre of JTF augmentees primarily service tactical organizations with Joint Pub 3-56,
drawn from the staffs of the comman- multi-service attachments, liaison Command and Control Doctrine for
der in chief, U.S. Pacific Command teams, and augmentees (some staffs Joint Operations
(CINCPAC) and PACOM service compo- growing from fewer than 100 to over
USACOM Joint Task Force Master Training Guide
nent headquarters; and CINC–JTF com- 600 personnel).
manders’ conferences. Developing time phased force deploy- Armed Forces Staff Pub 1,
JTF training and operations expe- ment data (TPFDD). Forces flow into Joint Staff Officer’s Guide
rience includes working with JTF core theater based on the joint operations universal joint task list
headquarters from all services across a planning and execution system (UJTL)
range of operations primarily in the (JOPES). TPFDD is the major JTF inter-
joint mission essential task list
lower end of the conflict continuum. face with JOPES. Without aggressive
(JMETL)
This article discusses JTF lessons management of TPFDD, JTFs lose con-
learned, conclusions drawn from them trol of force flow. The development joint operations planning and execution system
vis à vis joint publications, and recom- and management of TPFDD has been a (JOPES)
mendations to better support JTFs. recurring deficiency in JTF exercises. joint unit lessons learned system
These tasks represent the core (JULLS)
Lessons knowledge and skills JTF staffs need to
remedial action program (RAP)
By examining assessments from make the leap from single-service tacti-
various JTF commanders, after action cal to JTF headquarters reporting di- mission specific tactics,
reports, and items from the joint uni- rectly to CINCPAC. To develop training techniques,and procedures
versal lessons learned system (JULLS), plans to meet such needs, JTF staffs and (TTP)
PACOM joint trainers isolated the five PACOM joint trainers created a mini-li-
most frequently identified JTF training brary of reference sources (see figure 1)
needs. that may be useful to JTF commanders
Crisis action planning.Activities as- and staffs as well as joint trainers.
sociated with developing plans and or- control converge on JTFs in varying
ders to execute joint actions. Normally Conclusions degrees depending on the mission. As
involves mission analysis and the de- Based on an analysis of JTF needs, an area expands to include joint as-
velopment, analysis, comparison, and we have discovered some helpful pects, the difficulty of integrating
selection of courses of action; includes markers. One is that JTF work is time functions increases dramatically.
warning orders, course of action sensitive. This is driven not only by in- This leads to a third conclusion,
sketches, commander’s estimates, and herent mission urgency but the con- that the doctrine hierarchy is not user
operations orders. current task of standing up JTF head- friendly in most JTF operations. First,
Managing information. Activities quarters—initiating communications doctrine segregated by function is un-
associated with the staff’s ability to with a new higher and probably new wieldy for a staff trying to integrate
process information from internal and subordinate headquarters, organizing a joint capabilities and staff functions.
external sources. More than identify- J-staff and supporting boards and The regime for joint doctrine makes it
ing sources and making connections, it teams, assimilating augmentees, and easy for functional users to identify ap-
also determines what we need to establishing an internal information plicable titles, but JTF staff structures
know, who needs to know it, and how flow and staffing procedures. and responsibilities may not mirror a
we get it to users. Another conclusion is that most joint staff. Thus the doctrinal J-code
JTF missions require multi-functional- hierarchy with its numbering system
ity. Joint personnel, intelligence, oper- based along traditional joint staff lines
ations, logistics, and command and
Winter 1996–97 / JFQ 43
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n
JFQ FORUM
Figure 2. UJTL Doctrine Hierarchy Model
Strategic National(cid:13)
Strategic Theater(cid:13)
Operational
pub focused on their level for both
training and operations. The revised
JTF planning publication (Joint Pub 5-
00.2) is one step in the right direction
and should be expanded to include
personnel, intelligence, operations, lo-
gistics, and C4 guidance and aids.
Second, it may be time to aban-
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U.S. future needs—implementing JV 2010.
The system in use is unwieldy, perhaps
an indicator that its utility on that level
is waning. JTF staffers find it difficult to
of responsibility does not mesh well five topics identified as core joint com-
maneuver through its 109 approved
with JTF staffs. petencies. It would act as the nucleus of
and emerging titles. Moreover, it may
The amount of doctrine found in a set of JTF references. Complementing
constrain thinking on how to operate
the joint publication system is daunt- it would be titles on specific missions
in the future.
ing (see pages 40–41). Navigating such as humanitarian assistance. The
A practical and less restrictive
through the vast menu of sources to JTF master training guide published by
model may already exist: the universal
select applicable guidance is tough. U.S. Atlantic Command is a start. It has
joint task list (UJTL) hierarchy (figure 2).
Where do you start? What is “need to a mission focus on a single level and
It has a mission—vice functional area—
know” and “nice to know” for any combines useful directives, guidance,
focus and is banded by levels of joint
given mission? formats, and samples from many
command: strategic national, strategic
sources. The popular “purple book”
Recommendations published by the Armed Forces Staff theater, operational, and tactical. It even
has a task and level numbering system.
The joint community would be College, The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide,
The logic used to build UJTL can be ap-
better served with improvements in offers much of this material to theater
plied to thinking about joint doctrine.
three areas. In the near term we should and national level audiences. These hy-
The basis should be the mission or task,
produce a multi-functional publication brid volumes are well received since
not a J-staff code.
focused on the JTF level to address the they are almost one-stop-shopping ref-
erences. JTF commanders and staffs
would benefit from a comprehensive
44 JFQ / Winter 1996–97
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Prueher
There would be keystone pubs for
each level of joint command rather
than for either staff or functional focus
under the current system. They would
be multi-functional like that described
for JTFs.
UJTL also relates well to the joint
warfighting capability assessment areas
used by the Joint Staff. This match, al-
though not perfect, portends a linkage
among doctrine, training, strategy, and
resource allocation that only exists
today through extraordinary effort.
Full integration of these now disparate
areas would provide a more logical ap-
proach to addressing readiness issues
that surface through the joint monthly
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Requirements Oversight Council Thrust. Ar
processes. Recognizing that an adjust- U.S.
ment in one area impacts on others, a
common structure will be helpful in
the joint community’s effort to imple-
ment the JV 2010framework. drafting and staffing operations orders. further integrating doctrine with strat-
Third, in the longer term we must Moreover, on-line help would come egy, training, and resource allocation
look beyond paper and electronic li- from both military and civilian data in the near term, it may be time to as-
bases worldwide such sess the overall phenomenon of joint-
as JULLS. Key words ness. That joint doctrine is nearly over-
we have given JTF staffs responsibilities
and phrases would be whelming to implementers may
without the right tools to do the job hyperlinked to applica- indicate that we may be going down
ble source documents the path of jointness for the sake of
regardless of data base jointness. JV 2010 is a step toward re-
braries with CD–ROM technology. We location. Operators could keep aware of focusing on jointness for the sake of
must meld disparate developments in lessons learned in real time instead of joint warfighting.
information technologies and warfight- waiting for the next JULLS CD. We have made tremendous strides
ing concepts, organizations, and hard- The tools would support tutorials in developing joint doctrine to com-
ware to fit together optimally. (training and evaluation), simulations plement the quality of our people,
We should ease the burden that and modeling, and operational modes. technology, and training. We can capi-
integration puts on JTFs. We have If constructed correctly, they would be talize on this foundation by taking ad-
given them integration responsibilities level transparent—users would think vantage of operational experience and
but not the right tools. Applicable for- they were made specifically for their emerging information technology. Fo-
mats, doctrine, checklists, lessons missions. The information environ- cusing on the JTF level provides more
learned, samples from exercises and op- ment could be shared with higher and than insights for improving joint oper-
erations, situational awareness presen- lower staffs for collaborative planning. ations today. It is key to expanding our
tations, and modeling should be avail- An effective information environment thinking about the joint operations
able on demand—not just more could reduce deployed staffs by de- and information environment of to-
information faster but better and more ploying information instead. morrow. JFQ
useful information in a decisionable
format. On-screen information and de- Although we have focused on the
cisionmaking would be like a combina- JTF level, there are implications for all Pacific Command
tion of CNN and an Internet browser levels of joint command. Experience in
50TH
running concurrently. Instead of assim- PACOM and elsewhere indicates that
ilating news and preparing e-mail mes- much joint doctrine is helpful, but a
sages, JTFs would monitor common op- stovepipe hierarchy may impede fully
erating pictures of the battlespace while implementing JV 2010. While adopt- Anniversary
ing the UJTL model would be helpful
...see page 122
in focusing on joint doctrine users and
Winter 1996–97 / JFQ 45