DTIC ADA528862: America and the Asia-Pacific Region

7 Pages·0.27 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

1107 Pendley 10/16/97 11:19 AM Page 37
Thai soldiers in
Tandem Thrust ’93.
AMERICA
and the Asia-Pacific RegioU.S. Air nForce (Marvin Krause)
By W I L L I A M T. P E N D L E Y
C
hange is a word heard so often that with almost a billion people and a growing
it has lost its impact. Most of the at- middle class.
tention to change in Asia has been Centers of international power and lead-
focused on dynamic economic ership have historically been aligned with
growth. It would be almost impossible to the global economic axis. In the age of
miss a shift as dramatic as that in the global Greece and Rome that axis centered on the
economic axis reaching from the Atlantic to Mediterranean. In the age of European colo-
the Pacific basin. The world’s highest growth nial dominance and the rise of America, it
rates are in Asia and huge mar- moved to the Atlantic. At some point in the
kets are opening throughout the late 1980s and without fanfare, the GNP of
Japan is grappling with
region. One must aggregate the the Asia-Pacific region exceeded that of Eu-
a fundamental identity
member nations of the European rope. With Japan and America accounting
crisis that it avoided Union to equate Europe with for more than 40 percent of world GNP, the
Japan or, increasingly, with axis shifted again. But economic change is
facing in the Cold War
greater China which includes only part of the dynamic. It could be
both Taiwan and Hong Kong. overemphasized while more significant
No single nation in Europe, not even a re- strategic changes are ignored.
unitied Germany, comes close. To Japan and Japan is grappling with a fundamental
greater China must be added South Korea identity crisis that it avoided facing in the
and member states of the Association of Cold War. Can it find an international iden-
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which tity through a global economic leadership
have a growing regional economy with more role while still tying its political and security
than 300 million people. If the region is ex-
panded to include South Asia, India is added
Spring 1995 / JFQ 37
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1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
1995 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1995 to 00-00-1995
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America and the Asia-Pacific Region
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National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,Fort REPORT NUMBER
Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319
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1107 Pendley 10/16/97 11:19 AM Page 38
J F Q F O R U M
interests to those of the United States? Will but rather what has not changed and may
it instead seek that international identity in not change even with a new generation of
closer relations within Asia? leaders. A hundred years of foreign domina-
Regardless of the road Japan takes, its tion followed by the excesses of the Great
close and largely subordinate relationship Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution in a
with the United States will change. The period of relative isolation caused China to
growing value of global and Asian markets miss major conceptual changes in the world.
will lessen the relative importance of Amer- It is still stuck in a 19th century mindset rep-
ica to Japan. The protracted conflict and resented by territorial great powers with large
competition in U.S.-Japan economic rela- military forces. It still focuses on national
tions will push Japan in other directions. sovereignty issues and rejects interdepen-
Technological progress will allow Japan to dence and international cooperation except
choose advanced military technologies suffi- in narrow, self-serving ways. It pursues age-
cient to provide for its defense. While Japan’s less border disputes that have led to a variety
reorientation may be slowed by stumbling ef- of limited conflicts since the Korean War.
forts at reform and more effective govern- Probably the most destabilizing factor in
ment, it will still evolve into a more indepen- the next decade will be modernizing the
dent state. This change has vital strategic People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with empha-
implications for the United States. sis on its air and naval forces and power pro-
It is fashionable to focus on China’s eco- jection capabilities. China remains insensi-
nomic development and uncertain political tive to the impact that its actions have on
future. This has resulted in extreme projec- other states because it assumes that they op-
tions on both counts. China’s economic erate on the same 19th century conceptual
growth potential has been overestimated in basis. This assumes that the Japanese moti-
straight line projections similar to Japan be- vation for rearming will be unaffected by
fore its economic bubble burst. Some cite Chinese military modernization since rear-
growing inflation and an overheated Chi- mament would happen anyway as a result of
nese economy as well as the sluggish transi- national sovereignty and a drive for great
tion from state enterprises to a market econ- power status. Emphasis is thus on taking ad-
omy as signs of imminent collapse. Political vantage of Japan’s restraint to gain a
forecasts run from the return to hard-line stronger relative position. Military modern-
conservatism to the breakup of China into ization coupled with territorial disputes and
provincial power centers. China’s perception of what a great power is
Economic and political change will and how it should act makes for an uncer-
probably continue but at an uneven pace. tain and probably dangerous future for both
The economic boom will peak and level off Asia and the United States.
as China is forced to deal with nagging eco- Korea is a powder keg with a short fuse
nomic sectors that it has tried to ignore. The positioned at the point of convergence of
new generation of leadership appears more Russian, Chinese, Japanese, and American
technocratic and less ideological than its an- interests. The departure of Kim Il Sung has
tecedent. Although there may be more heralded a new era. The collapse of the
democratic progress in the Chinese Commu- Pyongyang regime is underway and only its
nist Party, including internal dissent, there timing and method remain unknown. Kim
will be opposition to creating rival political Jong Il inherited a failing state that had only
movements. been held together by the personality cult of
The greatest danger that China will pose his father. In the face of a rapidly declining
over the next decade is neither economic economy and growing discontent, he must
growth nor uncertainty over its leadership, make changes to improve living conditions
without threatening those elites who could
depose him. Such changes can only be real-
Rear Admiral William T. Pendley, USN (Ret.), ized by an economic opening of the North
teaches at the Air War College and was previously
and its integration into the international
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East
economy—the so-called China model.
Asia and Pacific Affairs. He also served as Director
Changes needed to prolong a dynastic
for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), U.S. Pacific
regime in the short term will unleash forces
Command.
38 JFQ / Spring 1995
1107 Pendley 10/16/97 11:19 AM Page 39
Pendley
policy or military presence is seen as an im-
pediment to reunification, Korean national-
ists will sever the relationship during the re-
unification process or shortly thereafter.
Fostering a positive long-term relationship
requires new thinking on the alliance
among Americans and South Koreans. It re-
quires a military reorganization that accu-
rately reflects the roles and contributions of
both partners. The principal change in Korea
and most of Asia is a vibrant nationalism
mpis) firmly rooted in pride over the economic
Val Ge progress made during the last three decades.
Air Force ( Rstercaoteggniciz iinntge rtehsatst icnh tahneg ere igsi oenss.ential to U.S.
U.S. Southeast Asia is the real frontier of East
Japanese ASDF Asia where the interests of the major powers
personnel loading may clash. Unlike the Vietnam War era when
AIM–9 missile. in North Korean society that will ultimately some Americans read every struggle in South-
change or destroy that regime. east Asia as a drive for Chinese hegemony,
This does not mean that North Korea Beijing’s future efforts in the South China Sea
will pass easily from the world scene but may constitute just such a move. While
only that the regime will be gone by early in China’s aims in the region may be primarily
the next century. It is extremely difficult for economic, expanding territorial claims and
external powers to influence the decline and military modernization could be seen as an
ultimate end of an isolated regime with effort to get a stranglehold on Japan’s vital
strong military forces and a deeply rooted sea lines of communication and hinder ac-
ideology, notwithstand- cess to the Persian Gulf. The one constant in
the passing of North Korea is ing the October 1994 nu- Southeast Asia is its geostrategic position,
clear framework accord. and that constant has become more impor-
simply a minor transition in
The challenge to the in- tant in an industrialized world economy
the long history of East Asia ternational community which is increasingly dependent upon free
will be to avoid a major trade and access to energy resources.
conflict or a spillover into South Korea of in- Geography is a constant in strategic
ternal upheavals in the North. This requires terms, but there has been dynamic change
continuing to retard Pyongyang’s nuclear in Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese threat in
program but with realistic goals. It also de- the region was a galvanizing force for ASEAN
mands an innovative policy for opening the and led to initiatives that went beyond end-
North economically to hasten either positive ing Hanoi’s occupation of Cambodia. Closer
changes in the regime and its integration relations were forged among national elites
into the international community or its to mitigate old disputes. Dynamic economic
peaceful departure from the scene. growth led by Singapore spilled over fron-
The passing of North Korea is simply a tiers to deepen the regional integration and
minor transition in the long history of East establish what Robert Scalapino has termed
Asia. More important will be the strategic Natural Economic Territories.
changes resulting from a unified Korea, and While rapid economic growth has rein-
they must be the focus of U.S. policy. The forced nationalism in Southeast Asia, there
foundations for relations with a reunified has been a determined effort by ASEAN to
Korea in the next century will be laid in the foster multilateralism through economic, po-
next decade. It is critical that America be litical, and security initiatives. This has been
viewed by Koreans as a positive force in the not only a reaction to Vietnamese expansion
peaceful reunification of their nation. If U.S. but also a recognition of the growth in Chi-
nese and Japanese power which no regional
state can deal with unilaterally. Through
multiple tracks the members of ASEAN
Spring 1995 / JFQ 39
1107 Pendley 10/16/97 11:19 AM Page 40
J F Q F O R U M
sought direct engagement with China and at- economic growth of recent years, America’s
tempted in the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Con- political and security interests sprang from its
ference (PMC) and other multilateral forums economic interests. Even in the Cold War a
to integrate China into regional dialogues. Si- major motivation of national security policy
multaneously, individual ASEAN states tried was to ensure that Japan’s economy would re-
to maintain American presence and engage- tain a Western tilt. The growth of our domes-
ment in the region. One result of these ef- tic economy and maintenance of a healthy
forts has been the launching of the ASEAN international economy will depend in large
Regional Forum (ARF) for a multilateral secu- part on the continued expansion of the Asian
rity dialogue and bilateral measures such as economy in the next century. Thus political,
the U.S.-Singapore facilities agreement. economic, and security engagement will only
ASEAN has been a leader in multilateral ap- support American interests as it contributes to
proaches because of the realities present in peace and stability.
relations among its members and Vietnam, While interests remain constant, poli-
China, Japan, and the United States. The cies must evolve with regional changes.
same multilateral approaches have the po- With Japan it is essential to forge a more bal-
tential to benefit the region as a whole. anced alliance with a decreasing reliance on
the security component and an increasing
American Interests
emphasis on political aspects. Only under a
After more than a century of engagement
broader alliance can mutual benefits be bal-
American interests in East Asia remain rela-
anced; and without such an alliance rela-
tively consistent. The United States has
tions will continue to be defined in narrow
sought access to resources, markets, and capi-
security or economic terms with public sup-
tal, as well as the freedom of navigation in
port on both sides of the Pacific rapidly
the waters of the region, which has led to op-
eroding. Such an alliance requires more fre-
posing the dominance of a single power that
quent high-level American political contacts
could pose a threat to such access or freedom
than in the past.
of navigation. In recent years the Nation has
It will also be important for the United
promoted market economies as well as
States to consolidate its military bases in
human rights and democratic institutions
Japan and if necessary reduce its force struc-
which support its interests. During its engage-
ture. With a change in the Pyongyang regime
ment in Asia and long before the dramatic
or reunification on the peninsula, Washing-
ton should expect to further reduce its forces
in Northeast Asia. Given a reluctance to fight
Repatriating Chinese
refugees from another conflict on the Asian mainland, ef-
Kwajalein Island. forts should be made to maintain U.S. air
and naval presence with limited though
highly mobile ground forces. This will be eas-
ier once the Korean issue is resolved. While
changes in the Asian security environment
will permit reduced ground forces, America
should seek access and support agreements
that will guarantee its ability to protect its in-
terests and those of its allies.
The U.S.-Japanese alliance is seen by
many in Asia as both an insurance against
Japanese militarism and an assurance of con-
tinuing U.S. engagement. This makes it vital
to balance reduced military presence with
strengthening of the alliance in other areas.
mpis) While Washington and Tokyo will continue to
Ge be economic rivals, it is vital that bilateral eco-
S. Air Force (Val ntthiooemn asi.lc l iAaissns ucceeh sab nayrg eme rciesosmonlatvinenadug eitnso g ta ove coboiudnf ofdemat miAca sgrieainl aigt-
U.
40 JFQ / Spring 1995
1107 Pendley 10/16/97 11:19 AM Page 41
Pendley
will be increasingly meaningful to subordinate
short-term national security and economic in- Australians boarding
terests to broader strategic objectives. Marine CH–53D
American relations with China have Sea Stallion.
been difficult for half a century. The United
States has considered China its real enemy in
two Asian wars. Only from 1972 to 1989 was
the relationship a loose strategic partnership.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, China
tUunrniteedd i tSst aattteesn. tIiot nf eaanrded a naxni eAtym teorwicaard t hthaet Mitchell)
would take advantage of a perceived unipolar C.
wgloorbladl tdoo mthirnoawn ciet.s Owpeeirgahttio anr oDuensder tt oS tsoeremk Navy (Terry
and public discussion of China as a potential U.S.
enemy only added to this perception while
underscoring the technological weakness of
the Chinese military. China viewed itself as tives share common interests in maintaining
the possible new object of a more aggressive peace and stability in Asia.
U.S. containment policy. The decision by the Clinton administra-
On the other hand, the United States tion last year to decouple most-favored-na-
was unsure of China’s intentions. Missile tion trading status from human rights and
and nuclear technology exports, aggressive to reengage China in political, economic,
territorial claims, continuing defense budget and security dialogues was an important step
growth, and a history of support to the toward broader strategic engagement. Sup-
Khmer Rouge and Iran made China a chal- port for multilateral initiatives such as ARF is
lenge to the peaceful global order that the also important. While direct leverage on
United States hoped China is limited, how Washington manages
it is important that our forward would replace the its security relationship with Tokyo, rela-
presence not be viewed as Cold War. These con- tions with Taipei, and force structure in Asia
cerns unfolded against has a positive or negative influence on Bei-
threatening by Chinese eyes
a backdrop of Tianan- jing’s actions. It is important to maintain a
men Square and cur- strong security relationship with Japan and a
tailed contacts between the United States force structure in Asia which is reassuring in
and China. A strong lobby in Congress the context of that relationship. It is equally
brings together human rights activists and important that our forward force presence
supporters of Taiwan, two groups which op- not be viewed as threatening by Chinese
pose normal relations with Beijing. Yet U.S. eyes. It is this delicate balance that may per-
strategic interests require engagement with mit a continuation of peace and stability in
China, the center of Asia and the fastest Asia and discourage a regional arms race
growing economy in the world. China casts over the next decade.
a growing shadow over all the subregions of It is also essential to press for an end to
Asia. As a permanent member of the U.N. the North’s nuclear weapons program. But
Security Council it has a major voice in that it may be naive to think that this pro-
organization’s role in crises around the gram—which is at the core of Pyongyang’s
globe. By accepting or rejecting the Missile security concerns—will be terminated
Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear through diplomatic negotiations. The best
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chinese will be that one could probably hope to achieve is
a major determinant in the pace of global to slow the progress of the program while
proliferation. Attempts to contain or working to peacefully change the regime’s
threaten China could lead to a Cold War international conduct. The objective is not
that is not in the interest of either China or merely to end the North Korean nuclear
the United States, which for different mo- weapons program but more importantly to
change the regime in order to peacefully re-
unify the Korean peninsula or to integrate
Spring 1995 / JFQ 41
1107 Pendley 10/16/97 11:19 AM Page 42
J F Q F O R U M
Korea. This will facilitate transitioning CFC
to the Korean general officer who exercises
peacetime operational control over all South
Korean forces in CFC. While a U.S. Army
four-star general should retain the U.N. Com-
mand, it is not necessary for him to be lo-
cated in Korea, and this command should be
activated only for major exercises or in the
wart) event of a new conflict.
Ste Negotiating access agreements for port,
Scott air, and supporting facilities throughout East
Air Force ( Ainsgia f laenxdib tlhe ep Poawceifri cp rwoijlel cbtieo vni tianl iann meraai notfa dine--
U.S. creasing overseas basing. Southeast Asia is a
Conference Row, priority area for such agreements. That prior-
Panmunjom. ity is a result of U.S. withdrawal from Philip-
the North as a positive participant in the pine bases and a continuing need to be able
international community. to project forces into the Persian Gulf re-
While the North Korean transition plays gion. This calls for a wide range of old and
out, it will be vital to maintain a strong de- new policy initiatives. America must revital-
terrent in South Korea and unified positions ize its alliance with Thailand, which has
with South Korea and Japan on policy initia- been strained by the Cambodian situation,
tives toward North Korea. It will be increas- and also explore alternative access arrange-
ingly important also to integrate China into ments with the Philippines in the context of
consultations on engagement with North the existing security treaty. In addition, the
Korea. Concurrently, America must continue United States must improve relations with
moving toward a supporting role in its al- Indonesia and Malaysia, finalize an access
liance with the Republic of Korea. The pres- accord with Brunei, and continue its facili-
ence of a highly visible American comman- ties agreement with Singapore.
der forty years after the armistice—in a Access agreements are not gifts and
nation with twice the population and at there will be costs in the form of military as-
least ten times the GNP of the North and sistance, improvements in infrastructure, re-
which provides more than 90 percent of the gional exercises, and political engagement.
forces for its own defense—is no longer real- These costs will be insignificant, however,
istic or in the best interest of the United when measured against maintaining the
States. Continuing this arrangement can flexibility and necessary capability to project
only foster anti-Americanism and the in- U.S. forces throughout the Asia-Pacific re-
creasing vulnerability of the United States to gion and into the Persian Gulf. JFQ
charges of prolonging the separation of the
two Koreas.
In this transition to a supporting role it
is critical that deterrence not be undermined.
This means maintaining our forces in the
South as well as increasing air and missile de-
fense systems. U.S. efforts should continue to
emphasize rapid reinforcement of heavy
forces but with priority on air and naval
forces. The steps which have been taken to
designate the Seventh Fleet Commander as
the Combined Forces Command (CFC) naval
component commander go in the right direc-
tion. The next logical step is to appoint an
Air Force officer as commander of U.S. Forces
42 JFQ / Spring 1995