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2214L&Y 5/7/97 6:24 AM Page 94 n O Joint Doctrine Development: vercoming a t n i o Legacy j f o t u o By D O U G L A S C. L O V E L A C E, J R., and T H O M A S - D U R E L L Y O U N G O ver the past decade jointness has be- The Centrality of Doctrine come a paean in the quest to improve Joint doctrine is as vital to operational objec- the effectiveness of the Armed Forces. tives as strategy is to national strategic goals. Op- Congress emphasized its importance by erationally, it links what must be accomplished to passing the Goldwater-Nichols Act which in- the available (or required) tools by providing the creased the power of the combatant commanders nexus between national military strategy and the in chief (CINCs), made the Chairman the princi- conduct of military operations. Joint doctrine pal military adviser to the National Command Au- should thus derive from, inter alia, national mili- thorities (NCA), and assigned him specific respon- tary strategy and thereby help implement it.1 sibilities for strategic planning as well as doctrine Just as objectives and resources are rational- and training. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ized in national military strategy, joint doctrine lost their baronial influence, and the Joint Staff guides the employment of joint forces and mili- was reoriented to serve the Chairman. tary capabilities to achieve strategic and opera- Yet this seminal legislation has not overcome tional objectives. Accordingly, the joint operation all the institutional impediments to effectively em- planning and execution system (JOPES) requires ploying joint forces. One remaining problem in that theater operation plans conform to estab- implementing joint doc- lished joint doctrine. joint doctrine is as vital to op- trine is caused largely by a Joint doctrine also has a collateral value. It flaw in the strategic plan- enables senior leaders to determine the sort of ca- erational objectives as strategy ning process. The lack of pabilities needed by CINCs and ensures effective is to national strategic goals direct linkage between the and efficient application of those capabilities to strategic direction of specific objectives.2 Moreover, it informs senior forces and operational civilian leaders and government agencies about planning for their actual employment hampers de- how they may expect the Armed Forces to be em- velopment of integrated joint doctrine. Because of ployed and thus illuminates force strengths and this disconnect between national military strategy limitations and consequent risks of using force. It and key joint planning documents, the services may serve a similar purpose for our allies and have been denied the greatest incentive for em- coalition partners, which is particularly apropos bracing joint doctrine. when establishing a U.S. position for developing multinational doctrine. It also forms part of the rationale for force structure. Goldwater-Nichols assigned responsibility for Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., and Thomas-Durell Young are members of the developing joint doctrine to the Chairman.More Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. generally, he is also responsible for developing 94 JFQ / Winter 1996–97 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1997 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1996 to 00-00-1997 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Joint Doctrine Development: Overcoming a Legacy 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,Fort REPORT NUMBER Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 7 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 2214L&Y 5/7/97 6:24 AM Page 95 Lovelace and Young joint professional military education (PME) and joint force commanders perform focused mission training policies that are influenced by documents analysis and develop joint mission essential task such as the universal joint task list (UJTL). In addi- lists (JMETL). They can then plan training pro- tion, he can prescribe how training will be evalu- grams to meet JMETL requirements. During joint ated and shape joint exercises by stressing specific training, commanders can rely on shared doctrine areas of interest.3In the case of PME, he can influ- to frame broad tasks and suggest measures of ef- ence the nature and amount of joint matter fectiveness. The influence of doctrine on training t taught at service colleges.4 These education and thus improves warfighting capabilities. n training responsibilities thus provide opportuni- If joint doctrine is indeed vital, how can its i o ties for advancing the implementation of joint development and implementation be enhanced? j doctrine. The solution to this problem is complicated by f The impact of joint doctrine extends beyond the disparate ways the services define and per- o the employment of joint forces to virtually all the ceive joint doctrine and in the individual service t Chairman’s strategic planning responsibilities, to roles in developing it. u include soliciting, evaluating, integrating, and set- o The Development Process ting priorities for CINC requirements. Discharging this duty forms the basis of the Chairman’s advice A good deal of current joint doctrine has not to the Secretary of Defense on the needs of CINCs. met the needs of the services and combatant Moreover, the Chairman advises the Secretary on commands. Just over two years ago the Chairman the extent to which service program recommen- stated that joint doctrine “is not well dations and budget proposals conform to priori- vetted...well understood. It is certainly not dis- ties in strategic plans and CINC requirements. seminated out there and is almost never used by This advice may include recommendations that anyone.”6 One weakness in the development differ from those submitted by the services. process has been the requirement to build con- The Chairman logically must consider exist- sensus among the services by removing portions ing and emerging joint doctrine in establishing of draft doctrine pubs which are vigorously chal- and integrating priorities for the requirements of lenged by any service. Thus, much joint doctrine CINCs and in assessing service programs. There- can reflect the lowest common denominator, fore, if elements of service programs do not con- which results in imprecise, confusing, or contra- form to the doctrine, the Chairman, as principal dictory concepts. Internal inconsistencies are military adviser to the Secretary and President, therefore common. Key factors in this dishar- may recommend program adjustments. mony are differing service views of doctrine and The triennial report on the roles, missions, the compartmented way it is developed. More- and functions of the Armed Forces also contains over, no effective vehicle for cross-checking the recommendations influenced by joint doctrine. A consistency of doctrine pubs is applied. case in point was the proposal by one former Historically, the services have not agreed on member of the Joint Chiefs that the battlefield be what doctrine means, let alone its purpose. The partitioned and each section assigned to a service dictionary defines it as“something that is taught, or functional component command.5 The intent held, put forth as true, and supported by a was to assign the rear and close battles mainly to teacher, a school, or a sect; a principle or position the Army and the high and deep battles primarily or the body of principles in any branch of knowl- to the Air Force. This proposal, inconsistent with edge.” Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dic- joint doctrine, would have transferred close air tionary of Military and Associated Terms, renders it support to the Army and deep interdiction—now as: “Fundamental principles by which the mili- shared by all services—primarily to the Air Force tary forces or elements thereof guide their actions and, to a lesser extent, to the Navy. Therefore, the in support of national objectives. It is authorita- Army would have lost its high and deep battle tive but requires judgement in application.” How- systems and the funding to acquire and maintain ever, to understand the meaning of doctrine one them. The rejection of this proposal suggests that must examine various service perspectives. service-initiated changes to roles and functions Doctrine has long been seen as essential by that do not conform to joint doctrine will not be the Army. It is regarded as the basis of current op- favorably considered. erations and organization as well as the engine of Common doctrine is also crucial since it pro- change. According to Field Manual 100-1, The vides principles to orient and focus education and Army, it is pervasive, encompassing the service training. For example, the universal joint task list ethos, professional qualities, esprit de corps, legal is guided by joint doctrine. Armed with this list, basis, readiness, principles of war, and military operations other than war. While accepting the defi- nition found in Joint Pub 1-02, the Army appears Winter 1996–97 / JFQ 95 2214L&Y 5/7/97 6:24 AM Page 96 n OVERCOMING A LEGACY USS Wasptransiting Norwegian fjord for Strong Resolve. t n i o j f o t u o Call) P. Franklin Navy ( S. U. Allen) teora ilnlyt etrhparent t“hjued Cgehmaiernmt ainn. 7apTphleic Aatrimony”’s mdoorcet rliinbe- Air Force (Jeffrey S. preceded joint doctrine, and experience in devel- U. oping and using it made that service a prime con- C–130 approaching tributor to joint doctrine. Thus other services may Tuzla air base. feel the Army exerts inordinate influence in the development process.8 Given the maturity of the “a shared way of thinking that is not directive.” U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and Though the Navy believes that doctrine should the relative inexperience of the doctrine centers of bridge national military strategy and service tac- the other services, such leverage is plausible. tics, techniques, and procedures, a Navy doctrine- The Navy only lately has begun to formalize based culture will not arise overnight. and institutionalize doctrine.9 This situation can Marines consider doctrine a philosophy of be partially attributed to culture, especially a warfighting. At higher levels it does not provide focus on technology and independent operations. specific techniques, but instead broad concepts Traditionally the Navy saw doctrine as procedures and values. In fact, Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, for applying capital systems. Naval Doctrine Pub- Warfighting, reveals that Marine Corps doctrine lication 1, Naval Warfare—which provides the sets forth a particular way of thinking about war foundation for a body of doctrine as yet largely and of fighting, a philosophy of leading marines unwritten—defines doctrine as conceptual, that is, in combat, and a mandate for professionalism and a common language. Overall, the Corps views doctrine as a codification of its essence rather than a body of knowledge to be consulted in preparing for and conducting war. 96 JFQ / Winter 1996–97 2214L&Y 5/7/97 6:24 AM Page 97 Lovelace and Young Marines landing at Kauai, Hawaii,RIMPAC ’96. t n i o j f o t u S. Viano) o Navy (Jeffrey S. U. Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, defines doctrine as “what we hold true about aerospace power...a guide for the exercise of professional judgement rather than a set of rules to be followed blindly.” It suggests that doctrine de- effective joint doctrine can velopment and revision is a living process. This con- only be effectively developed cept can be explained in using a top-down approach terms of a culture that stresses technologically advanced systems and my their improvement through enhanced human con- S. Ar tributions. As a result, the Air Force sees weaponry U. 101stAirborne in as a defining feature of war and has developed a Saudi Arabia. lexicon that includes system-oriented terms such as sortie generation, weaponeering, and target ser- vicing. This central focus on systems and adopting Development of joint doctrine has been sub- the latest technology results in an orientation on jected to these differing service views. When the system characteristics and, in effect, a subordina- director for operational plans and interoperability tion of doctrine and operational procedures.10 (J-7), Joint Staff, decides on behalf of the Chairman Clearly, significant differences exist among that some new aspect of doctrine is needed, he services, and their doctrines are developed to publishes a program directive assigning a lead meet their unique needs. Joint doctrine, on the agent to manage its development. This agent, usu- other hand, must transcend individual perspec- ally a service, writes or directs the writing of a draft tives and provide an overarching approach to pub and can inject parochial views into the warfare that integrates all individual service con- process. Whether or not such views survive the co- tributions. Whereas service doctrine can arguably ordination phase, they encourage adversarial rela- be developed via a bottom-up approach, effective tions among the services. And the impulse to settle joint doctrine can only be effectively developed contentious issues at the lowest possible level cou- using a top-down approach. pled with a natural reluctance to submit them to the Chairman for adjudication further runs the Winter 1996–97 / JFQ 97 2214L&Y 5/7/97 6:24 AM Page 98 n OVERCOMING A LEGACY risk of developing doctrine that is not only diluted developing more useful and accepted joint doc- but also biased in favor of the lead agent. trine for conducting operations and rationalizing Joint doctrine development can be con- types, numbers, and balance of forces. A process tentious for another reason. The services disagree that integrates strategic planning with doctrine on the very role of doctrine. The Air Force, for in- development would better conform to the intent stance, completely agrees with the proviso found of Goldwater-Nichols. And in an era of penury, in Joint Pub 1-01 that “joint doctrine will be writ- such reforms would assist NCA in assuring Con- t n ten to reflect extant capabilities.” Therefore, from gress that an effective and efficient defense capa- i its perspective, technological advances will dictate bility is being pursued. o new or revised doctrine. The Army, alternatively, While it is clear that national military strat- j believes doctrinal concepts should be engines of egy has little operational use until it is refracted f o change, heavily influencing decisions on systems through the prism of a coherent national military and capabilities. The lack of a common perspec- strategic plan, it is equally clear that joint doc- t u tive on the nature of joint doctrine and the poten- trine should be based on specific strategic con- o tial for enduring service parochialism, combine to cepts found in such a plan. The raison d’êtreof na- constrain the doctrine development process. tional military strategy is to translate strategic Criticism of this process leads individual ser- guidance provided in national security strategy vices to feel unobligated by joint doctrine even into military terms. By design, the unclassified, though it emerges from a consensus. Further- artistically arranged, and widely distributed na- more, the ability of the Chairman to direct that tional military strategy serves more as a military joint doctrine be followed is limited since by law policy and public information document. It com- he has no command authority and the Joint Staff municates the views of the Chairman on the rele- is prohibited from exercising executive authority. vancy of military power to national security strat- Yet this inability to assure effective development egy as opposed to delving into the specifics and uniform application of doctrine has serious needed to achieve particular objectives. negative implications. One example was the Such national military strategy lacks ade- downing of two Army Blackhawk helicopters in quate guidance for developing specific objectives, 1994 by Air Force F–15s which cost the lives of let alone the means of achieving them. Broad in everyone on board. Recognizing that teamwork scope and general in content, it is open to diverse might have prevented this tragedy, the Chairman interpretation.12Consequently, it is insufficient to directed that “immediate and serious attention” guide doctrine development by itself. Title 10 of be given to applicable joint doctrine.11 the U.S. Code requires the Chairman to prepare strategic plans that “conform to resource levels Strategic Planning projected by the Secretary of Defense to be avail- To the extent that joint doctrine corresponds able for the period of time for which the plans are to strategic planning, incomplete planning can to be effective.” These joint plans should conform inhibit its development and implementation. to national military strategy and carry strategic Thus it should not be surprising that both prob- direction to a greater level of specificity. lems share a common solution. Joint Pub 1 notes Title 10 indicates that the Chairman is re- that “though neither policy nor strategy, joint quired to provide “for the preparation and review doctrine deals with the fundamental issue of how of contingency plans which conform to the policy best to employ the national military power to guidance from the President and the Secretary of achieve strategic ends.” Militarily, national strate- Defense,” a duty fulfilled by the joint strategic ca- gic ends can be realized through strategic and op- pabilities plan (JSCP). Although national military erational objectives. To be effective, joint doctrine strategy is an effective vehicle for the Chairman in should help translate national and theater level assisting NCA with strategic direction and JSCP strategies into operationally useful methods. impels CINCs to prepare contingency plans, nei- National-level strategic concepts in strategic ther fully responds to his duty to prepare strategic plans should guide the disciplined development plans.13This void has a negative impact on the de- and implementation of joint doctrine. But absent velopment and implementation of joint doctrine. these strategic plans, current joint doctrine can, Strategic plans should enumerate and set pri- at best, be only loosely connected to national orities for specific strategic objectives, identify military strategy. Developing national strategic constraints, offer a strategy for securing such ob- plans would permit strategic guidance, as first ex- jectives, and be key in determining force capabil- pressed in the form of national security strategy ity requirements. They are envisaged to be com- and then by national military strategy, to be bet- prehensive plans, based on a global perspective, ter conveyed to service chiefs and CINCs as con- firmed strategic concepts. This top-down approach should provide specific guidance for 98 JFQ / Winter 1996–97 2214L&Y 5/7/97 6:24 AM Page 99 Lovelace and Young that contain strategic priorities and strategies for would be enhanced because contingency plans attaining them. They should set forth specific and joint doctrine would be consistent with an strategic concepts distilled from broad general overarching strategic plan. Thus such a document concepts found in national military strategy. would introduce new rigor into strategic and oper- These concepts should guide joint doctrine devel- ational plans, doctrine development and imple- opment. Therefore, they must be specific if the mentation, exercises, and ultimately operations. derivative doctrine is to be useful in achieving the The current body of joint doctrine has lim- t objectives outlined in both national security and ited value because it caters to the lowest common n military strategy. denominator and is only weakly linked to na- i An illustration is helpful. A strategic concept tional military strategy. From the foregoing analy- o j within the context of current national military sis, it is clear that joint doctrine can be improved f strategy is overseas presence. Together with by closer bonding it to national military strategy o power projection, this concept facilitates the through a national military strategic plan. It is t three components of the strategy: peacetime en- also evident that since developing joint doctrine u gagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, is a statutory responsibility of the Chairman, it o and fighting and win- need not base its legitimacy on service consensus. ning wars. Such strategy The Chairman has taken major steps to ad- current joint doctrine has limited provides general defini- dress these problems. Foremost was the release of value because it caters to tions of overseas pres- Joint Vision 2010 and the task given to the Joint ence and peacetime en- Warfighting Center (JWFC) to add operational de- the lowest common denominator gagement. It also finition to the vision. If the flesh put on the vi- describes them in terms sion’s skeleton effectively links national military of where forces are currently located and why strategy and joint doctrine, the coherence and they are there. For peacetime engagement, it de- value of doctrine will increase. Even if JV 2010 lineates both the forms it may take and why it is was not intended to be the type of strategic plan important. The strategy is educational in that it described above, it may serve an important surro- provides broad concepts and components of na- gate purpose with regard to joint doctrine, pend- tional military strategy and why they are vital. ing the development of a national military strate- But there is nothing in current national military gic plan. strategy to guide defense planners on how to In addition, JWFC is assuming a more active apply overseas presence to achieve the appropri- role in managing joint doctrine development. It ate type and amount of peacetime engagement established policies to improve joint scrutiny of in the right priorities and to promote U.S. inter- draft doctrine publications which should inhibit ests, given military capability (resource) limita- parochial influence. Moreover, the center fosters tions, for the period under consideration. a joint perspective from the outset and ensures Therefore, the value of strategic plans to that it is carried through into publication. In that joint doctrine development would be consider- way, JWFC can eliminate inconsistencies among able. Not only would they provide specific strate- doctrinal pubs and reduce problems in the cur- gic concepts on which to base doctrine; more crit- rent process. ically they would serve as a contextual framework As the Chairman and his various agents for developing doctrine. In addition, strategic exert a more assertive role in doctrinal develop- plans would provide a unifying mechanism for ment and service roles are further subordinated, the services, CINCs, and defense agencies. This the unifying effect of joint doctrine will more would: closely follow the intent of Congress as expressed in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Contradictions be- n legitimize the preeminence of joint doctrine over individual service doctrines tween service and joint doctrine will be resolved n result in more rationalized service doctrines and the fundamental purpose of doctrine clari- n produce a more coherent body of joint doctrine fied. While there has been marked progress in de- n increase service predilection to implement joint veloping joint doctrine over the last decade, more doctrine. needs to be done. Recent initiatives and others In summary, neither national military strat- under consideration promise to enhance its qual- egy nor JSCP meets the requirements of strategic ity and increase its acceptance. JFQ planning as found in Goldwater-Nichols. The development of strategic plans would among other things allow all the services to reach a common understanding of strategy and unified commit- ment to a body of joint doctrine that would better support that strategy. Moreover, the applicabil- ity and implementation of doctrine at theater level Winter 1996–97 / JFQ 99 2214L&Y 5/7/97 6:24 AM Page 100 n OVERCOMING A LEGACY doctrine has been spotty at best, the Naval Doctrine NOTES Command has issued a number of historical documents 1Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, on past or current doctrine. This revisionism was not p. vi; Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), very convincing. p. vi; Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, pp. I–1 10Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Mili- through II–3. tary Styles in Strategy and Analysis(Baltimore: The Johns 2While acknowledging the proviso in Joint Pub 1-01 Hopkins University Press, 1989), pp. 18–30. t that “joint doctrine will be written to reflect extant ca- 11In a July 28, 1994 memo (CM-378-94) to service n pabilities,” we consider it to be simplistic and superficial chiefs and combatant commanders in chief, the Chair- i with respect to the proper relationship between joint man called attention to command and control for joint o doctrine and force capability development. Obviously, air operations and JTTP for close air support. j DOD would not develop capabilities and then try to as- 12See Douglas Lovelace and Thomas-Durell Young, f o certain how best to use them. Alternatively, the joint U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing doctrine development process should consider potential Nexus (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, t u force capability development options. Calling for joint 1995). doctrine to reflect extant capabilities ignores the dy- 13Chairman, JCS, Instructional Joint Strategic Capabili- o namic and reciprocating link between joint doctrine ties Plan, MCM-126-92 (1992). This document contains and force capability development. See Joint Pub 1-01, a précis of national military strategy, offers general Joint Publication System Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, planning guidance to services and CINCs, assigns spe- Techniques, and Procedures Development Program, p. I–2. cific and regionally focused planning tasks to CINCs, 3For a critical review of the management of joint and lists and apportions forces for planning. Of particu- training, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Military lar note is what JSCP does not provide. It neither as- Capabilities: Stronger Joint Staff Role Needed to Enhance signs missions nor furnishes national level integration Joint Military Training, Report NSIAD–95–109 (Washing- of planning efforts of the various CINCs. It thus cannot ton, 1995). be considered a strategic plan in the context of section 4CJCS Instruction 1800.1, Officer Professional Mili- 153, Title 10, U.S. Code. tary Education Policy(1996), pp. 2–3 and enclosure C. 5Bradley Graham, “Air Force Chief on Attack: Mc- Peak Boldly Criticizes Other Services’ Roles and Plans,” The Washington Post, October 24, 1994, p. 1; see also, Merrill A. McPeak, briefing to Roles and Missions Com- mission, Washington, September 14, 1994. 6John Boatman, “The Jane’s Interview,” Jane’s De- fence Weekly, vol. 22, no. 23 (December 10, 1994), p. 32. 7On behalf of the Chairman, the director of the Joint Staff issued a memo on joint doctrine dated July 28, 1994 to the service chiefs and CINCs. It directed that the doctrinal concept found in the preface of each joint pub be changed to read: “The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, commanders will apply this doctrine (JTTP) except when exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.” In a September 15, 1994 memo, the commander of U.S. Army Training and Doc- trine Command (TRADOC) stated that the Chairman’s “views are consistent with the Army view that doctrine is authoritative, but requires judgement in application.” While acknowledging doctrine as authoritative, TRADOC appeared to be endorsing the exercise of “judgement and application” for situations with less than “exceptional circumstances.” 8In a memorandum dated February 8, 1995 to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, Maj Gen Charles D. Link, USAF, registered his concern that “joint doctrine is largely dominated by outmoded perspectives which handcuff airpower to the constrained mission of land component commanders.” Moreover, an analysis of Joint Pub 1-01 (appendix H) reveals that the Army has been designated as the lead agent significantly more often than the Air Force and almost twice as often as the Navy and Marine Corps combined. 9James J. Tritten and Gary W. Anderson, “Lessons from the History of Naval Doctrine Development,” Ma- rine Corps Gazette, vol. 78, no. 10 (October 1994), pp. 50–52. In response to criticism that the Navy’s use of 100 JFQ / Winter 1996–97