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On Space-Power Separatism MAJ SH AWN P. RIFE, USAF I N SEPTEMB ER 1997, Gen Charles A. Horn er, USAF, Retired, commander of coal it ion air forces during Operat ion De sert Storm and later head of Air Force Space Command and US Space Command (CINCSP ACE), created something of a stir when he questioned whether the US Air Force should continue to run military space sys tems: “If the Air Force clings to its owners hip of space, then tradeoffs will be made between air and space, when in fact the tradeoff should be made elsewhere.”1 Alt hough General Horner made his assert ion based on budgeta ry conside rat ions, his remarks enc oura ged Air Force offic ers who, using the origin al leaders of the US Air Force as role mod els, argue for a separate “space service.” Space- power enthus ia sts see themselves as modern count erp arts to the early airpower visiona ri es and often draw parall els between the rise of airpower and the rise of space power. Both origi nated in a desire to occupy the “high ground” and maintain a commandi ng perspect ive of the surf ace batt lef ield. Air-to-a ir and air-to-s urface comb at arose and flourished in the flames of two world wars, leading eventua lly to the crea tion of indep ende nt air forces as air offic ers sought to set free a new and potent ially decis ive arm of military force from surface-warfare paradigms.2 If, as Billy Mitchell said, “airpower is the abili ty to do something in the air,” then one can say that space power is the ability to do something in space. Unfort un ately, over 40 years af ter the first satell ite orbited the Earth, we still cann ot opera te in space nearly as easily or rout inely as air forces could opera te within a deca de of the Wright brothers’ first flight. 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CONTRACT NUMBER On Space-Power Separatism 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Air and Space Power Journal,155 N. Twining Street,Maxwell REPORT NUMBER AFB,AL,36112-6026 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 11 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 22 AIRP OWER JOURNAL SPRING 1999 Space power has not yet progressed much be airp ower theory and doctrine. Theories and yond that first parall el stage of develo pm ent. doct rines of airpower, land power, and sea Most people assume, however, that warfare in power may contribu te signific antly to the de and from space will eventua lly become a real- velo pm ent of the theory and doctrine of space ity.3 Although space weaponizat ion is hardly a power, but space power clearly requires funda foreg one conclus ion,4 the weapons and con ment al, bottom-up, theoretic al and doctrinal cepts of operat ions to make it happen have dev elo pm ent. The most conduc ive require been in develo pm ent for some time. Fancyi ng ment for such develo pm ent remains a separate thems elves as modern-day Mitchells or Giulio space corps or service.”7 Douhets, space-power separat ists maintain In the past, Air Force doctrine has chal that space forces will reach their full military lenged the notion that physical differe nces be- pot ent ial only when they free themselves tween air and space necess ari ly require a from airpower paradigms. separ ate space service: Some people have seized on the differences in A United States Space Force? air and space technologies to argue that space constitutes a separate environment from the air No explicit agreement exists on a specific and that space requires development of a bounda ry between air and space. The altit udes separate force to exploit it just as the land, sea, at which the effects of lift and drag become neg and air environments require separate forces. lig ib le, or at which a cabin or suit must have an This argument is equivalent to saying that submarines and surface ships should be in ind ep ende nt supply of oxygen and pressure, or separate force structures. Although there are at which turboj et engines become inope ra ble many differences between submarine and all differ. In intern at ional law, the major space surface craft, the important quality they share is powe rs genera lly accept “the lowest perigee at that they both operate at sea. Infantry and tained by orbiti ng space vehic les as the present armor use quite different technologies as well, lower boundary of outer space,” but this stan but they do not require separate services dard is not univers al.5 Even if a more precise de because their significant unifying characteristic lineat ion between the two envir onm ents is that they both operate on land. Similarly, the proves imposs ib le, their physical differe nces re- important quality that air and spacecraft share is that they operate above the earth’s surface. main signific ant. The space envir onm ent is Moreover, no sharp boundary exists between largely a vacuum charact eri zed by high-energy air and space, while it is quite obvious when one part ic les, fluctua ti ng magnetic fields, and the moves from land to sea or from aerospace to prese nce of meteo ro ids and microm et eo ro ids. land or sea. . . . The motion of bodies in orbit closely follows the laws of celest ial mechani cs, a much differ Freedom of movement and speed underscores ent system of knowledge than the laws of aero [sic] the military usefulness of exploiting air dyn ami cs governi ng the flight of aircraft. and space. While no current platform has the Airc raft opera te in the much more benign envi ability to completely exploit the full spectrum ronm ent of Earth’s atmosp here, charact eri zed of the aerospace environment, the planned by moisture, wind, precipit at ion, and pressure. development of an aerospace plane to operate In perhaps the most persuas ive argum ent both in the atmosphere and in space serves to illustrate the continuity of aerospace. Its for a separate space service, Lt Col Bruce M. continuity is further evidenced by the fact that DeB lois analyzes the two differe nt envir on conceptually many of the same military ments and extrapol ates a comparis on of the activities can be performed in air and space, relat ive advant ages of airpower and space even though different platforms (some of power (table 1).6 Based on his analysis, De- which are yet to be developed) and somewhat Blois concludes that “one cannot build space different methods must be used to perform power theory and doctrine in general upon them. Thus, from a military, as opposed to an engineering, perspective, the aerospace ON SPACE-POWER SEPARA TISM 23 Tab le 1 Chara ct eri st ic Advant ages of Airpower and Space Power Airpower Space Power Polit ics Pol itic al access to the realm Sove re ignty [milit ary use of space is limited by [no overflight restrict ions in space; par ticu lar pol itic al and legal constraints] int ern at ional agreements support free access] Likel ih ood of reduced casualt ies [based on use of remote, unmanned syst ems] Dev elo pm ent/ Cent rali zed command and control (C2) [No compara tive advant age for space Emp loym ent [cent rali zed C2 for space is degraded by power] mult ip le org aniz at ions intrudi ng upon CINCS PACE’s on-orbit control, launch, acq uis it ion, research and develo pm ent (R&D), and budget authority; airpower not comp arat ively constrained] Dec ent rali zed execut ion [conc ept applies relatively more to airpower; cont roll ing and executi ng elements for space may, in effect, be the same] Realm Access Ac cess to the realm (opera tions) [No compara tive advant age for space [ease of perform ing operat ions in the air power] as opposed to space] Ac cess to the realm (main te nance/sup port) [ease of perform ing mainte nance/ supp ort for air opera tions as opposed to space opera tions] Realm Comp os it ion of the realm Size of the realm Env ir onm ent [hos tile nature of the physical space [space affords unlimi ted potent ial for env ir onm ent as opposed to the air envir on freed om of movement] ment] Pos it ion of the realm [space envir onm ent encloses the air env ir onm ent] Realm-A fforded Auton omy Surv eill ance and reconn aiss ance Ca pa bil ity [adv ant age of indep ende nt decision- making [adv ant ages of perspect ive and cap ab ili ty in manned versus unmanned elev at ion] syst ems] Dur at ion Man euv er Range [aero dy nam ics versus orbital mechani cs] Speed of response Flexi bil ity Prec is ion Firep ower Stealth Source: Adapted from Col Phillip S. Meiling er, ed., The Paths of Heaven: The Evolut ion of Airpower Theory (Maxw ell AFB, Ala.: Air Univer sity Press, 1997), 564. 24 AIRP OWER JOURNAL SPRING 1999 Where is today’s [Billy] Mitchell . . . for space power? ON SPACE-POWER SEPARA TISM 25 environment must be considered as an exp ert ise, an indep ende nt space force is required indivisible whole.8 dem ands that one prove at least one of the fol lowi ng hypothes es (preferab ly both): DeB lois asserts, however, that “the aero 1. The requirem ents for that unique exper space conject ure is false” (emphas is in origi tise are not being fulfilled within the nal).9 Although he concedes that there is curr ent framework of organiz at ion, or “pot ent ial for some technol ogic al mitigat ion the resources of that expert ise are not of the vast differe nces in the charact eri st ics of bei ng used properly. airp ower and space power,” he dismisses pro- grams such as the space plane on the grounds 2. Only an ind ep ende nt space force can pro- that, historic ally, “dual-environment vehic les vide a capab ili ty that is conside red vital have proved more expens ive and less capab le to our national defense. than separate vehic les designed espec ially for each envir onm ent.”10 Although this observ a In effect, proving the first hypothes is tion may be valid, as a casual reject ion, it is means proving that the United States Air Force cert ainly premature. has not served as a satisf act ory steward for our Reg ardl ess, as do many space-power advo nat ion’s military space power. Undoubte dly, cates over the years, DeBlois criticizes a per some people, both in and out of the Air Force, ceived tendency to derive space doctrine simply would make such an assert ion—but the evi by substit uti ng the term space (or aeros pace) in dence suggests otherw ise. Certainly, as with airp ower doctrine. He rejects the argum ent that air, many civil, commerc ial, and military or airp ower and space power should be merged, ganiz at ions remain involved in and commit based on their functional equivalence in “em- ted to space, includi ng the Army and Navy. ployi ng military power from the third dimen Howe ver, the Air Force owns and opera tes the sion.” He counters that this logic wrongly prep ond era nce of milit ary space assets. As Gen dict ates merging land and sea power based on the Robe rt T. Herres, former CINCSPACE, has writ- same functional equivalence (employi ng mili ten, “Since the 1950s the Air Force has contin tary power from the two-dimensional surface): ued to fund, research, and develop those “Des pite the exist ence of a functional equiva milit ary systems designed to exploit the full lence between two forms of military power . . . med ium encomp assi ng all of aerospace. The and the exist ence of the technic al means to ac Air Force has accum ul ated a wealth of exper i comp lish those functions, the fact remains that ence in space operat ions and accum ul ated it at the envir onm ent and the technol ogic al means a great price. It is incorr ect to think those in- that posture us in those envir onm ents remain vestm ents have been made and are being diff ere nt. This is true of land and sea power; the made without a full apprec iat ion of the force exa min at ion of charact eri st ics indic ates that it is struct ure that must be provided for air and also true of airpower and space power.”11 space operat ions.”12 Some people may disagree with the gener al’s last assert ion. Certainly, many Air Force Two Hypotheses off ic ers today do not have full cogniz ance of the value and import ance of space power. At One cannot dispute the fact that the air and the same time, one should admit that not all space envir onm ents, as well as the technol ogi Air Force offic ers have full cogniz ance of the cal means that allow us to opera te in those en value and import ance of airp ower! Too many vir onm ents, are differe nt. However, the fact Air Force offic ers think that unders tandi ng that the differe nces necess ari ly dictate a space and apprec ia ti ng basic and operational-level force (or space corps) separate from the Air aeros pace doctrine is somebody else’s prob Force is not as obvio us. lem, not theirs. From a practic al viewpoint, to assert that Neve rt hel ess, today and for the foreseea ble bec ause a unique envir onm ent requires a unique fut ure, the United States in general (and the 26 AIRP OWER JOURNAL SPRING 1999 Air Force in particul ar) remains the world’s Horner’s statement, and—to an extent—the pree min ent military space power. In the Per point is valid: in funding aerospace forces, one sian Gulf War, Air Force Space Command as- should make choices somewhere other than sets proved critical enablers to the conduct of bet ween air and space. All the services enjoy comb at operat ions by all of the services—but the benefits of space-based capab ilit ies, but part icul arly by coalit ion air forces, which the Air Force bears most of the funding burden should ered most of the war-fighting burden for very expens ive space assets. Currently, the def ense budget is roughly split three ways (among land, sea, and aerospace power). If So, where is today’s Douhet crea ti ng a separate space force would allow the budget to be split four ways, thus allowi ng or Mitchell (or even Alfred air and space forces to command half of US de Thayer Mahan) for space power? fense outlays, the attract ion for aerospace So far, no such original thinker power advoc ates becomes obvio us. In reali ty, has yet clearly emerged. such an arrangem ent likely would not make a sign ific ant differe nce when one conside rs di mini shed budget resources, the power of the est abl ished services to retain their share of the duri ng the thousand-hour-w ar air campaign. pie, the addit ional overhead costs in creati ng Since then, several new types of precision- and maintaini ng a separate space service, and guided munit ions that use space-based navi the very real questions regardi ng the nation’s gat ion for guidance have entered (or will be pol itic al will to militar ize space even further. ent eri ng) the Air Force invent ory, includi ng For examp le, one cannot blame Air Force doc- the AGM-130, the Joint Direct Att ack Muni trine or leaders hip for the fact that the Clinton tion, and the AGM-154A Joint Standoff adm inis trat ion, without consulti ng the Air Weapon. Such weapons and space-based capa Force (and in appare nt contrav ent ion of its bilit ies provide the foundat ion for the Air own space-transportation policy), used the Force core compet ency of “precis ion engage line-i tem veto in 1997 to strike out Air Force ment.” funds for testing a military space plane.13 In fact, space-power conside rat ions are so Thus, based on the current state of our mili int ert wined with all Air Force core compet en tary space forces and the attent ion those assets cies that, without these inhere nt space capa rec eive within today’s Air Force organiz at ion, bilit ies, the Air Force’s core-competency I argue that the first hypothes is remains un promi ses become almost meaningl ess. Space proven. The second hypothes is now becomes power, together with the information- even more import ant. superiority and precision-engagement capa Space-p ower separat ists inheri ted the pio bilit ies provided thereby, enables airpower fi neeri ng and rebell ious spirit that spawned the nally to approach the full level of its potent ial ind ep ende nt United States Air Force. At first as envis ioned by Mitchell, Douhet, and other blush, it appears natural that space power early airpower theorists. The air and space me should remain separate from airpower, just as diu ms are differe nt, but air and space forces, airp ower should remain separate from surface ope ra ti ng together, offer a unique and poten power. But something is missing. Early air- tially decis ive synerg ist ic effect from the third di power advoc ates offered a compell ing ratio mens ion. nale for an indep ende nt air force, based on Space-p ower separat ists may maintain that reas ons other than the differe nces in physical a separate service (or corps) could better ad- env ir onm ent. Mitchell, Douhet, Hugh Tren dress vulnera bilit ies that exist in our space ca chard, and many others argued instead for the pa bil ity or better exploit techno logi cal dec is ive and revolut iona ry impact that inde cap ab ilit ies to field currently nonexi ste nt sys pende nt airpower would have on the conduct of tems. This was the implic at ion of General warf are. They articul ated a compreh ens ive vi- ON SPACE-POWER SEPARA TISM 27 sion showing that an indep ende nt air force bef ore the horse. One finds much theoretic al could do things for national defense that an disc uss ion on the “how” of space warfare but, air force corralled within the organi zat ional other than the paradigm of indep ende nt air- framew ork of the Army and Navy could not power theory (or the futuri st ic musings of sci do. In some cases, these early advoc ates were ence fiction), not much on the “why.” One way ahead of their time. Prophecies regardi ng also finds only vague genera lit ies of the need cap ab ilit ies of airpower once thought discred to “take the high ground” to gather inform a ited now receive new emphas is. tion and apply precis ion force globally. (Inter The real crux of the matter for airpower esti ngly, as should be clear, this is what separ at ists in the early years was the prevail aeros pace power already does today.) ing view of surface offic ers that air forces must Let us return for a moment to the question rem ain ancill ary to surface forces. Although of dec is ive force. One need only look to his- some antagon ism exists within the Air Force tory for scenari os involvi ng the decis iven ess (cert ainly not confined to Space Command) of land power, sea power, and airpower in with regard to the flying commun it y’s domi warf are. The dictiona ry definit ion of deci nat ion of today’s service leaders hip, one won sive—“havi ng the power to decide”—is not ders whether the current situation really very precise. In a joint war-fighting context, para ll els the fundam ent al philosophic al dis the term can easily cover a range of possib ili agreem ents between air and surface offic ers ties, includi ng an eclectic “me-tooism,” in earl ier in this century. Accordi ng to General which everyo ne claims a “decis ive” role. Herr es, Thus, one can reasonab ly say that space- based force enhancem ent proved decis ive in Space Operations were seen as a natural the Persian Gulf War—much as one can argue outgrowth and extension of air operations. As that airpower (in a recon nais sance role) early as the 1950s, Gen Thomas L. White coined proved decis ive in the Battle of the Marne in the word aerospace to describe the medium for 1914. The definit ion can also include another Air Force operations. Since then we have ext reme whereby a single service declares it- considered “air” and “space,” while two sep self the sole factor of victory in war—an inter- arate entities, as constituting a single realm—an pret at ion that provides fertile ground for “operationally indivisible medium.” Even bitt er interservi ce rivalry. One should keep in before the Soviets launched Sputnik, the senior leadership of the Air Force was looking ahead to mind Douhet’s admon it ion that “there is a a role for the Air Force in space. Clearly this is vast differe nce between ‘the sole factor of quite different from the view the Army took vict ory’ and ‘the decis ive factor of victory.’ toward aviation in those earlier years when ”15 General Mitchell and others argued for a The point of this discuss ion is that the cur- distinct role for air power. The Army of General rent lack of a full range of force-application Mitchell’s era rejected a large role for aviation; cap ab ilit ies directly from space to Earth be- the Air Force of today eagerly awaits the growth comes an import ant conside rat ion in the de- of space activities as part and parcel of bate over space-power separa tism.16 Until aerospace. 14 hum ans migrate from Earth, warfare will still So, where is today’s Douhet or Mitchell (or be about achieving object ives within the ter even Alfred Thayer Mahan) for space power? rest rial envir onm ent (land, sea, and air). This So far, no such original thinker has yet clearly means that without a viable space-to-s urface emerged. Without one, an indep ende nt space force-a pplication capab ili ty, space power (in- force really seems to lack a raison d’être. Ar dep ende nt or otherw ise) in and of itself can- gui ng that one needs a separate space service not be decis ive in warfare except under the to fulfill the potent ial of military space forces broade st possib le interp ret at ion that includes witho ut elaborati ng a reali st ic vision of what Space Command’s outstand ing force- that potent ial is (and why it requires an inde enhancement capab ilit ies. The latter defini pende nt space force) is like putting the cart tion implies a subord in at ion to airpower, land 28 AIRP OWER JOURNAL SPRING 1999 power, and/or sea power, which would place nity successf ully resists such a necess ary an indep ende nt space force in a uniquely in trans it ion, the need for an indep ende nt space fer ior posit ion by way of the other establ ished force will become clear.) servi ces. By necess ity, future war fighting will In this future aerospace force, the practic al war-f ighting dimens ions of the air and space en vi ron ment will become fully unified. Moreov er, in this context, space-based force At least for now, the case for app lic at ion can effect ively implem ent its role an independent space force and mission by capitali zi ng on the expert ise remains unsubstantiated. (part icul arly in intell ig ence, targeti ng, battle- damage assessm ent, etc.) already resident within the Air Force, rather than replic ati ng those capab ilit ies within the framework of a be joint. But all of the indep ende nt services separ ate organiz at ion. are organi zed, trained, and equipped to fight Thus, I argue that the second hyp othes is, and win the nation’s wars—preferab ly to like the first, is unp roven. At least for now, the gether, alone if absol utely necess ary. Space case for an indep ende nt space force remains power by itself cannot currently do that. uns ubs tant ia ted. If, however, space-based force-application cap ab ili ty becomes a reali ty, many terrest ri ally based military systems will probably be- The Tasks at Hand come obsol ete. For examp le, a recent artic le in US Naval Instit ute Proc eedi ngs argues that To say that the current rationa le for an in- weapo ns in low Earth orbit would present dep ende nt space force is hollow is not the such a threat to seaborne forces that the mod- same thing as saying that there are no issues ern carrier battle group—the centerp iece of to resolve before today’s Air Force can be- curr ent US naval strategy—might become ex- come a fully capab le aerospace force. In doc- tinct.17 Moreover, because any space-based trine, the Air Force must come squarely to force applic at ion into the terrest rial envir on grips with a broad issue: the theater require ment must(in a unique fashion) transit the at ments of a joint force commander (and his mosp here, the eventual impli ca tions for or her compon ent commande rs) versus the airp ower are profound. global focus of space forces (in terms of re If space-based force applic at ion approaches tain ing unity of command of aerospace the full potent ial of its technol ogic al capab ili forces). Newly approved Air Force Doctrine ties (i.e., the ability to find, fix, track, and de Docum ent (AFDD) 2, Org aniz at ion and Em- stroy virtua lly anything in the terrest rial ploym ent of Aerospace Power, presents images env ir onm ent), the debate over a separate space of unified air and space organiz at ion and servi ce will become obsol ete because airpower, emp loym ent but leaves many questions un as we unders tand it today, will become obsol ete. ans wered. The practi cal unders tandi ng of Space power will be able to do virtua lly every- how we will fight the next war remains un thing that airpower does today—and do it faster clear. The Air Force is actively explori ng a with less risk. Predomin antly space forces (with number of options for marryi ng vision to re air in an auxili ary role) will subsume the roles al ity, includi ng fleshing out notional sup- and missions of air forces, and the reins of ported/sup port ing re la tion ships and power within the US aerospace force will, by conc epts that implem ent “reachback.” Pro rights, transfer from the combat pilot of today posa ls that integ rate formal space exper tise to the space operat or of tomorr ow. Bec ause we into other Air Force major commands and are already an aerospace force, the transit ion numb ered air forces are being studied. should be a smooth one—perhaps imperc ept i One answer entails centrali zi ng the tasking ble. (Conversely, if the Air Force flying commu of military space forces at the unified level ON SPACE-POWER SEPARA TISM 29 Although the need or desire to exploit a new medium has resulted in separatism, the pace has been set by the development of technology and doctrine. Are time lines for sea power (centuries) or airpower (decades) relevant?