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1101 Miller 10/14/97 10:28 AM Page 80 A New Mission for Atlantic Command By PA U L D AV I D M I L L E R D photo O D I n a February 1993 “Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces,” General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended changing the Unified Command Plan (UCP) by placing cer- tain forces in the continental United States under a single joint commander for the primary purpose of ensuring the joint training and readiness of response forces. The Secretary of Defense approved that rec- ommendation in April and an implementa- Navy SEALs descend tion plan is now under development. The to a submarine. plan will merge Forces Command (FORS- DOD photo COM), Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT), Air Combat Command (ACC), and Marine Corps Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT) into a single combat command. The services will retain their Summary In a recent report to Congress, General Colin Powell raised the issue of creating a joint command to enhance the ability of forces based in the United States to respond quickly in the event of crises. The Chairman con- cluded it would be advantageous to establish such an organization and recommended that assets of Forces Command, Atlantic Fleet, Air Combat Command, and Marine Corps Forces Atlantic be fused into a single joint command. U.S. Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) will become that command with responsibility for joint training, force packaging, and deployments during contingencies, including providing support to U.N. peacekeeping operations and assistance in times of natural disasters. To accomplish this new joint mission LANTCOM must streamline training and exercises, facilitate packaging and adapting forces to meet theater requirements, and enhance readiness through innovations in doctrine. U.S. Navy photo by Paul Brylewski 80 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1993 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1993 to 00-00-1993 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER A New Mission for Atlantic Command 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,Fort REPORT NUMBER Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 8 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 1101 Miller 10/14/97 10:28 AM Page 81 Miller statutory responsibilities and the U.S. Atlantic mission for LANTCOM as one of the most Command (LANTCOM) will be responsible for significant aspects of this triannual report. joint training, force packaging, and facilitating The proposal builds on many important joint deployment in crises. training initiatives which have flourished The advantages of the proposed changes, since the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorgani- particularly in the area of joint training, war- zation Act of 1986, particularly in the wake rant a close look. LANTCOM is well-suited to of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. assume this new mission. As a CONUS-based General Powell helped to point the way joint headquarters, it already enjoys strong with the publication of Joint Pub 1, Joint component relationships with FORSCOM, Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, which traces LANTFLT, ACC, and MARFORLANT. Cold the roots of jointness and charts a course for War planning in LANTCOM focused on de- the future. Meeting challenges with a fending the sea lanes and conducting offen- smaller, less costly force depends on realiz- sive naval operations ing the full force-multiplier potential of against the Soviet Union. jointness. Joint Pub 1 is a focal point for the meeting challenges with While the NATO Alliance further refinement of joint doctrine. a smaller, less costly force endures—and LANTCOM Joint Training and Exercises depends on realizing retains a large regional The first cornerstone in realizing the full area of responsibility— the full force-multiplier potential of our Armed Forces is joint train- the threat of war is potential of jointness ing—particularly regularly scheduled, major greatly reduced. Thus joint exercises. Both Exercise Ocean Venture LANTCOM has the capac- in the Atlantic and Exercise Tandem Thrust ity to assume added responsibilities in keep- in the Pacific are examples of joint training ing with the revised military strategy and the being done by the CINCs. In 1992 those ex- proposed changes to the UCP. ercises saw thousands of soldiers, sailors, air- The Commander in Chief of the Atlantic men, and Marines train together on joint Command (CINCLANT) also has responsibili- warfighting tasks. A new spirit of cooperation ties under NATO as Supreme Allied Comman- and enthusiasm was clearly evident. Progress der Atlantic (SACLANT). In the new plan was made on doctrinal and joint command, CINCLANT will likely continue to serve as control, communications, computers and in- SACLANT where he will be well situated to telligence (C4I) issues as raised by Operations integrate and tailor forces to support Supreme Desert Shield/Desert Storm such as proce- Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) for dures for the Joint Force Air Component NATO contingencies. Since LANTCOM will Commander (JFACC) and effectively employ- no longer be a predominantly naval com- ing mobile operations and intelligence cen- mand, CINCLANT will be a nominative posi- ters with joint C4I connectivity. tion filled by an officer from any service. Joint training has a high priority in all LANTCOM will also be assigned additional theaters. The U.S. Pacific Command (PA- missions in support of United Nations peace- COM) has developed an innovative, two-tier keeping and disaster relief missions. The com- Joint Force Commander (JFC) concept to en- mand might also be renamed in order to sure the readiness of JFCs and staffs in re- more accurately reflect this new focus. sponding to contingencies. PACOM has de- Comments on the Chairman’s roles and ployable JFC staff augmentation teams that missions report—both from inside and out- train and exercise regularly with designated side the military—cite the proposed new joint force commanders. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has been busily en- gaged in joint training in Southwest Asia Admiral Paul David Miller, USN, is Supreme Allied since the end of the Gulf War. Regular joint Commander Atlantic, and the Commander in strike and air defense exercises maintain Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command. He was previously readiness for rotationally deployed forces Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet. Summer 1993 / JFQ 81 1101 Miller 10/14/97 10:28 AM Page 82 ATLANTIC COMMAND from all services. The U.S. cases the requirements were met by using European Command fairly rigid combinations of permanently as- (EUCOM) uses the Air signed forces and standardized deployment Force’s Warrior Prep Cen- groups. This was largely a single or dual ser- ter in Germany to sup- vice approach—as opposed to being truly Guard photo ptroaritn inaggg ereffsosirvtse. Jjooiinntt joouinr tm. Tilhitea rsyy sstetrmat ewgoyr.k Tedh ew seullp apnodrt seudp CpoINrtCeds S. Coast tSroauinthinergn in Ctohmem Uan.Sd. dfoeraclets d, iarnedct ljyo iwnti tfho rtchee i nsetervgircaetsio pnr owvaisd iancgc otmhe- U. (SOUTHCOM) supports plished in the field, often on an ad hoc basis. counterdrug and nation The Cold War prescription may now pro- assistance operations. vide more capability than needed in some re- With all the atten- gions. To do the job with a smaller force, we tion that has already been must explore ways to more tightly lace to- directed toward joint gether the full joint military capability of the training, one might ques- United States. We must explore and refine tion the need to assign ways of providing the CINCs with packages m overall responsibility for of capabilities more closely tailored to their Bah joint training of CONUS- requirements. Once assigned the joint train- C. U.S. Navy photo by Jack bctFtiwoiaormsnoset md,wr aesiflunaoldcsrbohceuren .is alsB d tuc ototoo nnta h, sd esororialen it dhsgaoareleer-. iaiJnnoteggidn tm Ttht hoeFise onsa irsesoceseneicds,o te P nLdaCdA jcI oNNkciaTonCgrCtsn i OcneianrMgps tad obwenislieiilgtl inoebfisen p rgeiad acaelkniazaldiglny etg srs .aitithnue-- than supplant or replace, (Top) A Coast Guard force multiplier potential of jointness is devel- cutter intercepts a ongoing efforts. Unified CINCs will continue oping effective joint force packages. The group of Haitians. to conduct joint training to sharpen the focus Chairman and the unified CINCs are already (Bottom) Carriers seen and maintain the readiness of assigned forces. underway during Exer- evaluating ways to better organize and train Second, as the military grows smaller fewer cise Dragon Hammer forces to support CINCs by making it easier to forces will be positioned forward, either per- ’92, (from foreground) call forward specific capabilities needed in Italy’s Guiseppe manently stationed (as in Europe and Korea) their respective areas of responsibility (AORs). Garibaldi,France’s or rotationally and periodically deployed (as One concept envisions rotationally deployed Foch,and Spain’s CENTCOM). Assigning responsibility for joint Principe de Asturias. forces from all services organized into adaptive training readiness to LANTCOM will help to joint force packages—that is, specific capabili- ensure that deploying forces are ready on ar- ties deployed during a given timeframe and rival for joint operations. It would also be a supported by designated back-up units in means for ensuring that those forces—and CONUS. This concept brings together initia- designated back-up units at the ready—can be tives from various quarters and involves two trained to meet the requirements and stan- elements: packaging forces and adapting those dards of the supported CINC. forces to specific theater requirements. As in the case of joint training, each ser- Forging adaptive joint force packages vice is doing an excellent job of providing does not require major adjustments to exist- basic, intermediate, and advanced training to ing service organizations. Each service will ensure its forces are ready for joint opera- remain responsible for individual unit readi- tions. This traditional stovepipe approach to ness and training. The Atlantic Fleet, for ex- training has served us well. It evolved during ample, has replaced traditional battle group the Cold War to meet each CINC’s require- formations with expanded force packages ments for forward positioned forces. In most more closely aligning responsibilities for tactical training with the operational chain of command. The new organization provides 82 JFQ / Summer 1993 1101 Miller 10/14/97 10:28 AM Page 83 Miller greater flexibility and adaptability, permit- tioned forces with a smaller force, the partic- ting battle groups, amphibious ready groups, ular full joint force package must be trained or other needed force packages to be config- jointly and structured to support a given ured from a broad range of maritime capabil- CINC’s specific requirements. Training must ities. The Pacific Fleet has been reorganized focus on specific contingencies and opera- along similar lines. In 1991 General Merrill tions that the joint force may be called upon McPeak, Air Force Chief of Staff, reorganized to execute. As seen in the accompanying il- the basic structure of the air wing. New Air lustration, tailored elements of the full set of Force composite wings are comprised of the joint forces—adaptive joint force packages— range of assets needed to provide a complete can then be positioned forward as needed. capability package. These new organizations As the concept matures, supported CINCs provide more options to the unified CINCs will be able to write a more accurate pre- and make it easier to select needed capabili- scription—based on the situation in the ties from each service force package kit. Sin- AOR—and call forward only the precise ca- gle service force packages can be adapted by pabilities needed. Since the full joint force selecting capabilities to meet specific theater will have trained together, an adaptive joint requirements. We are just beginning to ex- force package—once deployed—becomes the plore ways of doing this. forward element of a trained and ready joint Maritime forces provide a useful exam- force available in CONUS. ple of how force packages can be adapted to In examining the adaptive joint force specific theater requirements. Formerly, to package concept, Navy and Marine Corps counter the global Soviet threat, carrier bat- component commanders of LANTCOM tle groups (CVBGs) comprised a fairly stan- jointly developed concepts for a carrier- dard menu of assets and capabilities. New based Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground naval force packages facilitate breaking Cold Task Force (SPMAGTF). This special task War deployment patterns by making it easier force would provide the supported CINC to structure and train capability-specific with specified, focused capabilities—such as packages. In today’s fast-changing world a noncombatant evacuation, security opera- naval force may not need the same capabili- tions, or tactical recovery of aircraft and per- ties in one region or situation as in another. sonnel. Other maritime force package op- One CINC may desire to augment the offen- tions, including tailored carrier air wings sive firepower of an aircraft carrier by vary- and MARGs with a more capable Air Combat ing the mix of strike aircraft in the embarked Element (ACE), are also being examined. naval air wing. Another CINC may choose Recognizing the largely maritime flavor of to modify the capabilities of the carrier by these efforts, LANTCOM has been working reducing the number of naval aircraft and with Army, Air Force, and SOF components, instead embarking Special Operations Forces as well as the Coast Guard, to explore contri- (SOF) or a special purpose Marine force with butions that those forces could make to de- capabilities tailored to specific theater re- ployable joint capabilities packages. quirements. Circumstances in a third region Tailored joint capability packages, struc- may be such that requirements can be met tured and trained for a variety of require- with a tailored Marine Amphibious Ready ments, will soon prove their value in EUCOM. Group (MARG) supported by Tomahawk Joint Force 93–2, for example, represents an cruise missile-firing ships and submarines. In adaptive joint force package which blends ser- each case the capabilities are tailored to vice capabilities by combining a typical 11- meet CINC requirements. Army and Air ship carrier battle group, 5-ship Marine am- Force capabilities may be similarly tailored. phibious ready group, Special Operations From the vantage point of the supported Forces, land-based Air Force and naval aircraft, CINCs, the ready forces of all services repre- and advanced Army helicopters. Working sent the full set of available capabilities. To meet CINC requirements for forward posi- Summer 1993 / JFQ 83 1101 Miller 10/14/97 10:28 AM Page 84 ATLANTIC COMMAND with LANTCOM to develop, integrate, and other CINCs. Assigning LANTCOM the joint jointly train such force packages will help the training mission for CONUS-based forces supported CINCs meet the requirements for will institutionalize this critical role. Orient- continuous and periodic presence. By using ing joint force training toward the supported the full potential of a joint force and calibrat- CINCs’ requirements and training deploying ing forward-positioned capabilities to the forces alongside designated back-up units needs of CINCs, we can maintain a forward will ensure additional forces can be sent for- presence without overcommitting our forces. ward. Surge forces would arrive in theater or- The end of the Cold War enables LANT- ganized, trained, and ready for large scale COM to focus increased attention on tailor- joint operations. ing joint exercises and training to support To efficiently tailor joint training to the requirements of the supported CINCs, we need an effective, widely understood means Adaptive Joint Force Package Concept Full Joint Force Package Joint Command Element Tailored Forward Element JTF Command Element Naval Battle Group Naval Task Group Marine Expeditionary Unit Marine Expeditionary Brigade(s) Army Deployment for Training Air Force Squadron(s) Army Division Special Operations Forces Air Force Wing(s) Ready Response to CINC Requirements Special Operations Forces 84 JFQ / Summer 1993 1101 Miller 10/14/97 10:29 AM Page 85 Miller to communicate re- ual service schedules will make training more quirements. The Joint efficient, relevant, and interesting. Consider- S. Navy photo Savrteear fsdfa elav njeodloi npthtin etg a CsakI N ulnCisist- asfotbarlcyeei nismtgr upwcrotiutvhreeim.n E epxnirstot igcnragan m sbemrev eiacdce h beiuxeedvregcdeist esws hacnialnde U. which will make it be overlaid by joint mbard eCaIsNieCrs ftoor sstuaptep otrhteeidr tinracrienaisnedg cwoistth. oSeurt- service exercises Schulziner and Lo tionrga yicn,o ipmnrgimo rroeitnqi zuteier renmmeieendnoetlds- vbfoierc ems yeunxteucrahclri sobeensn ieczfaeintd, cnbaieznne ebdfe ift os, yra nmncdhu rtou-al Lockheed photo by tLtmruAaerNeiintnT tigChn oOges,xMe en ariecnnei ddsses t.sra uticdo- aytrarinenadldng essee pfuqfiotucirieletinnzacacteitiedioso ntnino,, syineie qtlrudae nensfcfpeiocdir ettnaoctiioesn, and support. Joint Doctrine range utilization, Another area The third cornerstone in realizing the and support with important po- full joint force multiplier potential is ensur- tential payoff is the ing the readiness of JTF commanders and evaluation and staffs to plan and execute contingency oper- testing of joint tactics, techniques, and pro- ations. Each geographic CINC is developing cedures to refine joint doctrine. Being located a JTF training concept, but individual the- in close geographic proximity to the Joint ater approaches are not yet grounded in a Doctrine Center, the Army Training and Doc- common set of JTF staff tasks, conditions, trine Command, and the newly created and proficiency standards. Once the univer- Naval and Air Force doctrine commands, as sal joint task list is finalized, LANTCOM will well as Army and SOF tactical training cen- be able to train deployable JTF and compo- ters at Fort Bragg, LANTCOM is squarely at nent commanders in joint doctrine, tactics, the hub of a number of activities. Assigning techniques, and procedures tailored to the the expanded joint training mission to supported CINC’s requirements from a LANTCOM will facilitate evaluating, testing, menu of common standards that are appli- and sequencing the development of joint cable worldwide. doctrine. Four principles have guided develop- The hub-and-spoke analogy also applies ment of the implementation plan for the to other joint training activities. LANTCOM new joint training mission: is working in cooperation with existing com- t Finding ways to add value without add- ponent commands to establish joint tactical ing cost training and development teams. Each team t Avoiding creating additional bureaucratic focuses on specific joint tactical mission layers areas such as joint air operations and joint t Resisting the pressure to increase the size air defense. The teams will assist in design- of the LANTCOM staff t Making good use of what already exists ing and evaluating realistic, relevant joint exercises and training. They will also de- These principles will help achieve the velop joint tactical standards and assist in full value of the proposed changes to the training joint staff elements. The teams pro- Unified Command Plan. One example is the vide focal points for developing joint tactics, potential payoff to be derived from coordi- techniques, and procedures, and cadres of nating exercise schedules. Aligning individ- joint tactical experts on the CINC and component staffs. Joint tactical training development teams could also provide a vehicle for drawing on the expertise, and integrating Summer 1993 / JFQ 85 1101 Miller 10/14/97 10:29 AM Page 86 ATLANTIC COMMAND the efforts, of various service tactical school- COM staff would be minimized and poten- houses and centers of excellence in an effort to tial redundancies would be limited, particu- enhance joint training without infringing larly in the areas of joint publications, dis- on service priorities. tributed simulation, and exercise support. Another useful hub-and-spoke arrange- The Atlantic Command currently has Members of the 82d ment could be created by establishing an ap- several JTF commanders. One of them, JTF- Airborne secure a building during an ex- propriate joint agency to provide a range of 4, is the executive agent in the counterdrug ercise in the Gulf. technical support ser- campaign. Others are established for train- vices to the exercise ing and contingency response. Each service programs of both the component has potential training/contin- CINCs and the ser- gency JTF commander, namely, the Com- vices. This agency manding Generals of the three CONUS- could provide turn- based active Army Corps; Commander key support in tech- Second Fleet; Commander 12th Air Force nologies and services (soon to be Commander 8th Air Force); and common to such ef- Commanding General, Second Marine Expe- forts. One example is ditionary Force. The permanently assigned OD photo ptrriobvuitdeidn sgi mthuela tdiiosn- smtaafrfisly o tfo JwTaFr dc osmervmicaen fduenrsc taioren so arinedn treedsp porni-- D technology needed sibilities. Each JTF commander is routinely to link existing train- given important responsibilities in joint ex- ing ranges, command ercises, and augmented by personnel from posts, and simulators CINCLANT and other components as neces- to an effective joint sary. Joint training and readiness could be Bivera training network. measurably enhanced by permanently as- D. While the services signing sufficient personnel from each ser- Navy photo by John woihnpooger urfiaalztdcoei nlacitsnoi ednws ,tu oitsnurea uleidnex i inbsttoge- vwvmiiiccateehr y otr ouea str mpedoaiaslnku seotii fbnt iheglxi ett pihJeeTesr F tao ibssreti la.ci ftoTfysmh ttioprs u rcoclayomr urjiylosd iionn ubgtte, psbaerucrit--- S. U. expanded by sharing complished by exchanging a modest Marines hit the beach data and capabilities number of permanent billets between exist- in Manta, Ecuador, among users via a distributed simulation ing organizations, though the need for some during a combined network. additional billets cannot be ruled out with- exercise. The skills and experience required for out further analysis. such complex technologies are not plentiful. One key to adding value without adding Building exercise support organizations sepa- cost or additional bureaucratic layers is rately for the CINCs, their components, and steadfastly controlling growth of the LANT- service staffs is inefficient and prohibitively COM staff if it assumes new responsibilities. expensive. One option under consideration Ideally, the goal is zero growth. To accom- would merge the Joint Doctrine Center plish the mission without additional person- (JDC) in Norfolk, Virginia, and the Joint nel, LANTCOM would rely on service com- Warfare Center (JWC) at Hurlburt Field, ponents—namely, FORSCOM, ACC, Florida, into a single command located near LANTFLT, and MARFORLANT—to perform LANTCOM headquarters. This new JDC/JWC their current functions. LANTCOM is not agency would be controlled by the Joint able to take over responsibilities or do the Staff and support simulation-based studies. work of the component commands. Rather, By working in partnership with the it will provide a common vision and effi- JDC/JWC the pressure to expand the LANT- ciently coordinate mutual efforts. The component commanders themselves would serve as an executive board, helping to develop 86 JFQ / Summer 1993 1101 Miller 10/14/97 10:29 AM Page 87 Miller and instill in LANTCOM the customer orien- tomer demand by providing trained and tation needed for success. ready joint force packages to meet a sup- Earlier organizations have had a ported CINC’s particular needs for periodic CONUS-based joint training mission, such as presence forces, forward positioned forces, U.S. Strike Command, established in 1961 and surge forces in times of crisis or conflict. and replaced by U.S. Readiness Command in The Goal of Unification 1971. Because they were perceived to con- Global security and economic reality flict with service Title X responsibilities (that call for a restructuring of our defenses. This is, to organize, train, and equip forces), nei- involves refining the capabilities and roles of ther command succeeded in its mission. the Armed Forces to advance the Nation’s se- LANTCOM would succeed only by comple- curity interests in the future. The definition menting, rather than competing with, ser- of those interests is growing. To do the job vice programs. Success would be measured we must change and adapt. We must find by just how well LANTCOM satisfies cus- new ways to bring our full capabilities to bear on emerging security challenges. We still need a capable military to de- fend our national interests. But, at the same time, the Armed Forces can be smaller and less costly. Meeting future challenges with a smaller, less costly force, however, will de- pend both on continued technical and C4I superiority, and on realizing the full force- multiplier potential of jointness. The fourth and final cornerstone in real- D photo imzianngd tehra tt hpeo tmenistsiaiol nis oasfs itgraniinnign ag sdinesgilgen caotmed- O D CONUS-based forces to fight as a joint team. Giving that mission to LANTCOM, as recommended by the Chairman, would be the next logical step in the evolutionary process of unification which began in 1947. By wisely using the tremendous capability at hand, we can add value without increasing cost or the size of the bureaucracy. And, by so doing, we can ensure effective joint leadership and combat capability on tomorrow’s multidi- mensional battlefields. JFQ Navy photo S. U. (Top) Air Force A–10 Warthog. (Bottom) Navy A–7 Corsairs. Summer 1993 / JFQ 87