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0607 Montaperto 10/15/97 2:50 PM Page 16 J F Q F O R U M The PLA In Search of a Strategic Focus By R O N A L D N. M O N TA P E R T O Trooping the line in Beijing. China’s influence reaches every corner of Asia and, PLA strategic planners are apparently deeply increasingly, the world. Your future is important to us divided in their assessments of the regional security environment. The terms of this de- and to all of the Asia-Pacific region, indeed is important bate should interest U.S. strategists for two to the world.... reasons. First, the debate reveals much about —Secretary of Defense William J. Perry assumptions implicit in Chinese strategic thinking. Second, it explains the purposes of China’s military modernization program. I n a recent address to the National De- Chinese analysts agree that regional se- fense University of the Chinese People’s curity is in a state of flux. The bipolar order, Liberation Army (PLA), the Secretary of based on containment, is fading as a com- Defense outlined the strategic basis of plex multipolar order emerges. Economic de- relations between Washington and Beijing velopment means that Asian powers are and stressed the importance of solid, mutu- identifying more national interests and have ally beneficial military-to-military contacts. resources to pursue them with greater inde- His remarks came as China is deeply in- pendence. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and volved in defining strategic priorities for the an increasingly confident Association of next century. How these priorities are de- Southeast Asian Nations question, and in fined, in turn, will determine PLA capabili- some cases are revising, long-held notions ties, roles, and missions. By acknowledging on the proper roles and relations among re- China’s central role in guaranteeing peace gional powers. The Chinese have no doubt and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and about the implication of such developments by proposing a broad strategic dialogue, Sec- for the United States. The PLA perceives retary Perry faced—and attempted to dis- America as a nation which is unable to uni- arm—the perception now prevalent among laterally determine the course of Asian af- PLA leaders that the United States regards fairs. It also sees the new security order as China as a hostile peer competitor of the fu- probably multipolar, though it is impossible ture. The effect of the Secretary’s remarks to discern more than a glint of their vision. may not be evident for some time because 16 JFQ / Spring 1995 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1995 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1995 to 00-00-1995 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER The PLA In Search of a Strategic Focus 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,Fort REPORT NUMBER Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 4 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 0607 Montaperto 10/15/97 2:50 PM Page 17 Montaperto It is here that PLA analysts diverge in preparing to deal with a near-term military determining which regional relations will be threat. Rather the problem is twofold: imme- the most influential. Some think that the diate and tactical on one hand, more evolution of the American partnership with broadly strategic and future-oriented on the Japan will be decisive. Conflicting priorities other. Immediately and tactically, China is and competing interests between Washing- determined to maintain control over situa- ton and Tokyo will grow and act as a con- tions with the greatest potential for conflict. stant source of instability. Eventually, U.S.- This means putting teeth in claims to Japanese competition will be the fault line sovereignty in the South China Sea and along which the region divides. Other ana- being able to enforce Chinese demands on lysts hold that relations between Washing- Taiwan, although the Chinese remain san- ton and Beijing will drive regional events guine about future developments in both while still others think that the engine of areas. This leads to the other more broadly change will be conflicts between rich and strategic and future-oriented dimension of less affluent regional powers. Finally, a few the problem. Mindful of an uncertain future, analysts see a future shaped by American ef- Beijing must create an economy capable of forts to maintain a defining Asia-Pacific role supporting a range of economic, political, Stikkel) da eUsp.Si.t er oal eg.rowing regional resistance to such avnodic me iilnit atrhyeo pnteiwon ss trthuactt ugruea raanndt esee cau mrea jiotsr Helene C. alectTich—eswe haincahl yassessu imlluess ttrhataet tah asyt sMteamrx iisst tdhie- placeC ahti nthae’s t arbellea.t ionship with the United OD ( product of contradictions between opposite States and other regional powers as well as D forces—is pervasive among PLA strategic the forces which the PLA is presently design- thinkers. Although communism is defunct ing serve both imperatives. They can alert as a basis of political economy, much less as the region to China’s priorities as the secu- a means of legitimizing rity system unfolds. Military modernization over the last few years China’s the rule of the Chinese in particular is a manifestation of Beijing’s Communist Party, typi- commitment. Together these policies and officially published defense cal Marxist categories programs ensure that China’s position is budget has roughly doubled of mind on interna- well-considered by other regional powers. tional relations persist The PLA is focused on strategic issues in the debate among PLA strategists. The and concerns. In the near term, given the thrust of Beijing’s security policies and the centrality of economic development and se- future PLA force structure will be directly vere deficiencies in key military capabilities, shaped by this debate, which also is a con- Beijing will wish to avoid disrupting a re- text for interpreting military modernization. gional stability that supports broad eco- Over the last few years China’s officially nomic contacts. This might not apply, how- published defense budget has roughly dou- ever, if the territorial dispute in the South bled. This development, coupled with air- China Sea altered the status quo or Taiwan craft purchases from Russia, an intransigent declared its independence. In the long run stand on territorial claims in the South the situation is less clear. Chinese strategists, China Sea, and a commitment to build a like counterparts in other countries of the re- force projection capability, sparks universal gion, will continue to face ambiguities and concern among regional security planners. uncertainties. Their approach will reflect a Whatever their disagreement may be high degree of nationalism manifested over the future shape of the regional security through a determination to secure China’s system, Chinese strategists concur that a cru- role as a pivotal force in regional affairs. cial juncture has been reached. In this light Much depends on policies implemented by Beijing’s major security challenge lies not in the United States in concert with regional al- lies. Such policies can resolve uncertainties or exacerbate them. In any event, broad en- Ronald N. Montaperto is a senior fellow in the gagement with China and especially strate- Institute for National Strategic Studies at the gic dialogue with the PLA are essential to National Defense University. He has served as an shaping regional security to support vital analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency and American interests. JFQ taught at the U.S. Army War College. Spring 1995 / JFQ 17 0607 Montaperto 10/15/97 2:50 PM Page 18 U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND (PACOM) MISSION: PACOM has a four-fold mission: to foster peace, democracy, and freedom throughout the Pacific Ocean region; to deter conflict through forward presence and combat ready forces; to strengthen political, economic, and security cooperation; and to win in war should deter- rence fail. PACOM stretches from the west coast of the Americas to the east coast of Africa and from the Arctic to the Antarctic, an area of responsibility which is more than 100 million square miles or roughly half of the earth’s surface. BACKGROUND: PACOM was among three unified commands—including Far East Command and Alaskan Command—established in the region in 1947. The Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) later absorbed the responsibilities of Far East South Korean sentry, Foal Eagle ’93. U.S. Air Force (Mike Reinhardt) Hilton) UinS HS oTnagra Kwoanga.t anchor S. Navy (Jeff U. 18 JFQ / Spring 1995 0607 Montaperto 10/15/97 2:50 PM Page 19 Command when it was disestablished in 1957. That (PACAF). In addition, PACOM has four sub-unified com- same year PACOM service component commands mands: U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), U.S. Forces Japan were formed with their headquarters in Honolulu (USFJ), Alaskan Command (ALCOM), and Special Opera- and CINCPAC headquarters were transferred to tions Command Pacific (SOCPAC); it also has two stand- Camp H.M. Smith near Pearl Harbor. Army, Navy, ing joint task forces (JTFs): Joint Interagency Task Force- and Air Force components re- West (formerly JTF-5), stood up in ported to CINCPAC and the 1989 to conduct counterdrug opera- Marines, under a type commander, to Japanese Maritime tions, and JTF-Full Accounting, formed Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet. Self-Defense Force in 1992 to investigate the missing in Due to the extent of command re- ships. Southeast Asia. sponsibilities, CINCPAC was relieved of In 1972 PACOM took responsi- direct command of Pacific Fleet in bility for U.S. forces in the Indian 1958, although Deputy CINCPAC had Ocean, Southern Asia, and Arctic area previously assumed de facto com- under a worldwide unified command mand. Command relations were realignment. To the north, the com- further realigned by the DOD mand also assumed responsibility for Reorganization Act of 1958 with a portion of the Arctic Ocean and combat-ready forces placed Agency Aleutian Island chain formerly under uofn dCeINr CthPeA Co.p ePrAaCtiOoMna hl acos mfomurand Defense Alinlaes koaf nS oCuotmh mAmanedri.c Tah bee Pcaacmifeic t hceo arset-- cUo.Sm. pAornmeyn tP acocimficm (aUnSdAsR tPoAdCa)y;: Japanese swphoinchsi btoiloitky roefs Aptolannstibicil iCtyo mfomr aalnl docean U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), areas fronting South America. including U.S. Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific ALCOM, a sub-unified command formed in 1989, has (FMFPAC); U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific responsibilities for the land, sea, and air defense of (MARFORPAC); and U.S. Pacific Air Forces Alaska, including the Aleutians and surrounding wa- ters—less the air defense mission of the Alaskan region of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Moreover, the PACOM area was expanded in Thai helicopter, Cobra Gold ’94. 1976 to include the east coast of Africa. The combined commands in the region are United Nations Command (UNC) and Republic of Korea/U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), both with headquarters collocated with USFK in Seoul. UNC is charged with oversight of the Armistice agreement of 1953 to pre- serve peace in Korea; CFC was established in 1978 to oversee bilateral military operations. JFQ way) Con mond T. Ray Combat Camera Imagery (ARBualapsctikerar ’ l9mia3ni.s sgiulea,r Pdiintcgh mbat Camera Center (Andy Dunaway) Russian MI–8 during U.S. Air Force (Val Gempis) Joint Co creosmcbuien eexde srecaisrec.h and Spring 1995 / JFQ 19