DTIC ADA528570: Roles, Missions, and Functions: Terms of Debate

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1705InBrief 10/7/97 9:44 AM Page 103
I N B R I E F
Roles, Missions, and Functions:
Terms of Debate
By D A N I E L T. K U E H L and C H A R L E S E. M I L L E R
The terms roles, missions, and services which became in effect force collateral
functionsare often used inter- providers for CINCs. The missions of t interdict enemy sea power
changeably to refer to a single the combatant commanders, how- t antisubmarine warfare and
concept. To many the terms are vir- ever, should not be confused with shipping protection
tually synonymous: they all mean those of the individual services. t aerial minelaying.
“what the services do.” In one sense Functionsalso date from 1947
Air Force operations during
that is true. But they also have finite when President Truman issued an
World War II provided notable ex-
and statutory meanings which stem executive order on the “Functions of
amples of each of these functions.
from what the services do and who the Armed Forces.”4They include
The legal basis for functions is
makes the assignments. As Congress those various activities, operations,
found in DOD Directive 5100.1
and the services begin what and capabilities for which the ser-
which specifies 17 primary functions,
promises to be an intense and possi- vices were responsible and for which
4 collateral functions, 4 responsibili-
bly contentious look at roles, mis- they were charged with the “orga-
ties concerning space, and 4 responsi-
sions, and functions,1it is helpful to nizing, training, and equipping” of
bilities relating to combat operations
review the origin and usage of these forces. The Air Force, for example,
in support of other services which are
terms as well as prospects for reallo- had seven functions:
assigned to the Air Force (those of the
cating what they signify. t air operations (including joint
other services are equally detailed).
operations)
Terms of Art The following list summarizes the
t general air supremacy
Rolesdate from the National functions of the Air Force:7
t local air superiority
Security Act of 1947 which set out
t strategic air operations (includ- primary
the basic purpose of each service.2
ing reconnaissance) t air combat operations
The Air Force was to be “organized,
t airlift and support for airborne t air and missile defense and
trained, and equipped primarily for
operations space control
prompt and sustained offensive and
t air support for land and naval t strategic air and missile
defensive air operations.”3Title 10,
forces operations
U.S. Code, currently contains the
t air transport. t joint amphibious, space, and
same statement for the Air Force as
well as similar ones for the other Less than a year after Truman’s airborne operations
services. Essentially, roles establish executive order was issued, the Key t support of the Army—close air
each service’s primacy in its respec- West agreement5listed service support (CAS), logistics, airlift, resup-
ply, aerial photography, tactical air
tive form or arena of war: land, sea, functions in greater detail and dis-
reconnaissance, and interdiction
or air. tinguished between primary and
t aerial imagery
Missionsdate from the Depart- collateral functions as illustrated by
t space launch and space
ment of Defense Reorganization Act the following list of Air Force
support
of 1958 which designated comman- functions:6
t aerial tanker operations
ders of unified and specified com-
primary t air lines of communication
mands as combatant commanders
(CINCs) directly responsible to the t gain/maintain air superiority t special operations and
President and Secretary of Defense. t air defense of the United States psychological operations
The job of carrying out broad opera- t strategic air warfare t electronic warfare
tional missions now belonged to t interdiction of enemy land collateral
joint organizations and not to the powetr ancldo sceo cmommubnati caantido nlosgistical air t sea surveillance and antisur-
face ship warfare
support
t intelligence (including tactical t antisubmarine warfare
t aerial minelaying
Daniel T. Kuehl teaches in the School of intelligence) and aerial photography
Information Warfare and Strategy, t airlift, air transport and t aerial refueling in support of
naval campaigns
Information Resources Management resupply, and support for airborne and
College, National Defense University; amphibious operations
Colonel Charles E. Miller, USAF, is chief
of the Strategic Planning Division at
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force.
Summer 1994 / JFQ 103
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I N B R I E F
responsibilities in support of space them by the President and Secretary General Powell’s final report
t organize, train, equip, and of Defense. This places the human visited the following specific
beings who carry out the functions issues:10
provide space forces
t develop tactics and techniques and missions in a bit of a quandary t a joint headquarters for U.S.-
since they are responding to two dif- based forces
for space operations
t exercises involving space force ferent lines of authority, one run- t assigning space to STRATCOM
t participate with other services ning to the service secretaries and t four air forces
military departments and a mission t best mix of aircraft for
in joint space operations, training, and
line running through CINCS to the interdiction
exercises
Secretary of Defense and President. t realigning the CAS mission
responsibilities in support of combat To recapitulate: services develop t eliminating/reducing Marine
operations by other services
forces but do not employ them, air wings
t amphibious and airborne while combatant commands, under t consolidating flight training
operations and procedures joint doctrine, employ forces but do t who should perform combat
t CAS. not develop them. To make matters search and rescue (CSAR)?
worse, the services then overlay this t duplication of multi-service
Institutional Debate
process with their unique doctrines, jammer and electronic intelligence
One result of examining service
and when services allude to missions (ELINT) aircraft
functions is an apparent overlap they are almost always referring to t further reduction of U.S.
which commonly is seen as duplica-
their doctrinal missions, not to forward deployments
tion. For example, the Navy and those of combatant commands. t duplication of Army and
Marines are both assigned the func-
The current debate on roles and Marine expeditionary capability
tion of prosecuting electronic war- missions is occurring in an era of t who should perform theater
fare, as are the Army and Air Force.
congressionally-driven emphasis on air defense (TAD)?
Each service is therefore authorized jointness. The Goldwater-Nichols De- t further restructuring of intelli-
to expend resources and develop
partment of Defense Reorganization gence organizations
forces to prosecute electronic war- Act of 1986 requires the Chairman of t active and Reserve component
fare. Even though this is accom-
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to re- mix.
plished from the relatively unique
view the “assignment of functions (or
perspectives of individual services,
roles and missions)” of the Armed Congressional Action
areas of warfare overlap are in-
Forces. Two such reviews have been This debate now features a con-
evitable. The military planner sees
carried out to date, one by Admiral gressionally-mandated Commission
this as a prudent hedge and a provi-
William Crowe in 1989 (which was on Roles and Missions of the Armed
sion of complementary capabilities
delivered only two days before his Forces (see The Joint World in this
to defeat complementary threats;
term expired) and another by Gen- issue of JFQfor details). The commis-
outside observers probably see it as
eral Colin Powell in 1993. Both re- sion is the result of new considera-
typical Pentagon waste. When the
ports have been criticized for recom- tions such as the end of the Cold
public hears that the F–4G, EF–111,
mending what some consider to be War, fiscal constraints, and perhaps
and EA–6B all perform an electronic
only marginal changes.8Crowe stated most importantly a congressional
warfare mission, they may assume
that service roles were “fundamen- perception that the two CJCS reports
that this reveals redundancy that
tally sound,” but that their functions were not comprehensive and thus
warrants cutting fat to realize sav-
should be revised to reflect current the Armed Forces need impetus from
ings, and usually no explanation,
strategy, new technology, and chang- outside to reform. Key issues that
however elaborate, that the three
ing threats to national security. He the commission will examine are
aircraft perform significantly differ-
made four specific recommendations duplication of effort, improvement
ent parts of the electronic warfare
within the context of a suggested re- in interoperability and military
mission will allay their criticisms.
vision of DOD Directive 5100.1:9 effectiveness, gaps in mission cover-
The complexity of the situation
t a report on roles and missions age, and the impact of advanced
is exacerbated by lines of authority
technology. The commission’s
should be required every two years
which are not as clean as commonly
t reports should delineate charter virtually assures that its rec-
believed. Congress assigns roles in
ommendations will be unsettling to
service functions with greater precision
the respective arenas of war (that is,
the existing structure of roles, mis-
and clarity
land, sea, and air) while the execu-
t CAS should be a primary sions, and functions. Questions that
tive branch (the President through
the commission is likely to take up
function of each service
the Secretary of Defense) assigns de-
t the Air Force should have include:
tailed functions and authorizes the t do we need two (Army/
primary responsibility for space
development of forces to carry them
Marine) expeditionary ground forces?
functions.
out. But the services do not employ t how many air forces do we
these forces, CINCs do in order to
need?
accomplish the missions assigned to
104 JFQ / Summer 1994
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I N B R I E F
t does everyone need to perform medium in which objects move and 4Ibid., document 5, Executive Order
CAS as a primary function? can be seen and acted on. If futurists no. 9877 (July 26, 1947), p. 90.
t who should defend aerospace are correct, information-processing 5See also Barry M. Blechman, et al.,
(from ground into space)? technologies—what some call cyber- “Key West Revisited: Roles and Missions of
t sea-based versus land-based space—might be another arena of the U.S. Armed Forces in the Twenty-First
aerial power projection war that must be dominated to Century,” report no. 8 (Washington: Henry
t duplication of helicopter maintain national security and be L. Stimson Center, March 1993), p. iii.
6Primaryfunctions authorize a service
forces and capabilities victorious in future battles. Even a
to develop force structure to accomplish
t duplication of other opera- simple listing of current and poten-
them and collateralfunctions pertain to
tional functions (reconnaissance, tial arenas suggests a radical change
activities in support of other services and,
electronic warfare, et al.) in the way we think about service in effect, have to be taken “out of hide”;
t duplication of intelligence roles and missions: ibid., document 7, “Key West Agreement”
functions (April 21, 1948), pp. 163–64.
current arenas of warfare
t consolidated training, 7Department of Defense Directive
logistics, and support services t land—Army 5100.1, “Functions of the Department of
t new post-Cold War missions t sea—Navy Defense and its Major Components,”
such as peace operations, et al. t amphibious—Marine Corps September 25, 1987, pp. 19–21.
t new functionally-based ser- t air—Air Force 8See General Accounting Office, “Roles
and Functions: Assessment of the Chair-
vices (special operations, space, et al.). potential arenas of warfare man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report”
If Carl Builder is correct in his t space (Washington: General Accounting Office,
analysis that the services possess al- t electromagnetic spectrum July 1993); see also Stephen C. LeSeuer,
most human instincts for self-preser- t cyberspace-information “Congress Forces Roles Issue,” in Defense
News, November 27, 1993, pp. 3, 27.
vation, the evolving roles and mis- warfare
9William J. Crowe, Jr., memorandum
sions debate could be contentious in t peace operations—peacekeep-
for the Secretary of Defense, subject:
a manner unseen since the so-called ing and peace enforcement. “Report on Roles and Functions of the
“Admirals’ revolt” of 1949. Given
Current scrutiny of overlapping Armed Forces,” dated November 2, 1989,
the synergistic influences of an un- missions and duplication of capabili- pp. 15, 19–22.
settled and murky geopolitical situa- 10Colin L. Powell, Report on the Roles,
ties among the services may, in fact,
tion, a declining budget whose low Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces
be small potatoes when compared to
point has not been reached, and of the United States(Washington:Joint
the significant changes in roles, mis-
threats to institutional relevance and Chiefs of Staff, February 1993), pp. xxii–
sions, and functions in the future.
survival, the upcoming debate has xxx.
Issues such as evolving arenas of war 11LeSeuer, “Congress Forces Roles Issue,”
real potential for becoming a bu-
may actually pose much more dis- p. 3.
reaucratic back-alley fight.
ruptive challenges to the way the 12Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War:
Arenas of War Armed Forces “organize, train, equip, American Military Styles in Strategy and Anal-
Uncertainty over roles and mis- and employ” in the next century. A ysis(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
sions and decades-old bureaucratic service with vision—and that is both Press, 1989), pp. 27–30.
13For an account of this event, see
jockeying for position is probably in- intellectually and organizationally
Philip S. Meilinger, “The Admirals’ Revolt
evitable; perhaps the problem is that ready to grasp “God’s coattail” (as
of 1949: Lessons for Today,” Parameters, vol.
technology has outstripped the abil- Otto von Bismarck quipped)—will be 19, no. 3 (September 1989), pp. 81–96.
ity of existing organizations to effec- the best placed to be militarily domi-
tively and efficiently enfold new nant when the future is now. JFQ
technologies. When the National
Security Act of 1947 created the ex- NOTES
isting organizational structure there 1For example, see Theresa Hitchens
were three arenas of warfare: land, and Robert Holzer, “Air Force, Navy Dispute
sea, and air. With the turn of the Roles Amid DOD Study,” Defense News,
century—indeed the end of a millen- March 7–13, 1994, p. 4.
nium—new and evolving arenas are 2While this article uses the Air Force to
influencing not only how forces are illustrate specific roles and functions, it
does not intentionally seek to promote the
organized, trained, and equipped,
roles and functions of one service over
but also their very missions. The
those of others.
ubiquity of electronic warfare sug-
3See Richard I. Wolf, The USAF: Basic
gests that the electromagnetic spec-
Documents on Roles and Missions(Washing-
trum is a new arena which must be ton: Office of Air Force History, 1987), doc-
dominated to be successful militar- ument 7, Public Law 253 (July 26, 1947),
ily. Space is another arena, more fa- which is better known as the National
miliar perhaps than electronic war- Security Act of 1947, p. 76.
fare since space, at least, is a physical
Summer 1994 / JFQ 105