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1021 Gehman Pgs 8/25/99 2:13 PM Page 47 USS John C.Stennis launching NATO Sea Sparrow missile. Prather) Navy ( S. U. Transforming NATO Defense Capabilities By H A R O L D W. G E H M A N, J R. T he transatlantic relationship the NATO periphery. We face a prolifer- created by the Washington ation of weapons of mass destruction, Treaty of 1949 has been increases in the lethality of terrorism, uniquely enduring and suc- non-state sponsored adventurism, and cessful in warding off common dan- other asymmetric challenges. These gers. However, this achievement has re- dangers have forced us to reconsider sulted in a new era that cannot be the definitions of peace, territorial in- characterized in bipolar terms. Ethnic tegrity, and security—concepts that are conflict, political instability, and terri- the raison d’êtreof the Alliance. torial disputes are mounting around NATO accepts the fact that it must change to remain as relevant as it has been for 50 years. Politically, programs Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., USN, is Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic such as the Founding Act with Russia, and Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command; he formerly served as a distinct relationship with Ukraine, Vice Chief of Naval Operations. the Mediterranean Dialogue, and the Spring 1999 / JFQ 47 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1999 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1999 to 00-00-1999 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Transforming NATO Defense Capabilities 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,260 REPORT NUMBER Fifth Avenue SW Bg 64 Fort Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 5 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 1021 Gehman Pgs 8/25/99 2:14 PM Page 48 n JFQ FORUM Partnership for Peace program evi- dence this development and extend transparency to the east and south. The most discernible new mission is the assumption of peacekeeping responsibilities as leader of Implementa- tion and Stabilization Force. Bosnia has been a success in both humanitar- ian and geopolitical terms and demon- strated that the transformation of the Alliance from a fixed defense posture to flexible mobile operations is well underway. NATO force levels have been reduced by 35 percent and shifted from high-readiness, forward- deployed heavy units to a mix of lower-readiness and core rapid reaction forces. Significant progress also is being made in doctrine, organization, and technology to ensure that NATO forces can serve as an effective crisis mtivaen iaTnghteeemr eSestntr tao ttfeo tgohilc ew Cahloleinnesec veisep rtt htahrpeeap ctreoonlvleeedcd-. Donald Storms) sinec 1u9ri9t1y othffaetr esde ta t hbreo satda gdee ffionri toiopne roaf- ThOorWiz ognu ndnuerrin sge aUrrcbhainng Division ( tions in the Balkans. NATO heads of Warrior. Marine state will approve a new Strategic Con- 2d cept at the Washington Summit that is likely to continue that trend toward Transatlantic Link military services—capabilities that will operations around the periphery of its provide the means of dealing with territory. The next century will present Throughout NATO history, the crises on the periphery of NATO. The a global environment of rapidly chang- transatlantic link has referred to the unfolding of initiatives such as the ing technology and diverse asymmetri- political, economic, and military ties combined joint task force, Partnership cal threats. Members of the Alliance between North America and Europe. for Peace program, European Security As one of two major and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO commands, Allied ACLANT acts as the conduit for the flow NATO, European Multinational Mar- Command Atlantic of planning, concepts, and technology (ACLANT) is the western itime Force, and counterproliferation are vital to the Alliance and enjoy a between North America and Europe pillar of that relation- high priority. Interoperability prob- ship. It was founded to lems and learning to exploit technol- ensure that military ogy are also critical issues. The charac- are struggling to make the transition to forces and sustainment could flow ter of the ACLANT staff has changed the information age while facing com- from North America to defend Europe. significantly to accommodate them. It peting demands for resources. Such Traditional common defense opera- is genuinely joint with representatives challenges will test the ability of its de- tions are integral to the Alliance and of every service who capitalize on the fense forces to function as a coherent remain the primary ACLANT mission; core competencies of the Armed Forces and compatible team capable of under- however, the changing security envi- as a whole. taking joint missions and operations. ronment provides an opportunity to In many ways these efforts repre- NATO thus needs a more systematic use the maritime expertise of the com- sent the new meaning of the transat- way of preparing for the rapid develop- mand in new ways. lantic link. ACLANT acts as the con- ment of defense capabilities required ACLANT is currently in the fore- duit for the flow of planning, by the new Strategic Concept. Al- front of planning and conducting sea- concepts, and technology between though the current force planning based combined and joint operations North America and Europe. We view process has been effective, it is a defi- designed to employ the full spectrum ourselves as a bridge to the future, ciency-based planning system unsuited of military capabilities from different leading in innovation as we adapt to for the larger and faster changes that changes in the strategic and opera- are bearing down. tional environment on behalf of the 48 JFQ / Spring 1999 1021 Gehman Pgs 8/25/99 2:15 PM Page 49 Gehman ms) Stor Donald 2Marine Division (d British troops during Landing in North Carolina, Division (Timothy A. Pope) JTFEX 99–1. Unified Spirit ’98. Marine 2d mes, Jr.) AtAThhltleliea asn nyAtcnicCee .rCO gToMyhm eb smCeet oawennfefdeno nre(tA scA CtaCiOroLeMA neNn).Th aanncde dU b.Sy. Company (Gerald T. Ja FRA–1F 5L atakkeinnhge oaftfh f.rom As commander in chief of U.S. At- Signal lantic Command I am responsible for 55th military interests of the Nation in the geographic area of the Atlantic Ocean, from the North to South Pole, exclud- ing the Caribbean and North Sea. While this is a vast area of responsibility (AOR), the only sizeable populations are ftcsohirgiuesnneyes dOd.a urTfineurh n icnIschc oteeaitolnr agneanexabdslpl ereiasenrn sicmpedlonu etndc htiseonei b cgAifo loizamtconiuemrysse. saom—nndaa jnaoosdrf- Squadron (Joseph Lozada) mmUnoairrteie ndthe Sast,na ta1en.s2—d m oairl ilrrimoonueg nsho llydw i8eitr0hs ,p isnear icltoehrnset, munications m of general purpose combat forces. Be- Co cause my AOR lacks hot spots, I pro- 48th vide these forces to the other geographic commanders in chief. More Spring 1999 / JFQ 49 1021 Gehman Pgs 8/25/99 2:16 PM Page 50 n JFQ FORUM of innovative approaches and leap- ahead capabilities and in the exploita- tion of opportunities to transform the U.S. military into a 21st century force. The bottom line is keeping all our op- tions open. Before experimenting, however, we are spending considerable time and effort to determine what constitutes an experiment and how the process of se- lecting topics, developing objectives, and analyzing results works. Joint ex- mons) perimentation is a long-term enterprise, m not a series of isolated events. It is not a A W. demonstration or exercise, although mas with careful planning an experiment AH–1 providing close air Company, (Tho cEieaxsnp. eWbrieme cemonnutadsttui ocentxe pdme uwrismitt hgeionn tb aetnoyo ednxidse crsoctuivsdeer-. sOuspppreoyr t’,9C8o.operative Signal and learn, not just demonstrate or ver- 982d ify. This is an iterative process for developing and assessing concept-based hy- potheses to identify and recommend the best value-added solutions. importantly, ACOM is responsible for process that allows the Alliance to sys- We are focused on integrated ca- joint training and integration, which tematically work on change without pabilities and warfighting concepts on are very much focused on future necessarily predicting the future. the operational level, with forays onto warfighting challenges. In fact, we like Joint Experimentation the tactical and strategic levels. We will to say that the future is in our AOR. All support, integrate, and leverage pro- of these tasks mesh well with my My role at the Norfolk conference, grams in conjunction with CINCs, NATO responsibilities and are key to beyond playing host, was to describe services, and agencies to synchronize bringing about the healthy changes one way in which we are dealing with efforts and provide a joint context for which I believe are needed in the U.S. the transformation of the U.S. military. experimentation. This plan involves military and the Alliance as a whole. In October 1998, ACOM became the performing simultaneous near-term, Given these varied responsibili- DOD executive agent for a process mid-term, and long-term experiments ties, the Secretary of Defense asked me known as joint experimentation. The in the areas of doctrine, organization, to host a conference last autumn enti- decision by the Secretary of Defense to and technology. tled “Transforming NATO’s Defense assign this vital role to us represented Near-term experiments seek to Capabilities” to examine current ef- the culmination of dedicated efforts by correct deficiencies in current forces forts and future plans to bring about both the Pentagon and Congress. and doctrine by rapid integration of change. In addition to presentations There are two primary and endur- off-the-shelf technology and changes on transforming national militaries, ing reasons to pursue joint experimen- in current operational concepts. Our most participants accepted the call to tation that equally apply to the United methods include the leveraging of transform allied capabilities to deal States and NATO: to prevent surprises scheduled demonstrations and tests as with challenges in the next century. by potential adversaries and to main- well as conducting experiments. Such There was agreement that long-term tain our military advantage. Experi- force planning, which has served mentation will help in the exploration NATO well, will not enable us to get where we must go. I am pleased be- cause this means we can start working Phases of Joint Experimentation on solutions. It will allow us to take Near Term maintain current dominance enhance capabilities of existing forces by quickly identifying the fear out of the planning process in innovative and current operational concepts,evaluating the future. There was also a consensus their potential,and applying off-the-shelf solutions on one solution—the requirement for a Common Operational Vision for our Mid Term actualize Joint Vision 2010 achieve and maintain full spectrum dominance with the defense forces. It could act as an um- 2010 force through joint experimentation with brella concept for a more methodical evolutionary concepts Long Term dominate the revolution in through bold thinking,shape the joint-force-after-next military affairs (RMA) by developing and exploring revolutionary concepts 50 JFQ / Spring 1999 1021 Gehman Pgs 8/25/99 2:16 PM Page 51 Gehman efforts are focused one to six years out In the process of implementing a Committee for review and concur- and impact on the current future year CDE program within NATO we are rence. Once approved, the command defense plan. Mid-term experiments proceeding along two complementary would develop a plan for each concept seek to build joint capabilities with tracks. The first involves leveraging na- to describe the schedule, participants, emerging technologies and evolution- tion-centered experimentation efforts and desired capabilities in sufficient ary operational concepts. The bulk of which involve battlefield operational detail that operational commanders or such efforts involve experiments and tasks such as the rapid insertion of re- agencies such as the NATO C3 Agency action forces to stabilize or SACLANT Undersea Research Center joint experimentation is an aggressive, crises, defense against can carry out the trial. This would con- hostile aircraft, or the de- tain a hypothesis that both defines ob- innovative process to propel the tection and destruction of jectives and describes the collection Armed Forces into the future theater ballistic missiles. and analysis of data. ACLANT will ex- Using this approach, amine the results reached on a given wargaming. The Common Operational coalitions of interested members oper- concept as well as information from Vision concepts based on Joint Vision ating under a lead nation would col- other experiments to draw conclusions 2010 fall into the mid-term category. laboratively develop and experiment on its utility and value for combined Long-term experimentation explores with new operational concepts devel- operations. After a thorough review, revolutionary ideas and future tech- oped to carry out critical tasks. these conclusions will become recom- nologies. Although experiments will This process begins by identifying mended actions for implementation. be used when possible, wargaming, critical task needs across the range of workshops, and seminars will be the potential military operations. Tasks It is not clear what exact shape most common methods. could be selected from various sources transformation will take. Yet we expect Joint experimentation is an aggres- which include: NATO-validated long- the challenges of the next century to sive, innovative process to propel the term requirement force goals; NATO- be both quantitatively and qualita- Armed Forces into the future. It is also sponsored requirement identification tively different from those of the Cold timely—occurring as a more methodi- efforts (such as land, maritime, and War and to require changes in individ- cal and systematic approach is required aerospace long-range studies); member ual and collective institutions, military to transform military institutions to en- nations; Supreme Allied Commander strategies, and defense postures. The in- sure their relevancy. Joint experimenta- Europe or Supreme Allied Commander stitutional challenge can scarcely be ex- tion is key to changing doctrine, organ- Atlantic (SACLANT); research and de- aggerated. Usually a sea change in the ization, and technology to meet this velopment committees; and the pri- military occurs only after a new, ascen- challenge of transformation. vate sector. To gain the maximum ben- dant threat appears on the horizon or efit for the resources expended, tasks major crises begin to unfold. Fortu- Concept Development will be chosen when significant short- nately, the end of the Cold War leaves NATO recognizes the requirement falls exist or the potential for major us without the former threat for now. for concept development and experi- improvement is clear. Initially CDE is This is an era of dynamic change, mentation (CDE) as integral to force focused on reaction forces, but it could constrained resources, and rapid tech- planning. CDE will help the Alliance be extended to all defense forces. nological advances. It requires bold, and individual member nations to ACLANT, in association with Allied innovative thinking and an ability to transform defense forces to meet Command Europe, will help coordi- shape and manage change to preserve emerging conditions. It will support nate and support the development of the leadership role of the Alliance. implementation of the new Strategic concepts from battlefield operational Technology must be an ally. To suc- Concept and the operational vision for tasks and facilitate the conduct and ceed, we must look into the future, ex- NATO forces and help member nations evaluation of experiments. plore innovative operational concepts, harness emerging technology via inno- The second CDE track involves develop the right technology, commit vative operational concepts. CDE will experiments on functional areas such assets wisely, and prepare the joint and examine both doctrine and organiza- as command, control, and communi- combined community for tomorrow. A tion as well as technology and, like cation (C3), intelligence, logistics, and program of concept development and U.S. joint experimentation, focus si- mobility. Concepts for the experiments experimentation is indispensible to multaneously on near-term, mid-term, could be selected, refined, and devel- systematic change. By seizing this op- and long-term concepts. It will save oped by a major command working portunity, NATO will remain the secu- money by identifying the most prom- group from the same sources as na- rity organization of choice for the next ising concepts and helping nations tional level CDE. ACLANT would cre- century. JFQ avoid locking in on expensive techni- ate a campaign plan to provide a high- cal solutions too early. level description of the process and an assessment of the utility of candidate concepts for experimentation. It would then present the plan to the North At- lantic Council via the NATO Military Spring 1999 / JFQ 51