DTIC ADA528420: Military Education for the New Age

7 Pages·0.54 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

JFQ Rokke Pgs 10/1/96 9:34 AM Page 18
Fires of Kuwait.
Military Education
for the New Age
B–17s over England.
U.S. Navy (S. Gozzo)
U.S. Air Force Collection, National Air and Space Museum
By E RV I N J. R O K K E PME institutions and the policy community as
well. Adapting to this change is the basic chal-
lenge confronting the war colleges today.
D
uring his transition from Princeton Uni- The issue is straightforward: either the war
versity to the White House, Woodrow colleges become agents for change within the in-
Wilson is alleged to have said that acad- dividual services and joint arena or they become
emic politics are the worst kind because anachronisms. Whatever the nature of academic
the stakes are so low. As any dean with curricu- politics, the downside is irrelevancy at best and
lum revision experience will attest, Wilson had a demise at worst. Five major factors contribute to
point. Squaring curricula with student needs at this phenomenon.
the expense of faculty interests is a complex task.
Factors for Change
The stakes clearly have changed, however, at
least in the context of professional military edu- International Politics. Historians and political
cation (PME) at the war colleges. Not only has the scientists hold that the international system
post-Cold War era placed new substantive and changes when new answers emerge to three fun-
pedagogical requirements on military educators, damental questions: Who are the major players?
but new demands on the relationship between
18 JFQ / Autumn 1995
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Military Education for the New Age
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JFQ Rokke Pgs 10/1/96 9:34 AM Page 19
Rokke
What can they do to one another? What do they Curricula are replete with cases of how such ad-
wish to do to one another? The unexpected end vances were treated by institutions and individu-
of the Cold War was only the latest watershed in als wedded to more traditional approaches.1 Re-
the world order. One classic example is the cently, however, breakthroughs related to warfare
French Revolution which spawned a new player have occurred with greater frequency, more sub-
(democratic France), a new capability (a citizen stantial impact on quality versus quantity trade-
army), and new intentions (liberty, equality, and offs, and increased organizational implications.
fraternity). Similar transitions occurred with the A former director of the Defense Intelligence
Congress of Vienna (1815), German unification Agency, Lieutenant General James Clapper, has
(1870), Treaty of Versailles (1919), and agree- raised an excellent case of the accelerating impact
ments following World War II. of technology on quality-quantity tradeoffs.2Dur-
From the perspective of war college curric- ing World War II some 9,000 bombs dropped by
ula, it is useful to examine the ongoing post-Cold more than 1,500 B–17 bomber sorties were re-
War transition against the backdrop of past quired to destroy a 6,000 square foot target. In
changes. In each instance the Vietnam the destruction of a similar target took
perhaps no single factor has results were not readily appar- only 176 bombs delivered by 88 F–4 fighter sor-
ent. The answers to questions ties. During the Gulf War, one bomb carried by
as much potential as the
concerning players, capabili- an F–117 fighter-bomber did the job. This is not
information explosion ties, and intentions are no to imply that a single 2,000 pound bomb can
more likely to surface quickly today destroy every 6,000 square foot target. Ad-
or clearly today than in previ- vances in guidance system technology, however,
ous realignments of the international system. As- have made a qualitative improvement in weapon
sessments made in the democratic atmosphere of effectiveness. Technological advances by ground
Paris circa 1789 did not foresee an autocratic and naval forces also resulted in impressive
Napoleon on the horizon. Similarly, most in- warfighting efficiencies during Desert Storm.
ternationalist projections made at Versailles fol- Equally important for PME are the organiza-
lowing World War I failed to predict a global de- tional, structural, and budgetary implications of
pression or a resurgent Germany. accelerated technological breakthroughs. The
The first requirement then for the curricula price of improved technology is high, particularly
at war colleges is to ensure that students do not if applied to such systems as the stealthy F–117
presume to know who their future opponents or aircraft. Indeed, given the tradeoff between a new
coalition partners will be. This appreciation for item of equipment representing a breakthrough
uncertainty is the beginning of wisdom in the in sophistication as opposed to just a better, sim-
post-Cold War era. But underscoring uncertainty pler item, some defense experts argue for the lat-
is not the same thing as saying that everything is ter.3 Whatever the ambiguity of quality versus
up for grabs. On the contrary, it means that the quantity tradeoffs, however, the organizational
war colleges must delve into what is known but is impact of increasingly expensive high tech items
frequently neglected in the defense establish- is clear. As the cost and operational complexity of
ment. For example, students must understand systems increase substantially, the organizational
more than their predecessors about economics, response is centralization. In the case of the evo-
technologies, and diverse cultures to make sound lution from photographic reconnaissance aircraft
judgments. This perspective brings into question to satellites the focal point of operations and con-
several major tenets of defense policy which were trol moves from the battlefield to Washington.
prevalent in a bipolar world. Although it offers Information. Perhaps no single factor has as
few clear-cut policy prescriptions, it is essential to much potential as the information explosion for
appreciating the security implications of a world changing the way in which military organiza-
order in flux. tions function, both during peace and in war. The
Technology. Advances in technology are widespread adoption of information technologies
hardly new phenomena. Stirrups, gunpowder, the in the latter part of this century has set the stage
steam engine, radio, stealth, and other innova- for a social transformation of historic magnitude
tions dramatically changed the nature of warfare. by making unprecedented amounts of informa-
tion instantaneously available in easy-to-use
forms at ever-diminishing cost. The emerging in-
formation highway, which extends from earth to
geosynchronous orbit, will certainly alter society,
to say nothing of conflict. Worldwide 24-hour
Lieutenant General Ervin J. Rokke, USAF, is
connectivity and sensors and hardware needed to
president of the National Defense University and
support information processing are already in
formerly served as assistant chief of staff for
place. So are stand-off weapons that can be
intelligence at Headquarters, U.S. Air Force.
Autumn 1995 / JFQ 19
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n
MILITARY EDUCATION
launched from almost anywhere and strike tar- them, the services have made major improve-
gets with accuracy measured in fractions of yards. ments in collaboration and interoperability. Joint-
To date the best thinking on innovative ap- ness is in. Outstanding professionals are now
plications for information age technologies has assigned to positions on joint staffs, and a succes-
been done by the staff of the Office of Net Assess- sion of JTF exercises and deployments has proven
ment under Andrew Marshall at the Pentagon. that the Armed Forces are capable of functioning
They have recast functional areas associated with within multi-service command structures. Even
traditional service expertise into precision strike, service monopolies on developing requirements
dominating maneuver, space warfare, and infor- have been redressed by the Joint Requirements
mation warfare. Moreover, they suggest that the Oversight Council (JROC) overseen by the Vice
potential for a revolution in military affairs Chairman.
(RMA) exists in a zone where these new warfare As the services become more familiar with
areas intersect and offer a new construct that joint responsibilities and work more effectively to-
demonstrates the military potential afforded by gether, we also are finding that the likelihood of
information. The Vice Chairman, Admiral the United States fighting alone is becoming re-
William Owens, with similar logic, has advanced mote. Experiences such as the Gulf War, former
a vision of a 200 square nautical mile battlefield Yugoslavia, and other recent crises suggest that al-
box about which virtually everything is known liances and well-greased multinational command
on a near real-time basis chains are insufficient if not outmoded. Ad hoc al-
and within which all tar- liances and coalitions are the norm, and the
gets can be hit using stand- United Nations is increasingly involved in hu-
off weapons.4 manitarian and peace operations.
Not surprisingly, de- Coordinating strategy and tactics to include
bates about whether RMA rules of engagement as well as the distribution of
notions are fact or fiction intelligence to coalition partners with both vary-
provide grist for the mill in ing capacities for information and differing levels
many PME seminars. But of security access are tasks that war college gradu-
information age issues go ates face. The problem becomes more complex as
far beyond procedures for tensions arise between the centralizing tendencies
waging war to the heart of of jointness and the decentralizing, multiple
military organization. chain of command biases of coalition warfare.
Cheap microchips and Ecology. Perhaps less known but significant
breakthroughs in commu- in their impact on security are environmental
nications have made huge phenomena. While this area has received little at-
amounts of information tention in PME, it is drawing increasing emphasis
available and created pres- worldwide. It embraces climate change, ozone de-
sure for decentralization pletion, deforestation, biodiversity loss, and air
and flat organizational and water pollution. Recent examples include the
structures. Bluntly stated, 1989 conflict between Senegal and Mauritania
vertical organizational which was sparked by a scarcity of water and
structures long associated arable land, and the mass migration from Rwanda
my (Larry Lane) wwsuiilttthhin ttghh eie n c mepnaitlrritat lafirrzoyam,t ioa nlho inrgehg- wodfeh vtiehclheo pblameccekan motsfe cpao ocutrlaidsbi lswe o ewfll a eaptfeifrce. cpItnr ot hpsheo orctriirtoc, nuesmc obsletoacgnaiuccseaesl
S. Ar tech and costly equipment, under which the Armed Forces are used as well as
U. are not optimal for the in- how they are used. Clearly this new challenge is
“Digital”soldier.
formation age. When tank, relevant to PME—although it has gone largely
ship, and aircraft operators unaddressed.
can directly receive much of the information they And so it is that various factors, from interna-
need to fight, at least some higher headquarters tional politics and ecology through technology
will become extraneous. and information, are moving doctrine, organiza-
Jointness/Coalition Warfare. Consistent with tion, and operations in new and often conflicting
the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the increasingly directions. As General Wayne Downing, Com-
prominent combatant CINCs have responsibility mander in Chief of U.S. Special Operations Com-
for command and control in warfare. To support mand, told students attending the School of Infor-
mation Warfare and Strategy, “In the information
age, the very nature of war is changing.”5
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Rokke
Inter-vehicle
information system.
my (Larry Lane)
Ar
S.
U.
Imperatives for PME world where rapid change is the norm. To do so,
The central task of war colleges is to prepare however, professional military education needs to
students to succeed across a broad spectrum of adapt in three ways. First, we must strengthen the
national security challenges. The impact of these capability to affect the full spectrum of national
institutions is in large part a function of how well security policies by embracing added roles for
their graduates perform. We are in the business of PME. Second, we must revise curricula and sup-
equipping leaders to deal with the security envi- plement the substance of what we teach. Finally,
ronment of the 21st century. The unpredictable we must update pedagogical concepts, ap-
nature of the ongoing process of change makes proaches, and technologies.
this more akin to a floating Like most institutions of higher learning,
craps game than an exact sci- war colleges can become ivory towers divorced
war colleges must equip ence. Nevertheless, it is a game from the world which they serve. If they are to
leaders to function in a in which we all must play. As help align military culture with the technologi-
the Chairman, General John cal, environmental, and geopolitical revolutions,
world where rapid change Shalikashvili, observed, “The they must be fully in tune with national security
is the norm unexpected has become the processes which stimulate and implement
routine; we need people who change. This goes beyond policy formulation and
are comfortable in an uncertain includes technology insertion, doctrine develop-
world.”6 In this game, the role of war colleges is ment, planning and budgeting, and training.
to make the odds better for graduates. And those How can PME institutions do this? First, they
odds can be shortened by doing everything possi- should be “present at creation” to ensure an envi-
ble to convey an understanding of the emerging ronment that encourages new thought and re-
security environment as well as teaching students wards rather than punishes innovation. Similarly,
to recognize and deal with the unexpected. This they must follow organizational processes for
is the PME challenge. change. War gaming, policy-relevant research, and
Managing change is what national security is faculty participation in ad hoc commissions are
all about. War colleges must equip leaders to as- classic examples. Each war college has a research
sume this critical responsibility. We must give institute to connect its parent institution with the
graduates the tools to function comfortably in a activities of the national security community.
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MILITARY EDUCATION
Secondly, PME institutions have a responsi- Indeed, because of the complexity of joint
bility to expose ideas, new as well as old, to the and combined operations, curricula must deal
critical light of academe. Wargames and simula- with the doctrine and capabilities of multiple na-
tion exercises work well. So do informal, off the tions and services. Moreover, blurred boundaries
record discussions between students and visiting among military, diplomatic, economic, and psy-
lecturers from the policy arena. Each senior PME chological tools require unprecedented sensitivity
institution enjoys special relationships with indi- for what policy types call the interagency process.
viduals sympathetic to the military and who liter- In sum, developing PME curricula—like our secu-
ally try out new ideas on faculty and students. rity environment itself—is of necessity an exercise
More of these exchanges are needed with policy- in risk limitation. There simply is not the time to
makers and leaders who are not instinctively cover all contingencies. The most one can do is
sympathetic to military culture. prepare for dealing with uncertainty.
Finally, PME institutions have a duty to be The classic approach to this dilemma is a bal-
harbingers of change. Classes and seminars are ance among academic disciplines, the interests
common ways for disseminating innovative ideas. and backgrounds of students, and the demands of
So are professional journals. Less developed, but theory and practice. Like a classic liberal educa-
with greater potential, are options associated with tion, war college curricula must cover a range of
the information highway. Without a home page academic disciplines that include basic and engi-
and a routine means for distributing the best of neering sciences as well as humanities and the so-
faculty and student research, a war college is sim- cial sciences.
ply not doing its job in the information age. In What then is different about curricular re-
brief, PME can and must play a central role as an quirements today? For a start, the balance of PME
agent in altering that greatest barrier to meaning- has shifted with the advent of the revolution in
ful change—our traditional culture. information technology. While military strate-
gists in past revolutions, such as that brought on
Adapting Curricula
by nuclear weapons, tended to be civilian
In the classroom, as in headquarters or war thinkers with humanities and social science back-
zones, the basis for innovation lies in critical grounds, the current revolutionary force puts a
thinking about capabilities, concepts, and organi- higher premium on basic and engineering sci-
zations relevant to current and future needs. As in ences. Historical perspective and an appreciation
the past, military innovators in the information of bureaucratic politics remain vital, but an ade-
age must develop an appreciation for what exists quate intellectual framework in the information
as well as analytic skills for critiquing the status age requires some understanding of the ones and
quo. It is not a choice between notions of mod- zeroes being passed around in such incredible
ern warfare and more abstract theories of coer- quantities. In short, the center of mass at the war
cion. Unfortunately, for already tight curricula colleges must move toward more technical acade-
and busy students, it is a combination of both. mic disciplines.
Educational and Research Initiatives
U.S.national security will be increasingly af- of the Joint Staff and the Assistant Secretary of broad range of information warfare electives to
fected by the ability to adapt doctrine,organiza- Defense for Command,Control,Communica- all students at both colleges.Finally,on a third
tional concepts,and operations to fully exploit tions,andIntelligence,ACTIS serves as a center tier,students will be able to select an intense
information technologies.Toward this end,the of excellence for information warfare within elective program in information studies to be-
National Defense University (NDU) has estab- DOD.This enhances the educational as well as come the information specialists of the future.
lished a teaching,research,and outreach activ- the research mission of NDU by contributing to ACTIS is the DOD executive agent for re-
ity to focus on the development of a vision for knowledge in a rapidly evolving field,offering search on command and control and informa-
national security in the information age.The courses on information warfare,and disseminat- tion warfare and also designs and manages an
Directorate of Advanced Concepts,Technologies, ing material on information warfare. extensive research and analysis program.In ad-
and Information Strategies (ACTIS),an element NDU is currently developing a three-tier dition,it provides outreach activities,including
of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, educational program for the School of Informa- short programs of instruction,workshops,sym-
merges efforts of the School of Information tion Warfare and Strategy.On the first tier infor- posia,and on-line services,and will dissemi-
Warfare and Strategy and the former Center for mation concepts will be introduced and inte- nate information warfare concepts,research,
Advanced Command Concepts and Technology. grated into the core curricula of the National War and course material. JFQ
Working under guidance issued by the Director College and the Industrial College of the Armed
Forces.On the second the school will offer a
22 JFQ / Autumn 1995
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How We Teach To conclude, there is a current revolution in
War colleges justifiably take pride in teach- PME that parallels the RMA. In both cases, core
ing techniques, which traditionally have included functions and procedures are undergoing funda-
seminar-style classroom interaction as well as lec- mental changes. In both cases, we are seeing dis-
tures by faculty and visitors, many of whom are parate rates of progress among the constituent
involved in the policy arena. Excellent student to parts. And in both cases, we are facing difficult re-
teacher ratios, as well as diverse student bodies, source tradeoffs between traditional approaches
facilitate the high quality of seminar discussions. on the one hand and information age alternatives
Though student diversity across the services and on the other.
defense-related civilian career fields is most bal- PME institutions must assume the role
anced at the National Defense University, service played by first class research universities. We have
war colleges also ensure student representation a duty to mobilize our institutions to expand
from the other services and civilian agencies. knowledge through research, educate practition-
Regardless of quality, however, it is increas- ers, and serve as catalysts for change through out-
ingly probable that teaching techniques need to reach. The war colleges must provide the intellec-
be supplemented to cover a rapidly changing se- tual capital for changing the existing paradigm.
curity environment and the increased informa- The stakes are high in the revolutions in mil-
tion age sophistication of incoming students. The itary affairs and professional military education.
notion that a ten-month experi- Significant obstacles and inertia must be over-
ence at a war college is suffi- come. The RMA has the potential to alter priori-
a major challenge for war cient for students who may ties among service capabilities. Similarly, the rev-
colleges lies in developing serve for a further ten years has olution in PME—challenging curricula and
always been questionable. Most teaching methods—has the potential to trans-
follow-on education certainly the accelerating pace form war colleges into innovative centers that
of change today makes it impor- spawn and foster new concepts of warfare. In the
tant that we begin to provide follow-on educa- final analysis, both revolutions demand changes
tional opportunities for PME graduates. in culture. Since PME shapes and promotes ser-
Technology for distance learning is available vice and joint cultures, it would be difficult if not
and the cost of personal computers is falling. Mil- impossible for the RMA to succeed without a cor-
itary personnel take lap-top computers on tempo- responding revolution in war college curricula.
rary duty to communicate with offices, homes, This places a major burden on those of us in-
and educational institutions offering degree pro- volved in PME and requires that we move ahead
grams over the information highway. Beginning with the revolution. JFQ
last year, students at several PME institutions
NOTES
were issued lap-tops. The Air Force Command
and Staff College, in particular, has made substan- 1A classic example is found in Edward L. Katzen-
tial progress in offering virtual seminars to stu- bach, Jr., “Tradition and Technological Change,” in
dents on a worldwide basis. Both the Army and American Defense Policy, 5thedition, John F. Reichart and
Air Force have begun providing lap-tops with Steven R. Sturm, editors (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
modems to general officers. The Army has also University Press, 1982), pp. 638–51; also see Stephen P.
Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern
funded a leadership development program at the
Military(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991).
Industrial College of the Armed Forces which will
2James R. Clapper, presentation at the National War
be implemented using lap-top computers.
College, February 9, 1995.
A major challenge for war colleges lies in de-
3See Jack N. Merritt and Pierre M. Sprey, “Negative
veloping the substance of follow-on education Marginal Returns in Weapons Acquisition,” in American
programs for transmission via the information Defense, 3rdedition, Richard G. Head and Ervin J. Rokke,
highway. Simply transmitting research products is editors (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
an initial but insufficient step. Faculty members 1973).
whose dialogue with students has been limited to 4William A. Owens, speech to the Retired Officers
the classroom must develop and conduct virtual Association, Des Moines, Iowa, July 1, 1995.
5Wayne A. Downing, presentation at the School of
seminars using distance learning. In fact, since
Information Warfare and Strategy, National Defense
faculty resources are unlikely to expand, new
University, August 16, 1995.
course development might involve curtailing
6John M. Shalikashvili, presentation at the National
some existing courses. Before the next century,
Defense University, August 18, 1995.
PME graduates need the option of communicat-
ing with war colleges on national security issues.
Autumn 1995 / JFQ 23