DTIC ADA527751: Goldwater-Nichols. Fighting the Decisive Battle

11 Pages·0.53 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

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N I C H
GOLDWATER-
NICHOLS
Fighting the Decisive Battle
By J A M E S L. L O C H E R I I I
A
decisive battle in American did not directly threaten anyone’s life,
military history began on but its outcome—depending on
the morning of February 4, whether deeply entrenched, outmoded
1986. It was not a conflict traditions and practices were reformed
of arms, but a momentous clash of or sustained—could save or cost untold
ideas and interests in a Senate hearing lives of American soldiers, sailors,
room. The adversaries were not armed marines, and airmen.
with weapons, but with concepts,
statutes, and amendments. This battle Strongly Worded Letters
At 9 a.m. that day, the Senate
Armed Services Committee (SASC) ini-
James L. Locher III has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special tiated its long awaited markup of a 56-
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and as a professional staff member on page defense reorganization bill. Earlier
the Senate Committee on Armed Services. in the morning, the Pentagon delivered
38 JFQ / Summer 2002
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Goldwater-Nichols. Fighting the Decisive Battle
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Locher
eight letters to the committee, one of the service secretary and service strenuously opposed! Moreover, the G
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each from Admiral William Crowe, chief essentially ceremonial. In place Joint Staff is currently a viable and effi- I
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the former would be five CINC pro- cient organization. I implore your in- H
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along with the three service secretaries consuls freed from civilian control; dulgence to keep it that way.”
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and the four service chiefs. The letter and in place of the latter, one single Kelley castigated the proposed R
from Crowe was reasonably argued, like voice (with deputy) to provide military strengthening of the unified com- A
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the one received the night before from advice to the President, National Secu- manders, arguing: “In my professional
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Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger rity Council, Secretary of Defense, and view, this chapter of the ‘draft bill’ N
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after Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Congress.” would create chaos between the duties O
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Nunn met with the Joint Chiefs of Lehman concluded by urging the and responsibilities of the service
Staff. The letters from the seven service committee members “to reject the staff chiefs and those of CINCs. It provides
officials were quarrelsome and con- draft, and consider true reform as rec- a complex, unworkable solution to an
tentious. Perhaps seeking to neutralize ommended to you by Secretary Wein- ill-defined problem. This is an excep-
Goldwater and Nunn’s strong defense berger last year. We need less bureau- tionally dangerous chapter, one which
credentials, they all took the line that cracy, not more; fewer bureaucratic has resulted from little, if any, dialog.
the bill reflected only the views of layers, not more; less congressional mi- It will create more disharmony than
headstrong staff and not those of the cromanagement, not more; and more jointness. Of the draft bill’s changes to
SASC leadership. decentralization and accountability military department statutes, Kelley
Navy Secretary John Lehman’s let- rather than a return to the ‘whiz-kid’ wrote, “My opinion is that these pro-
ter ranked as the most bellicose. “I am theories contained in your staff draft.” posals are alien to good logic and com-
surprised and disappointed that the se- The Marine Commandant’s letter mon sense, and the only ’consensus’ is
rious effort that the service secretaries matched Lehman’s tough language. among the drafters themselves!”
and the service chiefs devoted to your General P.X. Kelley repeated much of After noting that his comments
what he had told Goldwater and did not represent all of his concerns,
Nunn the night before, includ- the commandant concluded, “I
Lehman added that strengthening
ing: “If the ‘draft bill’ were to be strongly urge you to consider addi-
unified commanders “would make enacted in its current form it tional hearings to achieve conscious
a hash of our defense structure” would result in a significant addressal of these vital issues.”
degradation in the efficiency The Chief of Naval Operations,
and effectiveness of the defense Admiral James Watkins, wrote: “I be-
hearings seems to have largely been ig- establishment—to the point where I lieve our Nation would surely be
nored in the staff effort,” he com- would have deep concerns for the fu- standing into shoal water, with severe
plained. After lauding Weinberger’s ture security of the United States. In damage predictable, if we were to fol-
management changes, Lehman wrote this regard, I know of no document low the course charted for us in the
that the staff bill “charts a return to which has concerned me more in my current draft bill now before your com-
the discredited philosophy that led to 36 years of uniformed service to my mittee. In short, I consider the bill as
the overcentralized bureaucracy we in- country.”2 drafted to be terribly flawed and cer-
herited in 1981.”1 Given the impor- General Kelley said that he “was tainly not in the best interests of na-
tance of the votes of the committee’s extremely disappointed by the obvious tional security.”3
nine Democrats, that slap at the Carter lack of balance and objectivity [in] the The letters from the Army and Air
administration was ill considered. 645-page staff report.” He accused the Force Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff
Lehman added that the draft bill’s authors of the staff-drafted bill of hav- were also critical, but they were less
proposed strengthening of the unified ing “been unfaithful to your [Goldwa- strident.
commanders “would make a hash of ter and Nunn’s] direction and [having]
An Evolutionary Trend
our defense structure.” Five other serv- placed more emphasis on their own
ice letters also strongly criticized in- preconceived opinions than on ‘con- All 19 SASC members were pres-
creasing the authority of unified com- sensus views.’” The Commandant ent for the decisive battle’s opening
manders. Only the Air Force Chief, complained that “The ‘draft bill’ virtu- moments. Ideologically, the committee
General Richard Gabriel, did not object ally destroys the corporate nature of tilted heavily to the political right. All
to those provisions. By attacking re- the Joint Chiefs of Staff” and attacked Republicans were conservatives, except
forms that were supported by over- General David Jones by observing: “I for William Cohen, who was a moder-
whelming evidence and a sizable ma- know of only one former Chairman ate. Greater diversity was found on the
jority of the committee, service who would support this chapter of the Democratic side, where four conserva-
officials undermined their credibility. ‘draft bill’ as written, and his views tives outnumbered liberals by only
According to the Navy Secretary, must be carefully weighed against his one, and two moderates, Jeff Binga-
the staff draft would “make the offices performance while in office.” He man and Alan Dixon, occupied the
added that his own “views on the Vice pivotal middle ground.
Chairman being senior to the [service
chiefs] are a matter of record: I am
Summer 2002 / JFQ 39
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JFQ FORUM
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J Senate. If it is, I will have no regrets. Barry M.Goldwater represented Arizona
in the Senate for 30 years.A major
I will have had the privilege of
general in the U.S.Air Force Reserve,he
was the Republican Presidential
serving in the Senate on...the day
candidate in 1964 and served as
that our soldiers, sailors, airmen, chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee during the debates on
and marines were given the defense reorganization.
organizational and command
arrangements that will enable them
to effectively accomplish their vital
missions....
—Barry M.Goldwater
September 16, 1986
[This bill] fulfills the aims of
President Eisenhower, who said
almost three decades ago, “Separate
ground, sea, and air warfare are gone
forever....Strategic and tactical
planning must be completely unified,
Bill Nichols,a Democrat from Alabama’s
3rddistrict,died while serving his combat forces organized into unified
eleventh term in Congress.A combat
veteran of World War II,he chaired the commands....” Congress rejected
Investigations Subcommittee of the
President Eisenhower’s appeals in the
House Armed Services Committee
during its 1983–86 work on military
1950s. Today, 36 years later,
reform.
we can now report: mission
accomplished.
—Bill Nichols
September 11, 1986
40 JFQ / Summer 2002
Locher
Reorganization was unlikely to be G
Senator Nunn and N
sorted out on the basis of ideology. The colleagues. TI
strength of the Senators’ connections H
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to various services and their party affili-
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ation would play more significant R
roles. Thirteen members had served in A
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the military: four in the Army, two in
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the Air Force, three in the Navy, and N
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four in the Marines. Some members at- O
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tached little importance to these previ-
ous relationships while others main-
tained strong ties. Still others
maintained close connections with the
services for entirely different reasons.
For example, John Stennis tilted toward
the Navy because the Pascagoula Ship-
yard ranked as Mississippi’s largest em-
ployer. Party affiliation prompted some
Republican Senators to defend the ad-
ministration and Pentagon.
As the markup session began,
Goldwater set the historical context:
“The committee’s action continues an
evolutionary trend that began shortly
after the Spanish-American War.” He
also established a constitutional con-
text, calling the work “a solemn re-
sponsibility assigned by the Constitu-
tion to the Congress.” He added, “We
have neglected this important respon-
sibility for too long. Many of the prob-
lems that we now seek to solve have
been evident for decades.” The chair-
man then urged the committee to “rise
above narrow interests and emphasize
genuine national security interests.
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of these important decisions. We must
exercise caution in mandating changes
in the U.S. military establishment. At other Senators. Frankly, these lies make In his opening statement, Nunn
the same time, we must not shy away me mad as hell! I have been deeply in- noted, “We have had nearly forty years
from correcting clearly identified defi- volved in this project from the outset. of experience with the current arrange-
ciencies and from fulfilling our consti- I have read every word of the staff re- ments. We have seen these arrange-
tutional responsibilities.” port and the bill. I have attended every ments in action and have many con-
The chairman added: “I’d like to hearing, except when I had to be in crete examples of their shortcomings.”
make one personal point. I know that Arizona. So I know these issues and I Referencing SASC’s extensive reorgani-
some senior Pentagon officials have want to fix these problems.” zation work, Nunn said, “I do not
been opposing what I am trying to do know of any other set of issues since I
by telling Senators that this is not my joined the committee over thirteen
initiative. Instead, I am supposed to years ago that the committee has been
just be going along with the staff and better prepared to address.”5
Summer 2002 / JFQ 41
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JFQ FORUM
G Following the two leaders’ presen- Goldwater said he would have to John Warner presented a package of
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I tations, each member made an open- call back later and thanked her. As he thirteen amendments. The third-rank-
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H ing statement outlining his starting hung up, the Senator said, “Can you ing Republican had accepted the role
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position. These statements and read- believe that? They’re not supposed to of opposition leader. Although he had
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R ings from the Pentagon letters con- lobby Congress on legislation. I can’t tried to stay out of the reorganization
A sumed the morning. By noon it was wait to tell the committee.” At the battle as long as possible, the pressure
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clear that SASC was bitterly divided. start of the afternoon session, the to take the lead eventually became
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would conduct the markup in open or After the committee adopted the tary, former marine, and Senator from
closed sessions. Antireformers wanted draft bill as the basis for amendment, Virginia, a state with a powerful Navy
the sessions open to the public, believ- Goldwater asked me to give an lobby. Nevertheless, Warner appeared
ing that the committee would be more overview briefing. This led to what the uncomfortable with the intellectual ar-
cautious under the Pentagon’s glare. chairman called “a good discussion of guments of the antireform coalition.
Goldwater and Nunn knew the impor- a number of broad issues” that con- Nunn later said, “Warner always was
tance of proceeding in closed sessions sumed the entire afternoon.8 concerned, I think, in his heart of
and gained approval for doing so. hearts, that he wasn’t on the right
Death by Amendment
Their arguments centered on the need track basically taking the Navy’s line.”9
to discuss classified information, The following afternoon, Goldwa- Nevertheless, the Virginia Senator
which would happen seldom, if ever, ter, sensing that work on the bill threw himself full force into the role of
during consideration of this bill. would be highly confrontational and opposition leader.
Just before the end of the morn- time-consuming, decided he did not As the committee considered
ing session, a message from Ben want other SASC sessions competing Warner’s amendments, my role was to
Schemmer, editor of Armed Forces Jour- with the markup: “I am reaffirming, assess the impact of each and begin a
nal, informed Gerry Smith of Goldwa- after consulting with Senator Nunn, discussion of its advantages and disad-
ter’s staff that the Navy had estab- my direction that no other full com- vantages. I also offered recommenda-
lished a “crisis management center on tions as to what action the com-
DOD reorganization.” Schemmer also military and veterans associations mittee should take. I made every
provided the center’s telephone num- effort to perform these tasks ob-
were bombarding Goldwater with
ber.6 The center’s purported mission jectively and to assist Warner
was to defeat the legislation, an activ- letters objecting to the bill with the presentation of his
ity of questionable legality. With mis- amendments. Some amend-
chief in his eye, Goldwater grabbed mittee or subcommittee hearings be ments or portions thereof had positive
Smith and me and said, “Let’s find out scheduled until we finish this aspects that I recommended be
what this is all about.” markup.” Goldwater also noted that it adopted, such as clarifying how aspects
Back in his office, Goldwater said, might not be possible to finish in three of administration and support would
“I’m going to call this office and see days: “We will continue the markups be identified for inclusion under a uni-
what the Navy’s up to.” Smith offered mornings and afternoons every day if fied commander’s authority. But many
to place the call, but the Senator in- it takes one week, two weeks, or three of Warner’s amendments would have
sisted on dialing it. When his call was weeks to finish.” He also conveyed his weakened reform. Lengthy discussion
answered, Smith and I saw a Goldwater determination: “I want everyone in of each amendment by the members
we had never seen before: an actor. this room to understand that I will not clearly indicated to Warner that he
Disguising his voice, Goldwater asked be deflected or sidetracked in this ef- would not be able to have his reform-
the secretary who answered, “Is this fort even if I get a letter a day from weakening amendments adopted, so
the Navy office that is working to de- everyone in the Pentagon.” he did not force a vote on the first day.
feat the reorganization legislation?” In a campaign organized by the The approach of deliberately talking
When she said, “Yes,” he inquired who Pentagon, military and veterans associ- through each issue became the norm
worked there. She answered, “Captain ations such as the Reserve Officers As- for the markup. By the end of the af-
Cohen, and there is a Lieutenant sociation and National Guard Associa- ternoon session, however, we had fin-
Colonel Dole, and a Major Robert tion were bombarding Goldwater with ished only about half of the package
Roach.”7 Goldwater repeated the letters objecting to the bill. The chair- laid down by Warner, and it was clear
names as he wrote them down. man fired off a tough response to each that he had many more amendments.
Goldwater said he wanted to help letter and set up a meeting for me to The afternoon’s developments dis-
and asked if she had an assignment for brief the associations. pleased Goldwater. It was clear that the
him. She said she did not have one at Goldwater and Nunn had decided committee would never finish in three
the moment, but if he would leave his to address unified command reforms days, as he had hoped. The chairman
name and number, the office would first because there was wider support
get right back to him. for them. When Goldwater opened the
floor for the consideration of changes,
42 JFQ / Summer 2002
Locher
also feared that the bill might face G
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“death by amendment.” He did not I
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want to cut off debate, but he worried H
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about how seemingly unending
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amendments might affect prospects for R
completing committee action. Goldwa- A
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ter asked me to consider how he might
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put some pressure on the committee’s N
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reorganization opponents and the Pen- O
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tagon, which many believed was aid-
ing Warner and his allies. Goldwater
did not want to play an excessively
heavy hand; he was looking for firm
but not drastic responses that would
create pressure and, equally important,
demonstrate that he was serious.
I created a menu of SASC activi-
ties that the chairman could hold in
abeyance while the markup sessions
were still under way: no consideration
of nominations for senior defense
civilian and military positions, no con- Caspar Weinberger
with his service
sideration of promotions for military
secretaries.
officers, no approval of reprogram-
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ming of monies from one defense D
budget account to another, no consid-
eration of a supplemental authoriza-
tion bill, and no approval for the Navy committee to forgo its traditional de- With the list of absent Senators in
to begin expending funds for its Strate- fense authorization bill, this would, in hand, Goldwater and I headed for his
gic Homeporting Initiative. Goldwater Goldwater’s view, be an acceptable office. By the time we arrived, the
especially liked holding up the Navy’s price for enacting critical Pentagon re- chairman had decided to target the
project, which he called “strategic form. Goldwater made clear that he lightly regarded Dan Quayle. He placed
homeporking.” and Nunn were prepared to hear and a telephone call to a surprised Quayle
As the chairman read down my debate every argument in an effort to and said that he wanted his vote.
list, a hint of a smile emerged. I had prevent the committee from making Goldwater played political hardball,
expected him to choose one or two. He decisions on emotional and superficial warning that if the Indiana Senator
looked up and said, “If Senator Nunn bases like those that had dominated failed to support him he would first
has no objection, do them all.” Gold- congressional action on defense organ- take the chairmanship of the Defense
water wanted to close down the com- ization in the 1940s and 1950s. Acquisition Policy Subcommittee away
mittee while it was considering the re- Later that morning, Warner forced from him. Then he would get him
organization bill. He did not want a vote on one of his key amendments: kicked off the Armed Services Commit-
another piece of paper to move. to have acting JCS chairmanship in the tee. And then he would work for his
The next morning, Goldwater an- chairman’s absence rotate among the defeat in the next election. When he
nounced his actions to the committee service chiefs rather than be performed finished, Goldwater put down the re-
and indicated that these prohibitions by a newly created vice chairman. Fif- ceiver and said with a smile of satisfac-
would remain in place at least until teen Senators were present for the tion, “Quayle’s voting with us.”
the committee had completed its work vote, which Goldwater and Nunn won When the committee convened
on the reorganization bill. If he sensed by a margin of ten to five, with Strom that afternoon, however, Quayle’s mili-
that obstacles—like a filibuster—might Thurmond providing the vital tenth tary legislative assistant, Henry Sokol-
be employed in an effort to prevent vote. I told Goldwater that the four ab- ski, approached me and said, “Senator
the Senate’s timely consideration of sent Senators, who would have until 5 Quayle wants to change his vote.”
the bill, Goldwater said he might have p.m. to record their votes, would likely I directed him to speak to Gold-
to leave the prohibitions in place until vote with opponents. This would nar- water, who responded, “I have person-
the Senate had completed action on row the victory margin to one vote. ally spoken with Senator Quayle, and I
the bill. Goldwater wanted a bigger margin for will not change his vote unless we
The feisty chairman also an- this first crucial vote. He was deter- speak again.” As Goldwater antici-
nounced that he was prepared to dedi- mined to secure a favorable vote from pated, the day ended without any fur-
cate the entire year to working on reor- one of the four. ther word from the Indiana Senator.
ganization. If this required the Although the pro-reform side won the
Summer 2002 / JFQ 43
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JFQ FORUM
G first vote eleven to seven, Goldwater’s and yet as new information would convincing the full Senate that this
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I power play backfired: it increased the come to light, he always listened.”11 legislation was ill-considered. To anti-
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H tension between the sides and caused In the lengthy debate of amend- reform Senators and their supporters in
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opponents to regroup. Normally, the ments and rewriting of bill provisions, the Pentagon and elsewhere, it was im-
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R chairman and ranking minority mem- Cohen and Levin emerged as Goldwa- perative that they maintain nine votes
A ber would vote proxies from their ter and Nunn’s lieutenants. Both were in opposition. “Ten to nine” became
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party colleagues. However, because brilliant and articulate lawyers, and the opponents’ rallying cry, like “fifty-
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N both Goldwater and Nunn were on the they made insightful, thoughtful con- four forty or fight” more than a cen-
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O same side, antireform Republicans and tributions. They also helped to shoul- tury before.
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Democrats collected their proxies and der the burden of defending and Punaro, a Marine Reserve colonel,
decided who would vote them. strengthening the bill. had to withstand withering antireform
At the end of the first week of pressure from active and retired
Open Minds and Markup
markup, Congress recessed for a week. marines, but he returned fire. After
Goldwater and Nunn’s commit- When committee activity resumed, the every markup session, he took the long
ment to a patient, fair, everyone-gets- tactics and battle lines were un- way back to his office just so he could
to-be-heard process provided the first changed. Activity focused on the stack let the antireform officers in the Navy-
important step in creating a high-qual- of amendments that Warner offered on Marine Corps legislative liaison office
ity dialogue on the bill. When Warner, each bill chapter. Warner’s and Jere- know that the pro-reform faction still
a sincere and considerate gentleman, miah Denton’s military legislative assis- had the upper hand on the committee.
matched the two leaders’ tone, the in- tants, Colonel Romee “Les” Brownlee, The officers responded with the “ten
gredients for a productive examination USA (Ret.), and Allan Cameron, respec- to nine” slogan and told Punaro to
of the bill were present. Neither side tively, were preparing Warner’s amend- wait until the full Senate got its hands
lessened the intensity of its convic- ments. While Rick Finn, Gerry Smith, on the committee’s bill.14
tions, but after the initial trying days, a and I were burning the midnight oil to Although the solidarity of Gold-
high degree of collegiality emerged. If a defend the bill, Brownlee and Cameron water and Nunn’s ten votes convinced
member asked for more research, opin- opponents that SASC would re-
ion of a Pentagon official or officer, a port a bill, antireform Senators
if opponents could not defeat the
briefing, or examination of additional were determined to make every
options, Goldwater and Nunn made bill in committee, they would set effort to shape it more to their
sure that the request was honored. liking. The committee continued
their sights on the Senate floor
Warner later commented, “At no time a detailed debate of each provi-
did the distinguished chairman or sion, addressing a staggering
ranking minority member deny me any worked late each night preparing total of 140 written and oral amend-
privilege under the procedures of the amendments to attack it. Many staffers ments—nearly twice the average num-
committee to make known my views were convinced that the Navy was ber of amendments during committee
and the views of those Senators work- helping Brownlee and Cameron, a markup of a defense authorization bill.
ing with me.” Carl Levin observed that charge they denied. Arnold Punaro In chairing the markup sessions,
Goldwater “chaired the committee in a later commented: “There’s absolutely Goldwater continued to demonstrate
nonpartisan way; he has done it in the no question that the Navy helped that he would patiently allow each
fairest way I have ever seen the chair- them. With their limited resources and idea to be debated as long as needed.
man conduct the committee.”10 lack of access to legislative counsel, But he also signaled that he would not
Warner also won admiration for who were helping Goldwater and tolerate delaying tactics or other mis-
the way he led the opposition. He Nunn, there’s no way they could put chief. Symbolic of his preparedness to
thoroughly challenged every idea and that material together.”12 deal sharply with any disruptions was
ensured that the Pentagon’s perspec- Other members offered written a small wooden rifle that he kept close
tive on each issue was well repre- amendments as well, but theirs totaled at hand. My secretary, Barbara Brown,
sented, but he was not intransigent. 27 compared to Warner’s 53 amend- had given him the rubber-band
Christopher Mellon, Cohen’s staffer, ments. The committee debated each of shooter. Goldwater called it his anti-
later said: “One thing about Senator Warner’s amendments in exhausting amendment weapon, or AAW. He kept
Warner that I always admired...is detail. Warner forced only three roll- it loaded at all times and more often
that he maintained an open mind. He call votes, each of which he lost.13 than not held it in his hands. Al-
was willing to change his point of view As Thurmond’s steadfastness to though he was tempted to fire it often,
based on new evidence and informa- Goldwater and reorganization became he only shot it once, when staff direc-
tion. Senator Warner might go into clear, the opposition set a new goal. If tor Jim McGovern came into the hear-
something with a great deal of convic- the opponents could not defeat the bill ing room to speak with him after a ses-
tion on one side and argue furiously, in committee, they would set their sion. The chairman fired a rubber band
sights on overturning it on the Senate at McGovern’s crotch. “Didn’t hit any-
floor. A one-vote margin in committee thing,” the staff director responded.
would serve as the springboard for
44 JFQ / Summer 2002
Locher
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Joint Chiefs of Staff,
December 1986.
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Goldwater, known for a ribald sense of reached, and both sides were delighted. was able to discern. Members were mo-
humor, replied “Target too small.” The opponents were relieved to have tivated by national security considera-
Goldwater and Nunn’s decision to beaten back an extreme provision; tions. People were dedicated; every-
ensure a full debate turned out to be Goldwater and Nunn were pleased to body was engaged; they were working
critical. Proreform arguments proved have their desired outcome endorsed with a great deal of vigor, energy, and
more persuasive, and the debate slowly by the entire committee. commitment. Issues were decided on
strengthened the position of reform the merits and substance. It was the
Gaining Momentum
proponents. It was clear that many op- kind of experience that makes you
ponents were finding the Pentagon’s As the markup entered its third want to go into government and be in-
logic superficial and indefensible, even week, Goldwater and Nunn began volved and participate.”15
though not a single vote had yet slowly to pick up support in the de- Although the committee was
changed sides. bate. Phil Gramm was the first member nearing the completion of its delibera-
Goldwater and Nunn decided to switch sides. But soon after, another tions, Goldwater and Nunn slowed the
when to offer compromises, including Senator joined the proreform camp. pace to permit it to hear firsthand
those on the two extreme recommen- When thirteen or fourteen Senators from the Packard Commission on Feb-
dations in the draft bill: mission- were on board, the opposition began ruary 28, the day the commission was
oriented under secretaries and the to collapse. slated to deliver its interim report to
merger of the two headquarters staffs Looking back at the committee’s the President. During the meeting,
in the military departments. These work, Mellon said: “It was an example Packard said that “the portions of the
offers were well timed. Bargains were of good government. It is the memory commission’s report dealing with de-
I would like to have of the Senate. fense organization and the commit-
There weren’t parochial motives that I tee’s bill are consistent and mutually
supportive.” The interim report
Summer 2002 / JFQ 45
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I dropped all mention of the Vice Chair- The committee accepted about 60 vote no,” Cameron predicted the out-
F
R man’s seniority. On the issue of who percent of Warner’s amendments in come as follows:
A
W should serve as acting Chairman, the some form, many after significant Warner: Will vote yes because he
T report recommended, “The Secretary modification.19 None of the amend- believes that the JCS compromise re-
N
of Defense, subject to the direction of ments that passed altered the basic quires it and because he believes that
I
O
J the President, should determine proce- thrust of the bill. Instead, they pro- the bill has been sufficiently improved.
dures under which an acting Chair- vided useful clarification, especially of Humphrey: Will probably vote yes
man is designated.” Goldwater and roles and relationships, or provided for reasons of comity, although he is
Nunn’s press statement announced: safeguards governing the exercise of not happy with the bill.
“We are absolutely delighted with the new authority. One major initiative by Quayle: Will probably vote yes.
report that the Packard Commission Warner required the President to sub- Wilson: Will vote yes. Believes the
submitted today to President Rea- mit an annual national security strat- issue is politically sensitive for him,
gan.”16 The meeting with the commis- egy report to Congress. that “the train on defense reform has
sion did not produce any new ideas, already left the station,” and that he
The Final Vote
but it reassured certain members and cannot afford to vote against “reform”
added to the rationale others could cite On the night before the markup’s in the context of California politics
for their emerging proreform positions. last day, Finn, Smith, Punaro, and I and his reelection campaign in 1988.
At the next SASC session, held on speculated about the final vote on the Gramm: Unknown, but appar-
March 4, Warner offered an amend- bill. Fifteen votes in favor seemed cer- ently feels some pressure to vote yes
ment to conform the provision on the tain, but would there be more? I pre- for reasons of committee comity and
Vice Chairman to the Packard Com- dicted a vote of seventeen to two, with relations with the Chairman.
mission’s language. The amendment— Stennis and Denton casting the nays. Stennis: Probably will vote no be-
on a priority issue for the Pentagon— The committee met on March 6 to cause he believes the whole idea of JCS
was defeated twelve to four, with only conclude its work on the bill. Everyone reform is bad; Stennis went through
John Warner, John East, Pete Wilson, present understood the historic signifi- the [same] wars on the earlier occa-
and Jeremiah Denton voting in favor.17 cance of the coming vote. Goldwater sions.
The vote confirmed what the debate did not rush this golden moment. He John Glenn: Unknown, but much
had signaled earlier: only a handful of allowed the drama to build and for pressure to vote yes because of changes
Senators continued to oppose key reor- everyone to savor the committee’s to the bill and the political realities of
ganization provisions. achievement at the end of a hard- Ohio.
The Navy was outraged when it fought battle. Finally, time for the last Cameron’s memorandum summa-
became clear that its supporters in the roll call came. rized the situation: “I suspect a maxi-
committee had been defeated on reor- In line with practice, Chief Clerk mum of three or four no votes, assum-
ganization. Navy leaders blamed Chris Cowart called the roll of the ma- ing you vote no. I certainly believe
Warner, Wilson, and Denton, the three jority party first, starting with the most that someone should vote no, but I
Senators who had spearheaded the op- senior member after the chairman. It would not recommend that you or any
position, referring to them as the was fitting that Thurmond, who had other Senator do so alone.” As Cowart
“three stooges.” The criticism was self- represented the pivotal vote in the began to call the roll of Democrats,
serving and grossly unfair. The bill’s early going, cast the first aye. Warner Denton’s decision to vote yes or no de-
opponents had put up a vigorous fight. voted yes next, then Gordon pended on Stennis’s vote.
Unfortunately for antireformers, much Humphrey, then Cohen, and all other On the Democratic side, Nunn led
of the ammunition the Pentagon sup- Republicans, except for Denton, who off with his vote in favor. Stennis was
plied had been duds. passed. next. He began by explaining the vote
The rigorous challenge to the Allan Cameron, Denton’s military he was about to cast. He revealed that
draft bill carried important benefits. It legislative assistant, assessed the final Goldwater had asked to meet the night
forced the members to debate every vote in a memorandum for the Sena- before and that they discussed the fun-
word of the lengthy bill, question tor. Cameron himself opposed the bill, damental issues at stake. “I reiterated
every idea, and examine every issue. arguing that it “reverses nearly 200 that it was an extremely important
This process strengthened the bill and years of American military history” vote for the future of the Armed
achieved consensus. Mellon compared and earlier legislation that had “con- Forces,” Goldwater later recalled. “I
it to forging a sword: “Warner and the cluded that a single military adviser told him I was not speaking that way
Navy were the hammer, and Goldwa- was unwise and that the military ad- because of my background, but be-
ter, Nunn, and the staff were the anvil. vice in a democracy should be pro- cause of what I’ve learned here and
Warner kept firing in these amend- vided by a corporate body.”20 what I see.”21 Goldwater’s final attempt
ments and concerns and objections to Based on input “from the staff to bring his longtime colleague on
provisions. In a way, they helped to members of the Senators most likely to board succeeded. Stennis voted in
strengthen, sharpen, and harden some favor. All the other Democrats also
of the provisions and forged the bill in voted in the affirmative.
a hotter fire.”18
46 JFQ / Summer 2002