Table Of Content

A Basic Intelligence Need The Best Map Of Moscow Joseph A. Baclawski Foryears, CIA produced the best guidance from friends and unclassified general reference map of acquaintances. Moscow. Initially created in the post(cid:151)World War II years primarily Eventually, the Soviet Government for US Embassy personnel in the began issuing its first maps ofthe Soviet capital, dissemination ofthe city for public dissemination. These map steadily expanded and it became maps, however, were extremely sche a key reference guide for personnel matic and--except for a few tourist ofother friendly embassies in Mos landmarks such the Kremlin, as cow, as well as for many US visitors. museums, and GUM (the state On several occasions, even Soviet department store)--were lacking in Satisfying this State militiamen processing automobile accuracy and detail. accident reports involving US Department requirement Embassy personnel found the maps Westerners, accustomed to having for a detailed street map of duseenftulsifteosr.acTchuirsatiesltyhleosctaotriyngofthheoawcci rtheeaisronhaobmlyegcoitoide-s,quhaaldittywmoadpisffoerfent a major capital city. was the CIA developed this map to fill a explanations for such schematic . . poor basic intelligence a formidable task. gap. maps. One was that the maps merely reflected the extreme postwar Its magnitude far Soviet shortages oftechnical person exceeded CIA(cid:146)s normal How It Began nel and production resources. The second, clearly the more accurate, is reference and map The need for a reliable Moscow map that the Soviet security establishment production procedures. was first identified by a State Depart catefull~r designed these crude maps ment request to CIA(cid:146)s Directorate of to prevent foreign intelligence organi Intelligence (the DDI, now desig zations from collecting any useful nated the DI).1 During the war and information. for some years thereafter, there was no street map available to the Embassy. The lackwas a nuisance ATall Order and a time-wasting impediment to Embassypersonnel activities. When Satisfying this State Department the Soviet Government finally agreed requirement for a detailed street map to allow diplomatic personnel to ofa major capital city, whose popula drive, the need for a useful street tion numbered more than 6 million map became even more critical. inhabitants in 1959 and which was continuing to expand rapidly, was a This lack affected others beside formidable task. Its magnitude far Embassy personnel. Soviet inhabit exceeded CIA(cid:146)s normal refer map ants, including long-term natives and ence and production procedures. the thousands ofnew residents who Therefore, a special team approach were rapidly increasing Moscow(cid:146)s was devised that involved close col postwar population, were experienc laboration by all three divisions of JosephA. Baclawski served in the ing the same inconveniences. To the Geographic ResearchArea ofthe Directorate ofIntelligence. find their way around the city, they DDI. The Map Library reference had to depend on word-of-mouth collection was searched for all rele 111 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1997 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1997 to 00-00-1997 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER The Best Map of Moscow 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Center for the Study of Intelligence,Central Intelligence REPORT NUMBER Agency,Washington,DC,20505 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Studies in Intelligence, Volume 40, No. 5, Semiannual Edition, 1997, No. 1 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 4 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 Map vant Russian, Soviet, and captured GermanArmy maps ofMoscow. These resource materials were then assessedjointly by the USSR Branches ofthe Cartography and Geography Divisions, and a produc tion program was developed that required full-time assignments of sev eral cartographic and geographic research specialists, working as a closelyknit team. The cartographic team members applied their technical skills to com pile and draft precisely the locations and alignments ofliterally thousands ofMoscow(cid:146)s streets. (Theirwork eventually became the numerous color separation plates needed by CIA(cid:146)s reproduction facility to print the final map product.) The Russian language and area expertise ofthe geographers was used to comb Rus sian textual materials, to translate relevant information the of on extent wartime damage and postwar recon struction, and to transliterate each Russian street name from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet. ANew Map This concentrated collaborative research and technical effort resulted in the publication ofthe first useful postwar map ofthe central Moscow area in 1953. Subsequent editions covered a larger city area and incor porated numerous refinements. For example, the back ofthe map pro vided alphabetical list of an street names and information such as the location ofembassies, principal gov ernment buildings, subway stations, and other landmark features. To help users locate these features, each item on this listwas keyed to a geo metric grid that overprinted was on the face ofthe maps. The printed 112 Map The mostsignificantinputs after US intelligence came overhead photography of maps were disseminated as flat sheets the city became available. simplified format required for the and folded to facilitate insertion in a CIA map. pocket. The maps carried no attribu (cid:145)9 tion to the CIA so that they could be disseminated under the State Depart Ad HocAssistance ment(cid:146)s aegis. Later editions ofthe map were fur Most printed copies ofthe maps The most significant inputs came ther improved by three short-term were shipped to the Embassy, and its after US intelligence overhead pho assignments in Moscow ofDDI per personnel were asked to provide com tography ofthe city became sonnel who were directly involved in ments, suggestions, and corrections. available. The photography permit updating the map. Embassy officers Resulting feedback indicated that the ted far better and more reliable had neither the time nor the techni map was meeting its intended orien information on the details ofthe cal expertise to check and record new tation and reference purposes. Moscow urban areas. Its applicabil map details and to resolve conflicting ity to an unclassified Moscow map, information to any extensive degree. however, had to be balancedwith These problems were overcome by Initial dissemination and use in Mos the need to protect both the exist establishing an ad hoc arrangement cowwere circumspect and were ence and the capabilities ofUS involving both CIA and Defense restricted to Embassy personnel overhead intelligence sources. personnel. because ofthe proclivity ofSoviet sdeicsuprliatyyinpgermsaopnsneilntpouabrlriecstapnedopclheargi Guidance on how to achieve a bal Tphoirtseadrbryantgheemdeenftenwsaesadtirraeccht~lyisnup between and einsgpitohnaegmewaigtahinassteSnogvaigeitnmgilcihtaarrgyeand aprnocteection wasusperovidesdouprecresonally Mfoorstcheowsh(cid:151)boortt-hterbmyDwDriIttaesnsriegqnumeesnttss other national security installations. by the head ofthe DDI, on behalfof and by assigning Defense personnel the Director ofCentral Intelligence. Garnadduaavalillya,bihloitwyevoefrt,hethmeappreaspepnecaered The basic guideline was to use the atenmdatviehcicfileelsdtcohepcakrst.iciTphaitse in the sys to be accepted by Soviet security. photography to validate and incorpo cooperative arrangement proved The Embassy made copies available rate details obtained from other highly successful in generating much to diplomatic personnel offriendly sources and to omit Soviet-issued useful detail. It also is worth noting countries, and finally to US visitors information that was premature or that the systematic field checks of and tourists to Moscow, without false. Another key guideline was to hundreds ofstreets in all parts ofthe include only information that could incident. city temporarily diverted much of have been obtained visually by the time and attention ofMoscow Embassy personnel in the city areas KGB personnel from their normal where they permitted were access. surveillance targets. Improvements and Guidelines These guidelines required careful review ofevery new detail on the Othveermatphewyeerares,prueppdaarteeddasedtihteiocnistyof mmsuaabpsp,tadnbetutiataillt.haendpaaycocfufriancyadwdaistional AMore Detailed Map area expanded and additional source The map underwent a major format materials became available. Some of change in 1974, when pocket atlas a the information came from Embassy To speed the labor-intensive updat version was developed and issued in personnel debriefings and reports. ing and production processes, the order to better meet Embassy person Soviet sources such as planningjour Cartography Branch Chiefdevised a nel requirements. The single-sheet nals and newspapers provided unique method ofextracting perti map2 continued to be produced, but descriptions and sketches ofnewly nent detail from a contemporary it was also cut into 60 small rectangu completed housing and transporta classifiedArmyMap Service map of lar segments and assembled into a tion facilities. Moscow and putting it into the spiral-bound pocketbook. The inner 113 Map part ofthe citywas covered by 10 Moscow Olympics in 1980, acceler types ofintelligence collection tech additional map segments at a larger ated this trend. But the CIA- niques, both byhuman sources on scale. To facilitate reference, the seg producedMoscow Street Guide theground and bytechnical means ments were preceded by two index remained by far the best map ofthe from adistance. maps and a subway system map. city. (cid:149) This expertise helped the Intelligence The maps provided a wealth ofdetail Community identifypreviously on the street names and alignments Recognition and Benefits unknown Moscowinstallations and and the building (house) numbering facilities. system. They also located individual In its 1974 and 1980 national map- subway and railroad stations and design competitions, the US profes One final comment is in order. In identified the entrance and exit sional mapping association, the the normal course ofevents, CIA is ramps on the Moscow Ring Road, American Congress on Surveying not and should not be unilaterally the automobile beltway that encir and Mapping, awarded the contem producing detailed city maps. The cled the city. All features on the poraryversions ofthe CIA map a production ofits Moscow map, how maps were listed individually on a certificate ofmerit for outstanding ever, was a logical and necessary 66-page index ofstreet and locality achievement in cartographic design(cid:148) response to a unique basic intelli names, embassies, government build in the city plan category. In 1989, gence gap on a priority intelligence ings, theaters, hotels, restaurants, the Soviet Government finally issued target at a particularly critical time. and other places ofinterest, includ 250,000 copies ofa detailed paper ing cemeteries where famous back edition ofa Moscow map, Russians and Soviets are buried. Moskva: Atlas Turista. The effective NOTES ness and influence ofthe CIA map The first edition ofthe pocketbook product can be gauged from the fact 1. The choice ofthis channel was gov had 140 pages. The 1980 version, that the Soviet product is closely erned largely bythe fact that the which included the location ofgas modeled on the CIA format. State Department had transferred to stations, auto-repair stations, and CIA the map collection and produc tion assets that State inherited from active churches, was 203 pages. The The creation 0fthe Moscow map the dissolution ofthe OSS. This larger scale map ofCentral Moscow had the following long-term benefits: transferprovided that these mapping was expanded to 60 separate seg assetswould continue to be available ments. The 1987 edition had 214 (cid:149) It facilitatedestablishment ofsecu to service State(cid:146)s needs for foreign pages. ritypolicyguidelines for using area maps. satellitephotographyin unclassified sOcvheermatthiecyemaarps,scoofnMteomspcoorwargyraSdouvailelty intelligence products. 2. mSAedacvpraetwnecSreeercvmoipcaiedeetsooasfvuatpihlpeaobrsltienigttloses-teshcheuereitty incorporated more accurate and use (cid:149) Ithelped in the development ofa planning for President Nixon(cid:146)s visit ful detail. The increasing influx of unique DDI expertise on Moscow to Moscow inJune-July 1974. foreign tourists, especially during the thatsignificantlysupportedvarious 114