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0526 Echevarria Pgs 7/17/01 9:28 AM Page 11 C–17 taking off during Large Package. Interdependent Mann) Maneuver Kenn Wing ( Mobility Air 305th for the 21st Century By A U T U L I O J. E C H E VA R R I A I I V irtually all intelligence and opera- likely to be flooded with an admixture of techno- tional estimates suggest that war in logically sophisticated and relatively crude preci- the 21st century will require interde- sion and area-fire weapons (including weapons of pendence among land, sea, and aero- mass destruction) linked by communication sys- space systems. The services report that precision tems from state-of-the-art to the relatively primi- weapons will so expand the range and capabilities tive. At the same time, a dynamic strategic envi- of systems that the tactical deadly zone, once a ronment will add missions and responsibilities. few hundred meters, could extend beyond 200 Thus service interdependence will be necessary at kilometers by 2020. Operational exclusion zones, the low and high ends of the conflict spectrum. designed to deny access to land, sea, and aero- Although Joint Vision 2020 calls for the space forces, might reach 2,000 kilometers. Each is Armed Forces to become fully joint, it provides no operational concept for moving in that direction. Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II, USA, is director of national The desired endstate, full spectrum dominance, security affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War requires becoming better than everyone else at College and is the author of After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers doing everything. A worthwhile aim, it does not Before the Great War. offer the common ground for developing a shared Autumn 2000 / JFQ 11 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2000 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2000 to 00-00-2000 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Interdependent Maneuver for the 21st Century 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National Defense University,260 Fifth Ave SW,Fort Lesley J REPORT NUMBER McNair,Washington,DC,20319 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 9 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 0526 Echevarria Pgs 7/17/01 9:28 AM Page 12 (cid:2) INTERDEPENDENT MANEUVER conceptual model of future operations. Even more range of military operations through the applica- disconcerting, two concepts that allegedly support tion of information, deception, engagement, mo- full spectrum dominance—dominant maneuver bility, and countermobility capabilities. and precision engagement—stem from competi- On the other hand, precision engagement is tive rather than complimentary traditions. Unless the ability to locate, surveil, discern, and track reconciled, no move toward interdependence will objectives or targets; select, organize, and use the occur. This article examines the definitional and correct systems; generate desired effects; assess re- historical tensions underlying dominant maneu- sults; and reengage with decisive speed and over- ver and precision engagement and suggests a way whelming operational tempo throughout the full of harmonizing them under a new operational range of military operations. concept, interdependent maneuver. Each concept, according to JV 2020, uses “decisive speed and overwhelming operational Conflicting Definitions tempo” and is to be applied across the “full range Documentation such as JV 2020 and Joint of military operations.” But to gain dominant ma- Pub 3.0,Doctrine for Joint Operations, does not pro- neuver one must also carry out all the activities— vide a unifying concept. As presented in JV 2020, “scaling and massing force or forces and the ef- its four concepts—dominant maneuver, precision fects of fires”—contained in the definition of engagement, focused logistics, and full dimen- precision engagement. In fact, on closer inspec- sional protection, and their endstate, full spec- tion, engagement seems to be integral to maneu- trum dominance—are little more than tautologies. ver rather than a separate concept. Indeed, in Dominant maneuver amounts to the capacity to most cases precision engagement will not occur conduct maneuver that dominates, precision en- without some movement of joint forces or assets, gagement equates to the ability to engage with whether it be repositioning intelligence gathering precision, and so forth. Presumably these tautolo- satellites or launching F–16s. Similarly, dominant gies are marks on the wall toward which each maneuver will likely require some form of engage- service (as well as the many partners involved in ment, whether surveillance and tracking hostile defense research and development) should focus. However, since they are self-referential, tautologi- cal concepts tend to be- the lack of a unifying concept is come ends in them- Minuteman III, selves. In other words, Force Development a result of the failure of JV 2020 efforts to improve pre- Evaluation Program. to reconcile dominant maneuver cision engagement tend to take place in isola- and precision engagement tion from similar en- deavors in developing other concepts and could proceed beyond the point at which they contribute most meaningfully to full spectrum dominance. In a world of limited resources, efforts to perfect one capability could undermine the individual and collective effective- ness of others. Thus working toward ideal capabilities introduces pitfalls that might run counter to the development of a unifying operational concept. A vision document must at some point pres- ent desired capabilities that might come together to achieve battlefield success. Moreover, the lack of a unifying operational concept is a result of the failure of JV 2020to reconcile tensions between dominant maneuver and precision engagement. For example, dominant maneuver means having positional advantage wtaiiori,tn hsap ld eteceicamils piovope.e srWapteiidoeednl sya, ndandis dpo esvrpesaercwde h jfoeoilrnmctei snl—agn cdoap,p aesberaale-, M. Edwards) of scaling and massing force or forces and the ef- manda fects of fire—will secure advantage across the Air Force (A S. U. 12 JFQ / Autumn 2000 0526 Echevarria Pgs 7/17/01 9:28 AM Page 13 Echevarria USS Tarawaoperating off Aden. Miller) David Navy ( S. U. aircraft or neutralizing cruise missile sites, to per- With emphasis on both physical and psychologi- mit enough movement for positional advantage. cal dislocation, Blitzkrieg represented the epitome Differently put, it is as if JV 2020 defined the of 20thcentury maneuver theory. terms separately to mollify service interests rather A significant contribution to that theory than to isolate their virtues as concepts. Domi- came in the 1980s and 1990s as American mili- nant maneuver and precision engagement are in- tary writers engaged in a debate over the merits of terdependent—parts of the same activity. firepower versus maneuver. This exchange re- Dominant maneuver and precision engage- sulted in a redefinition of the concept of maneu- ment are defined independently because they ver as the “use of fire and movement to gain a have evolved from two conflicting traditions. The positional advantage.” Maneuver was thus di- origins of dominant maneuver are rooted in theo- vided into two mutually supporting elements— ries identified with the military canon of the 20th fire and movement, which could be employed se- century, so-called Blitzkrieg doctrine. In contrast, quentially or simultaneously. Fire is subsumed concepts underpinning precision engagement under maneuver. Yet for all its innovation, this emerged from ideas which influenced strategic new definition was applied better on the tactical bombing theory as developed following World than on the operational or strategic levels because War I. coordinating fire and movement over great dis- Loosely associated with the work of Basil tances remained difficult, chiefly because of the Liddell Hart, J.F.C. Fuller, and Heinz Guderian, limitations of communication technology. Blitzkrieg (lightning-war) centered on using air The applicability of Blitzkriegwas not limited bombardments, artillery fires, and armored at- to land operations. Both land- and seapower tacks to penetrate defensive zones, disrupt com- evolved in similar ways and shared enduring mand and control, and sever lines of communica- principles. Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian manda M. Edwards) twsfiiugoodhnudt l eadinnn cld yae .usn uAscpeitr p cawll yeod.dreA sfptte o nibctdek sweetrt o’sts,uh rlaedeg s paifissonytrascctnhe coo aevlon etgr oiwec nahceloe mllsmlhayopi nctsokge Clstaitoornanrdtb epeogtofit cw,f olpeirnrrc oeecsm o toonifn ccgeeoanpimtnt sm n casouuvmnacilhmc at athainsion dnck seoe,n fra stnt,rh darel ec lpsoieenoadcs. ieutEnipaotorrnlany-, S. Air Force (A odds, and with rapidly diminishing supplies. JMBauaprlamanyaae saaenn ddv iStchitnoeg raPipehsoi lriiepn ip nti nhtewes o Pi naacn tidfh irace —he atalhfn emd foaan lhlt haoslff, U. Autumn 2000 / JFQ 13 0526 Echevarria Pgs 7/17/01 9:28 AM Page 14 (cid:2) INTERDEPENDENT MANEUVER C–17 landing at North Field,South Carolina. Allen) Squadron (Jeffrey mera Ca mbat Co 1st months, and the Dutch East Indies in two and a surface attacks to strike directly and perhaps inces- half months—validated the ideas espoused by santly until an enemy capitulated or its capability Mahan and Corbett while confirming that to resist was destroyed. Blitzkrieg would work in theaters in which naval With the appearance of larger aircraft and pre- (including amphibious) operations replaced ar- cision munitions at the end of the 20th century, a mored pincer movements. The essential ingredi- new generation of airpower theorists—notably ent in rapid maneuver was not the armored vehi- John Warden—argued that the technology for cles but pinpoint application and timing of achieving strategic collapse of an enemy was just all-arms attack, followed by rapid exploitation be- over the horizon. Rather than using massively dev- fore an enemy could recover. Accordingly, recent astating bombardment, planners could employ studies have concluded that the principles of ma- long-range precision munitions for surgical strikes, neuver warfare on land apply equally at sea. greatly limiting collateral damage. As the range Ideas associated with strategic bombing the- and variety of precision munitions grew, theorists ory emerged concurrent with, but independent of, began to embrace the possibility of executing par- Blitzkrieg doctrine. They were inspired by events allel attacks—numerous simultaneous strikes during World War I such as the bombing of Lon- against critical infrastructure nodes. These attacks don. Six months of air raids in 1915 caused 1,750 would inflict damage on strategic assets that would casualties and created a panic among the British render an enemy incapable of either reacting or re- population. Although the air arms of the day covering, thereby forcing strategic paralysis and could not create or sustain the tempo to induce psychological collapse. the enemy to surrender, Giulio Douhet in Italy, The principles underlying dominant maneu- Hugh Trenchard in Britain, and Billy Mitchell in ver and precision engagement share a common the United States believed that airpower, which theme—attacking an enemy psychological center was evolving rapidly, had revolutionized warfare. of gravity. However, the fundamental difference is Accordingly, they argued that it was the best way that the former finds movement as essential to ef- to strike an enemy psychological center of gravity. fect an attack while the latter considers physical By means of strategic bombing, air forces could destruction as key. Both employ tempo, although circumvent the tactical and operational carnage of for dominant maneuver tempo pertains to the pace of physical movement in relationship to that of an enemy. Precision engagement, on the other hand, uses tempo in terms of the rate at 14 JFQ / Autumn 2000 0526 Echevarria Pgs 7/17/01 9:29 AM Page 15 Echevarria M–1 on range in Korea, Foal Eagle ’00. Squadron (Jeffrey Allen) Squadron (Wayne Clark) mera mera Ca Ca mbat mbat Co Co 1st 1st which destruction is inflicted on critical strategic Blitzkrieg Revisited assets. Both concepts also make use of lethality. Practical applications of the conceptual fore- But dominant maneuver uses lethality as a means runners of dominant maneuver and precision en- to facilitate movement while precision engage- gagement have a mixed record. Blitzkrieg doctrine ment employs movement to inflict lethality. was validated by German attacks on Poland, Another difference is the level on which the which fell in one month, Denmark and Norway, concepts apply. Dominant maneuver is found to which succumbed in two months, and France and the Low Countries, which were overrun in one practical applications of the conceptual forerunners and a half months. But for various reasons, not of dominant maneuver and precision engagement the least of which was better training and equip- ment, Germany’s enemies grew less susceptible to have a mixed record the psychological shock of Blitzkrieg as the war progressed. Campaigns between 1941–45, such as be the most applicable on the tactical and opera- those conducted in Russia, North Africa, and Italy, tional levels because of logistic and deployability became protracted as armies, navies, and air forces limitations. Precision engagement is often con- adjusted to a new style of war. Victory had to be sidered in terms of strategic applicability because won, more often than not, throughcostly and de- of the great distances that munitions and deliv- liberate annihilation. On the Russo-German front, ery systems can cover and because their expense for example, where fighting was particularly bit- makes them undesirable when used against tacti- ter, encircled forces held out for extended periods, cal targets. depriving Blitzkrieg of its chief advantage, light- The intellectual tradition behind each con- ning-like decisions. While the conflict remained cept has led to institutional conflict, not only one of movement on all fronts, logistical require- with regard to budgets but to the roles of air as- ments and adaptive opponents limited the ex- sets in campaigns and whether they should be ploiting of tactical victories for operational effect. controlled by a single service. This conflict can- From 1945 to 1995 the concept of Blitzkrieg not be wholly solved with a unifying operational changed more in form than substance. The object concept, but that is a place to start. remained integrating ground, naval, and airpower into decisive strikes to break enemy will to fight Autumn 2000 / JFQ 15 0526 Echevarria Pgs 7/17/01 9:29 AM Page 16 (cid:2) INTERDEPENDENT MANEUVER results fell short of expectations. Strikes against cities and industrial sites did not ensure victory. Rather than surrendering en masse, civilians became inured to massive devastation. Their will to resist was arguably strengthened rather than di- minished. The bombing of Hamburg in 1943, for example, caused 90,000 casualties in a four- month period, the bombing of Dresden in 1945 killed 80,000 in three months, and the most dev- astating of the Tokyo raids led to 125,000 victims during May 1945. Even with tremendous destruction, long-range bombing technologies did not generate sufficient tempo or lethality to compel surrender. For a time it appeared that Douhet and his disciples had mistakenly convinced themselves that air arms alone could achieve decisive effects. Then the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, causing some 220,000 casualties in three days. Technology seemed to finally catch up with theory. From the standpoint of more conventional munitions, however, the events of World War II had neither proved nor dis- proved the case for strategic bombing. From 1945 to 1980 intercontinental ballistic missiles not only expanded traditional strategic distances to global proportions but gave Douhet a renewed relevance. For a while, the capability to deliver long-range weapons of mass destruction against cities and industrial centers, whether dropped from B–52s or launched from sub- w) marines or missile silos, appeared to render con- Sha ventional forces obsolete. Strategic attack became Squadron (Sarah E. stddhyeenestetoorrrunryecy ntwmicoaeons,u .f fslFoe ocwxruitibsutelhned a nrtoeeusnlcpy lo,ce notahnsree ca, e ptaptrnatascdc kt sim,uc acaulhn ta udapa spls tlnaircsausatcuteliregoeaindcr munications othf es taradtveegnict nouf cplereacr iasitotanc-kg uisid uendt emstuend.i tMioenasn mwheailnet, Com launching a strategic strike without mass casual- 2d ties associated with weapons of mass destruction. B–52 being refueled, Long-range precision strikes were viewed as the Desert Fox. new warfare, and campaigns in the Persian Gulf, or destroy its military. The Arab-Israeli, Falklands, Bosnia, and Kosovo have been touted as airpower Panama, and Persian Gulf conflicts proved that victories. Although under the right conditions the Blitzkrieg concept was valid even if defensive such weapons can indeed modify enemy behav- technology was becoming deadlier and enemies ior, the extreme of strategic psychological col- did not always collapse instantly. Still the prob- lapse prophesied by Douhet and Warden has lem of moving beyond operational to strategic proven elusive. exploitation remained. Except in a few cases, maneuver forces could not maintain an operational The Human Factor—People’s War tempo that was sufficient to turn tactical success Conflicts in Vietnam, Cambodia, Afghan- into strategic victory. istan, and Somalia warned that insurgencies, civil wars, and terrorism remained the Achilles heel of Legacy of Strategic Bombing dominant maneuver and precision engagement. Unlike Blitzkrieg, history shows that the con- Neither concept has been particularly successful in cept of strategic bombing outpaced technology. resolving protracted, internecine, or civil wars. Although most evidence before World War II sug- gested that new air arms had enormous potential, 16 JFQ / Autumn 2000 0526 Echevarria Pgs 7/17/01 9:29 AM Page 17 Echevarria Marine vehicles in UAE,Iron Magic. Brien) O’ P. Branden mera ( Ca mbat Co Unit, Marine Expeditionary 13th Such conflicts generally do not involve limited Reconciling New Ways of War aims such as breaking the enemy will to resist, but To merge the concepts found in JV 2020, a nonnegotiable objectives such as political annihi- unifying operational concept is required to com- lation or genocide. The centers of conflict tend to bine the advantages of rapid movement with the remain dispersed. Time benefits the side that wages benefits of precision strike. It also must unite the a protracted war by offering an opportunity to tactical and operational applicability of dominant learn and adapt. The side that seeks a short, deci- maneuver with the strategic reach of precision en- sive war, on the other hand, suffers a decline in gagement. It must make movement and fire inter- morale as its expectations are frustrated and its dependent—hence interdependent maneuver. emotional endurance wanes. This means applying principles of fire and The basic element in waging protracted war, movement on all levels of war simultaneously, as Mao Tse Tung noted, is not overwhelming elevating a tactical concept to an operational and force, but patience. Indeed, a decisive battle in strategic one. This leap in conceptual warfare is the traditional sense was to be avoided. Instead of made possible by expected advances of informa- a classic confrontation of force on the battlefield, tion, maneuver, and firepower technologies over Mao called for first creating and consolidating a the next 20 years (the focus of JV 2020). Interde- political base of support among the populace, pendent maneuver assumes that such advances then expanding that base by bold attacks that will blend the tactical, operational, and strategic forced an enemy on the defensive and then a full- levels of war into a single continuum of military scale counteroffensive. This theory proved suc- activity. In any case, these levels have historically cessful in China and was adopted in other agrar- been little more than arbitrary categories used to ian societies, especially in Vietnam and Cuba. enable planners to assign objectives, resources, Because such conflicts are decentralized, with the and responsibilities. Therefore, rather than ac- front nowhere and everywhere, they pose unique cept such distinctions, one may find it more use- challenges to doctrines that attack the enemy ful to see warfare as consisting merely of military psychological center of gravity by more conven- actions—whether hand-to-hand combat or tional means. While U.S. forces consistently strategic bombing—linked in time and space by achieved tactical victories in Vietnam, political constraints kept them from achieving operational and strategic success. Autumn 2000 / JFQ 17 0526 Echevarria Pgs 7/17/01 9:29 AM Page 18 (cid:2) INTERDEPENDENT MANEUVER USS Pennsylvania. mith) S Navy (Larry S. U. myriad information systems. It may also be help- non-line-of-sight weapons. They would be de- ful to divide such actions into fire—the ability to ployed in and around key terrain to provide inflict lethality whether by the tip of a bayonet human intelligence, report battle damage assess- or the virulence of a biological agent—and movement, augment other special operations forces al- ment—the physical relocation necessary to de- ready in theater, and interdict enemy movements liver lethality. with reach-back fires. Interdependent maneuver thus is built upon The suppressive effects of fires executed the definition of tactical maneuver developed by throughout theater would in turn enable addi- military theorists in the 1980s and 1990s. In tional aerospace, naval, and perhaps heavier terms of application, however, it brings the syn- ground forces to be deployed into combat. Such ergy of fire and movement to the realms of opera- forces would exploit strategic vulnerabilities— tions and strategy, levels on which these compo- extant or created by interdiction fires—in enemy nents have never been applied in tandem. For defensive zones and maneuver to obtain a posi- example, once a decision is made to use force in a tion of advantage. In the meantime suppressive crisis, interdependent maneuver means that inte- attacks would continue throughout, developing grated ground, naval, and aerospace assets would synergy that comes from fire and movement. An begin to move into theater while at the same enemy is thus presented with a constant rain of time laying down suppressive fires throughout. destruction across its entire defensive zone as well Such fires would engage what have traditionally as the threat of inevitable capture or destruction been considered enemy tactical forces as well as by ground maneuver forces via the close fight. operational and strategic reserves and other criti- One further benefit is that interdependent cal strategic assets. The fires would combine maneuver applies more to situations that resemble ground, naval, and aerospace systems employing people’s wars than to traditional maneuver con- lethal and nonlethal weapons to facilitate the in- flicts. If such a war is in the first phase—building a sertion of ground elements. These units would political base—operations would likely entail less initially consist primarily of special operations suppressive fires and a greater number of ground forces equipped with reach-back support and elements to isolate an enemy from indigenous peoples, destroy supply caches, and interdict efforts to reestablish a logistic flow.If people’s war is in the second phase—expansion—interdependent 18 JFQ / Autumn 2000 0526 Echevarria Pgs 7/17/01 9:29 AM Page 19 Echevarria maneuver would be used to preempt its expan- making ground units more strategically agile. sion. Suppressive fires and ground elements would Most of these technologies are already under de- operate in tandem to reduce known enemy con- velopment in DOD or industrial laboratories. JV centrations, effect isolation, and erode indigenous 2020 should promote such technologies through support. The third phase—full scale counteroffen- a coherent, unifying operational concept that il- sive—resembles a conventional conflict. lustrates how such capabilities will contribute to Interdependent maneuver is more than link- military success. ing ground maneuver with the halt-phase concept, which claims that airpower alone can deci- The technological revolution of the 21st cen- sively defeat a large-scale armored attack. First, it tury which is currently underway might finally calls for a fully joint ap- combine fire and movement in a genuinely effec- interdependent maneuver proach from the outset, tive manner. If so, well-timed, precisely-directed generating synergy with surface, subsurface, and supersurface attacks over calls for a fully joint approach, the interaction between extended areas will provide a better means for generating synergy between fire and movement rather achieving political and military objectives even in than placing the burden situations like Vietnam, Bosnia, and Kosovo, where fire and movement of success on one dimen- force requirements may be subtle and dispersed. To sion, with others absent or realize this potential, we must complete this revo- only in support. Second, halt phase applies to a lution with comparable conceptual and doctrinal limited segment of the threat spectrum; it can’t transformation. At a minimum, a means must be effectively address people’s war, for example. The found to move the Armed Forces from a joint to type of conflict to which the halt-phase concept interdependent approach. As JV 2020 asserts, mit) applies, armored engagements in relatively open “Without intellectual change, there is no real Navy (Larry S timse rabrnaeeicnuo vmleikri eni sgt h breaa srMeedri. d odBnlye t hcEoean sptt rroianrs ctKi,p oilrnee taoenfr dpperepenseiennndstueinlnagt, cdohfe eaddne,gc irese icionenn dtp ordcoetvbreian tteeh,s a oto rvtghearen rwiez haisti cisohtni lssl e,s roovmri cleee awisd aetyhr set.o” a grInmo-. S. U. an enemy with a dual threat—destruction by fire Thus we must reconcile tensions between domi- or the close fight. Aerospace power alone is too nant maneuver and precision engagement. Merg- easy to counter. The Armed Forces need a truly ing these competing traditions into a single unify- integrative operational concept to give them ing operational imperative will not only reconcile every possible advantage. them but permit a coherent articulation of how a particular list of desired capabilities would con- Technological Prerequisites tribute to the execution of military actions and Ground forces will surely need to enhance provide a blueprint to focus the efforts of the re- strategic deployability to execute interdependent search and development community. maneuver. The Army and Marine Corps have rec- Adopting independent maneuver is not ognized this fact and established vehicle/system equivalent to emulating the technological opti- requirements to accommodate easier air and mism that captured airpower theorists before sealift with regard to military and commercial World War II. The evolution of technology will transport capabilities. Vehicles/systems projected bring both opportunities and challenges to fu- for the 2020 timeframe will likely feature modu- ture ways of war. Indeed, whatever new tech- lar designs to permit mixing and matching com- nologies may bring, the key to applying military ponents to a single chassis. One example of such force will remain the ability to discriminate be- a maneuver technology, a hybrid, air-cushioned tween the will of an enemy to fight and its vehicle, is currently under investigation and means to do so. JFQ could hover over level terrain or water, enabling it to reach speeds well beyond conventional track or wheeled systems. At the same time, advances in active protection systems, lightweight ceram- ics, titanium, and other metals might afford ground vehicles nearly as much protection as heavy armor. Ground forces are also exploring vertical-take-off-and-landing and short-take-off- and-landing technologies to develop viable self- deployment options. Other initiatives include developing fuel-efficient and hybrid-power technologies to reduce logistic requirements, Autumn 2000 / JFQ 19