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0620 Johnstone.pgs 1/8/00 5:02 PM Page 15 M2 Bradley during field experiment. Joint Kughen) Robert Experimentation: Aaron mpany ( Co Signal 55th A Necessity for Future War By M A R K A. J O H N S T O N E, S T E P H E N A. F E R R A N D O, and R O B E R T W. C R I T C H L O W W e are told that necessity is the Innovation requires adjustment not only in mother of invention. But inven- technology but in doctrine and organization. His- tion can be the mother of neces- tory presents examples of test-bed units that be- sity when it comes to military came templates for the future. Today a joint ex- adaptation to technological advances. New tech- perimentation organization could provide a nologies in the hands of an enemy may require ei- technique for minimizing overlap and interser- ther adjustment or accepting defeat. They can also vice rivalry, sharing ideas, and developing the generate political pressure for adoption and inno- force to fulfill JV 2010. vation. Due to the demands of the information Three options are at work or under considera- revolution and the goals set forth in Joint Vision tion. First, some services have established their 2010, the U.S. military again confronts the need own “battlelabs” to test technologies and concepts. to adapt. Second, the Secretary of Defense has designated U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) the executive agent for joint experimentation. Third, Senator Lieutenant Colonel Mark A. Johnstone, USA, is a member of the Dan Coats and others have proposed a separate Operations Directorate (J–38), Joint Staff; Major Stephen A. Ferrando, unified command for experimentation and doc- USMC, is assigned to the Future Operations Directorate (J–35), U.S. trine development. Given current resource con- Atlantic Command; and Major Robert W. Critchlow, USAF, serves in the straints, the ACOM solution is the most prudent command center at U.S. Strategic Command. They completed this article first step in experimenting with future concepts. while attending the Armed Forces Staff College. Autumn/Winter 1998–99 / JFQ 15 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1999 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1998 to 00-00-1999 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Joint Experimentation: A Necessity for Future War 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National Defense University,260 Fifth Ave SW,Fort Lesley J REPORT NUMBER McNair,Washington,DC,20319 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 10 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 0620 Johnstone.pgs 1/8/00 5:02 PM Page 16 (cid:2) JOINT EXPERIMENTATION exploit information, and act in a highly synergistic fashion to produce maximum combat power.1 The move to a force based on information superiority must also consider the integration of technology with the human factor, such as the risk of overloading future operators. The problem that emerges is how to promote innovations that require change across service boundaries and competencies. A recent draft RAND Corporation report notes that the timeframe is an important factor. Near-term era A adaptation represents evolution of current service competencies and technologies and era B innovation posits a complete revolution in military doctrine, organization, and technology that funda- Good) mentally alters the way war is fought. Era A starts Russell J. nlooowks atnod t hster entecahre as ntdo mariodu-tnerdm t hthe ryeaetasr a2n0d1 0u.s eIst Company ( etixeiss.t iEnxgp ltoecithinngo leomgye rtgoi nrged tuecche nporelosegnyt t vou mlnienriambiizlie- 55Signal th efoxricset intog rtehdruecaet sp ewrisloln enneal blleev erlese anngdin ceoesrtisn gw hthilee increasing capabilities. Essentially, we must effect High mobility artillery greater lethality and power projection by blend- rocket system. ing emerging technology with a smaller, more The Imperative for Innovation deadly force. Era A changes fall within the The driving force behind today’s call for mil- purview of the services.2 itary change is as common as beach sand: silicon. Era B looks to revolutionary change in warfare Whether or not the microchip and associated beyond 2010. Due to the nature of new threats, communications technologies have produced a era B should include experimentation with exotic revolution in military affairs (RMA) to which the concepts. Ideas such as speed-of-light theater mis- Armed Forces must respond, the mandate for sile defense, submarines with embarked land-at- adaptation remains. JV 2010 identifies informa- tack capabilities, or space and unmanned aircraft tion superiority as the key enabler behind leaner are just some avenues to explore. The key distinc- but more lethal forces. It will empower the mili- tion is that era B will present some threats that tary to react more quickly and cohesively, reduce cannot currently be envisioned. That will call for the “fog of war,” and allow friendly forces to dis- hedging—cultivating organizations and specially rupt enemy command and control. skilled people to develop exotic concepts that Arthur Cebrowski and John Garstka depict could someday reorder service functions. how these information capabilities might com- Looking at RMA in two separate but overlap- bine to produce a synergy in their concept of ping eras illuminates two points. First, the trans- “network-centric warfare”. The joint force is inter- formation of U.S. forces needs to be gradual but connected through an information grid that pro- steady. It is not a path to recklessly charge down. vides the command and control back-plane that Finding ways to use existing technology to defeat links all forces. Sensor grids use the information the near- and mid-term threats will take the col- grid to feed targeting information to engagement lective effort by all the services with a single grids. These grids then strike with precision and joint point of contact. Capitalizing on expertise lethality more quickly in their specific roles and missions gives the serv- experimentation will reduce than the enemy can ices a vested interest and will ensure that quality react. Individual high advancements are not sacrificed for swift change. guesswork, and a broad approach value platforms, and Second, continued evolution of the force that requires consensus building thus individual serv- through era B will require testing a broad array of ice-specific competen- ideas and hedging on future needs. Experimenta- will minimize the risk cies, become less criti- tion will reduce guesswork, and a broad approach cal on their own that requires consensus building will minimize merit. The vital factor is the ability of sensors and the risk. Under this approach, we must sacrifice shooters to interact quickly across the joint force, some efficiency for security. It is better to be slightly wrong in a number of overlapping 16 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 1998–99 0620 Johnstone.pgs 1/8/00 5:02 PM Page 17 Johnstone et al. choices than to be vastly wrong about a single Guderian, as a captain in the Inspectorate of overarching technological bet. Transport Troops, a logistics organization, con- Preparing for both eras A and B can cause ducted experiments with dummy tanks made friction in a resource-constrained environment. from automobiles fitted with canvas covers. In Choosing one or the other sacrifices near-term combination with secret tests in Russia in the readiness or future capability. The national mili- 1920s, these trials led to the concept of the Panzer tary strategy directs the services to “prepare now” division. In 1931 Guderian’s organization was ac- to exploit RMA and maintain military superiority tivated as the 3d (Prussian) Motorized Battalion, into the future. If “prepare now” is one of three consisting of armored reconnaissance cars and major pillars of the national military strategy, it dummy tanks, that permitted further develop- should receive commensurate resources. However, ment of combined arms doctrine. The reliance on the services lack the capacity to prepare for both dummy tanks was propitious. Germany did not the near and long term and they are struggling produce its first tank until 1930, thus procure- with how to spend their limited money. Atten- ment decisions were deferred until they could be tion could be focused on present deficiencies matched against doctrinal concepts. By 1935 the solvable within the future years defense plan first improvised Panzer division was established timeframe. Alternatively, funds could go to capa- for exercise purposes and the first corps was fi- bilities identified as essential in JV 2010 or to nally established with three divisions later that concepts far beyond 2010. year. When war broke out, the Germans, sup- At the same time caution is in order. The ported by advanced combined arms doctrine and process of change must be deliberate and infiltration tactics, overran the French and forced thoughtful. The United States must not search so the British into the sea at Dunkirk. aggressively for the “military after next” that it The German experience exploited several ad- sacrifices its lead and endangers readiness during vantages. The pain of defeat in World War I and the transition. the forced reduction of their army placed a pre- Doctrinal development and organizational mium on innovation. Further, they already pos- adaptation—which may threaten bureaucracies, sessed a nascent combined-arms doctrine that traditions, and prerogatives—must accompany needed only an armored force to reach fruition. changes in technology for a military to fully real- Lastly, the Panzer force enjoyed political sympa- ize the combat potential of new weapon systems. thy both in the operational concept and in sup- For example, in the 1870s the French military port for mavericks like Guderian, who had a had the advantage of a precursor to the machine propensity to offend the established order.3 gun in their war against the Prussians, the The U.S. Army enjoyed a similar period of Gatling-like Mitrailleuse. However, because it rode innovation in the 1960s. In a stunning example on a carriage like a cannon it was placed with the of the rise of an operational concept perfect for artillery rather than up with the infantry where it its time, the Army established the 11thAir Assault would have been able to better support combined Division to test helicopter mobility. That unit led arms operations. French organization had not to the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), which adapted to new technology to its best advantage. played a critical role in the early years of Ameri- In 1940, France had better tanks with larger guns can intervention in Vietnam. It also participated and armor thicker than opposing German Panzers in wargames and field exercises to advance doc- but limited their effectiveness by tying them to trine and organizational development. Further, it infantry support. sent companies to Vietnam in 1964 and learned valuable combat lessons. Lastly, it created a base Test-Beds as Seed Beds of officers experienced in integrating aviation How can the Armed Forces prod doctrinal, into Army combat operations.4 organizational, and technological innovation to As with the Panzer division, political support change how it fights? Historical examples of suc- was key. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara cessful innovation point to dedicated test-bed or- specifically directed the Army to explore helicop- ganizations that provide a venue for integrating ter mobility. His political support in turn shel- technology into the force, developing supporting tered airmobility advocates. Before that time avia- organizations, and creating implementation doc- tion was a fringe community the Army saw as a trine in a forum that provides verification of ideas support rather than combat arms element. By the and mitigates the impact of wildcat schemes on end of the 1960s airmobility emerged as an indis- the rest of the force. pensable combat concept. The classic case of such test-beds is the integration of tanks and development of Blitzkrieg doctrine by General Heinz Guderian in the Wehrmacht before World War II. As early as 1928, Autumn/Winter 1998–99 / JFQ 17 0620 Johnstone.pgs 1/8/00 5:02 PM Page 18 (cid:2) JOINT EXPERIMENTATION Monitoring laser overcome bureaucratic service inertia. Neverthe- calibration test. less, they emerged as a critical method for promoting military innovation that might prove valuable today. Competing Approaches Different approaches have been proffered for dealing with innovation. At issue is the Nation’s ability to meet threats during this era of technological revolution. At the far right on the spectrum is the status quo. Here four distinct services determine their future needs and take it upon themselves to ensure a modicum of interoperability, requiring only minor bureaucratic change. At the far left is a call for radical organizational change that might envision an eventual merging of the four services into one. These extremes have competing ideals, and pursuit of one can only take place at the expense of the other. Both models for change have positive aspects. On the right, multiple services engage in Castillo) soenrev isceer-vsipceec cifainc croolneds uacnt dth me icsosimonplse tbee cspaeucster unmo Deliah A. soifn golpee sreartvioicnes eifnfi ceiveenrtyly m meadniuagme.s6 aO snh rtinhkei nlegf td, ea- Air Force ( fdeingmse cboundtgientu. eOs nin t hheo pfaer t hriagth tth, eth aec qcuurisrietniot np asyras-- S. U. tem will support the pursuit of technology and experimentation to cover all aspects of warfare and achieve interoperability with other services. The Army experiments with AirLand battle On the far left, radical change creates a joint doctrine in the early 1980s found a home in the forces command with the authority, forces, and 9th Infantry Division High Technology Test-Bed. resources to transform the military through Established at Fort Lewis, this division tested joint experimentation.7 technologies such as light The Conservative Solution armored vehicles, machine the space battlelab initiatives guns, lightweight antitank Service-specific battlelabs represent the most are likely to remain small and antiaircraft weapons, conservative option. A typical service-specific and advanced command program for promoting innovation is the Air scale and peripheral and control systems. The Force Space Battlelab at Schriever Air Force Base. goal was to produce both Established in 1997, it is chartered to “focus on doctrine and organizations to enable rapid world- innovative space operations and logistics con- wide crisis response via air transport.5 The Army cepts, quantify their potential for helping the Air has since made rapid response a hallmark, as seen Force fulfill its ‘core competencies,’ then test the in Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield. concept in operational situations.” Most of its at- Generally, test-beds enabled the examination tention goes to field level. A review of ongoing and synthesis of doctrinal, organizational, and projects reveals that all are Kenney-level initia- technological concepts. They also allowed experi- tives, named for General George Kenney of World mentation without locking in specific systems for War II fame and focusing on small tactical initia- procurement and experimentation based on pre- tives of moderate cost. Their charter enables the existing systems. They permitted development of lab to address Mitchell-level initiatives, named for officer expertise that later proved valuable General Billy Mitchell, and dealing with large, throughout the force. And they often served as costly, revolutionary concepts; but the space bat- the basis for new combat-ready units that ex- tlelab is not conducting any far-reaching experi- ploited new capabilities. But the test-beds often ments at present. The programs under study needed outside political support to survive and apply more to service-specific techniques and procedures such as color space-object identifica- tion and use of commercial telescopes to aug- ment space surveillance .8 18 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 1998–99 0620 Johnstone.pgs 1/8/00 5:03 PM Page 19 Johnstone et al. Limited Objective Experiment. David J. Ferrier) Corps ( Marine S. U. The space battlelab initiatives are likely to re- Joint C4ISR (command, control, communications, main small scale and peripheral. They have lim- computers, intelligence, surveillance, and recon- ited funding and manpower. Projects must be naissance) Battlelab or JCB, an example of the ad- completed within 18 months. Further, ideas for vantage gained by joint capabilities integration. battlelab testing are subjected to sanity checks by JCB provides combatant commands on the JTF at a minimum of four review teams prior to ap- level with assessment and application integration proval. Such a process seems unlikely to impart a and fosters rapid insertion of proven C4ISR tech- revolution to the joint force. nologies on the combatant command level. Its re- Service battlelabs do present advantages for lationship with the Joint Requirements Oversight near-term innovation. Given their service-specific Council (JROC) has given it exceptional leverage orientation and manning, they are highly capable to institute changes across service boundaries. of exploiting service expertise in core competen- Since its inception in 1996 JCB has made cies. Further, they dovetail with the legislated huge gains in ensuring that C4ISR acquisitions are service missions to organize, train, and equip interoperable and has saved scarce procurement combat forces for the unified commanders. Thus dollars. For example, it developed a process that they are an efficient means of promoting the evo- allowed Navy and Air Force Link–16 messages lutionary era A change described in the RAND and Army Link–17 messages to exchange data in Corporation report. real time. In addition, it has furthered interoper- However, because of a limited focus, battle- ability across service solutions for asynchronous labs advocate only service-specific innovation and transmission mode communications, leading to a may fall short on advancing ideas that cross serv- standardized system across the service lines and a ice boundaries and enhance jointness. Further, be- cost savings. These successes illustrate how a joint cause of limited resources and mandates, they are battlelab is an important evolution and more ver- constrained to effecting change at the margins but satile option than the purely service-owned bat- not the revolutionary or era B innovations. tlelab. However, like the service battlelabs, JCB A variant on the concept that illustrates pos- targets the 18–36 month timeframe for imple- sible modifications for enhanced jointness is the menting solutions based on off-the-shelf capabilities rather than new technologies requiring a long-term perspective. Autumn/Winter 1998–99 / JFQ 19 0620 Johnstone.pgs 1/8/00 5:03 PM Page 20 (cid:2) JOINT EXPERIMENTATION A Balancing Act Several compelling factors make ACOM an The middle ground solution is to appoint excellent choice for joint forces experimenter. U.S. Atlantic Command as the executive agent First, it is the current joint forces integrator, for joint warfighting experimentation. The Na- trainer, and provider for 80 percent of DOD tional Defense Panel identified the need for such forces, active and Reserve. With these roles al- an initiative to bring JV 2010 to fruition. On ready in hand, the command will soon gain addi- May 15, 1998, the Secretary of Defense desig- tional expertise by assuming command of the nated CINCLANT as the executive agent to “ag- Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Warfare Analysis gressively foster innovation and rapid fielding of Center, Joint Command and Control Warfare new joint concepts and capabilities.” Under the Center, and Joint Battle Center. Secretary’s charter, ACOM is responsible to CJCS Second, command service components are “to explore new joint warfighting concepts and responsible for conducting service experiments. capabilities and determine doctrine, organiza- Including service expertise in the joint experi- tion, training and education, material, leader- mentation effort will synthesize diverse perspec- ship, and personnel (DOTMLP) implications for tives on experiments, assess concepts for service- change. These experiments will support JV 2010 unique capabilities, and enable effective and future joint warfighting visions.” The valida- coordination and control to ensure seamless cov- ting authorities for DOTMLP changes were CJCS erage of the spectrum of military operations. and/or JROC as appropriate until CINCLANT Moreover, linking service and joint experimenta- assumed the function. tion facilities and capabilities to create a “federa- The ACOM implementation plan (IPLAN) in- tion of battlelabs” will network service battlelabs cludes a process for taking a concept from an idea and the Joint Battle Center into a virtual distrib- to DOTMLP. Concepts are received from multiple uted network. sources, translated into future operational capa- ACOM will coordinate the efforts of these bilities, and prioritized. The joint experimenta- service experimental organizations and provide a tion campaign plan is published annually and joint context. It will improve standardization in translates concepts into objectives, including re- event design, execution, analysis, and reporting sourcing and scheduling. The plan is staffed with on experimentation. ACOM itself will only con- all key participants, validated by a board of direc- duct 10 percent of joint experiments, relying on tors, and approved by CINCLANT. the services for the “heavy lifting.” As the execu- The primary source for experimentation will tive agent, it can take advantage of its resident ex- be forces over which ACOM has combatant com- pertise and complementary tasks and use its serv- mand authority. The command can form JTFs to ice components’ expertise to ensure that the conduct joint experimentation as directed in the transformation is built upon diverse, quality, and joint experimentation campaign plan. By forming safe experimentation. mission specific JTFs, this plan will provide flexi- Third, CINCLANT is a unified combatant bility to the services and allows forces to focus on commander. His area of responsibility has recently core competencies when not involved with joint shrunk and become more benign. This change will experimentation. It also precludes permanently permit proper focus on the newly acquired task of taking away forces to establish a standing JTF or experimentation. As the joint forces provider, assigning them directly to ACOM. trainer, and integrator, CINCLANT will maintain The ACOM implementation plan presents a an operational perspective when recommending balanced approach towards achieving JV 2010 the direction transformation should take. His and future visions. It maintains the initiative and warfighting orientation as a geographic CINC will innovation of the service battlelabs that attack ensure that the needs of the other combatant com- era A-type changes. It also allows for RMAs that manders receive due regard. may completely change the composition and via- The middle-ground virtues of making ACOM bility of the military for era B changes. The intent responsible for joint experimentation could also is to use joint experimentation to identify the endanger its success. Managing joint experimen- high-payoff areas for systems development to ad- tation could imperil the warfighting focus of the dress current deficiencies, near-term capabilities, CINC or become a neglected additional duty in a and future concepts alike. command swamped with crisis management. The intent of the ACOM plan is to exploit existing exercises as opportunities for joint experimentation. This idea suffers from dangers of dis- traction. A JTF exercise built around joint experimentation risks reducing the instructional value of the event for troops whose training time is already constrained by operational deployment 20 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 1998–99 0620 Johnstone.pgs 1/8/00 5:03 PM Page 21 Johnstone et al. Remote sentry unit used to track multiple targets. Good) Russell J. mpany ( Co Signal 55th schedules. Alternatively, the exercise team may JFC: Cleaning House well treat the experimental events as distractions A JFC is the most radical option. It would that are at best half-heartedly integrated and take over service responsibilities for DOTMLP. played in the scenario. The National Defense Panel recommended creat- The key to ACOM success as the joint experi- ing a JFC under a functional unified commander. mentation advocate will be cooperation from the It would be manned with forces detailed from the services. This could prove to be the weakest link. services, establish joint national training centers, The command can make recommendations to the and create a joint battlelab that reports directly to services but will not have di- a CINC. According to the proposal, the panel did the key to ACOM success rective authority over “not seek to limit individual service innovation DOTMLP. The services will in any way....For example, the services would as the joint experimentation need to support joint experi- experiment with weapons systems...which once advocate will be cooperation mentation with funding and certified would be tested in the much broader manpower from their battle- joint arena.” from the services labs. They must also be will- The JFC option was outlined in legislation ing to adopt the resulting proposed by Senators Coats and Lieberman. A Title innovations, which could include doctrinal or or- XXX would amend Title 10 to give sweeping au- ganizational changes that counter service tradi- thority to the joint force commander and his joint tions. Lack of such cooperation in previous efforts experimentation efforts. Title XXX would propose led to the ACOM initiative and could also be the establishing a JFC as a unified combatant com- command’s downfall. mander with two principal functions: to integrate Autumn/Winter 1998–99 / JFQ 21 0620 Johnstone.pgs 1/8/00 5:03 PM Page 22 (cid:2) JOINT EXPERIMENTATION would also receive forces from all services for des- ignation as a joint experimentation force. It would develop mission need statements and operational requirements documents for major warfighting platforms. It would also evaluate and integrate products emerging from service experimentation. Such broad authority would allow the commander to view all programs being developed, assess potential successes and failures, pri- oritize programs based on need, and recommend shifting budgets to accelerate some programs and terminate others. Senator Coats implies that without such jointness DOD will wind up with several partially implemented service approaches and no coherent operational concept. However, he also admitted in a speech in October 1997 that services losing discretion over major investment decisions may be the “ultimate threat of jointness.”In an ex- treme view, the gradual weakening of service authority in the quest for jointness might cause the merging of all services into one. The more the services evolve in that direction, the less diverse they become. Thus the military could lose the S. Navy sfetrcetns gotfh s etphaarta ties sbearsveidce o cno rteh ceo cmopmeptelenmcieens.tary ef- U. It seems unreasonable to expect to represent DD21 “Land Attack every type of force of each service in the new Destroyer”concept. command. With a four star CINC at the helm, substantial forces must be envisioned, a drawback and provide ready joint forces based in the conti- in this resource-constrained era. Assigning forces nental United States to other combatant com- solely for joint experimentation would enable manders to carry out assigned missions; and to de- comprehensive testing and evaluation of joint sign, develop, and execute joint experimentation concepts and future technology but at a price. to determine the future capabilities, organization, Currently, all CONUS-based forces can be dual- and operational concepts of the joint force. tasked via the multiple joint strategic capabilities However, ACOM is already executing the plan apportionment for planning. This implies first function for most CONUS-based forces. that they can be used in a variety of scenarios in Therefore it is not revolutionary. The need for multiple areas of responsibility. These multiple joint integration, training, and providing forces taskings place a heavy training burden on the to other CINCs helped drive the unified com- forces, necessary because of reduced strength cou- mand plan change that transferred the ACOM pled with growing operational requirements. portion of the Caribbean to U.S. Southern Com- With operational tempo increasing, assign- mand. That permitted ACOM to focus on joint ing forces exclusively for experimentation poses integration and training to ensure that other competing demands. The services would have to CINCs received ready and capable forces. It can provide them to JFC while fulfilling operational easily perform the second function as well. warfighting requirements. The increased deploy- Title XXX would also propose consolidating ment of operational forces will have two impacts. all CONUS-based forces under a single command. First, those provided to other CINCs will suffer in The commander would hold four star rank and training and equipment readiness. Both quick have authority to plan, conduct, and assess joint turnaround and reduced maintenance cycles training. He would also advise CJCS and the Sec- mean equipment will wear out faster than it can retary on prioritization of requirements and ac- be replaced. Second, servicemembers will opt for quisition programs. His command would develop other employment. Fewer units stretched over joint doctrine, concepts and tactics, techniques, more and varied missions will result in tired per- and procedures along with an overarching sonnel who perform missions to a lower stan- process of joint experimentation. The command dard. This could mean preventable casualties, 22 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 1998–99 0620 Johnstone.pgs 1/8/00 5:03 PM Page 23 Johnstone et al. which would draw outside criticism. Disenchant- that is realistic given current resource constraints. ment is already appearing, with low first-term re- To take the best of both ideals, the preferred di- tention across service lines and increased resigna- rection should approximate the middle of the tion of junior officers who are highly qualified for spectrum. This middle ground solution, accord- civilian employment. ing to the ACOM implementation plan, should Senator Coats addressed three factors driving combine the strengths of both extremes and “im- development when he argued for establishing a plement an aggressive program of experimenta- JFC: assessment of likely threats/adversaries, tech- tion to foster innovation and rapid fielding of nology, and fiscal resources. With these tools he new concepts and capabilities for joint opera- pointed to historical innovations that combined tions, and furthermore to evolve our military technological advancements with new doctrine force through the ‘prepare now’ strategy for the and organizations to create more effective capa- future.” Given these parameters, ACOM is the bilities. One example is the evolution of carrier logical choice as the executive agent for joint ex- aviation. Although Coats rightly identified the perimentation. factors that drive development, his historical ex- The above approach has a number of advan- amples bear little resemblance to current reality. tages. Because it is the military’s proposal, exist- American development of carrier aviation oc- ing bureaucracies may be more amenable. By curred in an environment in which three factors channeling the efforts of present organizations, it outlined by Senator Coats that drove develop- drains minimum resources from readiness, thus ment were quantified. Military planners recog- maintaining the U.S. lead during the transforma- nized in War Plan Orange that the main adversary tion. By tying into service experimentation or- would be Japan, so the ability to project power ganizations, it exploits their existing pool of ex- across the Pacific was critical. Also, aircraft and pertise. By working for a combatant commander, carrier technology had it maintains an operational focus and integrates been tested as early as innovations quickly. early adoption of immature World War I. Our small, However this approach can fail. It will re- technologies could leave the isolationist military of the quire commitment from other unified com- services at a disadvantage as interwar era had a low op- mands. The services must cooperate both with erational tempo and few each other and with ACOM to exploit joint ex- other powers leapfrog ahead immediate requirements, perimentation recommendations and create syn- enabling it to look ahead. ergy. They must fund and fully support command After Navy planners ran focused experiments in efforts. It will be easy to treat these initiatives as the 1920s and 1930s, they determined on how distractions and marginalize them. The services much support to dedicate to new organizations and unified commands must remember the polit- and matériel. ical pressure for change and recognize that Con- Development strategy today rests on the gress will force a solution on them if this effort same factors of threat/adversary, technology, and fails. Attention to bureaucratic loose ends will be resources. Potential enemy operational methods needed. Redundant programs such as the Joint are a blank slate. Best guesses pit an advanced Interoperability Test Center and initiatives such force against an asymmetrical, unsophisticated as the commander’s interoperability initiative enemy who may reduce technological advantages fund need to be eliminated or folded into the of U.S. forces. This asymmetry may place the Na- ACOM purview. tion at a handicap. Therefore, the technology to Some philosophical warnings are also in be pursued as a basis for change is unknown. Fi- order. The experimentation must be objective. The nally, the realities of today require focusing fiscal answer must not be predetermined. Early adoption resources on operational requirements in a de- of immature technologies could leave the services manding, high operational tempo environment. at a disadvantage as other powers watch the With so many unknowns, a broad perspective for United States and then leapfrog ahead. The year experimentation is essential. 2010 should not be treated as a hard deadline. In this era of RMA, it is tempting to join the Evaluating options for joint experimentation transformation by jumping in with both feet. Re- means considering myriad factors. Planners ports from the National Defense Panel indicate should favor the proposal that builds on lessons that the need to create a transformation process is of past innovation, is best suited to produce joint urgent. Further, the Quadrennial Defense Reviewre- and synergistic change, and both promotes era A ported a world of evolving threats including evolution and allows the Armed Forces to exploit “WMD, information operations, and an array of era B revolution. They should choose the option asymmetric means to exploit our operational vul- nerabilities.” This bleak future combined with constant pressure to reduce defense spending is Autumn/Winter 1998–99 / JFQ 23