DTIC ADA525825: Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

Learning from the Past
Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis
James H. Hansen
Moscow(cid:146)s surreptitious dispatch of sian military texts indicate that
nuclear-capable 55-4 and SS-5 sur nw.rk,rovkais treared as an operational
face-to-surfacc missiles to Cuba in art to be pohslied by professors of
1962 upset the strategic balance in an military science and officers who spe
alarmingway I The resulting show cialize m this area.
down(cid:151)which the Russians call the
(cid:147)Caribbean Crisis(cid:148) and the Cubans D1A analysis preceding the missile
call the (cid:147)October Crisis(cid:148)(cid:151) brought crisis noted that the SovietArmy had
the world to the brink ofnuclear (cid:145)var. probably employed large-scale battle
From its inception, the Soviet missile field deception (cid:147)more frequently and
operation entailed elaborate denial with more consistent success than any
and deception (D&D) efforts. The other army.(cid:148) The Soviets practiced
craft ofdenying the United States extensive maskirovka before their
information on the deployment ofthe move into Czechoslovakia iii 1968.
missiles and deceiving US pohc~mak Moscow also trained foreign forces to
ers about rhe Soviet Union(cid:146)s intent apply deception, including North
was the foundation ofNikita Khrush Vietnamese units before the Tet
RangeofSoviet 55-4 medium-range chev(cid:146)s audacious Cuban venture. offensive in 1968 and Egyptian forces
ballistic missiles and 55-5 intermediare-range Piecing together the deception activi before crossing the Suez Canal in
balluricmissiles, iflaunched from Cuba. ties fromdeclassified US, Russian, and 1973.
Cuban accounts yields insights that
can help us anticipate and overcome
the D&D efforts ofa growing num Close-hold Planning
ber of foreign adversaries roda~
Gen. Anatoh Gribkov(cid:151)then a senior
member ofthe Soviet General Staff(cid:151)
Maskirovka provides revealing insights into the
early planning ofthe operation. I-Ic
Moscow has always had flair for says that, after Nikita Khrushchev
a
decided to emplace the missiles in
D&-D, known in Russian as
rnriskirovka. Its central tenet is to pre Cuba m the spring of 1962, the Gen
eral Staffdetailed only five officers(cid:151)
vent an adversary from discovering
Russian intentions by deceiving him four generals and a colonel(cid:151)to serve
about the nature, scope, and tiimng of as the center of the military planning
apparatus. Col. Gen. Semyon Ivanov,
an operation. j~Iasktrovka covers a
chiefofthe General Staff(cid:146)s Chief
broad range ofconcepts, from decep
Operations Directorate, in
tion at the strategic planning level to was over
camouflage at the troop level.2 Rus
2Pennie A Stevchs and Henry S. Marsh,
(cid:147)Surprise and Deception in Soviet M Ii(cid:151)
i Cuba is approximately 115 kilometers tan(cid:146) Thought.(cid:148) All//tan Review, hily
from US shores The 55-1 meditim-cinge 1982, pp 25-35
ballislic missiles. which were deployed Defense Intelligence Agency (DIAL So
James H. Hansen has served m f2i,r5st00tokiCluohmae,tehrasd(cid:145)la(cid:146)heranSgS-e5oifnutpertmoediate io(cid:146)wu/j/iWa(cid:146)ag,eyav,ivici(I3(cid:146)veen?e(cid:146)c(cid:146)vG/ruo,ue,~,itilM(cid:145)lii(cid:146)et/e(cid:146)irii(cid:146)sc~uQc&ic.rn(cid:151)
both CIA and DIA. range ballistic missiles had a rangeofup DDI-1100-161-78, January 1979, p. vu.
to 5,000 kilometers
49
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Missile Crisis
To strengthen the
concealment,
many
decided to emplace the missiles units were outfitted Malinovsky on 4 July and Khrush
in Cuba in the spring of 1962. the with skis, felt boots, chev on 7 July.9 From May
General Staff detailed only five through October, for reasons of
fleece-lined parkas,
officers(cid:151)four generals and a security, no communications
colonel(cid:151)to serve as the center of and other winter about the proposed. planned, and
the military planning apparatus. equipment. actual Soviet deployments in
Col. Gen. Semyon Ivanov, chief Cuba were sent, even by coded
of the General Staff(cid:146)s Chief Oper (cid:147)- messages. Everything was hand(cid:151)
ations Directorate, was in overall carried by members of the small
charge. During that summer, the coterie of senior officials who
circle of collaborators and con were directly involved.
tacts expanded to include dov was brought in as well.
members of each of the relevant possibly for the cover that he
service branches, but secrecy and later provided for traveling dele Developing A Cover Story
need-to-know prevailed. The gations.7 Biiyuzov and his experts
most senior officers brought into believed that the deployment The General Staff(cid:146)s code name for
the plan were at least told that could he made expeditiously and the operation(cid:151)ANADYR(cid:151)was
Cuba was involved in the opera secretly, without the US discover designed to mislead Soviets as
tion, hut only a few were ing the missiles. Mikovan was well as foreigners about the desti
informtd-of the exact nature of surprised at this judgment and nation of the equipment. Anadyr
the mission 5 believed the marshal to be a is the name of a river flowing into
fool.5 Rashidov was confident that the Bering Sea, the capital of the
The top civilian and military offi the missiles could be hidden, Chukotsky Autonomous District,
cials conceptualizing the claiming that the)(cid:146) could he and a bomber base in that deso
operation did not see eye-to-eye placed so as to blend in with the late region Operation ANADYR
about the likelihood of pulling off palm trees. Gribkov held that was designed to suggest to lower
a successful deception. At the only somebody inexperienced in level Soviet commanders(cid:151)and
very center of those making the military matters could reach such Western spies(cid:151)that the action
decisions stood First Deputy a conclusion, given the extensive was a strategic exercise in the far
Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan, preparations needed for each mis north of the USSR. Promoting the
Presidium member Frol Kozlov, sile site illusion, the troops that were
Defense Minister Marshal Rodion called up for the Cuban expecli
Malinovsky. and Marshal Sergei l(cid:146)hroughout the early planning tion were told only that tIle)(cid:146) (cid:145)were
Biryuzov, commander of the Stra stage. no secretaries \vere used to going to a cold region. Those
tegic Rocket Forces.6 Alternate prepare final ryped texts. A colo needing more precise instnic
Presidium member Sharaf Rashi nel with good penmanship (cid:147)rote dons, such as missile engineers,
the proposal that the Defense were informed that they would he
a(cid:145)ammG!enYS,coASnwma!ittohGl.einOeIp.reaGtlr-saifhRlkeoconoviziiaNun~td4tDGh)ee(cid:146)RnCuUbWaSi,l,l Cfteuonlu,ln-cwfilhleidcgaheddowppatlseand,apIspttirlglorvheeawdndibnwytroita tZtiaeckmiwlnhygae,rIeCaBnMluascrlgteeoairaslwsaeintadepoionnntsNhoehvaAadryca
Af~ssile Cr,s,~c CChicago. Berlin, Tokyo. long been tested.
and Moscow(cid:146) edirion q. mc,. 1994\ p
24. This is a vital source, given Gen.
Gribkov(cid:146)s role in planning and imple(cid:151) 7 Dm0 A Brugioni, Eyeball to E~obalI To strengthen the concealment,
nienting the operation TheInsideStoryoftheCuba,,i~l,sstleCn(cid:151) many units were outfitted with
~ Ibid .c,s(NewYork Random House. i991), p
Raymond l, Ganhnff,Reflectionsonthe 84. The author was a key figure at he
Cuba,,MissileCns,s. revised edirion National hoographic interpretation
(Washington, Dc The Brookings Institu(cid:151) center in 1962 Grihkov and Smith, p 24.
non, 1989), pp 12-13 a Garthoft, p 17 Garthott(cid:146), p 17,
50
MissileCrisis
skis, felt hoots, fleece-lined par Alekseev took Cuban Defense The Russians began to dispatch
kas, and other winter Minister Raul Castro aside to officers and specialists covertly to
equipment.12 Moreover, perhaps explain that (cid:147)Engineer Petrov(cid:148) in Cuba by air. On 10July, Gen. Issa
to further backstop the cover the group actually was Marshal Pliyev, traveling under the name
plan, Moscow tapped four ground Biryuzov, and that he needed to (cid:147)Pavlov,(cid:146) arrived in Cuba to com(cid:151)
forces regiments from the Lenin meet with ci /uic(cid:146)i- nict(cid:146)ci inc with(cid:151) mand the Soviet contingent.19
grad Military District in the north out delay. Only three hours later Two days later, 67 specialists
for dispatch to Cuba. The decep (cid:147)Engineer Petrov(cid:148) was shown into touched down. They journeyed as
tion was so thorough that it Fidel Castro(cid:146)s office.15 The Cuban machine operators,(cid:148) (cid:147)irrigation
fooled even senior Soviet officers leadership unanimously and specialists,(cid:148) and (cid:147)agricultural spe
sent to Cuba. One general there enthusiastically gave its approval cialists.(cid:148) Their covers, however,
asked Grihkov why winter equip in principle. 6 could not have withstood prob
ment and clothing had heen ing(cid:151)they had been assigned to
provided. The general admon Soviet maritime policy began to occupations about which they
ished him to (cid:147)think like an adult,(cid:148) shift in accordance with these first knew nothing. They were urged
and explained, (cid:147)It(cid:146)s called trips. In June and July, the USSR to consult the few genuine spe
ANADYR for a reason. We could began to charter Western ships to cialists traveling with them to gain
have given away the game if we carry general cargo from the some rudimentary knowledge of
had put any tropical clothing in Soviet Union to Cuba, resen(cid:146)ing their ostensible jobs.2(cid:176) On 17July,
your kits.(cid:148)1~ its own freighters for carrying mil Havana announced that Cuba and
itary cargo.7
the USSR had signed an agree
ment establishing a regular
Getting the Cubans On Board During 2-17 July, a Cuban delega Moscow-Havana civil air route.
tion led by Raul Castro traveled to US intelligence analysis at the
Secrecy surrounded the first Moscow to discuss Soviet military time speculated that the new Tu
Soviet delegation that ~vent to shipments, including nuclear mis 114 flights were bringing Soviet
propose the audacious plan to siles. Khrushchev met with the military officers and sensitive
Fidel Castro and other Cuban Defense Minister on 3 and 8 July.
electronic and
leaders. The officials arrived in Raul Castro initialed a draft treaty
signal-monitoring equipment to
Havana with little fanfare on with the Soviet Defense Minister
Cuba.
29 May. amidst a delegation of that governed the deployment of
agricultural experts headed by Soviet forces to Cuba. This pact
Rashidov. The group included was not to be publicly revealed Then-Minister for Industry Ernesto
Col. Gen. Ivanov and several mis until a visit that Khrushchev the(cid:148) Guevara and the head of
sile construction specialists and planned to make to Cuba in the Cuban militia led another del
other military experts, whose job November.~s egation to Moscow during 27
it was to determine whether the August-2 September. The pur
missiles could be deployed in pose was to introduce Fidel
secrecy.11 Ambassador Aleksandr GarthofC p. 15; alsn, Grihkov and Castro(cid:146)s revisions into the draft
Smith. P 14
0 Fursenko and Naftali, p iad treaty. The Cubans proposed that
James 0. Blight. BruceJ Allyn. and the deployment he made public
Aleksancir Fursenko and Timothy Naf David A. Welch, with the assistance of
tali, (cid:147)O,w lie/Iofa Garth/aT Khn(cid:146)sb Davis Lewis. Cubaon theBn(cid:146)nk. Castro. in order to head off any Ameri
chap. Castro, andKe,,,,edL 1958(cid:151)1964 theMissileCrtc,s, andtheSovietCo//apse can overreaction; Khrushchev,
(NewYork and London. \V (cid:145)V Norton& (NewYork PantheonBooks, 1993), p 8.
Company, 1997), p. t9L This valuable This source draw(cid:146)s extensively on input
source relies on material from Soviet/ from key Soviet/Russian and American
Russian archives officials who had a hand in the crisis i9 Fursenko and Naftali, p. 192.
Gribkov and Smith, p. 15 Brugioni, P. 92. 20 Grihkrjv and Smith. pp. 37-38.
0 Ibid. Grihkov and Smith. p. 21 Brugioni. p~ 93.
51
Missile Crisis
(cid:147)
The ship captains
were not told where
however, successfully argued for theft cargoes were to ing missiles. On deck were cargo
continued secrecy. be delivered. trucks, none of which were asso
ciatcd with the missiles
Nonetheless, some US experts
Keeping The Secret At Home speculated that the ship might he
carrying ballistic missiles deep in
In the Soviet Union, the men and its hold, because the Soviets
equipment destined for Cuba tended to use large(cid:151)hatch ships of
were assembled, loaded, and dence.~(cid:148) Secrecy was so strict that the Pu/lava and O#i,th classes to
moved by rail at night under rein couriers carried all messages deliver such missiles.30
forced guard. The train routes and between the ports and the
final destinations \vere kept Defense Ministry in Moscow. The ship captains were not told
secret. Mail and telegrams along where their cargoes were to he
the way were strictly prohibited.22 On hoard, the Soviets applied the delivered. Before casting off, the
same nias/eirovka measures that captain and the troop com(cid:151)
To mask the immensity of the they had adopted when they first
iiiander jointly received a large
overall effort, the shipments to began to send weapons to Cuba. sealed envelope. Unfastening it,
Cuba left from eight ports(cid:151)four Packing crates or special ship they found a smaller envelope to
in the north (Kronstadt, Liepaya, ping containers concealed and
be opened only at a certain set of
Baltiysk, and Murmansk) and four protected weapons carried as geographic coordinates in the
on the Black Sea (Sevastopol, deck cargo. Certain telltale mili Atlantic Ocean. When they
Feodosiya. Nikolayev, and Poti).23 tary equipment was boarded up reached the designated point, an
\Vestern access to these ports was with planks to make it look like officer from the KGB(cid:146)s Special
closed off It was normal for the the ship(cid:146)s superstructure Even Department joined them for the
Soviets to close ports when muni on-deck field kitchens were dis opening of the envelope. The
tions were being loaded, hut this guisecl.28 The Soviets shielded instructions told them to proceed
time the surface-to-surface mis crated military hardware(cid:151)such as to a Cuban port and authorized
siles were being put on the ships missiles and launchers(cid:151)with them to inform the ship(cid:146)s com(cid:151)
under tight security and cover of metal sheets to defeat infrared pan)(cid:146) of the destination.3i The
darkness.2~ photography.2(cid:146) They stored other concern for secrecy permeated
combat and specialized equip
the process. The last sentence of
The troops were housed at ment below, out of sight. the captain(cid:146)s letter read: After
nearby military facilities during Ordinary automobiles, trucks.
familiarizing yourself with the
the two or three days required to tractors, and harvesters ~vere contents of this document,
load a ship. Guards were posted placed on the top deck to con destroy it.(cid:146) 32
to prevent anyone from leaving ~(cid:145)ev the impression that only
the area. No letters, telegrams, or civilian and agricultural gear was
telephone calls were permitted, a being transported. Every ship involved in Operation
rule that also applied to the offic ANADYR carried thick folders,
ers.25 The ships crew members, The freighter Poltat.(cid:146)a, which prepared by Defense Ministry
some of whom made more than sailed to Cuba in September, was staff officers, which contained
one run to Cuba, were forbidden a good example. No external background information on a
shore leave and correspon signs indicated that it was carry(cid:151) number of countries with which
the USSR had good relations. The
Crihkov and smith, p 56 I/nd p 56
.
~(cid:145) lb/cf p. 29 2(cid:148) I/nd p 29 -~ Brugioni, pp 149(cid:151)150
Brugi,oni, p 119 ~ I/nd,, p 30 Gribkov and smith. p 31
c;rihkov and Smith, p 30 2(cid:148) lbicL, p. 56, .(cid:145)~ I/nd
52
MissileCrisis
(cid:147)
If challenged at sea,]
the captains were to
(cid:145)destroy alldocuments
study materials on Cuba were route. In July 1962. the Soviets
buried in these packets, so that with State and military described US reconnaissance mis
not even the compilers would secrets,(cid:146) take measures sions in international waters as
know the real focus of the (cid:145)harassment,(cid:148) and requested
operation. to protect the through their GRU officer in
personnel, and sink Washington, Col. Georgi Bolsha
the ships. kov, that these flights he stopped
Secrecy In Transit for the sake of better bilateral
relations.78 In retrospect, this
The Soviet ships macic false dec overture clearly appears to have
larations when they exited the been an effort by Khrushchev to
Black Sea and the Bosporu& delay the discovery of weapons
Cargo records were altered and approached the Soviet ships, the related to Operation ANADYR.
the tonnage declared was well Soviet crews would lower bulg Bolshakov met with Attorney
below what ~~(cid:145)as being carriecl.~~ ing parcels of vodka, brandy, General Robert Kennedy more
The ships would declare from caviar, sausages, and other clelica than a dozen tithes.
Odessa, although they had loaded cies. Grihkov noted that this
at other ports. OFten ships going transparent hrihery worked well: Most of the voyages lasted from
to Cuba listed Conakn(cid:146), Guinea, (cid:145)Everyone likes to get presents, 18 to 20 days. Due to strict
as their destination. When the even pilots.(cid:148)~~ maskfroplea measures, the troops
volume of traffic increased, a were kept below decks except (cid:145)or
number ofships did not give their The captains were instructed to a few minutes at night when
destinations but simply stated that take all possible evasive action in small groups (cid:147)crc allowed to
they were carrying general the event of attacks or an effort to exercise and get some fresh air.~
cargo(cid:148) and (cid:145)awaiting orders.(cid:148)3(cid:146) hoard their ships. Should evasive During the tropical days. heavy
action fail, they were to destroy tarpaulins cove (cid:145)ccl the hatches to
Transit through the Bosporus and all documents with state and mili(cid:151) the lower decks where the troops
the Dardanelles Straits presented taiy secrets,(cid:148) take measures to were berthed. \Vith little air circu
a special challenge. Not only protect the personnel, and sink lation, the inside temperature
were the soldiers kept below the ships.36 Should their vessels climbed to 120 degrees Fahren
decks, hut the captains were experience mechanical failure en heit or higher. Rations were
under orders to prevent any for route, the captains were to issued twice a clay and only in
eigners from boarding, even the explain to ships offering assis darkness~ ~lu Many of the troops on
Turkish pilots who usually guided tance that they were exporting hoard swore that they would
civilian ships through those tricky automobiles.3~ 1-lad this occurred, never again set foot on a ship.
waters. Whenever the pilots it might have provided clues(cid:151)the
USSR had few cars of any kind Although the restrictions macic
~3 USSIGINT revealed that Soviet vessels aauntdowmoabsilneotexrpeocrotgenri.zed as an conditions on board nightmarish,
were making false port declai(cid:146)anons and the deceptions worked. Gen.
listing less than theirknown cargo-darn(cid:146) Grihkov states that (cid:145)US intelli
ialngSeccaupraictiytAygeB)n(cid:146)cylatneotAeudgutshta,t 5t7hevoNyaatgieosn Moscow also resorted to diplo gence discovered neither the true
toCuha had taken place in a little overa matic means to reduce US significance of the surge in Soviet
month andthatsome shipswere ontheir reconnaissance of the ships en shipping to Cuba nor the mission
second voyage in that period of time.
See: National SecurityAgency, Ni-I anti
/he CuI,ii,iMissile Crisis (Fort Mciclc,
MD(cid:146) NSA centerforcryptologic History, 3~ Grihkov and Smith, p 57 ~Ibfr1, p 193.
1998). pp 3-(cid:146)i Fursenku and Naitali. p 192 3(cid:176) Grihkov and Smith, p 35-
.~ Brrigioni, p 149 3~ Ibid. IhuL, p 56
53
Missile Crisis
(cid:147)
By late October, the
size of the Soviet
contingent in Cuba
of our troops on the island until all Allied bombers on Germany
near!)(cid:146) all the men had come was about 41,900 throughout World War II (cid:145)~(cid:145)~
ashore and, still moving in large personnel(cid:151)quadruple
numbers only by night, had been the size that US Most of the military technicians
deployed to their assigned also came ashore at Marie!.
positions.,,.(cid:146)1 inteffigence agencies Deception activities throughout
figured. the transit stage and the strict
security measures at Mariel
hindered tile ability of US
Unloading in Cuba
intelligence agencies to estimate
the number of Soviet troops The
As the Soviet troops arrived, plan for ANADYR that was
Cuban officials took steps to approved in early July had called
Even before the Soviet ships
support Moscow(cid:146)s ,nask/rovk(cid:146)a for moving 50.874 men. That total
plan. In earl)(cid:146) fall, they began to approached Cuban ports, a num included personnel for field hos
ber of niaskjropka
exert control over the pitals. bakeries, mechanical
precautions had been imple
movements of all foreigners on workshops, and other support
mented. At Mariel, for example,
the island. News reporters and units, all with a three(cid:151)month sup
foreign embassy personnel were the Soviets built a large cinder- ply of food and fuel. During
block wall around the unloading
forbidden to travel outside Septenther, the plan was revised
Havana, In the city, Cuban agents area so that none of the port to eliminate submarine and sur
sun(cid:146)eilled and harassed foreign activity could he observed by face ship squadrons, clue to
land-based agents.-i5 As the ships potential resupply problems and
eorfsf,icieaslps.ecially British embassy lay in port, KGB officers kept concerns that their presence
watch on deck. All Cubans, even might sound an alarm bell in
militiamen, were barred from the Washington. By late October, the
The planners had selected port areas.(cid:148)6 Local inhabitants size of the contingent in Cuba
11 Cuban ports to receive the within a mile of the waterfront in had reached about 41,900 person
Soviet ships(cid:146) Havana, Mariel, Mariel had to evacuate their nd(cid:151)quadruple the size that US
Cabanas, Bahia Honda. Matan homes.4(cid:146) intelligence agencies figured.~
zas, La Isabella, Nuevitas, Nicaro,
Casilda, Cienfuegos, and Santi The first 55-4 missiles arrived in Nonetheless, in the hectic initial
ago de Cuba.(cid:145)~ The)(cid:146) earmarked Marie! on hoard the Onisk on days in Cuba, secrecy created
three of them(cid:151)Bahia Honda and 8 September. The Jndiguk(cid:146)a more than a few glitches. The
Mariel on the northwest coast and brought the initial shipment of General Staff had neglected to
Casilda on the south coast(cid:151)to nuclear warheads on 4 ~ provide passwords to facilitate
receive the surface-to-surface mis According to one source, this ship communication between the
siles and nuclear warheads.H4 carried 99 nuclear charges(cid:151)some arriving transport ships and the
two-thirds of all nuclear weapons
sent to Cuba and over 20 times
IlneL the explosive power dropped by Fursenko and Naftali, p. 217. There is
12 Brugioni. p 148-TheCubans probably conflicting source information on the
knew that the British were helping the number ofwarheads ~.pecifically for tile
United States, which did nothave formal 85-4 misstles Gribknvstates that 36such
representation in Havana. LS Brugioni. p 1514 warheads (cid:147)crc introduced. this issue
~3 Grihkov and Smith. p 38 Grihkov(cid:146)s David Detzer, TheB(cid:146),, C,,hcet, ,1is(cid:151) cannot he resolved based on crirrent ev
map puts Nicaro in the wrong location. cl/cc;(cid:146),s,.s /962 (New York(cid:146)- (cid:145)l(cid:146)humas y idence, hut 36 appears to be a like!)(cid:146) fig-
apparently confusing it with Niquero nn Cr(cid:146)owell. 1979), p 69 Lire as that tracks with Soviet doctrinal
the Southea(cid:146)~t cuasr JhicL, p 57 requirements for rel(cid:146)ire nlksiles.
Fursenko and Naftali, p 216 ~ Grihkov and smith, p 52 ~(cid:147) Gribkov and Snlith, p. 28.
54
MissileCrisis
(cid:147)
Soviet and Cuban
planners leaked
Cuban greeting parties. Accord accurate information rate information about the
ingly. some ship captains and on- about the deployment deployment so as to mask it. The
board troop commanders had dif through discredited information was funneled through
counterrevolutionary organiza
ficulty accepting orders to reroute groups] so as to mask tions and their press in the United
their ships from their originally
States, especially in Miami. The
it.
assigned ports. The captain of CIA discounted the information,
one ship even turned back out to because it did not consider the
sea rather than allow a Cuban groups and people peddling it to
patrol boat crew to come aboard he credible. This strategy was
to guide him to his anchorage.51 highly effective, according to a
former Cuban intelligence
Movement to Field Sites officer.~
Usually two or three days were
required to unload a ship with The inaskirouka measures were The deception campaign that
military cargo, and maskijouka not air tight. In the initial stages exploited the dmigrds(cid:146) lack of
requirements invariably compli of the operation, the United States credibility was unwittingly back
cated the work. Equipment that received reports from friendly stopped by correspondence
had at least a superficial resem ndeanttiso,ns,anndewosthpearpesrourccoersrespon abnedtwreeelnatiCvuesbainnsthaendUntihteeidr fSrtaiteensd.s
blance to agricultural machinery indicating that hundreds of Rus From June to September, Cuban
was unloaded in broad daylight. sian troops in fatigues had been intelligence intercepted some
hut weapons and other military seen in Havana and in seemingly 17,000 letters that had something
equipment could he unloaded endless convoys along Cuba(cid:146)s to say about the deployment of
only at night. From the docks, main highways. Many young Rus Soviet troops and missiles in
specialized equipment was stored sian men also had been obsenred Cuba. In late September, Cuban
sightseeing in the Cuban capital authorities permitted those letters
in sheds or moved directly to des in checked, cotton shirts and to arrive in Miami as part of the
ignated bases along back roads at cheap trousers.54 Although the deception campaign. Just as
night 52 Soviets and Cubans took extra Havana expected, the CIA paid
precautions to keep gawkers no attention to these letters.57
All this time, Radio Moscow was away from the whanres and
moved the nuclear cargoes away
claiming that the USSR was only For US intelligence analysts, the
under black canvas and escorted
giving Cuba machine tools, by heavy guard, the chatty amount of noise(cid:146) from Cuba
wheat, and agricultural machin Cubans gave a steady stream of ginrefwrodmeaCfuebnainnsg,. tRoeuproisrttss, fflooroedigend
ery,(cid:146) along with some 7,000 tons clues to US SIGINT collectors.55
diplomats in Cuba, and newspa
of various fertilizers. (cid:145)53 This
per officials reporting in a private
description was consistent with At the same time, the Soviets and
the false identities provided to Cubans mounted a major cam
many of the Soviet military spe paign using HUMINT channels to 5(cid:148) Doiningo Aniuchastegw. (cid:147)Cuban In
bolster the overall deception telligence and ihe October Crisis.(cid:148) Intel
cialists and also with the daytime effort. The planners leaked accu ligenceam!Na/loiza!Secilnhs(cid:146), Vnlu ne
unloading activity. 13, Number3. Auiumn 1998, p. 101. (cid:145)Ibis
is a special issue (In inielligence and the
missile crisis. edited by,!ames C ill gin
Brugioni. p, toi and David A \VeicIi. It is a unique col(cid:151)
5512 lIIbnitd!.. Pp. 38-39 (cid:147)shiNpSAO.xfoop.rdCuwa,spph.ug2-g3ingThteheUScuSbiaGnINT dliefcfueornentofianrtteilclliegseoncneisheervriocleess.phiyecl by
(cid:147) Detzer. p. 57 coastline at that time- (cid:147) Ibid
55
Missile Crisis
capacity. At the CIA focal point at mention their inilitaiy designa Dobiynin sought out Robert
Opa-Locka, Florida, intelligence tions or the ranks of their Kennedy and stated that he had
officers screened countless commanders. Moreover, all com(cid:151) received instructions from
reports and debriefed Cubans munications between the Soviet Khrushchev to assure the Presi
who had fled (lie island 58 Most of military headquarters in Havana dent that there would be no
the reports from Cuba were exag and units in the field had to he surface(cid:151)to(cid:151)surface missiles or
gerated or imaginary(cid:151)some were made in person, not written or offensive weapons placed in
so outrageous that they were sent by radio. Except for very Cuba. Dobrynin also added that
laughable and made all the oth brief hookups and equipment
the Attorney General could assure
ers suspect. There were far tests, Soviet troops maintained
his brother that the Soviet mili(cid:151)
fetched tales of African troops total radio silence in order to
with rings in their noses, lurking mask their identity, location, and tarv buildup was not of any
signifiance.u1~ On 6 September.
Mongolians. and even Chinese troop strength from US
troops These accounts followed intelligence.hi Theodore Sorenson, special coun
earlier erroneous reports of Soviet sel to President Kennedy, met
military equipment secreted away In retrospect. some Soviet and with Dobiynin, (cid:147)ho reiterated his
in caves, underground hangers, Cuban officials found it remark assurances that Soviet military
and concrete domes. The previ able that the operation remained assistance to Cuba was strictly
ous reports had cast doubt on the secret for a lull month after the defensive in nature and! did not
reliability of sources, so US ana missiles arrived in Cuba.(2 The represent a thi(cid:146)eat to American
lysts found it easy to dismiss the missile carriers were too big to go security. The following day,
stream of reports of Soviet unnoticed on the hack roads of Dobn(cid:146)nin assured US Ambassa
the island for long As they rum clor to the United Nations Acllai
bled through the little Cuban Stevenson that the USSR was sup
From the port areas, the canvas- towns, they left a trail of downed plying only defensive weapons to
covered 55-4 missiles were moved telephone poles and mailboxes. Cuba On 11 September, TASS
in night convoys, under tight When a peasant(cid:146)s shack had to be announced that the USSR neither
security, to sites in the interior of moved or knocked down to allow needed nor intended to intro
sthoethiastlantdh.e Stercouorpistydiwsaesmbtaigrhkteedned acomrinsesri,lethcoasreriewrhtoo wtiutrnneassteigdhtthe duce offensive nuclear weapons
into Cuba.~
dressed as civilians, and their event were hound to talk Soviet
escorts(cid:151)Soviet personnel who and Cuban efforts to discredit
had arrived earlier(cid:151)were such anecdotal accounts paid off. In late September, Khrushchev
required to wear Cuban mil tar)(cid:146) ernbai(cid:146)ked on a barnstorming tour
uniforms and issue commands in the Turkmen and Uzhek
along the convoy routes only in Disingenuous Diplomacy republics, ibis high(cid:151)profile ti(cid:146)ip,
Spanish.~ On the march or Nv(cid:151) which extended into the first
ouackecl. Soviet military men Soviet spokesmen kept up a week of October, emphasized
remained dressed in civilian steady stream of denials and dis agricultural themes. In none of
clothing and were forbidden to
information in September. On 4 Khrushchev(cid:146)s man)(cid:146) speeches dur
September, Ambassador Anatoli ing his travels was there any
~ Deizec p 59 reference suggesting aggression
(cid:147) 1/nd., p. (tO. or threats to the United States.65
Grihkov and Smith. p 39 (cid:145)liii,,
,uash,,(cid:146)ovh(cid:146)u requirement is comparable I/mI . p 52. and Amuchastegu , p loL
to tiIat used during the Korean conflict, A cautionary note here is that ihis arude
when Soviet pilots were instructed to is the only puhli,(cid:146)~hecl account by a (cid:147)(cid:145) Brtigioni, p 115~
speak in Chinese while flying nlis(cid:146)iOiiS firmer Cuban intelligence officer tliu~ Blight. Allyn, and Welch, pp (cid:145)i63-(cid:146)i64.
tn tO,(cid:146) t( knit US SIGtNT units linigioni. PP 157-158
56
MissileCrisis
In only six minutes,
US Air Force Maj.
Richard Heyser
The pattern continued. On readied massive air attack and
13 Octohei, a high State snapped 928 photo invasion plans(cid:151)including send
Department official. Chester graphs thatyieldedthe ing nuclear-armed B-52s aloft(cid:151)
Bowles, questioned Dohrvnin on and engaged in extensive policy
first confirmation of
whether Moscow intended to put deliberations in the Executive
offensive weapons in Cuba; the offensive missiles in Committee. On 22 October, Presi
Ambassador denied any such Cuba. dent Kennedy revealed the
intention. On 17 October, GRU missile buildup to the world. Con(cid:151)
Col. Bolshakov brought Robert fronted with the photographic
Kennedy a personal message evidence, the Russians informed
directly from Khrushchev to Presi Raul Castro that i-nore attention
dent Kennedy that under no would have to he paid to con
circumstances would surface-to- cealing the site work and
surface missiles he sent to Cuba.(cid:148) concrete slabs and surrounded camouflaging the missiles and
The next day Foreign Minister not only by the missiles, but also other heavy equipment.72 l(cid:146)he
Gromyko met with President by multiple buildings, fuel trucks Soviet units stretched tarpaulins
Kennedy for two hours. Gromyko and tanks, and hundreds of and nets over the missiles, and
assured him that the Soviet aid to meters of thick cable To try to daubed paint or mud across the
Cuba (cid:147)pursued solely the pur maintain secrecy, Soviet com canvases. This marked the first
pose of contributing to the manders forbade their troops time that they tried! to conceal
defense capabilities of Cuba and from raking any leave l(cid:146)roin their their missiles from the air, proba
to the development of its peace- deployment sites and ruled out bly hoping to mask the total
lii! economy.(cid:148)6(cid:148) using Cuban labor. Nonetheless, number of missiles and protect
Soviet commanders and planners against sabotage.~~ By 28 Octo
knew(cid:146) that although the tractor- ber, however, the confrontation,
trailers and associated large including Kennedy(cid:146)s imposition of
Denouement
objects could be covered by can a naval and air quarantine on the
~(cid:145)as. their masses could not be shipment of offensive
The missile sites themselves could shrunkfi Heavy equipment might military equipment to Cuba, led
never have remained hidden for obscure part of the missile site Khrushchev to agree on a
long. They \vere constructed in signature from ground(cid:151)level, but formula to end the crisis. The
areas expropriated from Cuban from above it stuck out
landowners, had no fences or markedly.70
walls, and were exposed to aerial The details of the u(cid:151)2 mission arc
obsen(cid:146)ation.6~ Standard found in voI,iIl/CXI: Fi(cid:145)rei(cid:231)(cid:146),i Refattolls
eninacsekztroodvekapldooycmterinnteignavweoopdreefder Ophnot1o4gOrcatpohbeedr,thaeUa-r2eaaiorfcrSafatn AtEh1de/wcaUd/nrc/dnCvrCt!s~SRsueIedtfueesdr,A1/c9lh6w~1i--rm1la9et6s/-i3S,,eSOda,i!mtxpeisd,o,bny.
areas, yet Cuba(cid:146)s forests were Cristohal, where the first missile LouisJ~ Smuh. and David S Pattcrson
gfeenwercallulsytesrspaorsfep,aclomnstirseteisngorofa a usinxitmiwnaustebse,inUgSdAeiprloFyoerdc.e MIanj.only (ianWgiansOhafiifxnicguet.onti,h9e9~6scit..atpuUsS2o9Gf-otvAheletrhnwoneuiagehnixi)unPnsrciiennrt
thick undergrowth of bushes. Richard Heyser snapped 928 pho Cuba at the time of disc,~ven(cid:146), we no(cid:148)
Salulcohfvtehgeetmaitssiiolneceoquulidpmneonttc.o~vesrs(cid:151) tcoongfriarpmhastithoantoyfieolfdfeednstihvee fmiisstsiles pakamjb~il~oe(cid:146)ndtihenahtlvaeotrenvlOycstsyosobtemree-m.sofO(cid:147)efrt-hctehenrue3ac6dl)es(cid:146)aSr-fr4(cid:151)c,sar
4 launchers are anchored to large in Cuba.71 Washington stepped up deployed, for example. only about haIf
intelligence collection of all kinds, ~~(cid:145)cre ready to he fueled(cid:151)an i8(cid:151)hour
process(cid:151)and not one had been pro(cid:151)
grail]iiied ft)r night. Sec Crihkov and
Blight. Allyn. and Welch, pp 465-466 Sniiih, p. 63
i3rugioni. p i50. (cid:176)~ mu-f, p 55 7~ Gribknv and Smith, ~ 53,
Ciibkov and Smith, p 40. 1/in-f p. 40 ~- Detzer, p i94
,
57