DTIC ADA525711: The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework PDF
Preview DTIC ADA525711: The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework
Dr.PollackisdirectoroftheStrategicResearchDepart- mentintheCenterforNavalWarfareStudiesofthe NavalWarCollege,wherehealsodirectstheCollege’s Asia-PacificStudiesGroup.Afterearninghisdoctorate inpoliticalsciencefromtheUniversityofMichiganand completingapostdoctoralfellowshipatHarvardUni- versity,heworkedfortheRANDCorporation(succes- sively as member of the research staff, head of the Political Science Department, faculty affiliate of the RANDGraduateSchool,directorforinternationalpol- icy,andsenioradviserforinternationalpolicy).Hehas taughtattheUniversityofCaliforniaatLosAngelesand atBrandeisUniversity.Hisrecentpublicationsinclude The United States and Asia: Towards A New U.S. StrategyandForcePosture(2001,contributor),Pre- paringforKoreanUnification:ScenariosandImplica- tions(1999,seniorauthor),TheFutureofChineseand Japanese Naval Power: Implications for Northeast Asian Maritime Security (1998, senior author), In China’s Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese ForeignPolicyandMilitaryDevelopment(1998,co- editor),AssembledinChina:Sino-U.S.Collaboration andtheChineseAviationIndustry(1998,seniorau- thor),andTheFutureofU.S.NuclearWeaponsPolicy (1997,contributor),aswellasnumerousjournalarticles andbookchaptersonU.S.Asia-Pacificstrategy,Chinese politicalandstrategicdevelopments,andEastAsian international relations. Naval War College Review, Summer 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 3 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2003 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2003 to 00-00-2003 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval War College,686 Cushing Road,Newport,RI,02841-1207 REPORT NUMBER 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 40 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 THE UNITED STATES, NORTH KOREA, AND THE END OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK Jonathan D.Pollack B etweenOctoberandDecember2002,withAmericanpolicymakerspreoccu- piedbythegrowingpossibilitiesofwarwithIraq,amoreimmediateandun- anticipatedconfrontationloomedbetweentheUnitedStatesandNorthKorea. Withstunningrapidity,WashingtonandPyongyangunraveledclosetoadecade ofpainfullycrafteddiplomaticarrangementsdesignedtopreventfull-scalenu- clearweaponsdevelopmentontheKoreanPeninsula.Byyear’send,bothcoun- trieshadwalkedawayfromtheirrespectivecommitmentsundertheU.S.-DPRK AgreedFrameworkof October1994,themajorbilateralaccordnegotiatedbe- tweenWashingtonandPyongyangduringthe1990s.NorthKoreafinalizedits breakwiththeearlieragreementbyannouncingitsimmediatewithdrawalfrom theNuclearNonproliferationTreaty(NPT)on10January2003,becomingthe firstnationevertowithdrawfromthetreaty,simultaneouslyseveringallnuclear inspectionarrangementswiththeInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA). Theabruptcollapseof theAgreedFramework,intheabsenceof alternative arrangementstoconstrainNorthKorea’snuclearweaponspotential,triggered majorinternationalconcernoverthelonger-termconsequencesfortheglobal nonproliferationregime.TherenewedconfrontationbetweentheUnitedStates andNorthKoreaalsoexacerbatedthemostserioustensionsinthefifty-yearhis- tory of the U.S.–Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance, quite possibly laying the groundwork for a major regional crisis unparalleled since the Korean War. Thoughaworst-casescenarioisnotinevitable,apeacefuloutcomethatprevents an avowed DPRK nuclear weapons capability seems far from assured, and an agreement acceptable to both states that would supplant the discarded 1994 agreementremainsoutofreach. 12 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW TheAgreedFrameworkfrozePyongyang’sactivitiesatitsYongbyonnuclear complex,includingtheoperationofaplutoniumreprocessingfacility.Leftun- constrained,thereprocessingfacilitywouldhaveenabledNorthKoreatosepa- rate substantial quantities of weapons-grade plutonium from the spent fuel removedfromitsoperationalgraphite-moderatedreactor.Haditsongoingac- tivities not been halted, North Korea would have ultimately developed the means to fabricate significant numbers of nuclear weapons,as well as enabled Pyongyang to market weapons-grade plutonium to other parties.In return for mothballing its operational TheAgreedFramework“asweknowitisdead.” reactor and related facilities, the United States agreed to provide heavyfueloiltotheNorthandtoassumeleadershipofamultinationalprojectto build two “proliferation resistant” light-water reactors (LWRs). These reactors wereintendedtoreplacetheNorth’sextantpowerreactorandforestallthecom- pletionof twolargerreactorsthatwouldhaveenabledproductionof fargreater quantities ofweapons-grade plutonium. AsNorthKorea’snuclearactivitiesincreasedduringthelate1980sandearly 1990s, the U.S. intelligence community devoted growing attention to Pyong- yang’snuclearweaponspotential.ThereportingontheNorth’snuclearweapons program varied little during the 1990s,but estimates released since 2001 have been highly inconsistent. In 1993, the Central Intelligence Agency first con- cluded that in the late 1980s “North Korea ...ha[d] produced enough pluto- nium for at least one,and possibly two,nuclear weapons.”This judgment was reaffirmedinallunclassifiedintelligenceassessmentsthroughoutthelatterhalf of the 1990s, up to intelligence reporting in mid-2001.1 Though the CIA assess- mentwaswidelyinterpretedasevidencethatNorthKoreahadoneortwonu- clear weapons in its possession, neither the intelligence community nor any senior U.S.official offered a definitive statement to this effect during the re- mainderofthe1990s.However,theintelligencecommunityassessmentshifted noticeablyinDecember2001,whenanunclassifiedversionofaNationalIntelli- genceEstimate(NIE)assertedthat“[t]heIntelligenceCommunityjudgedinthe mid-1990s that North Korea had produced one,possibly two,nuclear weapons.”2 Subsequentintelligencereportingfurtheralteredearlierestimates.Inanunclas- sifiedassessmentprovidedtotheCongresson19November2002,theCIAstated: “TheU.S....hasassessedsincetheearly1990sthattheNorthhasoneorpossibly two [nuclear] weapons using plutonium it produced prior to 1992.”3 TheinitialBushadministrationintelligenceestimatesthusofferedmorede- finitiveclaimsaboutNorthKoreannuclearcapabilities.Theyalsomovedback the date that intelligence analysts believed North Korea had fabricated one or two weapons, or the supposed date when the CIA made this determination. POLLACK 13 However, a CIA estimate provided to the Congress in January 2003 reverted to the more equivocal language of the 1990s, asserting that “North Korea probably has produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons.”4 The January 2003 document did not reiterate the assertions of late 2001 and late 2002 that Pyongyang already possessed one or two weapons,let aloneclaimthattheintelligencecommunityarrivedatthisjudgmentatamuch earlier date. Intelligence inconsistencies and uncertainties concerning the North’s nuclear program were not surprising. However, decade-old estimates werenowbeingsharplyrecast,withdirectimplicationsforfutureU.S.policyto- wardPyongyang. In addition, the U.S. intelligence community concluded in the summer of 2002thatNorthKoreahadundertakenacoverturanium-enrichmentprogram, mostlikelyinitiatedinthelate1990s.AccordingtotheCIA,activitiesassociated with this program surfaced definitively during 2001, including extensive pur- chases of materials for construction of a gas-centrifuge enrichment facility.5 ThoughtheCIAcontendedinNovember2002thatthefacilitywasatleastthree years from becoming operational, intelligence analysts believed that a com- pleted facility could ultimately produce sufficient fissile material for “two or more nuclear weapons per year.”6 In the CIA’s judgment, an enrichment facility wouldprovidetheNorthanalternativesourceoffissilematerialtosubstitutefor the plutonium reprocessing activities frozen under the Agreed Framework.In addition,theNovember2002intelligenceestimatedidnotprecludethepossibil- ityofPyongyang’sreactivatingitsplutoniumseparationprogram. U.S. officials asserted that North Korea’s enrichment activities violated the spiritandtheletterof the1994accords,throughwhichbothstatespledgedto keeptheKoreanPeninsulafreeofnuclearweaponsandtoredefinepoliticaland economicrelationsbetweenthetwocountries.AsstatedbyPresidentBushinhis 6March2003pressconference,“Mypredecessor,inagood-faitheffort,entered intoaframeworkagreement[withNorthKorea].TheUnitedStateshonoredits sideof theagreement.NorthKoreadidn’t.Whilewefelttheagreementwasin force, North Korea was enriching uranium.”7 Under the Agreed Framework, Pyongyang had pledged to “consistently take steps”to implement the January 1992JointDeclarationontheDenuclearizationoftheKoreanPeninsula,which obligatedtheSouthandNorthnotto“test,manufacture,produce,receive,pos- sess,store,deployorusenuclearweapons,”aswellascommittingbothcountries “not[to]possessnuclearreprocessinganduraniumenrichmentfacilities.”Dur- ing 2001, senior administration officials had acknowledged that North Korea had upheld its obligations under the Agreed Framework.8 But the United States nowconfrontedthepossibilityofacovertfissilematerialprogramnotcovered 14 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW bythe1994agreement,therebyenablingPyongyangtocircumventitsdeclared nonproliferationcommitments. AfterreviewingtheintelligencedataandweighingAmericanpolicyoptions, theBushadministrationinearlyOctober2002dispatchedapresidentialemis- sary,AssistantSecretaryofStateforEastAsianandPacificAffairsJamesKelly,to Pyongyang.AssistantSecretaryKellyinformedseniorNorthKoreanofficialsof thesummer2002intelligencefindings,withoutfurnishingspecificordetailed evidencetosubstantiatethem.Hemadeclearthatthesedevelopmentshadin- troduceda“precondition”toanypossibleimprovementinU.S.–NorthKorean relations,andthatNorthKoreawouldneedtoverifiablydismantleitscovertnu- clear activities before the United States would consider the resumption of high-level exchanges with the DPRK.9 According to State Department officials, NorthKoreanofficialsfirstdeniedtheU.S.allegations.However,inafinalmeet- ingwithAssistantSecretaryof StateKelly,aseniorNorthKoreanofficial,First ViceMinisterofForeignAffairsKangSokJu,reportedlyadmittedtheexistence of aclandestinenuclearweaponsprogram,whileassertingasovereignrightto developnuclearweaponsand“morepowerfulthingsaswell.”Kangalsoalleg- edlyinformedhisAmericaninterlocutorsoftheNorth’sintentiontoterminate the Agreed Framework.10 AfullerrenderingofpolicydevelopmentspriortotheKellyvisitandsubse- quenteventssuggestsamorecomplexandmoretroublingstory.NorthKorean scientistshadengagedinactivitiesthatcontravenedorskirteddeclaredobliga- tionsundertheAgreedFramework,butneitherWashingtonnorPyongyangdis- tinguisheditselfinreactingtothe The Bush administration had opted for a intelligence claims. Leaders in waiting game with Pyongyang. both capitals were increasingly dissatisfied with the 1994 accord, though for very different reasons. Pyongyang complained repeatedly that the UnitedStateswaslaggingfarbehindthescheduledcompletionoftheLWRpro- ject,andWashingtonfaultedtheNorthfordelaysinclarifyingitspriornuclear weapons activities.Neither government saw compelling reasons to sustain the 1994accord.Theintelligencefindingsthusenabledbothgovernmentstodeem theirpriorobligationsnullandvoid.Withbothcountriesputtingforwardmax- imal, nonnegotiable policy positions, the subsequent collapse of the Agreed Frameworkwasvirtuallyforeordained,thoughitunfoldedwithfargreaterra- piditythanU.S.officialsprobablyanticipated. Thisarticlewillfocusprimarilyonthefactorsthatledtothebreakdownof the Agreed Framework. This requires analysis at four principal levels: U.S.– NorthKoreanrelationsundertheClintonadministration;earlyBushadminis- trationpoliciesandhowthesepoliciesmayhaveaffectedNorthKoreanpolitical POLLACK 15 andsecuritycalculations;anassessmentofthenuclearenrichmentactivitiesun- dertaken by North Korea; and how Washington and Pyongyang responded to the U.S.disclosure of North Korea’s renewed nuclear activities,leading to the policyimpasseandultimatecollapseoftheAgreedFrameworkinlate2002and early2003.TheselargerissuesfirstnecessitatesomeobservationsontheNorth Koreansystem,itscurrentcircumstancesandpolitical-militaryorientation,and theNorth’snegotiatingstrategies. UNDERSTANDING THE NORTH KOREAN SYSTEM TheDemocraticPeople’sRepublicof Korea(DPRK)istheworld’smostself- referential political system and America’s longest-running political-military adversary.The United States has continuously deployed major military forces onthepeninsulaforahalf-centurytopreventasecondKoreanwarandhelpde- fendSouthKoreaintheeventofdeterrencefailure.TheNorthcontinuestoad- here to a national mythology reinforced by a dynastic succession from father (KimIlSung)toson(KimJongIl).Itistheworld’ssolesurvivingStaliniststate, with an undiminished cult of personality surrounding Kim Jong Il. Indeed, nearlyadecadeafterKimIlSung’sdeath,thepositionofpresidentremainsun- filled,enablingtheelderKimtobedesignatedpresidentinperpetuity. NorthKoreaisalsotheworld’smostmilitarizedregime.Itsmassiveconven- tionalforces,rocketlaunchers,andartillerydeployedimmediatelynorthofthe thirty-eighthparallelposeaninherentrisktothirty-seventhousandU.S.mili- tarypersonnelstationedintheROK,aswellastothewell-beingandsecurityof SouthKoreaasawhole.TheNorthmaintainslargestockpilesof chemicaland biologicalagents;theprimaryresearchandproductionfacilitiesarecontiguous to the Chinese border,thereby rendering them far more problematic to target during wartime.11 Hundreds of Scud B and C missiles (some estimates range as highassixhundred)aredeployedatvariouslocationsintheDPRK,fromwhich theyareabletostriketargetsthroughoutthepeninsula;hundredsofthesemis- siles have also been exported to the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia.Lesser numbers of Nodong 1 and 2 missiles (generally estimated at about thirty,though other estimates range lower as well as higher) are reportedly de- ployedatmissilebasesintheNorth;theyhavearangeupto1,300kilometersand are therefore able to reach targets throughout Japan.12 Given the North’s capabili- tiesandtheSouth’sgeographyandhighlyconcentratedpopulationcenters,any significantarmedconflictwouldbeextremelyviolentanddestructive;thispossi- bility has long sobered senior U.S.and ROK officials. North Korea is also a society experiencing acute internal privation.Despite somelimitedevidenceofexperimentationwithmarket-basedreforms,itsecon- omy remains almost totally detached from the dynamism of the ROK and 16 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW China.TheNorth’sdysfunctionaleconomicpoliciesledtoahorrificfamineand humanitarian crisis during the mid-1990s, likely resulting in the deaths of as manyas2.5millionpeople,ormorethan10percentofthecountry’stotalpopula- tion.13 Having lost its Cold War subsidies provided by the former Soviet Union, andtoalesserextentbyChina,NorthKoreaissustainedprincipallybyinterna- tionalaidprograms(especiallyforfoodandenergy);tourismandjointventure activityprovidedbytheSouth;andrevenuefromsalesof ballisticmissilesand fromilliciteconomicactivities.Itsultimategoalappearstoberegimesurvival, evenasitcontinuestopresentitselfasthesolelegitimateembodimentofKorean nationalism. Despite (or because of) its grim isolation and horrendous internal circum- stances,NorthKoreahasprovenextraordinarilyresourcefulinelicitinginterna- tional assistance and in holding its own in negotiations with the outside world.14 Itconsistentlypunchesaboveitsweightandderivesmuchofitspoliticallegiti- macyfromtheinternationalattentionithasgarneredfromvariousmajorpow- ers,whichitthenconveystoitsownpopulaceandwithintheNorthKoreanelite. It has parlayed its vulnerabilities, nuclear weapons and ballistic missile pro- grams,andtheever-presentthreatof asecondKoreanwarintoafinelyhoned negotiating strategy. In so doing, it has withstood international pressure and preventedtheoutsideworldfromimposingpoliticalanddiplomaticoutcomes on the North that Pyongyang deems unacceptable.15 Through insistence on normsthatforeigninterlocutorsseldomgraspbuttowhichtheyarefrequently compelledtoaccommodate,NorthKoreahasremainedwithinitsprotectivepo- litical cocoon, repeatedly frustrating international efforts to induce major changeinitsinternalandexternalbehavior.Theseconsiderationsshapedwhat theClintonadministrationdeemedpossibleinitsdiplomacywiththeNorth,as wellasthesubsequentpoliciesoftheBushadministration. THECLINTONADMINISTRATIONANDTHEAGREEDFRAMEWORK From its initial promulgation in October 1994 until its ultimate demise, the Agreed Framework was widely judged an incomplete and flawed policy docu- ment but one that did achieve measurable results.16 It reflected the inherent pe- culiaritiesinU.S.-DPRKrelations,includingPyongyang’sexpectationthatthe UnitedStatesserveasitsnear-exclusivenuclearinterlocutorandtacitguarantor of theNorth’ssovereigntyandsecurity.Theeventsof late2002andearly2003 suggest clear parallels with the U.S.–North Korean negotiations of the early 1990s,thoughtheoutcomeofthelatterconfrontationhasthusfarbeendecid- edly different.17 The predominant concern of the Clinton administration was to forestallNorthKoreanplutoniumgenerationandreprocessingactivitiesuncon- strained by international inspections and in defiance of international norms. POLLACK 17 Theseworriesshapedtheadministration’sprimaryobjectivesinitsbilateralne- gotiationsandidentifiedtherelevantpressurepointsthatNorthKoreasought to exploit.The missing pieces in the Agreed Framework (in particular,North Korea’sundeclarednuclearfacilitiesandthepriorhistoryoftheDPRK’srepro- cessingactivities)andtheinabilityorunwillingnessofbothgovernmentstoful- filltheirrespectivecommitmentsundertheagreementultimatelyprovedthe sourceof itsundoing.However,theBushadministrationhasyettopropose an alternative strategy to rebuild what the Agreed Framework successfully achieved. ThehistoryofensuringNorthKoreancompliancewithitsnonproliferation commitmentsisalongandcheckeredone,antedatinghigh-levelU.S.negotia- tions with the North by well over a half-decade.18 Virtually all agreements have involvedprotractednegotiations,withmanyunderstandingsrepeatedlysubject toreversalorthreatenedbreakdown.DependingonhowNorthKoreaninten- tionsareviewed,thisrecordillustratesPyongyang’sintensefearsandoutright paranoia toward the outside world,or it highlights North Korea’s exceptional skillatevadingfulldisclosureand PresidentBush’sremarkswerearebuketoKim wringing concessions from very Dae-jung,[who]reportedlytookampleoffense. powerful adversaries. (A satisfac- tory answer entails elements of bothfactors.)RespondingtosustainedpressurefromSovietofficialswhowere otherwiseunpreparedtofurnishlargernuclear-powerreactorstotheNorth,the DPRKsignedtheNPTinlate1985.However,itwasnotuntilthespringof1992, nearlyfiveyearslongerthanstipulatedbyIAEArequirementsandfollowingthe unilateralwithdrawalofallU.S.tacticalnuclearweaponsfromthepeninsulain September 1991, that North Korea ratified a safeguards agreement, including thedeclarationofsevenprincipalnuclearsites.Followingaseriesofinspections duringthelatterhalf of 1992,theIAEAuncoveredsignificantdiscrepanciesin thedataprovidedbyNorthKorea,leadingtheagencyinFebruary1993tode- mandspecialinspectionsattwoplutoniumstoragefacilitiesattheYongbyonnu- clearcomplex,approximatelyseventy-five kilometers north of Pyongyang.The followingmonth,NorthKoreadeclareditsintentiontowithdrawfromtheNPT, adecisionthatwassuspendedoncenegotiationswiththeUnitedStatesbeganin June 1993.19 Although North Korea did grant IAEA inspectors access to some of its de- clarednuclearsites,itcontinuedtodenyrequeststovisittheplutoniumrepro- cessingfacility.NorthKoreantechniciansalsobegantoremovespentfuelrods fromthefive-megawattresearchreactoratYongbyonwithoutinspectorsbeing present.20 Fearful of the consequences for proliferation should Pyongyang ulti- mately reprocess the thousands of spent fuel rods stored at Yongbyon, the 18 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW Clinton administration in the spring of 1994 reportedly undertook detailed planningforanairattackontheNorth’sprincipalnuclearcomplex.Anattack would have been designed to entomb the plutonium in the reactor and to de- stroythereprocessingfacility,eventhough(asseniorU.S.officialsassumed)the attack would trigger full-scale war on the peninsula.21 Opinions remain divided on whether the Clinton administration was fully prepared to undertake these military operations, in view of the risks, uncertainties, and potential conse- quencesof amajorattack.ButPresidentCarter’sJune1994visittoPyongyang abruptlyalteredthesecircumstances.IndiscussionswiththeformerAmerican president, Kim Il Sung offered to freeze the North’s nuclear activities in ex- changeforrenewedtalkswiththeUnitedStatesandanegotiatedunderstanding with Washington,forestalling the immediate possibility of a major regional crisis.22 TheAgreedFramework,signedon21October1994,entailedanoverlapping setofjointandnational-levelobligations,manyofwhichremainedunfulfilled at the time of the unraveling of the accords in late 2002.23 The United States and DPRKpledgedtonormalizeeconomicandpoliticalrelations,includingtheulti- mateexchangeofambassadors.NorthKoreawasexpectedtofulfillitscommit- mentsundertheSouth-Northdenuclearizationagreementof1992;foritspart, theUnitedStateswasobligatedto“provideformalassurances”nottothreaten orusenuclearweaponsagainsttheDPRK.TheUnitedStatesagreedtoestablish and lead the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO),a multinationalconsortiumthatwouldoverseethefinancingandconstructionofa pairofthousand-megawattlight-waterreactorstoreplacetheNorth’sexistingor planned graphite-moderated reactors. Building directly on the Agreed Frame- work,KEDO and the DPRK signed a contract for two LWRs in December 1995. TheprincipalU.S.concernwasfocusedonafifty-megawattreactorthenun- derconstructionatYongbyonandatwo-hundred-megawattreactorthenunder constructionatTaechon.Hadtheseprojectsbecomefullyoperational,theywere expected to yield approximately 275 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium each year.24 Depending on the assumed requirements for fabricating a pluto- niumweapon,thisamountoffissilematerialwouldhaveprovidedNorthKorea the annual potential to produce more than forty nuclear weapons.25 The original targetdateforcompletionoftheLWRprojectwas2003.Pendingitscompletion, theUnitedStateswasobligatedeachyeartoprovideNorthKoreawithfivehun- dredthousandmetrictonsof heavyfueloiltocompensatefortheenergypro- duction the North claimed it would forgo by shutting down its indigenous five-megawatt reactor and ceasing construction of the larger reactors.26 FromtheU.S.perspective,theessenceof theAgreedFrameworkconcerned theconstraintsimposedonNorthKorea’snuclearactivities,inreturnforU.S. leadershipoftheLWRprojectandtheprovisionofheavyfueloil.Inaseparate
The list of books you might like
