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0625 Hoyt Pgs 2/24/01 10:12 AM Page 17 Standing guard at the Red Fort,Delhi. Photos World Wide P/ MODERNIZINGA the Indian Armed Forces By T I M O T H Y D. H O Y T I ndia appears to have embarked on assured nuclear retaliatory capability a major military modernization ef- and a triad of land, sea, and air-based fort. In 1998 it electrified the world weapons. by detonating three nuclear de- The budget for 1999–2000 signifi- vices in the Rajasthan desert, followed cantly increased funds for space and by two more tests. Less than a year later nuclear related activities. And the it launched a solid-fuel, mobile, budget for 1999–2000, reflecting the medium-range ballistic missile, the Kargil crisis in Summer 1999, called for Agni-2, with an estimated range of an increase of 28 percent in defense 2,500 kilometers. In August 1999, in outlays. India has announced the pur- the heat of domestic elections, it chase of new frigates, submarines, and drafted nuclear doctrine calling for an perhaps an aging Russian aircraft carrier as well as Mirage-2000 and Su-30 Timothy D. Hoyt teaches in the National Security Studies Program at Georgetown strike aircraft and most recently the ac- University and in the College of Continuing Education at the Naval War College. quisition of new T–90 tanks. Summer 2000 / JFQ 17 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2000 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2000 to 00-00-2000 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Modernizing the Indian Armed Forces 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National Defense University,260 Fifth Ave SW,Fort Lesley J REPORT NUMBER McNair,Washington,DC,20319 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 6 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 0625 Hoyt Pgs 2/24/01 10:12 AM Page 18 (cid:2) JFQ FORUM The army has experienced a short- Siachen Glacier base fall in officers over the last decade and camp. the low quality of recruits is also a concern. Though the portion of the army budget dedicated to payroll and bene- fits continues to grow, the relative ben- efits for company and battalion-level officers fell 60–70 percent between 1947 and 1982, spurring an exodus of mid-level officers. Slow promotion rates and the relatively mature age of mid-level officers further complicate this personnel problem. Stores and stockpiles were run down in the 1990s, a period of relative austerity and limited growth in the defense budget. New equipment has been World Photos pcraoudnracfrhlsiac ats.en ddW imhni olreue nsaptratoiinlnlse egr yeta ofr i rtaehr eec oaKnta trtrghoiell Wide top of the priority list, the big ticket P/ A item is the T–90 tank. Navy. The 1980s marked a high point for the navy in terms of recogni- The State of the Force from China and Pakistan, the former tion abroad and prestige at home. Ac- The Indian defense establishment with nine mountain divisions and the quisition included lease of a Soviet is among the largest in the world, num- latter with three armored and four Charlie-I class submarine, purchase of bering over 1.2 million personnel. The rapid (partially mechanized) infantry former HMS Hermes (renamed Viraat) army is the predominant service in divisions (up from two armored and to provide a second carrier, and fleet terms of prestige and resources. Its share one mechanized). Nineteen infantry di- expansion from 32 principal combat- of the 1999–2000 budget was 55.29 per- visions, fifteen independent brigades, ants to 44 ships. cent compared to 14.8 percent for the and other support units round out the Today the navy seems to be on navy, 22.49 percent for the air force, current army structure. the verge of halting a decade-long de- 6.07 percent for research and develop- As supporters of the Indian mili- cline. The carrier fleet has fallen to one ment, and 1.35 percent for defense pro- tary have pointed out, this posture with the decommissioning of Vikrant, duction. Although India is often por- and the number of frigates and trayed as militarily passive—reacting to ambitious plans for out-of-area destroyers has declined to 20. the acquisition by Pakistan of high Ambitious plans in the late technology or advanced systems—this intervention capabilities cannot be 1980s for out-of-area interven- is not the case. Its nuclear capability has achieved at current spending levels tion capabilities and three car- been under development since the mid- rier task forces cannot be 1940s, and procurement in 1990 indi- achieved at current spending cated that New Delhi initiated acquisi- commits over half of the allotted levels, and indigenous shipbuilding tion of almost every category of budget to fighting a conventional war programs have been plagued by long weaponry. Because Islamabad is unable against Pakistan most do not believe delays and technical problems. to procure modern arms as a result of will occur. The heavy divisions commit- Nevertheless the service demon- U.S. sanctions and its own economic ted to the Pakistani frontier—ill-trained strated significant regional lift capabili- situation, India can be expected to for counterinsurgency operations, ties by intervening in the Maldives and maintain the initiative in obtaining poorly equipped for peacekeeping, and Sri Lanka during the late 1980s. It con- new weapons and technology and to re- too heavy to lift elsewhere—cannot be tinues to show the flag outside the re- tain a substantial conventional advan- easily used for other purposes, either to gion, including a recent visit by the tage. engage China or for out-of-area opera- jump-deck carrier Viraat to the Persian Army. Although it has shrunk by tions. Pakistan’s deployment of nuclear Gulf and planned exercises in the 120,000 men since 1990, India still has weapons reduces the likelihood of mid- South China Sea. The navy has suffi- over a million soldiers under arms. The to-high intensity armored conflict of cient forces to assert sea control in a army is organized around regional significant duration; the risks of escala- short conflict with Pakistan, but it commands (North, West, Central, tion are simply too great. lacks air cover—particularly early South, and East). It has separate divi- warning—and would be at risk in oper- sional structures to manage threats ations too close to the Pakistani coast. 18 JFQ / Summer 2000 0625 Hoyt Pgs 2/24/01 10:12 AM Page 19 Hoyt Other acknowledged shortfalls include entrenched forces. More serious prob- combat aircraft (ten years behind ini- lack of reconnaissance aircraft, poor lems include declining numbers of pi- tial plans), and the acquisition and sensors, and insufficient standoff mis- lots and insufficient funding for opera- licensed manufacture of Russian siles. The large submarine force, how- tions and maintenance. Su-30MKIs (with some delivered be- ever, provides a sea denial capability. Also lacking are critical force-mul- hind schedule and significant delays in Air Force. The absence of an ad- tiplying capabilities such as airborne setting up production). In the mean- vanced trainer, aging equipment (par- warning and control systems, mid- time, India will rely on older MiG–21 ticularly obsolescence in the MiG–21 flight refueling, advanced electronic airframes and probably lose aircraft at force), and rigorous flight schedules warfare, and sophisticated night-strike an annual accident rate of 20–25 have led to a high rate of accidents. Ef- assets. While Indian analysts paid close planes per year. forts to procure an advanced jet trainer attention to the performance of air- Strategic Forces. Nuclear tests and have been stalled for over a decade. power in the Persian Gulf War, the air draft nuclear doctrine demonstrate an The quality of pilots remains quite force will require substantial increases intention to field some form of nuclear high, as demonstrated in the Kargil in funding to meet expectations. deterrent and operational strategic conflict when units flew difficult strike Efforts to increase air force capa- forces. The draft nuclear doctrine does missions at almost 18,000 feet against bilities include upgrading MiG–21s not explicitly rule out tactical nuclear with Russian assistance (two years be- weapons despite adherence to a no- hind schedule), production of a light first-use policy, and some analysts have raised the tactical nuclear option. India currently has sufficient weapons-grade plutonium for roughly sixty weapons. Growth in Active Paramilitary Strength, 1990–2000 With much larger stocks of reactor- grade plutonium (which is less effi- Organization 1990 2000 cient material for weapons design), the State Armed Police 250,000 400,000 number of weapons could increase to (formerly known as Provincial Armed Constabulary) 750–1,000. Tests of thermonuclear, fis- Border Security Force 90,000 174,000 sion, and sub-kiloton devices have re- (under Ministry of Home Affairs) portedly included a reactor-grade plutonium design, with some analysts Central Reserve Police Force 90,000 160,000 calling for testing both thermonuclear (performs internal security role; under Ministry of Home Affairs) devices and neutron bomb technology. Central Industrial Security Force 70,000 88,600 India has recently tested the 2,500- (guards private sector locations; under Ministry of Home Affairs) kilometer ranged solid-fuel Agni-2 mobile missile, continues to deploy and Railway Protection Forces 70,000 70,000 test land and sea-launched versions of Assam Rifles 40,000 52,000 the tactical Prithvi missile, and pursues (performs security duties within northeastern states; under Ministry submarine-launched cruise and ballis- of Home Affairs) tic missile options. Rashtriya Rifles — 36,000 Whither Transformation? (under Ministry of Defence) Though Indian forces have begun Defence Security Force 30,000 31,000 integrating some new capabilities, in- (provides security at Ministry of Defence installations and facilities) cluding increased use and production of unmanned aerial vehicles, it is un- Indo-Tibetan Border Police 14,000 30,000 clear that they have either the inclina- (under Ministry of Home Affairs) tion or requirement for significant lev- Special Frontier Force 8,000 9,000 els of innovation. Most threats are (mainly ethnic Tibetans; under Cabinet Secretariat) adequately and less expensively man- aged through a manpower intensive Coast Guard 2,500 8,000 force than through high technology. Like many militaries, the Indian armed National Security Guards 5,000 7,400 forces are emphasizing computer liter- (anti-terrorism contingency deployment force; comprising elements of acy, but they are having great difficulty the armed forces,Central Reserve Police Force,and Border Security Force; under Cabinet Secretariat) in recruiting, promoting, and retaining technicians with revolution in military Special Protection Group — 3,000 affairs (RMA) related skills. (VIP protection) Source:International Institute for Strategic Studies,The Military Balance,1990-1991(London:Brassey’s,1989); The Military Balance, 2000–2001(Oxford:Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies,2000). Summer 2000 / JFQ 19 0625 Hoyt Pgs 2/24/01 10:12 AM Page 20 (cid:2) JFQ FORUM Future Threats Republic of India India faces threats on several Defense Budget: Estimated at $15.9 billion for 2000; the gross domestic fronts: internal separatist insurgencies product in 1999 was $440 billion ($1,800 per capita). and acts of terrorism, Pakistan, China, Manpower: With a population of 1,016,242,000, India has a total of and a maritime or extra-regional threat. 136,290,000 men between 18 and 32 years of age. Active military strength is The internal threat has diminished 1,303,000. Reserve forces number 535,000—army, 300,000; territorial army since 1990 but remains the primary se- (volunteers), 40,000; navy, 55,000; and air force, 140,000. curity concern for the near term. The Armed Forces: India has an army of 1,100,000 soldiers and some 3,414 resolution of the bloody revolt in Pun- main battle and 90 light tanks, a navy with 53,000 sailors and 16 submarines, jab ends a major danger to stability. But 26 principal surface combatants, 38 patrol/coastal craft, 17 mine warfare the Kashmir insurgency continues. The vessels, a force of 1,200 marines, and naval aviation with 5,000 personnel and northeast remains restive, and though 37 combat aircraft; and an air ethnic conflict rages force with 50,000 members and in Sri Lanka there will 774 combat aircraft. be concerns about the Paramilitary Formations: A Tamils. total of 1,069,000 personnel The significance serving in various police, secu- of the internal security, and special units (see figure rity threat is revealed on page 19 for strength of ac- by the increase in tive paramilitary formations). paramilitary forces, which have grown Source: International Institute for substantially since Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2000–2001 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989–90 (to include fSotur dtihees, I2n0t0e0rn).ational Institute for Strategic Aijaz Rahi) cspreeactiianl gu anti tlse atost ptwroo- Photos ( tpelcetm VenIPt sc oaunndt etroi nssuupr-- Border Security World gency forces). This The most important change in Force on parade. P/Wide ithnacnre raespeo rtiesd dgercelainteesr A national securityhas been the elec- in army strength, sug- tion of two consecutive coalition gesting that internal governments led by the Bharatiya process. Singh is also in charge of one security threats demand more than re- Janata Party (BJP)—the only party fo- of the four committees that reviews assigning personnel from one service to cused on national security issues, in- intelligence policy—another recom- another. Evidently, despite positive cluding nuclear deployment. The party mendation of the report. movement in Punjab and the northeast, promised to undertake a strategic de- Since independence, India has internal security is a resource drain. fense review, establish a working na- demonstrated the near-absolute pri- Although Pakistan is perceived by tional security council, and make other macy of civilian authority over the mil- India as a threat, its capability has structural reforms to improve the deci- itary. BJP came to power advocating re- changed in scope and complexity. A sionmaking process. form in national security, including decade of poor economic performance Thus far the result of these efforts assuring greater military input in deci- and the U.S. arms embargo have de- is mixed. The relative influence of the sionmaking. In a demonstration of this graded the army and air force. While national security advisor, which is new atmosphere, the defense minister’s the army has been expanded by five in- considered critical to reform, is un- committee—composed of the minister fantry divisions, manpower has in- clear. Brajesh Mishra holds the portfo- and service chiefs—actually met. The creased by only 40,000. Most of the lio, but Arun Singh, a veteran of the fact that it had not been convened for 2,320 tanks are obsolescent, with the Rajiv Gandhi administration and one twenty years suggests how little mili- exception of 300 modern T–80UDs, and of the foremost security experts in the tary influence exists in the national se- mechanized forces have older M–113 country, has been appointed the na- curity process. The minimal sugges- armored personnel carriers. Heavy tional security advisor to the foreign tions of the Arun Singh Commission in forces appear incapable of sustaining of- minister. The Kargil review committee 1990, which included devolving pow- fensive action. Moreover, the army report suggested that the national se- ers to theater commanders so service lacks adequate medium altitude air de- curity council is not as yet an impor- chiefs can engage in more long-term fense systems and helicopters and has tant factor in the decisionmaking planning, have not been implemented; experienced difficulty in acquiring and many recommendations have not equipment from any source. The air been publicly released. force relies on aging Mirage III and V variants, Chinese models of older Soviet 20 JFQ / Summer 2000 0625 Hoyt Pgs 2/24/01 10:12 AM Page 21 Hoyt Senior naval leadership in Bombay. Crasto) win Sher Photos ( World Wide P/ A mar) Ku Ajit Patrolling forward area Photos ( of Siachen Glacier. World Wide P/ A MiGs, and a few F–16A Falcons deliv- weapons, in addition to Ghauri, Sha- of its common border with India—has ered in the 1980s. Any qualitative edge heen, and Chinese-supplied M–11 mis- 220,000 troops, with one armored and Pakistan might once have enjoyed over siles. The nuclear threat has become an four infantry divisions. In 1990 there established part of regional were 19 regular PLA infantry divisions the real threat posed by Pakistan has security affairs, and Pakistani and one regular tank division in these experts credit their nuclear districts. China also has been undergo- shifted to the two extremes on the deterrent with having staved ing modernization, building short- conflict spectrum off several Indian invasions. range ballistic missiles of the M-series Pakistan also supports Kash- and buying naval vessels and advanced India is gone, except perhaps in subsys- miri insurgents and Islamic volunteers, aircraft from Russia. These systems tems and electronic warfare compo- largely from Afghanistan, who want to have been concentrated in the south- nents. The navy is worse off, though it fight India. This support included infil- east to threaten Taiwan. Beijing has maintains a significant force of French tration of Pakistani Northern Light In- participated in incidents that have Agosta and Daphne-class submarines fantry as well as artillery support into troubled New Delhi, including devel- and anti-ship missile capabilities with Kargil in 1999. Analysts on both sides oping intelligence assets in Myanmar U.S.-supplied Harpoons. of the border anticipate further clashes, and port facilities in Pakistan and in- The real threat posed by Pakistan and the border has been hotly con- tervening across the de facto boundary has shifted from mid-intensity conven- tested of late. with India in 1999. tional warfare to the two extremes on China’s conventional threat has Despite Chinese political med- the conflict spectrum—nuclear capabil- declined notably since the crisis of dling and modestly improved capabili- ity and low-intensity conflict and ter- 1986–87. Its forces in Chengdu mili- ties, it is difficult to find a rationale rorism. Pakistan has fissile stocks esti- tary district—which includes Tibet— for excessive concern. Attention by mated as sufficient for thirty nuclear number 180,000, with one artillery and four infantry divisions. Lanzhou military district—which includes most Summer 2000 / JFQ 21 0625 Hoyt Pgs 2/24/01 10:12 AM Page 22 (cid:2) JFQ FORUM three years, the military is hollow. The Exhibiting surface-to-air force structure has been maintained at missiles,Panchkula. the expense of its serviceability and sustainability, a range of weapons systems acquired from multiple sources stresses logistics and support services, and force multipliers to increase the overall capability of fighting units have not been acquired. Outside influences have substantially decreased external threats. A large military, bolstered by a nascent nuclear force, provides a deterrent to any hostile state. Relative security from external threats thus suggests that the Aman Sharma) cstehucirfhrte,s n mitn af onrerpscooew usretcrreu-sic,n ttiuser nea,sd iebvqaeur rfaiotnregc. e Lms oaawljsoeorr World Photos ( fwnoiirctmh o ptrhr iceml abasarsys-i sbt hafosreera ddt ses:a eelpitnhag-- Wide ratist movements, possibly P/ A aided by external interests. Again, relative success in containing and in some Beijing has been conspicuously fo- cases resolving insurgen- cused elsewhere, particularly on the cies suggests that this cur- United States and Taiwan. New para- rent force structure and or- Jaguar fighter climb- digms of warfare are clearly intended ganization are sufficient to be applied to other, asymmetrically ianirg bfraosme. Srinagar Photos for India’s needs. aBitda irvsra inungnt alaigknee dloyu attbdhrvaeeta rkCs ahorfiin euasn wrteoisl tlt ihinne c Treiebaasestte., Wide World defenMseasin dtaoiensi nngo ta dseuqgugaetset P/ A its forces in the region. The primary hostile intent toward Indian concerns involve its nuclear re- neighboring states. Capa- lationship and support for Pakistan in enough to deter virtually any adver- bilities may be improved incremen- the form of conventional and uncon- sary or coalition of adversaries from tally; but the pursuit of revolutionary ventional weapons and production fa- sustained assault on its territory and to increases appears unlikely at best. cilities. Addressing either issue defend against all but the most dire There is no predictable threat that through a buildup of conventional scenarios. India is attempting to India cannot manage with its existing arms is problematic at best, because of achieve even more conspicuous levels or planned acquisitions and force pos- the difficult terrain along the Hi- of security by threatening Pakistan ture. Innovative technological solu- malayan border and the obvious ex- with an ill-defined strategic concept of tions are expensive, not perceived as pense of acquiring sufficient force to limited war. necessary, and endanger existing bu- coerce a state as formidable as China. reaucratic and organizational prefer- An Adequate Force The extra-regional threat is no- ences. Even under the BJP govern- tional at best. India has misgivings The late 1980s were a high point ment, with increased emphasis on about use of international interven- in the influence of Indian armed foreign and defense policy, there is no tions to resolve human rights abuses forces. Military thinkers, particularly vision of military reform, much less and their implications for national General Krishnaswarmy Sundarji, and revolution. Indian national security sovereignty. This issue is particularly defense intellectuals such as Arun policy demonstrates continuity with cogent given the similarities between Singh, had unprecedented influence tradition rather than a new vision of Kosovo and Kashmir. However, it is on Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. In- military affairs. Its neighbors should not clear what leverage New Delhi dian forces were involved in regional find this fact reassuring. JFQ could gain by increasing defense ex- crises with both Pakistan and China. penditures. Its armed forces are capable But the death of Gandhi and the economic crisis of 1990–92 reduced the status of the armed forces. Despite higher levels of spending in the last 22 JFQ / Summer 2000