DTIC ADA525279: Thoughts Engendered by Robert McNamara's in Retrospect

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

Revisiting Vietnam
Thoughts Engendered by Robert McNamara(cid:146)s
In Retrospect(cid:146)
HaroldP. Ford
From thepointofview ofthe edly, that he and his colleagues were either thewar(cid:146)s veterans; or the
UnitedStates, with reference wrong, terribly wrong. They should families ofthe war(cid:146)s thousands of
to the FarEastas a whole, not have tried to fight a guerrillawar casualties; or those who still remain
Indochina is devoidofdecisive with conventional military tactics true believers that thewar could have
military objectives, andthe against a foe willing to absorb enor been won; or thosewho opposed the
allocation ofmore than token mous casualties (cid:147). in a country war; or, not least, the hundreds of
. .
US. armedforces to the area lacking the fundamental political sta CIA and other officerswho in god-
would be a serious diversion of bility necessary to conduct effective awful circumstances did their damn
limited US. capabilities. military and pacification operations. dest to do what theywere told was
It could not be done, and it was not their duty. Bythe time this article
JCS Chairman
done.(cid:148) (p. 212). They did not ade reaches print therewill have been
Adm. ArthurRadford, J9542
quately level with the public. There gallons ofpublic inkexpended
on
were many occasions in which they the appropriateness and moralityof
To introduce whiteforces(cid:151)
should have begun considering a Mr. McNamara(cid:146)s meaculpa. Those
US.forces(cid:151)in large numbers
withdrawal from Vietnam. And rights and wrongs will not be
there Vietnam] today, while it
rehashed here.
so on.
mighthave initialfavorable
an
military impact, it wouldalmost
He lists many questions which US In Retrospectis nonetheless worth
certainly leadto adversepolitical conduct ofthe war left unanswered. absorbing for the contributions it
andin the longrun adverse Would the loss ofSouth Vietnam makes concerning the Vietnam
military
consequences. pose a threat to US security serious policymaking process and the role
RobertS. McNamara, 1962~ enough to warrant extreme action to therein that US intelligence did and
prevent it? Ifso, what kind ofaction did nor play. McNamara stresses
We were wrong, terribly wrong. should we take? Should it include many facets ofpolicymaking: the
the introduction ofUS air and ever-present divided counsels among
RobertS. McNamara, ]9954 ground forces? Riskingwar with his best and brightest colleagues, not
China? Whatwould be the ultimate much ends
so over as over means;
Mr. McNamara(cid:146)s accounting ofhis cost ofsuch a program in economic, the highly constricted setting in
tory is ambiguous, debatable, and, military, political, and human which they found themselves; the
above all, selective. It does illumi terms? Could it succeed? And ifthe manner in which they sought to
nate certain facets ofpolicymaking chances ofsuccess were low and the solve their Vietnam dilemmas; and
and intelligence, but it does not dis costs high, were there other courses thejourney bywhich, largely apart
pel many ofthe frustrations that (cid:147)such as neutralization or with from the Congress and the public,
have long clouded our comprehen drawal(cid:148) that deserved careful study they begot a tar baby and a deeply
sion ofthe war. Mr. McNamara(cid:146)s and debate? In Mr. McNamara(cid:146)s dividedAmerica.
troubled conscience tells us, repeat- view, these questions remained unan
swered during LyndonJohnson(cid:146)s
presidency and (cid:147)for many many Divided Opinions and Debates
years thereafter.(cid:148) (p. 101).
Harold P. Ford held senior positions In being reminded ofthe divided
in both the National Intelligence Most still remain unanswered counsels among our top decisionmak
Council and the Directorate of despiteIn Retrospect. Norwill ers over how to prosecute the war, it
Operations. Mr. McNamara(cid:146)s confessions satisf,r is instructive to recall that controversy
95
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Thoughts Engendered by Robert McNamara’s In Retrospect
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Studies in Intelligence, Volume 39, No. 5, 1996
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In Retrospect
concerningVietnam did not begin Pressures To Intervene still more constraints on their policy
with SecretaryMcNamara and the makingarea ofmaneuver. Their
Kennedyadministration. Just as there We should also recall that our predic manner ofVietnam decisionmaking
are now divided reactions to ament did not start with Presidents repeated the too-secret style thathad
McNamara(cid:146)s confessions, so there Kennedy andJohnson and their earlier bought them disaster at the Bay
have always been deeplydivided opin Secretary ofDefense. The Kennedy ofPigs. Norwas this small group of
ions overVietnam. They began in the administration had been dealt a bum the best and the brightest short on
immediate post-World War II Vietnam hand(cid:151)the Lyndon hubris and arrogance: whatever the
Johnson administration French experience in Indochina had
period: whether to help or hinder an even
France(cid:146)s desire to reestablish its colo worse one. JFK(cid:146)s election victory been, American technology, arms, and
nial position in Indochina. Then, over Richard Nixon had been razor management know-howwould now
thin and controversial. The Demo do the trick. Also, these policymakers
after near-decade and several billion
a vulnerable for having (cid:147)lost mistakenlydeemedworld Commu
dollars ofUS aid to the French, when cCrhaitsnaw(cid:148)eraend for having accepted a nism a monolith, theVietnam war
the latter(cid:146)s forces got trapped in a stalemate in Korea. The experience one ofits facets; therefore, contrary to
place called Dien Binh Phu, our deci ofmassive Chinese Communist inter the intent ofour containment policy(cid:146)s
sionmakers spent frantic days vention in Korea nonetheless created author, George Kennan, theyfeltwe
debatingwhether to try to rescue the a restraining upper limit on the risks had to make a stand against Commu
French and, ifso, how. In the endwe later administrations were willing to nism everywhere.
did not intervene, but onlyafter some run in SoutheastAsia. The McCar
senior officials had urged the use of thyyears had decimated senior East Thus, by the time theJohnson
nuclearweapons, while others had Asian expertise in the USG; latter- administration came along, we were
urged caution. The latters(cid:146) cautions day officials would not be eager to reallystuck in Indochina, as the
are worth recalling now,5 in view of risk criticizing EastAsian policies or French had been, with a ruthless and
McNamara(cid:146)s statement thatwewere theAsian allies Washington adminis resourceful enemy and an ineffective
wrong, terriblywrong, and his In trations embraced. And in Vietnam, Vietnamese ally. And in the crucial
Retrospectaccount ofthe hawkish after winning surprisingvictories year ofdecision whether and how to
arguments hisJCS colleagues ofthe against his South Vietnamese com try to win the war by substantially
mid-1960s made. petitors, President Ngo Dinh Diem expanding the US commitment,
defied the Geneva accords(cid:146) directive 1964, LBJ had many other things on
that Vietnam-wide elections be held; his plate. Among these other heavy
To date there has not been a dispas
sionate study ofwhy theJCS(cid:146)s views he andWashington had proceeded demands on his attention were the
ofthe 1950s and 1960s were so thereafter to construct a South fall ofKhrushchev and the advent of
opposite. At a minimum, two of Vbieeftonraem(cid:151)a whGaelraetenao-lniekehacdrebateieonn with nCeowmmaunndiusntteCshtienda(cid:146)sSovniuectlleeaardedres;tona
the almost certainly (1)
causes were which successive US administrations tion; and, most important, a coming
the preponderant influence ofGen.
fell in love. Then, the USSR(cid:146)s presidential election campaign in
Matthew Ridgway and otherArmy
General Secretary Khrushchev, dis which Mr. Johnson(cid:146)s conduct ofthe
leaders in 1954, comparedwith the
dainful ofthe young and untested warwould have to be seen as neither
rising influence a decade later ofthe American president, set out in Ber too soft nor too reckless.
Air Force and Marine Corps enthusi lin, Vienna, and elsewhere to push
asts about victory through air power; him around; Kennedy somehow had
and, more important (2), the fact to prove his macho. A Game ofDominoes
that whereas the United States had
been an onlooker at the time the He choseVietnam, stating that the The bedrock constraint, however,
French were stuck in Indochina, we United States had to make its power on the Kennedy andJohnson admin
were ourselves good and stuck there credible, and (cid:147)Vietnam is the place.(cid:148) istrations(cid:146) area ofVietnam policy
a decade later. In this process he and his team created maneuver, and the concept that
96
In Retrospect
(cid:147)
McNaniara came to
champion in-between
an
ofmilitary
course pres
locked those decisionmakers into an sures, one that got us good McNamara(cid:146)s Middle Course
incrementally expanding effort,
war
and committed (enraging
was their agreed conviction that, if Locked into this fear oflosing
Vietnam fell, the rest ofSoutheast domestic dissenters), but Vietnam, yet deterred by fear of
Asiawould inexorably succumb to with and provokingwar with China,
Communist domination. Termed one weapons McNamara came to champion an
the domino effect by President target restrictions that in-between course ofmilitary pres
Eisenhower in 1954, that concept precludedfullycommitting sures, one that got us good and
had been around for some time. committed (enraging domestic
As far back as January 1951, for US military power dissenters), but one with weapons
instance, the then Assistant Secre (enraging critics and target restrictions that precluded
on
tary ofState for Far Eastern Affairs fully committing US military power
the right).
had defined the domino thesis in (enraging critics on the right). That
these terms: (cid:145)9 in-between war became known
widely as McNamara(cid:146)s war(cid:151)and in
Itisgenerallyacknowledgedthat many respects was indeed his war.
~fIndochina were tofall...
Burmaand Thailandwould In Retrospectillustrates how
followsuitalmostimmediately. McNamara(cid:146)s responsibilities at times
having been written the day before
Thereafter, itwouldbedifficult, usurped those ofthe pliant Secretary
by Secretary McNamara:
ifnotimpossible,forIndonesia, ofState Rusk, and how the conduct
India, andtheothers to remain ofthe war became essentially
outside theSoviet-dominated We seek an independent non- McNamara(cid:146)s: neither retreat nor
Asian Bloc. Therefore, theDepart CommunistSouth Vietnam. rashly escalate. His book ofconfes
ment(cid:146)s policy inIndochina takes Unless we can achieve this sions pointedly describes how that
onparticularimportancefor, in a objective. . . almostallof course brought him personal abuse
sense, itisthekeystoneofour SoutheastAsia willprobably from the two sides: radical antiwar
policy in the restofSoutheastAsia. fallunder Communistdomi protesters, and superhawks.9
nance (allofVietnam, Laos,
That spokesman had been Dean and Cambodia), accommodate McNamara was not himselfthe
Rusk,6 who, as Secretary ofState to Communism so as to remove superhawk imagined by many anti
under Kennedy andJohnson, effective US. andanti-Commu war advocates. In Retrospectexpands
remained a firm advocate ofthe dom nist influence (Burma), orfall previously known public awareness
ino thesis and to his death a staunch under the domination offorces ofhow, with the passage oftime and
supporter ofourVietnam course. not now explicitly Communist with the war bdgging down,
That domino thesis was thereafter but likely then to becomeso McNamara progressively lost heart
repeatedlyvoiced by senior civilian (Indonesia taking Malay and in 1967 finally confessed his
over
and military officials, including one sia). Thailandmight holdfor heresy to LyndonJohnson. Long
a
version in 1962 which held that Viet periodwith help, but would before 1967, however, McNamara
our
nam(cid:146)s fall was (cid:147)a planned phase in be undergravepressure. Even had in fact begun to lose heart, con
the Communist timetable forworld the Philippines wouldbecome fiding to some colleagues that the
domination,(cid:148) and that the adverse shaky, andthe threat to India warwas not goingwell, and on occa
ealesfsfsfeachrtesaaowtfeadVyiraehsteAntfaorrmii(cid:146)scca.tf7haelIlndwosomouimlnedowbhetahtfeelt Ztoeatlheanwdestto, Athuestsroaultih,a aannddNew wstiheoernerpo(cid:147)arsiyvbaruteenplocyrhtesoxfbpelciorndagipn.gg(cid:148)0ivtehInanthlsiaotmeme of
sis finally became engraved as part of Taiwan, Korea, andJapan to 1965, McNamara pushed for a
formal US policy in 1964 (NSAM the north andeast wouldbe bombing halt(cid:151)which came to
greatly increased.8
288), its domino concept section naught and brought him little credit
97
InRetrospect
McNamara(cid:146)s book is of
particular interest to the
degree that it discusses the
with LBJ. By 1967 he had turned role intelligence played(cid:151) The Impact ofIntelligence
to CIA for independent, candid
analyses ofthe war(cid:146)s progress and or did not play(cid:151)in Viet In addition to these illuminations In
had commissioned the gathering of decisionmaking. Retrospectmakes ofpolicymaking,
nam
what became ThePentagon Papers. In McNamara(cid:146)s book is ofparticular
9~
the spring of 1967 he confessed his interest to the degree that it discusses
apostasy to LBJ. the role intelligence played(cid:151)or did
not play(cid:151)in Vietnam decisionmak
ing. In short, outlined below,
as
Private Pessimism Secretary McNamara largely ignored
Despite that May 1967 defection, CIA(cid:146)s judgments for some years, but
In a private memorandum he gave to McNamara continued to support by 1966-67 had come to respect and
draw heavily them. Overall, the
the President on 19 May 1967, the war publicly for some time. But Agency(cid:146)s recOornd ofVietnam judg
MinchNiasmvaierwa, cpoarirnutpetdiaondaarnkdpriocttuwreer:e atso tohbeseyrevaerrswotrhaetohne,hitadbelcosatmheeacrlte.ar mneunmtesrowuasshaismtioxreiadnsontee,stibfuyt,,itaswas on
widespread in South Vietnam; the Late in November LBJ administered balance far more acute, prescient,
enemywas hurting but retained the the coup de grace(cid:151)to the official he and candid than any other intelli
military initiative; Hanoi was not had once asked to be his Vice Presi gence given McNamara and his
about to meet our negotiating terms; dential running mate(cid:151)by suddenly policymaking colleagues(cid:151)just in
as
and the warwas extracting a heavy announcing that McNamara was the field CIA(cid:146)s pursuit ofhow to
price within America. Hence, leaving the Defense Department to fight the Viet Congwas much more
McNamara argued, we should limit head the World Bank. effective than the pacification effort
further major increases in US troops became after the military took it over.
in Vietnam. We should
cease our Just as his military course in Viet
cmeonmtmiitfmitecnetasteodtthoehSealipgoitnselgfo.vAenrdn nam had been a middle one, so, too, MOcfNeasmpeacriaal(cid:146)sintbeoroesktiisnthreeaadtitnegntion
we should adopt a more flexible was McNamara(cid:146)s own personal posi he does and does not give to two
negotiating position while seeking tion with respect to the war. Many periods where intelligencejudgments
a
ofhis colleagues in Defense, State,
political settlement. McNamara now had a chance to make a meaningful
argues: and the NSC mechanism had been impact on decisionmaking. The first
more dovish earlier than he, some such periodwas 1964-65, the year
Today, itis clear to me thatmy much more hawkish. Prominent ofdecision whether to go big in
memorandumpointeddirectly to among the latter, as In Retrospect Vietnam bysystematically bombing
the conclusion that, through repeats, was Walt W. Rostow, Direc the North and committing US
either negotiation ordirect tor ofState(cid:146)s Policy Planning Staff troops to combat in the South.
action, weshouldhave begun and later the President(cid:146)s Assistant During these months, the several
withdrawalfrom South for National SecurityAffairs,11 who cautions given him by CIA, State,
our and certain military intelligence
Vietnam. There wasa highprob has remained perhaps the truest of officers made little if
attbheiorlsmiestyancwoceelpecstsoeudaldndveaahnratlvyaegsedioxounyseeatsrohsaonn MtfhecerNetanrcmueaeirbnaelM,iaeavrtecrahsn:1aL9cB9cJ1o,rLdiRibonrsgatrtyoowcon ionfmoptwahcobtsreioefcnlayuhtmiiemonnsta.tiotWnhoserastoneinym,leya,papadacnirodseunphtlee
as
later(cid:151)c(cid:151)without anygreaterdan (cid:147)continued to assert thatAmerica(cid:146)s cussed below, McNamara
now
ger to US. nationalsecurityand decision to intervene in Vietnam, baldly distorts the recordwith
at much less human,political, and the waywe prosecuted the war, respect to a keywarning note CIA(cid:146)s
andsocialcosttoAmerica and had proved beneficial to our nation Board ofNational Estimates gave
Vietnam. (p. 271). and the region.(cid:148) (pp. 235-236). theJohnson administration in
98
In Retrospect
mid-1964, and misrepresents the cau tough and persevere, meeting US Although the RobertJohnson team
tions given a November 1964 NSC escalation with North Vietnamese included military officers, it is not
working group by its interagency escalation. Nor would US bombing clearwhether Secretary McNamara
intelligence panel. ofthe North basically improve South was aware at the time ofthat group(cid:146)s
Vietnamese morale or effectiveness, skeptical judgments. Whatever the
The second period where CIA had a and it might cause Saigon to become case, a copy ofitsclosely held report
chance to make an impact on policy even more dependent on the United found its way to State(cid:146)s principal
making 1967-68. This States. senior dissenter, Under Secretary
was was a
period marked especially by ques George Ball, who specificallycited it
tions concerning the effectiveness of This group, headed by Robert when in October 1964 he prepared
US bombings ofNorth Vietnam Johnson ofState(cid:146)s Policy Planning his own searing, across-the-board
(DRy), by the fight between CIA Staff, also held that, bygoing North criticism oftheJohnson administra
and MACV over how many troops a la Rostow, the United States might tion(cid:146)s continuing confidence in light
the enemyhad, and by the runup to get caught up in a situation in which at the end ofthe tunnel.15 According
the enemy(cid:146)s Tet offensive and its the South Vietnamese might crum to historian Stanley Karnow, when
depressing effect on theJohnson ble in the midst ofUS escalation and Mr. Ball(cid:146)s electri~ingdissent was
administration(cid:146)s will to stay the thereby destroy our political base for given to the Secretary ofDefense,
course. Here, as discussed below, having gone big. The group warned McNamarawas (cid:147)shocked by the doc
McNamara does admit he was defi that before going North, the United ument, less by Ball(cid:146)s apostasy than
nitely influenced by CIAjudgments. States should (cid:147)consider in advance by his rashness in putting such hereti
the upper limits ofthe costs and com cal thoughts on paper, which might
mitments it is prepared to bear. be leaked to the press.(cid:148)6 McNamara
Skepticism Over Strategy Potential political costs include costs states that at the time he discussed
ofpossible failure.(cid:148) Also, ifthe US Ball(cid:146)s memo with Dean Rusk and
The first ofseveral inquiries into the action did not cause the DRVto McGeorge Bundy only, and now
feasibility ofgoing big in Vietnam back offand we were not prepared to admits, (cid:147)We should have immedi
began inJanuary 1964. This was a escalate further, (cid:147)we would face the ately discussed the memo with the
high-level interagency, supersecret problem offinding a graceful way President... and should have sub
evaluation ofa thesis championed by out ofthe action whichwould not mitted] it to experts from the State
Walt Rostow, at the time head of involve serious loss ofUS prestige or Department, the CIA, the Defense
State(cid:146)s Policy Planning Staff, that undermine further the US position Department, and the NSC for evalu
sys
tematic US bombing ofthe DRV in South Vietnam.(cid:148)13 ation and analysis.(cid:148) (p. 158).
would (cid:147)convince the NorthVietnam
ese that itwas in their economic self- However prescient thesejudgments,
interest to desist from aggression in theywent for naught. Rostowsmoth The SigmaWargames
SouthVietnam.(cid:148)t2 ered this group(cid:146)s denial ofhis pet
theses by blandly reporting to Secre Meanwhile, a fewweeks after the
The interagency group ofofficers tary Rusk that the posited US actions RobertJohnson group(cid:146)s exercise, a
formed to evaluate that argument against North Vietnam (cid:147)could cause second testing ofthe proposition to
judged that the posited bombing it to call offthe war principally save the South by bombing the
strategywould probably notwork. because ofits fear that itwould other North had taken place in the form of
Their report held that, contrary to wise risk loss ofits politically aJCS wargame, Sigma 1-64:Played
Rostow(cid:146)s central thesis, the greatest important industrial development, byworking-level CIA, State, and mil
interest ofthe DRV did not lie in because ofits fear ofbeing driven itary officers, that game ended with
preserving such industrial develop into the arms ofCommunist China, the United States hung up. Here,
ment as it had achieved but in and because ofMoscow(cid:146)s, Peiping(cid:146)s too, as the RobertJohnson group
extending its control to all Vietnam. and Hanoi(cid:146)s concern about had found, the bombing strategy did
This being so, Hanoi would hang escalation.(cid:148)14 not work. In the wargame, the
99
In Retrospect
(cid:147)
Mr. McNamara
owes us
another (cid:145)We
were wrong,
terribly wrong(cid:148) for but
United States had progressively esca tressing his then-believed fallofLaosandSouth Vietnam.
lated but had then come to a dead- Furthermore, a continuation of
domino thesis the
end dilemma. Its options had nar at thespreadofCommunism in the
rowed to either seeking a military expense ofCIA and area wouldnotbe inexorable,
decision by significantly expanding and spreadwhich did
historical any occur
hostilities against the DRy, at a accuracy. wouldtake time(cid:151)time in which
believed risk ofwarwith China, or (cid:145)9 the totalsituation mightchange
beginning the process ofdc-escala in any ofa numberofways unfa
tion at a believed cost oflowered vorable to the Communistcause
US credibility and prestige. Accord
in fact land in Vietnamjust 10 days Moreover]the extentto
winagrgtaomAem(cid:146)sb.thWeiorleltiiacamlSeunldl,iva1n9,70b,ytthhee later, no wargame this time, on (cid:149)wh.i.ch individualcountries
8 March 1965. wouldmoveawayfrom the US
US had 500,000 troops in Vietnam towards the Communists would
but still facedwith stalemate
was a ,besignificantly affectedby the
and with draft riots at home)7
Upside-Down History substanceandmannerofUSpol
Hcoomwee,veitrhpardeszceireontefSfiegctmao-nI(cid:146)ssenoiuotr Meanwhile, 10 weeks afterthe dom oicfyLianosthaenadreSaofuotlhloVwiientgnatmh.e1l9oss
policymakers. And though ino thesis had been enshrined in
even
Sigma-I had been aJCS endeavor formal US policy, as discussed above, Mr. McNamara owes us another
and military officers had played key theWhite House had finally asked (cid:147)We were wrong, terriblywrong(cid:148) for
roles in the game, including a briga the Board ofNational Estimates for buttressing his then-believed domino
dier general as head ofthe Blue its view ofthe domino concept. In thesis at the expense ofCIA and his
(good guys) Team, In Retrospect a setting heavywith pressures to torical accuracy. Whatever the case,
makes no mention ofthis warning- (cid:147)get on the team,(cid:148) those senior CIA the impact ofthe Board ofNational
light war game. officers had the audacity to question Estimate(cid:146)s heresy was a dull thud.
the thesis that the loss ofSouth That attention apparently
no was
McNamara does, however, briefly Vietnam would lead inexorably to given this questioning ofthe key
mention that game(cid:146)s successor, the loss ofthe rest ofthe Southeast stone ofUS policywas almost
Sigma-II-64, which was played in Asia, et al. McNamara does discuss certainly influenced by the fact that
mid-September by command-rank this episode, but in so doing stands at the time the Board was out
officers. (p. 153). Like Sigma-I, history on its head, claiming that gunned: its boss, DCIJohn
Senidgimnag-,ITcocnacmleudtionagstihmaitlatrhleypdooslietfeudl tchoenfBioramreddtohfeNdaotimoinnaol tEhsetsiism.atHees per McCone, remained a staunch sup
ofthe domino thesis.
US bombing program would not forms this feat ofrewriting history by pMocrNtaermara:
cause North Vietnam to back offor quoting only part ofthe Board(cid:146)s find
lessen its support ofthe Viet Cong. ings. (pp. 124-125). What he does
According to David Halberstam, not quote is the following: Ata September 1964meeting
with thePresident, Gen. Max
Sigma-II(cid:146)s posited US demon
course
well Taylor]flatlystated
strated (cid:147)not how vulnerable the Wedo notbelieve thatthe loss of we
North US bombing, but South Vietnam andLaos would couldnotaffordto letHanoi
was to
rather how invulnerable itwas.(cid:148)8 A befollowedby the rapid, succes win. GeneralEarle Wheeler]
footnote to history: in Sigma-Il, the sive communization oftheother emphaticallyagreed, emphasiz
officer playing the role ofPresident statesoftheFarEast.... With ingthechiefs unanimous belief
theoretically committed US thepossible exception ofCambo thatlosingSouth Vietnam
a
Marine Corps expeditionary force to dia, it is likely that no nation in meantlosingallSoutheastAsia.
South Vietnam(cid:146)s defense on 26 Feb thearea wouldquicklysuccumb Dean RuskandJohn McCone
ruary 1965; combat Marines did to Communism asa resultofthe forcefidly concurred. (p. ]55).20
100
InRetrospect
McNamara misrepresents
the fact that this NSC
commissioned panel of
Widening theWar CIA, State, and Pentagon probably bewilling to suffer some
damage to the country in the course
intelligence officers took
By November 1964 the name ofthe ofa test ofwills with the US over the
game was no longer whether to a skeptical view ofgoing course ofevents in SouthVietnam.(cid:148)23
expand the war a la Rostow, but how North. McNainara makes
to do so. By this time the plot had As characterized by the authors of
thickened in many respects. National no mention ofsuch an ThePentagon Papers, the intelligence
Intelligence Estimates were telling interagency panel of panel(cid:146)s members tended toward a
or
McNamara and his colleagues that pessimistic view: the panel pointed
the South was in perilous shape: the its lack ofenthusiasm. out that (cid:147)the basic elements ofCom
outlook there of(cid:147)increasing munist strength in South Vietnam
one (cid:145)9
defeatism, paralysis ofleadership, remain indigenous,(cid:148) and that (cid:147)even
friction with Americans, exploration ifseverely damaged the DRV could
ofpossible lines ofpolitical accom continue to support the insurrection
modation with the other side, and book discusses this Bundy group and at a lessened level.(cid:148) Also, the intelli
a general petering out ofthe war its work, but does not mention its gence panel (cid:147)did not concede very
effort.(cid:148)21 North Vietnamese gun interagency intelligence panel (which strong chances for breaking the will
boats had attacked US destroyers in included military officers) or the fact ofHanoi.(cid:148)24 David Halberstam(cid:146)s
the GulfofTonkin in earlyAugust that it did not share the parent characterization is stronger: the intel
(at least for certain), and Lyn Bundy exercise(cid:146)s basic assumption ligence panel (cid:147)forcefully challenged
once,
donJohnson had received blank that iftheJohnson administration the Rostow thesis that Hanoi would
a
check resolution from Congress to could come just up with just the succumb to the bombing in order to
more or less prosecute the war as he right kind ofair offensive against protect its new and hard-won indus
wished. Then, on 1 November, the North Vietnam, this would cause trial base.(cid:148)25
eve ofour presidential election, Viet Hanoi to back off.
Cong guerrillas carried out their In any event, this NSC working
most successful raid ofthe war to group intelligence panel(cid:146)s cautions
that time: at Binh Hoa airfield (near A Prescient Panel came to naught. TheJCS members
Saigon) they destroyed or damaged ofthe Bundygroup sharply dis
more than a dozen aircraft and killed The intelligence panel held (1) that agreed with the panel(cid:146)s skepticism;
or wounded more than a hundred Hanoi(cid:146)s leaders appeared to believe and in the end, the Bundy group(cid:146)s
US and South Vietnamese troops. that the difficulties facing the United principals ended up recommending a
TheJCS and presidential candidate Stateswere so great that US will and moderate, graduated course ofbomb
Barry Goldwater called for immedi ability to maintain resistance could ing, with no mention oftheir
ate airstrikes against the DRV. be graduallyeroded; (2) that because intelligence panel(cid:146)s estimate that it
NorthVietnam(cid:146)s economywas over probablywould not work. The
Instead, PresidentJohnson whelmingly agricultural and to a Bundy group(cid:146)s final report did not
appointed a special NSC interagency large extent decentralized in a myriad include their intelligence panel(cid:146)s
working group under William P. ofmore or less economicallyself-suffi judgments, nor was there any men
Bundy, Assistant Secretary ofState cientvillages, airstrikes would not tion ofthose skeptical intelligence
for Far EasternAffairs, to draw up have a crucial effect on the dailylives judgments when the Bundy group(cid:146)s
various political and military options ofthe almost all ofNorthVietnam(cid:146)s principals discussed their report with
for direct action against North Viet population; (3) that air attacks on PresidentJohnson on 19 Novem
nam. That group held its first industrial targets would not exacer ber.26 And, in the meantime, Rostow
meeting on election day, 3 Novem bate existing economic difficulties to had once again ignored an intelli
ber, with representatives from the the point ofcreating unmanageable gence panel(cid:146)s disagreementwith his
NSC Staff, State, Defense, theJoint control problems; and, therefore, basic thesis ofgoing North, when
Chiefs, and CIA.22 McNamara(cid:146)s (4) that NorthVietnam (cid:147)would three days before the principals(cid:146)
101
In Retrospect
McCone recognized that
shock-effect bombing
alone would do the
not
presidential meeting he wrote Secre trick; the would have South.28This heresy cost McCone
war
tary McNamara that the central his job as Director: his access to and
purpose ofbombing the DRV to be won in the South. relations with the President had now
should be the sending ofa signal to This heresy cost McCone become so distant that in lateApril
Hanoi that the United States was McCone resigned and returned to
his job Director: his
(cid:147)ready and able to meet any level of as ac civilian life.
escalation(cid:148) the North Vietnamese cess to and relations with
might mount in responseto these the President had be
airstrikes.27 now Army Resistance
distant that in late
come so
In his In Retrospect, McNamara mis AprilMcConeresignedand In those months ofdecision, various
represents the fact that this NSC leaders ofthe Armywere a principal
commissioned panel ofCIA, State, returned to civilian life. source ofresistance to the idea ofvic
and Pentagon intelligence officers (cid:147) tory through air power. As
took a skeptical view ofgoing North. characterized by Gen. Bruce Palmer,
McNamara makes no mention of Jr., later General Westmoreland(cid:146)s
such an interagency panel or ofits war effort included Dean Rusk, deputy in Vietnam and thenArmy
lack ofenthusiasm. He does devote Vice ChiefofStaff, (cid:147)Air Force and
MACV chiefWestmoreland, former
one paragraph (p. 162) to stating President Eisenhower, Walt Rostow, Marine Corps leaders firmly believed
that (just) the CIA submitted and McGeorge Bundy. McNamara that an all-but air offensive would
saknedptoincalp.vi3e6w7scsiutecshaasshtishesoaubrocvee:, sBtuatnedsythfaatv,oarletdhboougmhbihneganthdeBNilolrth ictosmepffeolrtHsatnootiakteoocveearseSaonudthdeVsiisettin
(cid:147)CSiItAuatiInotnelinliVgienectenaAsms,esPsPmeGnrta:vTehle in some fashion, they stressed that snhaamre.t.h.isbvuite]w.t(cid:148)2h9e UMScNAarmmayrdaidnonowt
ed.], vol. 3, pp. 651-656.(cid:148) In fact, the prime requirement ofvictorywas cites certain oftheseArmy cautions.
stability in the South. (pp. 99-100).
as registered in fn. 23 above, that In September 1964 Gen. Harold K.
Pentagon Papers title, on page 651 Johnson, Army ChiefofStaff,
ofthe Gravel edition(cid:146)s Pentagon Ofthose who disagreed with the argued that the rationale for air-
Papers, Volume III, reads: (cid:147)NSC solution ofmoderate, graduated strikes was gravely flawed, and that a
Working Group on Vietnam bombing, one ofthe most forceful growing body ofevidence showed
IntelligenceAssessment.(cid:148) was DCI John McCone, who had for (cid:147)the VC insurgency in the RVN
We will assume, charitably, that months been an especially close con could continue for a long time at its
McNamara(cid:146)s faulty accountings are fidant ofLBJ on many issues(cid:151)not present or an increased intensity even
due simply to oversight and faulty confined to intelligence matters ifNorth Vietnam were completely
scholarship. alone. In McCone(cid:146)s view, for maxi destroyed.(cid:148) (p. 152).
shock effect should hit the
mum we
North extremelyhard at the outset. In March 1965 GeneralJohnson
Months ofDecision Without this, he held, committing shocked PresidentJohnson by telling
US ground forces in the South him that it would probably take
The next few months following would end up becoming (cid:147)mired 500,000 US troops five years to win
November 1964were the crucial down in combat in thejungle in a the war. (p. 177). And inJanuary
ones ofdecision whether to expand military effort thatwe cannotwin, 1965 Gen. Maxwell Taylor, then
the war and how to do so. The and from which we will have Ambassador in Saigon, sent the Presi
Bundy NSC exercise had solved(cid:149) extreme difficulty in extricating our dent a personal cable in which he
nothing. PresidentJohnson(cid:146)s advis selves.(cid:148) Nonetheless, McCone held that (cid:147)I do not recall in history a
remained widely(cid:146) split. Those recognized that shock-effect bomb successful antiguerrilla campaign
ers
most confident that bombing the ing alone would not do the trick; the with less than a 10 to 1 numerical
North would significantly assist the war would have to be won in the superiority over the guerrillas and
102
In Retrospect
without the elimination ofassistance can leadonly to disastrous defeat and, despite numerous recommenda
from outside the country.(cid:148) (pp. 165- Wesee two alternatives. tions from civilian and military
166). Thefirstis to use our military advisers that the United States retali
powerin theFarEastandto ate strongly, PresidentJohnson had
McNamara does not mention forcea change in Communistpci refrained from doing so. But six
an extraordinary caution Gen. icy. Thesecondis to deployall weeks later, on 7 February 1965, the
Maxwell Taylor raised a month later, ourresourcesalonga trackof atrocity occurred that at last started
22 February 1965: negotiation, aimedatsalvaging LBJ down the road to major escala
whatlittle can bepreservedwith tion. That atrocitywas a shattering
Aslanalyze theprosandconsof no majoraddition to ourpresent Viet Cong raid on US installations at
placing considerable number military risks. Bob McNamara] Pleiku in the central highlands of
any
ofMarines in Danangarea andItendtofavor thefirst South Vietnam which killed eight
beyondthosepresently assigned, I course, butwe believe thatboth Americans, wounded 109, and dam
developgrave reservationsas to shouldbe careflullystudied aged numerous aircraft.
wisdom andnecessity ofso doing andthatalternativeprograms
White-facedsoldier, armed, shouldbearguedoutbeforeyou. Its profound effect on US policymak
equzppedandtrainedas he is not (pp. 167-168,). ingwas magnified by coincidence:
suitableguerrillaJighterforAsia the President(cid:146)s Assistant for National
fcrestsandjungles. French tried These extraordinary cautions raised SecurityAffairs, Mac Bundy, hap
to adapt theirforces to this mis by three ofour prime movers ofViet pened to be visiting South Vietnam
sion andfailed. Idoubtthat nam policy, Maxwell Taylor, Robert at the time; Soviet Premier Kosygin
USforces coulddo much better McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy, happened to be visiting Hanoi; and,
Finally, there wouldbe the illustrate the gulfthat existed just four days before the Pleiku raid,
ever-presentquestion ofhowfor between their inner doubts(cid:151)as far DCI John McCone had told Presi
eign soldiercoulddistinguish back asJanuary 1965(cid:151)and the outer dentJohnson that Kosygin(cid:146)s coming
between a VCandfriendly Viet confidence they continued to voice trip to the DRV signaled a more
namesefarmer. When Iview this for over two years more. active Soviet policy in SoutheastAsia
array ofdifficulties, Iam con which would probably result in
vincedthat weshouldadhere to On the same day PresidentJohnson greatly increased Soviet aid to North
ourpastpolicy ofkeepingour received his (cid:147)explosive(cid:148) memoran Vietnam and in encouragement to
groundforces outofdirect dum from McNamara and step up Hanoi(cid:146)s subversion ofthe
counterinsurgency role.30 McGeorge Bundy, he sent the latter South.31
to Vietnam to appraise the prospects
for stable government in Saigon and On this, his first trip to South Viet
Alarming Doubts to advise whether to initiate US mili nam, Bundy had found the situation
tary action against North Vietnam. there (cid:147)grim,(cid:148) with the enemy hold
Ambassador Taylor(cid:146)s caution was not The particular circumstances sur ing the military initiative through
the only extraordinarywarning sig rounding this trip ofBundy(cid:146)s much ofthe countryside. On the day
nal raised during these weeks ofearly provided the spark that atlast deto before the Pleiku attack, he had pre
1965. McNamara now confides that nated the US decision to go big in pared a draft memorandum for
on 27January, just aweek after Vietnam. PresidentJohnson recommending a
LBJ(cid:146)s presidential inauguration, he forceful policy of (cid:147)sustained
and McGeorge Bundy gave President reprisal.(cid:148) The next day, learning of
Johnson (cid:147)a short but explosive mem The Fallout From Pleiku the destruction at Pleiku, he tele
orandum.(cid:148) They told LBJ that: phoned Washington that the Viet
On Christmas eve, 1964, the Viet Cong, in collusion with Kosygin,
both ofusare nowpretty well Cong had bombedAmerican bar had (cid:147)thrown down the gauntlet,(cid:148)
convincedthatourcurrentpolicy racks (the Brinks Hotel) in Saigon, and he recommended that the
103