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Snider/Forum 12/9/96 11:43 AM Page 53 Navy (Jeffrey Viano) S. U. Emergence of the Joint Officer By H O WA R D D. G R AV E S and D O N M. S N I D E R Both the form and substance of professional military education (PME) have been subjected to basic and revolutionary reforms in recent years. The farsighted Goldwater-Nichols Act, though hotly debated and strongly resisted at the time of its passage, mandated and catalyzed this change. Initially the law had little appeal to the military departments. Today each service accepts, indeed embraces, these reforms because their contribution to the effectiveness of joint warfare outweighs the new burdens which they have admittedly placed on the services.1 PME reforms were the result of Recalling that the military is de- two profound and complementary fined, as well as delimited, by its exper- thrusts found in title IV of Goldwater- tise in military science and that this ex- Nichols that dealt with officer person- pertise is an intrinsic part of the nel policy. The first, which addressed self-concept of the officer corps and its form or process, created joint specialty relationship to the state, it is easy to see officers (JSOs) and imposed criteria for the prescient mutual significance of their selection, education, utilization, these two new thrusts in PME. To- and promotion. The second, one of gether, they have produced joint offi- Lieutenant General Howard D. Graves, substance, revamped the content of cers of a kind rarely before found in our USA (Ret.), served as superintendent military science as it applies to the ed- military institutions and culture. Some of the U.S. Military Academy where ucation of JSOs through its focus on Don M. Snider is currently the Olin emerging joint doctrine. professor of national security studies. Autumn 1996 / JFQ 53 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 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THIS PAGE Same as 5 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 Snider/Forum 12/9/96 11:43 AM Page 54 n JFQ FORUM may disagree with this characterization been neither joint educational programs Institutional Costs by pointing out that Goldwater- nor required standards The services have adapted to the Nichols only defined new duty posi- n mandated promotion policy objec- new realities of Goldwater-Nichols, but tions and educational requirements. tives for officers in joint duty assignments, not without costs. The requirement to objectives directing that as a group these of- But they misunderstand the revolution- assign promising officers to joint bil- ficers should be promoted at a rate compa- ary nature of what has occurred in the rable to officers serving on service staffs in lets who otherwise would receive posi- joint arena over the last ten years—the the military departments tions which their service deemed im- clear emergence of a new culture n required newly promoted flag and portant to its own missions has among the leaders of the Armed Forces. general officers to attend the Capstone complicated personnel management. This new culture is truly joint. It is course, which is designed specifically to pre- The increased quality of officers serv- evidenced in the experiences of officers pare them to work with all the services ing in joint assignments resulted in a who have been educated and served in n designated a PME focal point in the corresponding decline in the overall joint billets, many during operations in vice director, Operational Plans and Inter- quality of service headquarters and op- Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, operability (J-7), Joint Staff, who is dual- erational staffs, a cost more quickly hatted as the deputy director, Joint Staff, for Haiti, and Bosnia.2 The reforms intro- recognized by some services than oth- military education and oversees the Military duced under Goldwater-Nichols are not Education Division (J-7). ers. Further complications have arisen the sole cause of this emerging joint over the time officers spend outside culture, but they were vital in facilitat- Moreover, a program for joint ed- their services for joint PME and in ing the learning experience through ucation has evolved into a PME frame- joint duty assignments, which in which it is being nurtured. work which relates five educational many cases now approaches 20 percent Joint culture continues to emerge. levels to career phases (namely, pre- of professional careers. Its ultimate impact on the individual commissioning, primary, intermediate, The third cost has been an unre- services is not yet fully known, nor is senior, and general/flag officer), each lenting increase in the number of joint the ethos it advocates. One outcome with its own mandated learning areas billets, more than 10 percent over the appears certain: the next logical steps and objectives.3 last six years alone, a period in which in the evolution of joint PME will pre- the services markedly reduced their sent serious challenges. As we face the next logical steps in the strength in officers. Lastly, inflexibility them, it is vital—especially for younger evolution of joint PME will in managing JSO assignments and in- officers—to recall that the Armed creased turbulence because of the re- Forces successfully adapted to new re- present serious challenges quirement to attend phase II of the alities under title IV of the Goldwater- program for joint education (PJE) dur- Nichols Act. ing twelve weeks in residence at the These provisions, with others too Armed Forces Staff College constitute Influences on PME numerous to detail here, linked assign- ongoing costs to the services. The principal changes brought ments, education, and promotion po- Notwithstanding their expense, about in joint PME under Goldwater- tential to joint duty. The law had re- these reforms have been so fruitful Nicholsinclude actions that: markable effects on service policies that on balance the result has been the relating to professional development. n established the Chairman as princi- emergence of a new joint culture. The services had to adjust traditions, pal adviser to the President and Secretary of America’s evolving approach to war- particularlytheconventionthatofficers Defense on all military issues including fare, which is increasingly joint in all did not serve outside their service nor PME (previously the domain of the corpo- respects, has been supported, even led rate JCS) theirtight-knitcareerspecialtylestthey and facilitated, by officers profession- n defined “joint matters” for educa- fall behind their contemporaries who ally educated and employed under tional and other purposes as relating to the remainedintheservice’smainstream. Goldwater-Nichols. integrated employment of land, sea, and air To effect change in the services, Ultimately, the benefit of PME re- forces in the areas of national military strat- Goldwater-Nichols needed to define egy, strategic and contingency planning, the nature of joint officer development forms must be measured against the and command and control of combat oper- performance of the Armed Forces in and create institutional incentives suf- ations under unified command, whereas be- defending and furthering national in- ficient to promote its ultimate legiti- fore they were not clearly defined and tradi- terests. In this case the record is clear: macy.4As indicated, it did this initially tionally included only joint planning better officers, better prepared for joint by linking assignments, education, and n created a JSO career track to im- force employments, with markedly prove the quality and performance of offi- later promotion potential. In subse- better results in integrating service ca- cers assigned to joint duty; mandated that quent years, the effectiveness of joint pabilities on the battlefields and in re- critical positions identified in joint organi- combat operations has been even more gional conflicts. zations be filled only with JSOs contingent powerful in persuading officers that With so much successful adapta- upon their completion of joint PME joint duty is both personally fulfilling n mandated maintaining “rigorous and career enhancing. tion over the past decade, is joint PME standards” at joint PME institutions for ed- now established for the decades ahead? ucating JSOs, where previously there had 54 JFQ / Autumn 1996 Snider/Forum 12/9/96 11:43 AM Page 55 Graves and Snider If not, what issues should occupy those significance of those inter- responsible for preparing officers for ests. Thus these missions joint duty? Two broad sets of ongoing must be conducted swiftly changes in the security environment and efficiently, with even create challenges for designers of joint a higher premium on pre- PME. The first relates to future missions conflict integration of ser- of the Armed Forces—those purposes vice capabilities and joint for which the Nation will employ the training readiness. Fur- military in the next millennium. The thermore, they are likely second centers on the response of to have limited objectives Western democracies, including the and be of short duration, United States, to a new security envi- creating the aura of con- Gavin) ronment and its implications for civil- stabulary missions.7 Brian military relations. theseTehveoltveinnsgiomnisssiwointshainl- Camera ( Future Missions ready are, and will con- mbat Withrespecttomissionsofthefu- tinue to be, quite real for Co ture, it would appear that within the officers. Will core compe- mpany, rteemsid,ucaoln,fsltiacttes-acmenotnrigcminatjeornraptoiownearslwsyisl-l tbeenfcoiecussaenddosneltfh-ceornocleepotsf Signal Co Mwoeudnicdse cda Hrrayiitniagn. be the exception.5 But nonstate actors the warrior or on that of 55th have increasingly created capabilities the constable and peace- which endanger U.S. and allied inter- keeper? Most OOTW mis- ests in widely separated regions. sions have also called for decentralized set of ongoing changes that will influ- Threatsexistalongtwovastlydifferent mission execution. This dispersion re- ence joint PME—the nature of the re- segments of the conflict spectrum: at quires greater political-military sophis- sponses by democratic governments, thelowendwithoperationsotherthan tication in younger officers, to include including the United States, to changes war(OOTW),andatthehighend—be- directcontactwiththemedia,non-gov- in security imperatives. yond conventional war as seen in re- ernmental organizations, and foreign A New Environment gions like the Persian Gulf—through governments, as well as coping with the proliferation of weapons of mass theinherentambiguitiesandcomplexi- Democratic responses can be ag- destruction (WMD), some potentially ties of such international operations. gregatedintofourareas,eachdiverging to nonstate actors. Recent sharply from the patterns of the past OOTW missions which five decades, and with some quite im- will core competencies be focused on haveinvolvedjointforces— portant differences between America in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, the role of the warrior or on that of and its allies. First, the resources being Bosnia, Liberia—contrast allocatedtonationalsecurityhavebeen the constable and peacekeeper sharply with the focus of sharply reduced and will remain so theColdWareraandthere- untilanewthreattoourvitalinterests gionalconflictintheGulfthatimmedi- Such missions also require officers of emergesforwhichelectedgovernments ately followed it. But in fact they have exemplarycharactersincetheambigui- can extract the necessary resources beenthenormalmissionsoftheArmed ties and complexities of international from internally oriented publics.8Cou- Forces save for the historical anomaly operations often have a moral-ethical pled with the requirement for political oftheColdWar.6 character, and joint commanders must legitimacy in the use of military force, The need to be prepared for vastly work with foreign officers whose cul- asobservedintheGulfWarandBosnia, contrasting missions—from OOTW to ture and institutions reflect a different this means that Western democracies regional war with WMD or a return to valueorientation. willfightfutureconflictswithpolitical- major power competitions—poses sig- Since the Nation will always militarycoalitions.9 nificant challenges for joint PME. First, rightly expect that its Armed Forces be Secondly, unlike the Cold War era since OOTW missions do not usually prepared across the full spectrum of of long-standing coalitions, the future involve our vital interests (with the ex- potential conflict, the success of future norm will consist of ad hoc and condi- ception of international terrorism), the adaptations of joint PME may well de- tional commitments by democratic polity will expect them to be achieved pend on how this dilemma is resolved. governments, again as seen in the Gulf without casualties and other costs The challenge will consist of further War and recent OOTW missions. The which are not commensurate with the developing competencies for new, lim- implications for joint PME are clear. ited missions while enhancing joint For every joint concept, doctrine, or warfighting—a daunting task given the course, the United States must develop likelihood of continuing resource con- straints. This brings us to the second Autumn 1996 / JFQ 55 Snider/Forum 12/9/96 11:43 AM Page 56 n JFQ FORUM missions for which they are relatively The Desirability of Joint Duty—1982 least suited, consuming even greater shares of declining resources. This is more true of the most critical asset for Joint assignments are seldom sought by officers. A joint position removes them from the environment change: the focus of senior military for which they have been trained,in which they have established relationships and reputations,and in leaders.12 Thus, unless resourced and which they seek advancement. It places them instead in a wholly new environment involving unfamil- nurtured by them, PME may regress iar procedures and issues for which most of them have little or no formal training. Their fitness reports (which affect their careers and prospects for advancement) are often entrusted to officers of other services from the notable strides made under with little in common by way of professional background. Goldwater-Nichols.13 Adding to these concerns is the perception that much of the work on the Joint Staff is unproductive, and that too much effort is wasted on tedious negotiation of issues until they have been debased and re- Overarching Challenges duced to the “lowest common level of assent.” Regardless of which future un- The general perception among officers is that a joint assignment is one to be avoided. In fact,within folds, those responsible for PME will one service it is flatly believed to be the “kiss of death”as far as a continued military career is concerned. In face two transcending and thus key contrast,service assignments are widely perceived as offering much greater possibilities for concrete ac- challenges. The first is retaining the complishments and career enhancement. As a result,many fine officers opt for service assignments rather right balance between service and than risk a joint-duty assignment. Yet joint positions have the potential for making major contributions to the joint/combined PME. The second and defense effort,and offer challenging work to the finest officers. more important is maximizing the —Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Study Group, contribution of joint PME to the The Organization and Functions of the JCS(1982) moral-ethical development of officers. Atthe“pointofthespear”injoint warfightingareservicecapabilitiesthat enable the Armed Forces to conduct parallel combined capabilities in con- wellasinfluencingofficerattitudesand land, sea, and air operations in succes- cert with its allies. Those responsible perceptions toward fundamental shifts sive and successful battles. Developing for joint PME should urgently consider inmilitarydoctrineandorganization.11 andeducatingofficersintheintegrated the profound implications of the rapid But the success of such investments in employmentofthesecapabilities,joint internationalization of U.S. military in- human capital is problematic at best or combined, should not serve to di- stitutions and processes. given the political clout of congres- minish core service capabilities. PME The third response is the evolving sional-industrial interests that favor shouldnotbecometoojoint.Ifitdoes, specialization in U.S. military capabili- spendingondefensehardwareandsoft- the profession of arms could be criti- tiesvis-à-visthoseofourallies.Basically, ware. Thus, only at senior levels where cized for “majoring in minors.” Calls Washington has indicated its intention the civilian and military leadership forsubstantialamountsofjointeduca- tomaintainahigh-techcompetitivead- make these trade offs can the specific tion down to the precommissioning vantage—in pursuit of a revolution in challengefromapotentialRMAtojoint level, among other initiatives, could military affairs (RMA)—whereas other PMEbemet. rapidly lead to that point. By contrast, nations, with the possible exception of In the fourth area of response, our servicecultureand interservicecompe- FranceandJapan,haveeschewedsucha allies have significantly reshaped their tition, especially on the tactical level, role. Unfortunately, any intention to force structures, in some cases even areconstructiveaspectsofmaintaining adapt and reshape the Armed Forces making changes in reserves and con- aneffectivedefenseestablishment.14 through an RMA is unresourced as yet. scription, although America has done Of course such competition at Further, developments to date indicate little. The most notable examples are higher levels has occasionally gotten an asymmetric application of RMA ca- Britain and France, who have exten- out of bounds, such as when con- pabilities across the conflict spectrum, sively reduced and reorganized their strained resources inflame it, and per- with few benefits for OOTW, currently militaries. France even announced the haps could once again. On the other the most frequent grounds for employ- end of obligatory national service. hand, officer education is not the most ingjointcapabilities. Collectively, the implications of effective method to deal with per- SincejointPMEoperatesatthein- these responses for PME—at service, ceived excesses in interservice rivalry. tersection of intellectual development joint, and combined levels—are omi- Effective civilian leadership, which can andoperationalart,adaptingtoanRMA nous. Just as role specialization, a po- easily channel such competition to requires the formation of officers who tential RMA, and sharp declines in re- constructive adaptations and innova- areanalytic,pragmatic,innovative,and sources are making adaptation, tions, is a more appropriate corrective. broadlyeducated.10Historyteachesthat innovation, and reshaping more criti- Civilian leadership cannot, how- effective PME—though insufficient by cal to military institutions—processes ever, effectively address the second itself—has proven to be necessary for historically facilitated by PME—the challenge. The moral-ethical dimen- military innovation, experimentation, Armed Forces are heavily engaged in sionofmilitaryservice,vitalineducat- and adaptation. This resulted primarily ing officers, is inherently part of the whenPMEprovidedthedualbenefitsof “contract” that the Armed Forces have training in new factual knowledge as maintained with the Nation. Were the 56 JFQ / Autumn 1996 Snider/Forum 12/9/96 11:43 AM Page 57 Graves and Snider military to abrogate that pledge, as re- An overriding need exists to 4That such institutional change is pos- cent actions by a few officers have imbue joint PME with an ethos which sible, even predictable, is well documented. demonstrated, it would cease to be a is suited to the emerging culture. The For example, see Deborah Avant,Political In- profession. It would become unattrac- moral-ethical development of leaders, stitutions and Military Change:Lessons from the Peripheral Wars (Ithaca:Cornell Univer- tive to those who might wish to serve their education in character, occurs sity Press, 1994). and unsupported by those it is dedi- much more in the field and fleet than 5Among many works on this subject, cated to protect. Furthermore, and in academic settings. But knowledge of see Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation aside from this contract, officers have ethics and values, which can be con- of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), always had to act with integrity and veyed through joint PME, is a necessary and Donald M. Snow, The Shape of the component of this Future, 2d edition (New York: M.E. Sharpe officer education is not the most effective development. PME Publishers, 1995). curricula are already 6Samuel P. Huntington, “Nontradi- method to deal with perceived excesses overflowing with tional Roles for the Military,” in Noncombat- in interservice rivalry good joint subject ant Roles for the U.S. Military in the Post Cold- War Era (Washington: National Defense matter. That is exactly University Press, 1993), pp. 3–12. the point. For the 7For early insights on such roles, see trustworthiness.Suchattributeswillre- moral-ethical development of joint of- Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier main a functional requisite to mission ficers, the military risks supplanting the (New York: The Free Press, 1960), particu- accomplishment in a profession that essential with the good. Desiring to re- larly chapter 20. unleashesviolenceasateam,witheach main a profession, those responsible for 8See Don M. Snider et al., “The Coming member subject to unlimited liability. the future of joint PME should not set- Defense Train-Wreck...and What to Do As noted, OOTW test such trust- tle for so little. About It,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 19, worthiness early in an officer’s career. no. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 87–127. Therefore at a time when individual In 1986, Congress transformed 9SeeInternationalInstituteofStrategic Studies,“TheProblemofCombatReluctance,” characterisbecominglesscentraltothe the officer corps over harsh opposition inStrategicSurvey,1995–1996(London:Oxford society which professional officers from the Pentagon. Not discounting UniversityPress,1996),pp.48–57. serve, it remains of unrelenting impor- the remarkable progress of the last 10For amplification of this point, see tancetothemregardlessofgradeoras- decade, new difficulties have emerged Steven H. Kenney, “Professional Military signment. To meet that need, all ser- for joint education. Senior military Education and the Emerging Revolution in vices are making serious efforts to leaders should not forget the lessons of Military Affairs,” an unpublished paper pre- develop and maintain leader character. the past. The challenge now is to re- sented at a symposium on the same subject Butsucheffortsarenotcoordinatedand shape PME—balancing the Nation’s in- convened at the National Defense Univer- appeartobeimplementedunevenly. vestment in its future military leaders sity on May 22–23, 1995. Improvements in moral-ethical de- and their character against invest- 11See Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, edited by Williamson Murray and velopment are needed. Recent cases of ments in technology and forces—with- Allen R. Millett (New York: Cambridge Uni- untrustworthiness include adultery and out relying on Congress. JFQ versity Press, 1996). fraternization on the part of senior offi- 12The critical role of military leaders in cers, failure to hold officers accountable NOTES peacetime innovation is well documented. for friendly fire incidents which cost 1The authors are indebted to the deputy See Stephen P. Rosen, Preparing for the Next lives, personal use of government air- chiefs of staff for personnel of all the ser- War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, craft, and more intrusive “zero defect” vices for providing candid comments which 1991), particularly chapters 3 and 9. command climates which severely test assisted in the preparation of this article. 13General Shalikashvili is attempting to principled performance at every level. 2Here we subscribe to the definition of do this but has noted a lack of progress in Thus, if a joint culture is emerging, it is organizational culture advanced by Edgar critical areas: “...despite the importance H. Schein, “Culture is what a group learns we have attached to simulations, nobody equally clear that its ethos at the joint over a period of time as that group solves its has yet developed a single, fully-tested, reli- level is largely unarticulated and has problems of survival in an external environ- able, joint warfighting model.” See “A Word yet to be successfully inculcated. Unfor- ment and its problems of internal integra- from the Chairman,” Joint Force Quarterly, tunately, neither the new instruction tion.”See “Organizational Culture,”Ameri- no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 1994–95), p. 7. issued by the Chairman on PME (CJCSI can Psychologist, vol. 45, no. 2 (February 14Don M. Snider, “The U.S. Military in 1800.1, March 1, 1996), nor Joint Vision 1990),pp.109, 111. Transition to Jointness: Surmounting Old 2010 even broaches the question of 3Not all the reforms summarized were Notions of Interservice Rivalry,” Airpower character development for future mili- mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Of Journal, vol. 10, no. 3(Fall 1996). tary leaders. In addition, this ethos is particular importance was the legislation undergirded only through discrete, un- passed in 1989 as a result of the efforts of a House panel chaired by Representative Ike coordinated, and less than effective ef- Skelton. See U.S. Congress, House, Commit- forts by the services to strengthen indi- tee on Armed Services,Report of the Panel on vidual character and commitment to Military Education,report. no. 4, 100thCong., institutional values. 1stsess., 1989. Autumn 1996 / JFQ 57