DTIC ADA524805: Making the Case for Multinational Military Doctrine

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

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Making the Case for
Multinational
Military Doctrine
By J AY M. V I T T O R I
The strategic goal of collective security
and the resultant alliances and
coalitions into which the United States
Significant has entered require that its aspects of efforts to de-
global commit- Armed Forces be prepared velop standard proce-
ments, a dwin- for multinational military operations. dures. First, it looks at
dling overseas how existing joint doc-
—Joint Pub 0-2,
presence, and shrinking trine deals with multina-
United Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
force levels suggest the tional issues. Second, it
United States will con- examines our experience
duct most future opera- in producing viable doc-
tions in cooperation with its allies, friends, and trine in an international context, with a focus on
coalition partners. Thus there is a need for multi- the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
national military doctrine. This article weighs two After the demise of the Soviet Union and dis-
solution of the Warsaw Pact, military planners
and doctrine developers shifted emphasis from
Portuguese frigate superpower confrontation to regional instabili-
NPR Batista de Andrade, ties. Since 1989 the United States has mounted
Strong Resolve ’98.
major operations in Panama, Kuwait, Somalia,
Turkey, Haiti, and Bosnia. Although not all can be
classified as combined or multinational, each re-
quired some interface between our forces and
those of other nations.1 Drawdowns coupled with
global commitments have reinforced the demand
wicz) for doctrine that can address cooperation not
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mand (Todd oppumbliecnatt ipornosc esisns chea 1s 9y9i1el. dLeeds sm woerlel tkhnaonw 7n5, hjooiwnt-
m ever, is the effort to standardize guidance for
Co
maging multinational military operations (MNOs).
Fleet I The Boiler Plate
Joint doctrine began to concentrate on
multinational activities in 1993. Joint Pub 3-05.3,
Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures (ap-
Lieutenant Colonel Jay M. Vittori, USAF, is chief of multinational proved August 1993), was the first document to
doctrine development at the Air Force Doctrine Center.
Spring 1998 / JFQ 109
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Making the Case for Multinational Military Doctrine
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MULTINATIONAL DOCTRINE
contain a multinational preface which stated that While the total number for 1997 appears alarm-
it set forth ing, only three volumes were approved by mid-
year. The proportion with substantive statements
...doctrine to cover the joint activities and perfor-
is growing, with 83 percent of the joint pubs ap-
mance of the Armed Forces of the United States in
proved in 1996 attempting to satisfy the require-
joint operations as well as the doctrinal basis for U.S.
ments of the preface.
military involvement in multinational and intera-
Unfortunately there is a flip side. A quarter
gency operations.
of the total—some 15 titles—have no reference to
All subsequent publications, except for a few MNO. Included are several key doctrine volumes
which appeared in late 1993, included that state- produced in recent years: Joint Pubs 3-01.4, JTTP
ment. It clearly indicates for Joint Suppression of
that joint doctrine Enemy Air Defense;
Collective security is a strategic goal
should address pertinent 3-01.1, Aerospace De-
multinational issues. of the United States, and joint operation fense of North America;
Of 56 volumes ap- planning will frequently be 3-17, JTTP for Theater
proved with this pref- accomplished within the context of Airlift Operations; and
ace, 25 have specific 4-04, Joint Doctrine for
treaty or alliance operation planning for
sections dealing with Civil Engineering Support.
multinational operations.
MNOs. Some are exem- While it may be argued
plary, such as Joint —Joint Pub 5-0, that these topical areas
Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
Pubs 2-0, Joint Doctrine do not warrant distinct
for Intelligence Support to multinational sections,
Operations; 2-01, Joint it is difficult to believe
Intelligence Support to Military Operations; 3-0, Doc- any associated operations or functions will not
trine forJoint Operations; 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Nu- interface with foreign partners. Also included on
clear, Biological and Chemical Defense; 3-13.1, Joint this list is the approved publication on interdic-
tion, Joint Pub 3-03. Considering that interdic-
three-quarters of all publications have substantive tion efforts in the Gulf War, Turkey, and Bosnia
all involved multinational forces, the publica-
statements about multinational operations
tion’s lack of MNO doctrine is disconcerting. Dis-
cussion of it is scant in numerous other volumes.
Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare; and Of 51 studied, 28 had fewer than five substantive
3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs. Three-quarters statements. Overall, statistics indicate that
of all publications have substantive statements progress is ongoing, but many publications fall
about multinational operations. short of the preface requirement.
There seems to be an increase in the percent- Development of the most significant publi-
age approved with MNO content (see figure 1). cation on MNO, Joint Pub 3-16, Joint Doctrine for
Multinational Operations, began in 1994. The pro-
gram directive called for addressing MNO as part
of alliances, coalitions, and ad hoc arrangements
Figure 1. Publications Trends (December 1997) and for including organizational structures, plan-
ning, and execution. The major audience for this
tome is joint force commanders, component
commanders, and the staffs which plan and exe-
83 cute MNO.
75 74 73 Writing was initiated at a conference hosted
by the primary review authority, the National De-
63
fense University (NDU). Two drafts followed, the
57
53 first written by NDU and the second by the Joint
45 Warfighting Center. The subsequent coordination
not only included the required reviewers but also
service chiefs and combatant commanders. The
25 25
few contentious issues included command and
control of forces—foreign control of U.S. forces
and airlift assets. But Joint Pub 3-16 has not fared
0 0 well during final coordination. It appears the Air
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total Force, Marine Corps, and possibly Navy will not
Percentage of publications with specific Percentage of publications with significant
concur. In the case of the Air Force the concern is
sections on multinational doctrine mention of multinational doctrine
over a section on space operations that was added
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Vittori
since the preliminary draft. The Navy and Marines Another problem has surfaced. The project
dispute wording on relations among joint force proposal for Joint Pub 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logis-
commanders, airspace control authority, and area tic Support of Multinational Operations, won ap-
air defense commanders. None of the issues relate proval after heated debate among the services and
to multinational matters; rather, they replay age- commands. The argument centered on the alleged
old turf battles among the services. need for developing a separate specialized multina-
When published Joint Pub 3-16 will be an tional logistics publication versus addressing the
“above-the-line publication.” This refers to the subject through revisions to existing joint logistics
distinction in the joint doctrine hierarchy be- publications. The program directive for Joint Pub
tween key doctrinal publications and subordinate 4-08 declares that it “will describe the unique logis-
supporting doctrine and tical aspects associated
tactics, techniques, and with multinational oper-
In almost all cases, strategic movement
procedures publications ations to include plan-
will require integration with the
listed below them. ning, coordination, exe-
Joint Pub 3-16 tack- movement, organizations, and cution, command and
les several issues. The capabilities of allies in control, and deconflic-
most valuable doctrine international military organizations tion of logistics require-
relates to command and ments.”2 This notion is
and/or coalition partners.
control (chapter II) not a far cry from the
which addresses the de- —Joint Pub 4-01.3, multinational preface.
JTTP for Movement Control
gree of control foreign Unfortunately, approval
commanders may exer- of Joint Pub 4-08 could
cise over U.S. forces, the establish a precedent for
role of multinational force commanders, and intri- separate multinational doctrine and possibly
cacies of multinational command and control spawn multinational publications on topics such
structures. Another useful section is a comman- as public affairs, meteorology, or intermodal con-
der’s checklist for MNO (appendix A). However, it tainers. Thus it might behoove the Joint Staff
contains little ground-breaking information. For through the Directorate of Operational Plans and
instance, the section entitled “Types of Multina- Interoperability (J-7)—particularly the joint doc-
tional Operations” fea- trine working party—to reconsider Joint Pub 4-08.
doctrine development with allies tures a list that includes
war and all military op- U.S.-Ratified Procedures
and coalition partners is a
erations other than war. Multinational doctrine also is developed
complicated process warranting Moreover, the tenets of through formal alliances, bilateral arrangements,
multinational coopera- and multilateral organizations. Some may be sur-
close scrutiny and attention
tion are nothing more prised to learn that such doctrine may take prior-
than common sense ity over approved joint doctrine. As stipulated
terms such as respect, rapport, knowledge of part- within the multinational preface:
ners, and patience. Overall, Joint Pub 3-16 fulfills
Commanders of forces operating as part of a multina-
the requirements of the program directive and
tional (coalition or alliance) military command
should be useful for commanders.
should follow multinational doctrines and guidance
ratified by the United States.
Do We Need More?
The multinational preface and program di- For instance, if the United States participates
rective for Joint Pub 3-16 appear to be in conflict. in a NATO operation, it will do so in accordance
If all joint doctrine is to provide a basis for U.S. with U.S.-ratified NATO procedures.
military involvement in multinational opera- Doctrine development with allies and coali-
tions, is there need for a separate tome on MNO? tion partners is a complicated process warranting
One may argue that there is nothing in Joint Pub close scrutiny and attention to detail. Responsi-
3-16 that cannot be parceled to other volumes. bility for a particular military doctrine matter
On the other hand, not all live up to their pref- flows from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
aces and thus leave gaps to be bridged in such and Chairman to a designated lead service or
volumes as Joint Pub 3-16. A compromise would agency. This is the major difference between the
allow it to exist until key MNO issues can be fully national and international doctrine development
addressed by applicable publications. systems. The U.S. process is dominated by a joint
structure directly involved with development, ac-
ceptance, distribution, and implementation of
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MULTINATIONAL DOCTRINE
doctrine. The international system primarily de- the Commanding General of the Marine Corps
pends upon the services to take the lead. The Di- Combat Development Center coordinates partici-
rectorate for Operational Plans and Interoperabil- pation by that service. The Secretary of the Air
ity (J-7) is tasked only with monitoring doctrinal Force has assigned responsibility for such matters
standardization and interoperability efforts and to the Departmental Standardization Office
serving as the office of primary responsibility which, in turn, delegates them to the Air Force
(OPR) for non-matériel, multinational opera- International Standardization Office. Among
tional activities save for myriad duties this office
those issues related to assigns senior represen-
In most scenarios, the combatant
intelligence, special op- tatives to working par-
erations, security assis- commander will be working ties and panels and also
tance, and command, with multinational forces in the monitors the doctrine
control, communica- prosecution of a conflict or military ratification process.
tions, and computers. operations other than war. As such, NATO, the largest
Included in that developer and user of
it is imperative that full consideration be
instruction is guidance multinational doctrine,
given to multinational concerns.
for U.S. involvement has a complex process.
with multinational mil- —Joint Pub 3-11, Its various standardiza-
itary doctrine develop- Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, tion bodies include the
Biological, and Chemical Defense
ment.3 Each service has NATO Standardization
a structure to manage Office, Conference of
standardization. For ex- National Armaments
ample, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army Directors, NATO C3 Board, Senior NATO Logisti-
for International Affairs oversees the standardiza- cians Conference, and Military Agency for Stan-
tion program through its International Plans and dardization (figure 2).
Policy Division though most working party ex- The Military Committee is responsible for
pertise for NATO doctrine is tasked through U.S. military standardization policy and the Military
Army Training and Doctrine Command. The Agency for Standardization executes it. The latter
Navy has transferred most of its doctrine-related has four boards—three service (army, naval, and
taskings for the international military standard- air) and one joint to manage standardization in
ization program from the Chief of Naval Opera- their areas of responsibility. The U.S. Army, Navy,
tions to the Naval Warfare Development Com- and Air Force have board representatives perma-
mand. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, nently assigned to NATO headquarters.
Policies, and Operations at Headquarters, U.S. Working groups serve as focal points for as-
Marine Corps, supervises standardization while signed functional areas. The United States has at
least one representative on each. More encom-
passing working groups require more delegates.
Figure 2. Selected NATO Standardization Activities
North Atlantic Council
Military Committee
NATO Standardization Conference of National
Office Armaments Directors
Military Agency for
Standardization
Senior NATO
NATO C3 Board
Logisticians Conference
Army Board Naval Board Air Board Joint Service
Board
Working Working Working
Groups Groups Groups
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Vittori
German and Italian
vehicles in Pale.
Cheung)
Squadron (Lance
mera
Ca
mbat
Co
1st
For instance, the Interservice Air Operations range from basic arrangements to encompassing
Working Group has six to ten American delega- bodies of doctrine like that developed for the Re-
tion members, to include representatives from public of Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command.
the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and various A designated Joint Staff OPR works bilateral mili-
contractors. For the most part the services, not tary agreements and coordinates with the services
joint agencies, control U.S. involvement with and unified commands. Numerous multinational
NATO working groups. organizations develop doctrine. Normally efforts
It is through working groups that most stan- are functionally organized and involve common
dardization agreements (STANAGs) and allied national interests. For example, Australia, the
publications (APs) are developed and approved. United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and the
NATO currently has nearly 1,300 STANAGs and United States constitute the Air Standardization
more than 350 APs. Few would qualify as doc- Coordinating Committee (ASCC) and a naval
trine because they are procedural-level directives. counterpart (AUSCANNZUKUS), while the Ameri-
STANAGs and APs are developed from study can, British, Canadian, Australian (ABCA) Armies
drafts, prepared by a custodial nation, and re- Organization focuses on issues of interoperability
viewed by member nations and commands. among land forces. These organizations have es-
Members have the option to ratify the doctrine tablished working parties which develop agree-
and may do so with reservations—stated qualifi- ments and standards through processes similar to
cations describing the parts of the STANAG which those used by NATO.
a government chooses to implement either with Through ratification members are able to im-
or without limitations. When a sufficient number plement publications or agreements by ensuring
of nations have recommended ratification (usu- national procedures are aligned. For instance,
ally eight), the STANAG is ratified. when the United States subscribed to NATO
Outside NATO, multinational military doc- ATP-56, Air to Air Refuelling, the Alliance expected
trine is developed through bilateral agreements our Armed Forces to incorporate the procedures
and multinational organizations. Bilateral accords in applicable publications. While it appears that
ratified, internationally developed doctrine drives
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MULTINATIONAL DOCTRINE
our doctrine for related subjects, it frequently One problem area stems from the policy al-
works the other way. CJCS Instruction 2700.01 lowing a service to apply its doctrine when no ap-
asserts, “Once approved, joint doctrine provides plicable joint doctrine exists or when single ser-
the initial national position for multinational vice issues are involved in multinational doctrine.
doctrine development.” While practical, this
Therefore, U.S. repre- practice sometimes
Multinational operations are now the
sentatives must ensure leads to “backdooring,”
that “entering argu- norm for military operations. whereby a service is able
ments” for any new or —Joint Pub 2-01, to garner international
revised doctrine are in Joint Intelligence Planning concurrence on doctri-
accordance with estab- nal concepts still under
lished joint doctrine. review in the United
The Air Force has taken this a step farther in Air States and, in turn, use such agreement as leverage
Force Policy Directive 60-1, Operations and Re- to gain approval for joint use at home. Another
sources Standardization: problem is that not all working parties have par-
ticipants from every service. It is thus incumbent
The Air Force will not support the adoption of or
on the representing service to update other ser-
ratify any standard that conflicts with national, inter-
vices on key issues. Poorly coordinated working
national, or U.S. military practices, unless a peculiar
party activities could result in another service not
military operational requirement exists, or a civil
seeing a project until the ratification phase. With
standard is unacceptable for military use. U.S. joint
a central U.S. joint agency overseeing doctrine de-
publications will be the basis of U.S. positions for de-
velopment efforts of major working parties, this
veloping, ratifying and implementing [international
backdoor approach could be reduced and all of
military standardization]agreements.4
the services would be better informed.
While not codified as such by all services, this There is another major aspect of service in-
concept is the standard goal for U.S. working party volvement. A designated lead service or agency
delegates. Most allies understand this view yet may (often the former) is responsible for directing U.S.
not agree. Our closest partners tend to study our ratification. This is a questionable delegation of au-
joint doctrine, accept its strong points, and adeptly thority that can lead to difficulties. For instance,
provide compromises for contentious areas. services may propose U.S. reservations in the ratifi-
cation phase. While these recommendations
The Backdoor Approach
should reflect established joint doctrine, there may
If working party delegates and multinational be occasions where a joint precedent does not
doctrine reviewers carry out their prescribed du- exist. Services may therefore have to fall back on
ties, internationally developed doctrine should their own doctrine. The complexity increases
align with U.S. joint doctrine. Where conflicts when a recommended reservation is disputed by
arise delegates can propose changes. If differences one service. Based on CJCSI 2700.01, the lead ser-
are not resolved the United vice or agency should attempt to reach a resolu-
despite some infighting the States could evoke nonrati- tion. Failing that the issue is forwarded to the Joint
fication or reservations. Staff for action. Most likely a representative of the
services have cooperated in
With regard to recent im- Directorate of Operational Plans and Interoperabil-
international doctrine forums provements to NATO, ity (J-7) will serve as OPR for doctrinal matters. The
ASCC, and ABCA publica- process would be more efficient if a designated
tions, it appears that dele- joint agency was in control of ratification from the
gates and doctrine reviewers are fulfilling their re- outset. Ratification is a national issue and should
sponsibilities. Despite some infighting the not be relegated to any one service.
services have cooperated in international doc- Still another problem is distributing agree-
trine forums. Delegations usually base discussions ments and publications. Internationally devel-
on established joint doctrine. Nonetheless prob- oped doctrine tends to trickle down to the lowest
lems exist, most relating to interservice squabbles levels. Unlike joint doctrine, it is distributed
and the lack of a strong central function to re- mostly by a pull down system: the user must re-
solve such matters. quest the item from a distribution office.5A docu-
National Security Strategy Core Values: To en- ment cannot be obtained unless customers are
hance our security with effective diplomacy and with aware of it. Thus it is imperative for working party
military forces that are ready to fight and win. To bol-
ster America’s economic prosperity. To promote
democracy abroad.
—National Security Strategy(May 1997)
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delegates to pass on the status of new or revised agencies of the implementation responsibility,
doctrine to users. Unclassified NATO STANAGs, could improve the process.
ASCC air standards, and ABCA agreements are The United States has made progress in in-
available through a single DOD point—the De- corporating MNO concerns into its joint doctrine.
fense Printing Office Internationally, U.S.
(DPO). Classified prod- doctrine developers
There is a high probability
ucts and NATO APs have effectively repre-
that any military operation undertaken
must be ordered sented their interests in
through service publica- by the United States of America the course of develop-
tion distribution sys- will have multinational aspects, ing key military doc-
tems.6 These distribu- so extensive is the network of alliances, trine publications and
tors rely on timely agreements. Progress
friendships, and mutual interests
receipt of new publica- notwithstanding, some
established by our Nation
tions. Generally, this is areas require attention,
a problem for NATO around the world. most relating to overall
publications. An awk- —Joint Pub 1, control. The lead service
ward system requires Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces or agency appears to
the doctrine custodian of the United States have too much respon-
to pass new Alliance sibility. There should be
material, in turn, to the one agency to control
appropriate NATO board, the national representa- ratification, implementation, and distribution of
tives to that board, and national service/agency internationally developed doctrine. As the single
publications distribution systems. organization designated to monitor doctrinal
Centralizing functions could eradicate some standardization activities, the Directorate for Op-
distribution problems. Ideally, the custodian erational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), Joint
should be able to send the document to a single Staff, appears to be a logical choice. JFQ
U.S. distribution point responsible for notifying
customers of its availability. Also, a single distribu- NOTES
tion agency eliminates each service maintaining
1Multinationalas applied to military doctrine is a rel-
the same publications. Under the current process,
atively new term originated by a Pentagon staff officer
for example, Air Force publication distribution of-
who found it more appropriate than the universally ac-
fices hold various land, naval, and amphibious ceptedcombined.
operations publications in much the same way as 2See final draft of program directive for Joint Pub 4-08,
other service centers maintain air-related docu- Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations,
ments. If DPO maintained classified documents Joint Staff Action J-7A 00892–96 (April 10, 1997).
and NATO APs, it would relieve the services of this 3CJCS Instruction 2700.01, International Military Ra-
responsibility by providing one-stop shopping for tionalization, Standardization, and Interoperability between
the United States and Its Allies and Other Friendly Nations,
all internationally developed military doctrine.
p. B-4.
By far the most critical problem area is the im-
4Air Force Policy Directive 60-1, Operations and Re-
plementation process, the agreement made by a
sources Standardization, p. 3.
nation during ratification to enforce agreements
5The Navy has a sophisticated push system which
by a given date. This may require a lead service or automatically distributes documents to designated
agency to introduce changes to a designated na- users. The Air Force relies on a pull/push system which
tional doctrine.The ratified publication itself may forces users to first establish their requirements before
be the implementing document, which usually oc- being placed on automatic distribution.
curs when there is no approved national doctrine. 6Government agencies or contractors may obtain
There is no established system to ensure that rati- copies of unclassified NATO, ASCC, and ABCA agree-
ments and standards by calling DPO at (215) 687–2179
fied agreements are properly implemented; it is left
or DSN 442–2179/2667 or via FAX at (215) 697–2978 or
to a lead service or agency. Furthermore, it is diffi-
DSN 442–2978.
cult to implement procedures through joint doc-
trine documents that normally change over a three
to four year cycle. This sequence may not coincide
with other producers such as NATO, which delays
implementation. Fortunately, the caveat in the
multinational preface asserting U.S. support of rati-
fied doctrine serves as an interim implementation
measure. A central function, relieving services and
Spring 1998 / JFQ 115