DTIC ADA524774: Why CIA Analysts Were So Doubtful About Vietnam

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

UnpopularPessimism
Why CIA Analysts Were So Doubtful About Vietnam
Harold P. Ford(cid:146)
In travelingthrough Tonkin, every vil National Estimates (ONE), the
lageflew the VietMinhflag, andhad Office ofEconomic] Research and
armedsoldiers, many withJapanese Reports, and the South Vietnam
weapons taken in raids. The women Branch ofthe Office ofCurrent
andchildren werealso organized, and Intelligence (OCI). Such views were
allwere enthusiastic in theirsupport. generally a bit less evident among
The importantthingis thatallwere officers ofthe North Vietnam
cognizantofthefactthatindependence Branch ofOCT. many ofwhom had
was notto begainedin a day, and been transferred there from previous
werepreparedto continue theirstrug Soviet and North Korean assign
gleforyears. In the ruralareas, Ifound ments. The situation among the
It is well documented and notone instanceofopposition to the Agency(cid:146)s operational offices at home
well known that for VietMinh, even amongformergovern and abroad was mixed: some enthusi
mentofficials. astically shared official White House
decades CIA analysts were views, while others were remarkably
skeptical ofofficial OSS report, October J9452 caustic. In more than a few cases, the
Intelligence Community(cid:146)s (IC)
coor
pronouncements about the It is well documented andwell dination processes and top CIA
Vietnam and officers muted doubts about Viet
war known that for decades CIA analysts
consistently fairly were skeptical ofofficial pronounce nraanmks,exypertestsheedfiinniCsIheAd(cid:146)sinatnealllyitgiecnce
pessimistic about the ments about the Vietnam war and produced by the DDI and ONE
consistently fairly pessimistic about
outlook for light at the end the outlookfor (cid:147)light at the end of maintained definitely pessimistic,
ofthe tunnel. the tunnel.(cid:148) Less well known is why skeptical tones over the years.
theAgency(cid:146)s analysts doubt
were so
ful, especially because CIAwas all the The danger always existed that indi
while a central player in US opera vidual CIA analysts could get locked
tional efforts to create and strengthen into constant dark points ofview,
SouthVietnam. Thus, it is important reluctant to accept new evidence to
to examine the sources ofCIA ana the contrary. Also, at times some
lysts(cid:146) doubts about successive CIA analysts overreacted to certain
administrations(cid:146) repeated assurances assertive personalities from other
and claims. offices who happened to be arguing
wholly unsupportable optimism. And
Not all CIA analysts thought alike, there were a few occasions where
and at times there were substantial CIAjudgments on Vietnam badly
differences ofview. Skepticism and missed the boat, or where Agency
pessimism aboutVietnam were judgments were too wishy-washy to
present chiefly among those officers serve the needs ofpolicymaking or,
who produced finished intelligence in a handful ofcases, where analytic
Harold P. Ford held senior positions in the form ofNational Intelligence officers caved in to pressures from
in both the National Intelligence Estimates and in Intelligence Direc above and produced mistakenly rosy
Council and the Directorate of torate (then the DDI) publications: judgments. Despite these hazards,
Operations. that is, analysts in the Office of and, as Robert McNamara(cid:146)s recent
85
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Why CIA Analysts Were So Doubtful About Vietnam
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Studies in Intelligence, Volume 40, No. 5, Semiannual Edition, 1997, No. 1
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Vietnam
(cid:147)
The fact that CIA
judgments often
were more
candid than those of
most
bookIn Retrospectmaintains, the rivals, the VM/VC dominated
other offices due in
was
war(cid:146)s outcome justified many ofthe the countryside. Local populations
CIA analysts(cid:146) doubts and warnings. important measure to the seldom volunteered intelligence to
bureaucratic advantage the the French, the South Vietnamese,
Officials in other entities, especially or theAmericans about Communist(cid:151)
in the Department ofState(cid:146)s Bureau Agency(cid:146)s culture and led forces in their midst.
ofIntelligence and Research, often afforded.
purpose
came up with similar doubtingjudg Then, too, theVM(cid:146)s 1954 victory
ments. At times, their doubts also 9~ over the French at Dien Bien Phu
were shared by certain officers in and the end ofFrench rule had been
DIA and elsewhere in the Depart tremendous boosts to nationalist sen
ment ofDefense and by certain timent and Ho Chi Minh(cid:146)s status
junior and field grade intelligence France(cid:146)s fight against the Commu and popularity. At that time, most
officers in Vietnam. CIA(cid:146)s analysts observers ofIndochina affairs, includ
nist-led Viet Minh (VM) and how
haofvafadiiclenasbo,lesnpoteocuionatlihqseuoreuUracSneaslGyootfivcdearmtneamtnehonottdol satnruaiclbhyustutensdfstououbntsdheeequdFernoetpnltcyihmwiidestfnmeeashtsa.eddCcIoAn hitehnlagdt,UiSfthneiantVtieoMlnlwiwgieodnuecleedlaegwceitnincoinebssy,waejrulaedrggeed
ogies, no precomputer-age Window identical patterns in much oftheneUaSr- margin.
95s. TheAgency(cid:146)s analysts simply, if
military and diplomatic reporting
usonofsutcreicneendstiiodffincdaooltluysb,qtudaiirsntetiolwljieutddhtghomefeifrinctimsaalntphyrato dfatlreot-migmrSeaasdiegtooUlnSd.cImoninlfaiidtddaeirntytiiaoannl,dlytMhbieysysmiwoienrde ADthCesIirmeiAclloalrrednvioDefuwlalwe1as9s,5w4ehvNeon,SCsahcamcreoeerdtdiibnnygg,to
nouncements(cid:151)a recordwhich the officers ofsuch practices. A few CIA told that senior group that (cid:147)The
anuutmheorrosuosfoTthheerPehnitstaogroinanPsaphearvseand arniaelnycsetdsfsierrsvtehdanidnsVuicehtndiasmtoarntidonexbpye mnoeswst dfirsohmeaIrntdeoncihnginfae.at.ur.ewaosftthhee evi
documented. dence that the majority ofthe people
some senior US officials there. The
in Vietnam supported the Vietminh
resulting candor ofCIAjudgments
The following principal factors and rebels.(cid:148)4 South Vietnam(cid:146)s Ngo Dinh
flowed also from the fact that the
forces are among the many reasons reports Headquarters analysts Diem (with subtle US backing) sub
for the doubts exhibited by so many received from CIA(cid:146)s Saigon station sequently proceeded to frustrate the
ofCIA(cid:146)s Vietnam analysts: holding ofelections, and this
were much more factual and exacting strengthened the determination of
in their demanded authenticity than
CIA(cid:146)s cultural advantages. The fact much ofthe other reporting VM forces to continue subverting all
that CIAjudgments often were more wfarsom Vietnam. Vietnam in order to redress their
candid than those ofmost other grievance at being robbed ofwhat
offices was due in important measure they felt had been theirvictory in the
to the bureaucratic advantage the Recognition oftheVietnamese field and at Geneva.
Agency(cid:146)s culture and purpose Communists(cid:146) (VC) enormous
afforded. Thejob ofCIA analysts advantages. CIA(cid:146)s analysts were And one ofthe greatest advantages
was to tell it like it is, freer from the aware that the basic stimulus among Ho(cid:146)s movement enjoyed, at times
policy pressures withwhich their col the politically conscious Vietnamese indicated in reporting from the field,
leagues in Defense, the military was nationalism and that, following were the subversive assets the VM
intelligence agencies, and, to a lesser WorldWar II, the VM had largely and the VC had throughout South
extent, the Department ofState had captured the nationalist movement. Vietnam. Thousands oftheir agents
to contend.3 Many CIAVietnam ana Ho Chi Minh(cid:146)s apparatus came to be and sleepers existed throughout
lysts had beenworking Indochina better led, better organized, and South Vietnam(cid:146)s Government,
on
problems for some time, often longer more united than any other ofthe armed forces, and security/intelli
than most military intelligence offic competing, divided nationalist Viet gence organizations. The dramatic
ers. ThoseAgency officers were namese parties. Through a extent ofthat advantage was not
familiar with how intelligence report combination ofsome reforms and revealed until the fall ofSaigon
ing had been distorted during ruthless elimination ofpolitical in 1975, when events disclosed
86
Vietnam
CIA analysts (as well
as
intelligence officers from
other agencies) repeatedly
how thoroughly the enemy had warned decisionmakers units; and how the enemy had
penetrated the society ofSouth Viet stunned the world by overwhelming
nam(cid:151)including some American that such US military the French forces at Dien Bien Phu.
offices there. escalation would not in BecauseAgencyofficers were not bur
dened with the operational task of
Recognition ofVM/VC determina itselfsave South Vietnam training and developing South Viet
tion to try to meet South unless it accompanied namese armed forces, they were
were
Vietnamese and US escalation, and much freer ofcertain views more
by substantial political-
willingness to suffer great damage, prevalent among US military person
ifnecessary, in order to win even social progress in Saigon nel, such as disdaining the French
tualvictory. CIA analysts widely experience, maintaining that US mili
and especially in the
appreciated the fact that the enemy tary know-how could prevail, and
saw its battle as a long-range conflict villages. trying to impose upon Saigon gov
andwas prepared to go the distance. ernments US military tactics that
To sustain VM/VC morale, Hanoi 9~ were better suited to European battle
repeatedly invoked pastvictorious fields.S Such appreciation by CIA
Vietnamese heroes, even ancient officers found reflection both in the
ones who for nearly a thousand years field and at Headquarters: in CIA
had fought Chinese pressures to maintained that the war had to be counterinsurgency measures that lost
dominate Indochina. Like those won. Agency officers made this their effectiveness when later taken
heroes, Hanoi was confident that its point to policymakers through clan over by the US military, and in
many advantages in the field and the destine service reports, DDI and numerous Headquarters analyses
power ofits forces to endure would ONE memos, National Intelligence thatjudged that US military tactics
in time frustrate more powerful, less Estimates (NIEs), participation in were not substantially reducing the
patient outside powers and cause JCS war games and in NSC-sanc enemy(cid:146)s ability and determination to
them eventually to quit. For decades, tioned working groups, and, in the continue the war.
end, warnings by DCI John
CIA analysts again and again told
pdooulbitclyemsaskepresrsetvheartet,hecoeunnteemryeswcaolualtde MtunrctaCitlioonanebwo.auntBtu1et9d6nt6ootolhniasetteinf.nrutIsthterwaaatsidomnniosntiins Mwoerreeosveenrsi,timvaentyo tAhgeegnecoygraanaplhyisctsand
as best it could, and do so despite suf terrain features in Indochina that
the field caused certain previous
fering heavy damage. shielded supply lines from
sienngiionrptlraucee,beelsipeevceiraslltyoSbeecgrientadreyfoefct outer vieewnaenmdyhelped enemy guer
Such Agency analysts(cid:146) doubts were Defense McNamara, whose In Retro rilla tactics but impeded US
especially marked during the months mechanized forces. CIA analysts long
Jionh1n9so6n4(cid:146)sanaddm1i9n6i5s,trwahtieonnPwraessisdtenutm shhpeaedcatnbndeoehnwischoporolrdlesiccttyhamallatkaCilnIognAgcwoaalnrldneiatgnhugaests ahtoIwndroelcuhcitnaantastsheigJnCmSenatsndretchaellUedS
bling toward carrying the war to had been (cid:147)wrong, terriblywrong.(cid:148) Army had been in 1954 to try to bail
North Vietnam and committing US out the French militarily at Dien
combat forces in the South. During Bien Phu, in part because US mili
that time, and in the face ofpres Recognition ofthe great difficul tary studies had concluded that
sures to (cid:147)get on the team,(cid:148) CIA ties French andAmerican military Indochina(cid:146)s location and terrain were
analysts (as well as intelligence offic measures encountered in trying to not suited for readysupplyor effec
ers from other agencies) repeatedly combatVM/VC political-military tive US military action. These
warned decisionmakers that such US warfare. Virtually all CIAVietnam analysts also recalled, as most policy-
military escalation would not in officers, in the field and in Washing makers by the early 1960s seemingly
itselfsave South Vietnam unless it ton, remained strongly influenced by did not, how reluctant US Army
were accompanied by substantial the French defeat in Indochina. leaders had been to become engaged
political-social progress in Saigon They recognized how ill-suited in war in Indochina, and how at the
and especially in the villages of French military tactics had been for time theJCS had held that (cid:147)From
South Vietnam, where virtually all fighting the enemy; how the VM the point ofview ofthe United
CIA officers at all levels had long had chewed up elite French military States, with reference to the Far East
87
Vietnam
We do not believe that the
loss ofSouth Vietnam and
Laos would be followed by
as awhole, Indochina is devoid of the rapid, successive conflicting nationalistic elements(cid:151)
decisive military objectives, and the the later ofCommunist
as wars
allocation ofn-iore than token US communization of Chinaversus Communist North
armed forces to the area would be a the other states ofthe Far Vietnam and Communist Cambodia
serious diversion oflimited US versus Communist North Vietnam
capabilities.(cid:148)6 East. illustrated.
Similar views following US expan These judgments contributed to~the
sion ofthe war to the North in doubts held by certain CIA analysts,
1965, together with available posi especiallywithin ONE, that the loss
tive evidence, led most CIA(cid:151)and much impact(cid:151)that the Sino-Soviet ofVietnam would inexorably lead to
DIA(cid:151)analysts to conclude that, alliance was coming apart at the the loss ofall SoutheastAsia and the
despite US bombing efforts, the level US defense position in the far
seams; that the USSR and China
ofHanoi(cid:146)s arms shipments to the were competitive with respect to the Pacific. The doubts went unvoiced
VC were continuing to rise. Subse Vietnam war; and that their develop for years in the face ofrepeated
quent accounts byJohnson ing estrangement offered US embraces ofthe domino thesis by
administration decisionmakers con administrations an exploitable oppor senior officials ofthe Truman, Eisen
firm that those reports had a tunity. The principal exceptions to hower, Kennedy, andJohnson
definitely depressing influence upon these views within CIAwere largely administrations. Then, when finally
their earlier certainties, and, in some confined to certain counterintelli asked by the White House in mid-
cases, were instrumental in causing officers who, after the 1964 for its view ofthe domino the
gence even
some ofthose policymakers to lower Sino-Soviet firefights that occurred sis, ONE replied heretically that
their previous enthusiasm about the along the Ussuri River border in (cid:147)We do not believe that the loss of
war(cid:146)s prospects. 1969, continued to maintain that South Vietnam and Laos would be
followed by the rapid, successive
the Sino-Soviet estrangement was a
Rejection ofofficial claims that plot to deceive the West.8 communization ofthe other states of
Moscow and Beijingwere direct the Far East ~ The impact of
ing the enemywar effort and that those doubts on policymakers was nil.
international Communism Those CIA analysts who rejected the
was a
monolith. Manysenior policymak official view that Moscow and Recognition ofthe fact that South
ers judged for years that the enemy(cid:146)s Beijingwere largely running the Vietnam remained a fragile entity
war effort in Vietnam was being run Vietnam war effort based their skepti whose ability to cope effectively
by (cid:147)the Communist bloc.(cid:148) One such cism on several sources. One was with theVC should not be overes
example: Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, at appreciation ofthe degree ofinde timated. These views, held widely
the timeJCS Chairman, stated in pendence from outside Communist among CIA analysts, ifless so
1962 that Vietnam(cid:146)s fallwas (cid:147)a control Ho Chi Minh(cid:146)s movement among CIA operations officers, for
planned phase in the Communist and fledgling government had years ran headlong into repeated
timetable for world domination(cid:148) and enjoyed all along. Anotherwas the assertions by successive US adminis
that the adverse effects ofVietnam(cid:146)s fact that, following the French defeat trations that Saigon(cid:146)s military
fall would be felt as far away as at Dien Bien Phu, Moscow and effectiveness was rising. Subsequent
Africa.7 By contrast, virtuallyall CIA Beijing could have given Hanoi more events validated such CIAjudg
officers held that available evidence support at 1954(cid:146)s Geneva Confer ments: former NSC staffofficer
clearly indicated that, although the ence than they did. There also was Chester L. Cooper, for example,
USSR and Communist China evidence that all along the Soviets later recorded that, of 1962, (cid:147)The
were as
giving Hanoi defense assistance, the had less interest in promoting Com fact was that thewar was notgoing
Vietnam war was Hanoi(cid:146)s show and munist aims in Indochina than in well, theVietnamese Armywas not
had been from the outset. Moreover, buttressing Communist Party for taking kindly to American advice,
with the exception largelyofone tunes in France and Western and Diem was notfollowing through
CIA office, Agency analysts had been Europe. Most CIA analysts held that on his promises to liberalize his
way ahead ofthe rest ofthe IC in the various Communist movements regime or increase its effective
pointing out(cid:151)for years without in SoutheastAsia each contained ness.(cid:148)0 In addition, over the years
88
Vietnam
For CIA(cid:146)s
years, messages
did find ready
not response
downtown because they
much field reporting underscored against fearful Aseas ofDoubt
were up
the fact that President Diem(cid:146)s gov
ernment did not enjoywide support odds These, then, were the principal areas
in Vietnam(cid:146)s villages. His govern 9, ofdoubt that foryears lay behind so
ment was a minority Catholic one in many CIA analyses ofthe outlook in
a predominantly Buddhist country)(cid:146) Vietnam. Except for those occasions
Diem was not a dynamic leader, and whereAgencyofficers produced
he could not compete with the wide doing a goodjob ofconverting the flawed accounts or rosied up their
spread popularity Ho Chi Minh ARVN into aneffectivefightingforce. judgments to meet pressures from
enjoyed. He was remote from the above, the areas ofdoubt translated
people, as attested even by Lyndon into the following fairlystark mes
Johnson in early 1961 while still Such sensitivitywas particularly sages to successive policymakers:
registered in early 1963, when
Vice President:
DCI McCone, theJCS, CINCPAC,
MACV, the US Embassy in Saigon, 1. Do not underestimate the enemy(cid:146)s
strength, ruthlessness, nationalist
Afinalindication ofthedanger and other policymakers took
appeal, and pervasive undercover
pisiethoefftahcetctihtiaetstohefoSorudtihna~ypeo aunmdbrtahgeeICa(cid:146)st awdorrakfitnNg-IlEevwehliocfhficOerNsE assets throughout South Vietnam.
Vietnam]andprobably even had agreed upon. It held that among
smtoarreveodfftohreIreuadrearlsahrze~aswiatrhe under Vwieertenaaml(cid:146)sack(cid:147)voefry(cid:147)agggrreesastivweeakannedssfeisr(cid:148)m 2r.esDiloienncoetaunnddesrteasytinigmaptoewetrh.e eHneemiys(cid:146)sin
standingandwarmth. There is leadership at all levels ofcommand, for the long run and is confident that
popularenthusiasm poor morale among the troops, lack US morale will give way before his
an enormous will. He will keep coming despite
andgreatpopularpower waiting oftrust between peasant and soldier, huge casualties. If escalate, he will
tactical ofavailable forces, we
to be broughtforth byfriendly poor use a
personalpoliticalleadership. But very inadequate intelligence system, too.
and obvious Communist penetration
itcannot be evokedby men in ofthe South Vietnamese military 3. Do not overestimate the degree to
white linen suits whose contact organization.(cid:148)3 which airpower will disrupt North
with the ordinarypeople is Vietnam(cid:146)s support ofthe VC or will
largely through the rolled-up win cause Hanoi to back offfrom such
dows ofaMercedes-Benz.(cid:146)2 Those criticisms by Communityana support.
lysts raised a firestorm ofprotest
the policymakingofficers.
Subsequently published documents aThmeoyngbroughtsuch pressure on 4a.ndDopolniotticaolveproetsetnitmiaatleotfhe miSliotuatrhy
indicate that MACVand Mission DCI McCone and ONE that the lat our
Vietnamese ally/creation.
officers occasionallyvoiced despair at ter caved in and agreed to a rewritten,
the Government ofSouth Vietnam(cid:146)s decidedlymore rosyNIE (53-63), in
(GVN) lack ofmilitary and political which the earlier criticisms ofthe 5. The war is essentially a political
progress, but tended to confine their ARVN were muted and the tone of war that cannot be won by military
doubts to official, classified channels. the Estimate changed: the first sen means alone. It will have to be won
Public official admission oiserious tence ofthe revised NIE now read, largely by the South Vietnamese in
GVN shortcomings was rare. Even (cid:147)We believe that Communist the villages ofSouth Vietnam.
more so, senior US militaryfigures, progress has been blunted in South
at home and in the field, were almost Vietnam] and that the situation is 6. The war is essentially a civil war,
always reluctant to admit that for improving.(cid:148)4 Thiswas not one of run from Hanoi, not a Communist
years South Vietnamese military CIA(cid:146)s proudest moments. And less bloc plot to test the will ofAmerica
units (theARVN), usuallymuch bet than fourweeks later, serious riots to support its allies.
ter armed than the enemy, were no began in Huewhich introduced the
match for the VC. Criticisms of chain ofevents that culminated in 7. Winning the hearts and minds of
ARVN shortcomings were especially the self-immolation ofBuddhist theVietnamese is a tough task. Most
offlimits, lest there be an implication monks and the murder ofPresident Vietnamese simplywant to be left
that US militaryadvisers were not Diem. alone, and most do not identifywith
89
VIetnam
(cid:147)
Perhaps the most potent
hurdle for intelligence...
the fact that the
was
Saigon. And manyare either too decisions on what to do in 10. Caught up by their commit
attracted to the VC or too afraid to ments and operational enthusiasm,
volunteer much information about Vietnam were not taking most senior policymakers did not
the VC presence in their midst. place within but want to hear doubts from below.
avacuum
They tended to ignore such views,
in a highly charged especially those ofmorejunior
What CIAAnalyses Were Up political experts unknown to them. Witness
arena.
Against McNamara(cid:146)s subsequently telling us
(cid:145)9 that there were no experts on Viet
nam)6 And Gen. William E. DePuy
For years, CIA(cid:146)s messages did not
find ready downtown (1988): (cid:147)We did intervene on behalf
response
because theywere up against fearful ofa veryweak and dubious regime,
albeit better than Communism, but
oadndds.juOdugtmweenitgshwienrgeimntaenllyigveinecwes,fafctasc hofadounrots.upWeeriowroufilrdepsouwcecre.ed because wveeriyghdtubainodusmeianntienrgm.sBouftpoIlditoinc(cid:146)tal
tors, and forces which for years
remember anybody saying that. Do
obtained widely among the best and
the brightest of decisionmakers: 6. Top officials believed that sus you? Nobody. Not even the experts,
our
tained US bombing programs will not even the scholastics and academ
disrupt North Vietnam(cid:146)s supply ics said that.(cid:148)(cid:146)7 Or, at times,
1. World Communism is essentially
mpMaoornstolcoioftwhaiwacon,rdaldnBedicjotinhnsegp.Viiraectynarmunwfarroims srHouaucnthoesiintdtooustbthraeicakVlCod,fefvafenolrdofpwemoareunlotdfalcsoasuiitsnehgas pofoourlti(cid:147)ndcooytumbatkbeeerrissn,gdaosennPortuehsneicdteeednatmd(cid:148);iJsoshoennrtsfeorrnosze
achieved. did with the dissenting DCI
McCone; or sent doubters to new,
2. Khrushchev and the Russians are Siberia-type assignments, as State did
testing us: ifthe United States does 7. Many senior decisionmakers were with SoutheastAsia expert Paul
not fulfill its stated commitments in confident thatVietnam(cid:146)s enormous Kattenburg.
Vietnam, our credibility among our complications could be reduced to
allies elsewhere in the world will suf systems analysis and statistical mea 11. Intelligence was only one ofthe
fer seriously. sures such as body counts(cid:151)attitudes many forces that crowded in upon
epitomized by Secretary ofDefense policymakers. In addition, those deci
3. Vietnam is the first domino. Ifit McNamara(cid:146)s oft-cited assurance sionmakers were aware of
goes, the rest ofSoutheastAsia, as (1962) that (cid:147)every quantitative mea dimensions ofwhich intelligence
well asAmerica(cid:146)s strategic position in sure we have shows we(cid:146)re winning officers were not. The record shows
the far Pacific, will crumble. this war.(cid:148) clearly that their chief
concern was
the US position in the world, not
4. Top policymakers were receptive 8. Senior policymakØrs were too Vietnam per Se, and that in their
to theviews ofprogress given them harassed and bogged down in their viewVietnam was so vital to broad
for years by senior military and Mis day-to-day tactical responsibili US interests that we hadto make a
many
sion officers, views that in many ties to give intelligence or the longer strong stand there.
csaisoensswoefrmeodriestcoarnteddi,doapptpirmaiisstailcsver rinanVgieectonnasmeqtuheenccaersefouflUatSteinntiitoiantives 12. Perhaps the most potent hurdle
initially registered bymore-junior for intelligence, however, the
officers in the field who were closer those matters deserved. fact that the decisions on wwhaast to do
to the scene. in Vietnam were not taking place
9. There existed among senior policy- within a vacuum but in a highly
5. There was a profound hubris makers what a US Army(cid:151)sponsored charged political arena. For some
among top policymakers. They history has since called (cid:147)a massive years, the Democratic Party had
believed their made-in-America and all-encompassing(cid:148) American been vulnerable for having (cid:147)lost(cid:148)
schemes would work in Vietnam, ignorance ofVietnamese history and China and having been (cid:147)soft(cid:148) in
where similar schemes by the French society.(cid:145)~(cid:145) Korea. Presidents Kennedy and
90
Vietnam
Johnson repeatedly stated that they policymakers. Vietnam analysts dealingwith Vietnam. In
(cid:149) .. .
were not going to be the US Presi sometimes got locked into mindsets. addition to estimates, ONE pro
dents who (cid:147)lost(cid:148) Vietnam and This contributed to their being duced 51 Memorandums for the
SoutheastAsia. wrong on occasion. Sometimes very DCI concerningVietnam over
wrong(cid:151)especially in not sounding the same period. Indeed, ONE
clear alerts that the enemywas about published more on Vietnam than
ClassicAnalytic Hazards to launch an unprecedented Tet any other single subject.2(cid:146)
offensive in early 1968, and in later
In short, the often pessimistic intelli underestimating the amount of NIE 35/1, 1952]: Through mid-
gencejudgments that CIA and other North Vietnamese military support 1952, the probable outlook in
analysts gave ourVietnam decision- being funneled to the VC through Indochina is one ofgradual deteriora
makers over the years did not have Cambodia. tion ofthe Franco-Vietnamese
much impact, except on those militaryposition... The longer
occasions where senior consumers Not least, at all times analysts had a term outlook is for co.ntinued -
could use intelligence to buttress much easier time ofit than did har improvement in the combat effective
their own arguments, orwhere they ried decisionmakers: analysts operated ness ofthe Viet Minh and an
had come to question the more opti in a protected, quiet atmosphere, increasedViet Minh pressure against
niistic reports theyhad been receiving whereas policymakerswere beset by a the Franco-Viethamese defenses.
from other sources, orwhere they weakVietnamese ally, a toughViet Unless present trends are reversed,
had begun to doubt their own earlier namese enemy, and aUS public that this growing pressure, coupled with
enthusiasms. There has indeed sel could not stay the distance inwhat the difficulties which France may
dom been a better example than came to be regarded, correctlyor not, continue to face in supporting major
Vietnam ofthe eternal occupational as an unwinnablewar. military efforts in both Europe and
hazards intelligence analysts face: that Indochina, may lead to an eventual
thejudgments they deliver do not French withdrawal from Indochina.22
necessarily enjoy careful, rational
study, but disappear into a highly
politicized, sometimes chaotic process Illustrative Quotations cNoIntEin9u1e,t1h9r5o3u]g:hIfmpirde-s1e9n5t4t,retnhdes
where forces other than intelligence
French Union political and military
judgments often the day.
carry
CIA Intelligence Memorandum, position may subsequently deterio
This is what CIA and other analysts 1950]: The Vietnamese insurgents rate very rapidly.23
predominantly nationalists rather
experienced during the longyears of are
than Communists, but Communist
the war in Vietnam, breaking their (Senator) John F. Kennedy, 1954]:
lances in trying to penetrate policy- leadership ofthe movement is firmly I am frankly ofthe beliefthat no
established. These insurgents
makers(cid:146) consciousness that the actual . . . amount ofAmerican military assis
facts oflife were more grim than have long controlled most ofthe inte tance in Indochina can conquer an
rior ofVietnam. Before 1954, they
those senior consumers gen~rally enemywhich is everywhere and at
will probably have gained control of
appreciated. Even so, those analysts the same time nowhere, (cid:147)an enemy
if all, ofIndochina.(cid:148)
performed well in trying to produce most, not ofthe people(cid:148) which has the sympa
candid appraisals(cid:151)inasmuch as the thy and covert support ofthe people.
principal calling for intelligence ana General Bruce Palmer,Jr.]: The first In November of 1951, I reported
lysts at any one time is to try to tell it national estimate on Indochina, NIE upon my return from the Far East as
like it is, to remain a unique calling 5, 29 December 1950, (cid:147)Indochina: follows: (cid:147)In Indochinawe have allied
within a policymaking process over CurrentSituation andProbably Devel ourselves to the desperate effort ofa
burdened with prior commitments, opments,(cid:148) ... was averypessimistic French regime to hang on to the rem
emotion, special pleading, and estimate. 20 nants ofempire. There is no broad,
hubris.18 general support ofthe native
General Palmer]: During the period Vietnam Government among the
Yet analysts have to keep in mind 1950(cid:151)October 1964, ONE pro people ofthat area To try to
. . . .
that hubris is not a monopoly of duced forty-eight (NIEs and SNIEs) win militaryvictory] apart from and
91
Vietnam
in defiance ofinnately nationalistic seldom equaled the motivation ofthe be won only by the will, energy, and
aims spells foredoomed failure.(cid:148)24 VC and the NVA North Vietnam political acumen ofthe resisting
ese]. theARVN was losing the war governments themselves. US power
. .
Former CIA officerJoseph Burkhal just the way the French had lost the can supplement and enlarge their
ter Smith]: I was stationed in war, and for many ofthe same power, but it cannot be substituted.
Singapore then 19541, and British reasons.28 Even ifthe US could defeat the Com
intelligence officers told me that they munists militarily by a massive
thought the United Stateswas mad Former Director ofthe CORDS injection ofits own forces, the odds
to prop up South Vietnam.25 program in South Vietnam, Amb. are that what itwouldwin would be,
Robert W. Komer]: In the first anal not a politicalvictorywhich created
Gen. Bruce Palmer]: Overall, the sit ysis, the US effort in Vietnam failed a stable and independent govern
uation in Vietnam inherited by the largely because it could not suffi ment, but an uneasy and costly
United States from France in 1955 ciently revamp or adequately colony.3~
was disadvantageous, ifnot hopeless. substitute for a South Vietnamese
It is difficult to escape the conclusion leadership, administration, and Judgment by the intelligence panel
that the United States in deliberately armed forces inadequate to the task. ofan NSC interagency working
pushing the French out ofthe way As George Ball put it in his well- group, March 1964]: It is not likely
and replacing them in Vietnam acted known 1964 memorandum on (cid:147)Cut that North Vietnam would (ifit
unwisely.26 ting Our Losses in South Vietnam,(cid:148) could) call offthewar in the South
(cid:147)Hanoi has a government and a pur even though US actions systemati
ONE Memorandum, 1960]: The pose and a discipline. The cally bombing North Vietnam]
catalog ofpublic discontent in (cid:145)government(cid:146) in Saigon is a travesty. would in time have serious economic
South Vietnam] includes awide In avery teal sense, South Vietnam and political impact. Overt action
spread dislike and distrust ofNgo is a countrywith an army and no against North Vietnam would be
family rule Diem(cid:146)s tightly central government.(cid:148)29 unlikely to produce reduction in
. . .
ized control and his unwillingness to VC activity sufficiently to make vic
delegate authority. the growing The authors of ThePentagon tory on the ground possible in South
. .
evidence ofcorruption in high Papers]: In this instance, and as we Vietnam unless accompanied by new
places; the harsh manner in which will see, later, the Intelligence Com US bolstering actions in South Viet
many persons, particularly the peas munity(cid:146)s estimates ofthe likely nam and considerable improvement
ants, have been forced to contribute results ofUS moves are conspicu in the government there.32
their labor to government programs ously more pessimistic (and more
and the government(cid:146)s increasing realistic) than the other staffpapers NSCAction Memorandum 288, 17
(cid:149) (cid:149) (cid:149)
resort to harsh measures as a means presented to the President. This March 1964]: We seek an indepen
ofstifling criticism.27 SNIE October 1961] was based on dent non-Communist South
the assumption that the SEATO Vietnam. Unless we can achieve
. . .
Gen. William E. DePuy]: Well, force would total about 25,000 men. this objective in South Vietnam,
there wasn(cid:146)t a Vietnamese govern It is hard to imagine a more sharp almost all SoutheastAsia will proba
ment as such. There was a military contrast between this paper, which bly fall under Communist
junta that ran the country. Most of foresees rio serious impact on the dominance. accommodate to
. .
the senior Vietnamese officers, as VC] insurgency from proposed Communism so as to remove
you know, had served in the French intervention, and Supplemental effective US and anti-Communist
Army. A lot ofthem had been ser Note 2, to be quoted next the influence. or fall under the domi
. .
geants. Politically, theywere inept. JCS estimate that 40,000 US forces nation offorces not now explicitly
The various efforts at pacification will be needed to clean up the Viet Communist but likely then to
required a cohesive, efficient govern Cong threat.(cid:148)3(cid:176) become so. Even the Philippines
. . .
mentwhich simply did not exist. would become shaky, and the threat
Furthermore, corruption was ram ONE Memorandum, 1962]: The to India on the west, Australia and
pant. There was coup after coup, and teal threat, and the heart ofthe bat New Zealand to the south, and Tai
militarily, defeat after defeat. tle, is in thevillages andjungles of wan, Korea, andJapan to the north
The basic motivation oftheARVN Vietnam and Laos. That battle can and eastwould be greatly increased.33
92
Vietnam
ONE Memorandum for the Direc there is enough military-political about our high terms. The chances
tor, June 1964]: We do not believe potential in South Vietnam to make are considerably better than even
that the loss ofSouth Vietnam and thewholeVietnam effortworthwhile. that the United States will in the end
Laos would be followed by the rapid, Otherwise, the United States would have to disengage in Vietnam, and
successive communization ofthe only be exercising its great, but irrele do so considerably short ofour
other states ofthe Far East. With vant, armed strength.35 present objectives37
. . .
the possible exception ofCambodia,
it is likely that no nation in the area The authors of ThePentagon Gen. Bruce Palmer]: In late 1965]
would quickly succumb to Commu Papers]: However, the intelligence W. W. Rostow requested an analysis
nism as a result ofthe fall ofLaos panel ofan NSC interagencywork ofthe probable political and social
and South Vietnam. Furthermore, a inggroup, November 1964] did not effect ofa postulated escalation ofthe
continuation ofthe spread ofCom concede very strong chances for US air offensive. CIA(cid:146)s somber reply
munism in the areawould not be breaking the will ofHanoi by insti was that even an escalation against all
inexorable, and any spread which did tuting a program ofsustained US majoreconomic targets in North
occurwould take time(cid:151)time in bombing ofNorth Vietnam]. They Vietnam would not substantially
which the total situation might thought it quite likely that the DRV affect Hanoi(cid:146)s ability to supply its
change in any ofa number ofways was willing to suffer damage (cid:147)in the forces in South Vietnam, nor would
unfavorable to the Communist course ofa test ofwills with the it be likely to persuade the Hanoi
cause. . . . Moreover] the extent to United States over the course of regime to negotiate. Similarjudg
which individual countries would events in South Vietnam. The ments were to be repeated
move away from the US towards the panel also viewed Hanoi as estimat consistently by CIAfor the next sev
Communists would be significantly ing that the United States(cid:146) will to eral years.38
affected by the substance and manner maintain resistance in SoutheastAsia
ofUS policy in the area following could in time be eroded(cid:151)that the General Palmer]: With respect to
the loss ofLaos and South Vietnam.34 recent US election would provide the Vietnam, the head ofthe CIAwas
Johnson administration with (cid:147)greater up against a formidable array of
CIA officers(cid:146) comment onJCS war- policy flexibility(cid:148) than it previously senior policymakers . . . all strong
game, April 1964]: Widespread at the felt it had.36 personalities who knew how to exer
war games were facile assumptions cise the clout oftheir respective
that attacks against the Northwould ONE officer memorandum ofApril offices But] McNamara was not
. . . .
weaken DRV capability to support 1965, written shortly after President entirely satisfied with his intelligence
the war in SouthVietnam, and that Johnson(cid:146)s decision to begin bombing from the Defense Department and
such attacks would cause the DRV North Vietnam and committing US beginning in late 1965, relied more
leadership to call offthe VC. Both troops to combat in the South]: This and more on the CIA for what he
assumptions are highly dubious, troubled essay proceeds from a deep believed were more objective and
given the nature ofthe VC war. concern thatwe are becoming pro accurate intelligencejudgments.39
The impact ofUS public and Con gressivelydivorced from reality in
gressional and world] opinion was Vietnam, that we are proceeding Former NSC staffofficer Chester L.
seriously underestimated. There with far more courage than wis Cooper]: It is revealing that Presi
. . .
would bewidespread concern that dom(cid:151)toward unknown ends. dentJohnson(cid:146)s memoirs, which are
the US was risking majorwar, in There seems to be a congenitalAmer replete with references to and long
behalfofa society that did not seem ican disposition to underestimate quotations from documents which
anxious to save itself, and by means Asian enemies. We are doing so now. influenced his thinking and decisions
not at all certain to effect their We cannot afford so precious a lux on Vietnam, contain not a single ref
desired ends in the South. In sum, we ury. Earlier, dispassionate estimates, erence to a National Intelligence
feel that US thinking should grind in war games, and the like told us that Estimate or, indeed, to any other
more careful consideration than has the DRV/VC would persist in the intelligence analysis. Except for Secre
taken place to date. This does not face ofsuch pressures as we are now tary McNamara, who became a
mean that the United States should exerting on them. Yet we now seem frequent requester and an avid reader
not move against the DRy, but that to expect them to come running to ofEstimates dealingwith Soviet mili
we do so only ifit looks as if the conference table, ready to talk tary capabilities and with the
93