DTIC ADA524519: Germany and the United States in the Age of Terror: Ideas, Domestic Politics, and the International System of States PDF
Preview DTIC ADA524519: Germany and the United States in the Age of Terror: Ideas, Domestic Politics, and the International System of States
GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE AGE OF TERROR Ideas, Domestic Politics, and the International System of States Donald Abenheim A stheshockwavesintherealmsofideasandgeopoliticalstrategyrolledout- ward from Ground Zero on 11 September 2001, the edifice of German- American security and collective defense shuddered Dr.Abenheimisdirectorofgraduateeducationininter- and soon piled up collateral damage in Washington, nationalstrategicstudiesandanassociateprofessorof nationalsecurityaffairsattheU.S.NavalPostgraduate NewYork,Paris,Berlin,andbeyond.Intheaftermath School(NPS),inMonterey,California.Hereceivedhis of the terror attacks, culminating in the spring 2003 Ph.D.inEuropeanhistoryatStanfordUniversityand Anglo-American-Australian-Polish blitzkrieg against joinedtheNPSfacultyin1985.Since1987hehasbeena visitingscholarattheHooverInstitution.Hehelpedcre- Baathist Iraq,the German-U.S.bond,a basic element atetheNPSCenterforCivilMilitaryRelations(CCMR) of the Euro-Atlantic security order that has prevailed in 1993 and represents CCMR to the Consortium of for more than a half-century since the end of World NATOand‘PartnershipforPeace’DefenseAcademies. HeistheauthorofthemonographReforgingtheIron WarII,seemstobeintheprocessofcollapse.Germany Cross: The Search for Tradition in the German andtheUnitedStatesarepubliclyatodds,andtheties ArmedForces(Princeton,1988);hismostrecentpubli- that bind our countries appear to have disintegrated cationshaveappearedintheOxfordCompanionto MilitaryHistory(2000),aswellasinOrbisandthe intovituperationandinvectivethatrecalltheworldof Hoover Institution Digest. the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.1 If Theviewshereinaretheauthor’sown.Theyrepresent this cornerstone of the international system of states thepositionofneithertheDepartmentofDefensenor theU.S.governmentandshouldnotbeconstruedas changes further for the worse—and any significant such.TheauthorwishestothankDr.CarolynHöfigof GermanretreatfromtheU.S.andNorthAtlanticori- theDepartmentofStateforherwiseaidintheprepara- entation that has sustained liberal democracy and tion of this article. prosperityinandaroundtheFederalRepublicofGer- Healsoacknowledgesthesupportofhiscolleaguesinthe CenterforCivil-MilitaryRelations,aswellasthatof many for decades counts as “for the worse”—unpre- one of its sponsors, the U.S. National Guard Bureau. dictableconsequenceswillfollowfortheUnitedStates and the world order most congenial to it. Naval War College Review, Autumn 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 4 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2003 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2003 to 00-00-2003 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Germany and the United States in the Age of Terror: Ideas, Domestic 5b. GRANT NUMBER Politics, and the International System of States 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval War College,686 Cushing Road,Newport,RI,02841-1207 REPORT NUMBER 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 19 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 64 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW WhataccountsfortheriftbetweenWashingtonandBerlinatpresent?Nosin- glecauseemergesfromanexaminationofthissituationthathopestogobeyond the facile,reactive,if not jingoistic,analyses of the chattering classes in Berlin and Washington. Rather, the current strain is wrought of a convergence of forces,complicatingmanifestationsofhistory,ideology,experience,andambi- tionthathavealwaysswirledaroundtheGerman-Americanrelationship,how- ever inchoately. For a variety of reasons, these factors have coalesced to exacerbatetensionsandproduceatroublingreactioninthelastseveralmonths sincetheAmericancoalitionagainstterrormarchedtowar,firstinAfghanistan andtheninIraq.Thisarticleexaminesthesecomplicatingfactorsandthecir- cumstancesthathavemadethemsovirulentoflate. The following focuses on the German side of the problem,first tracing the roleofideasinGermanpoliticsandsociety,theideologicalframeworkonwhich thecurrentdebateisbuilt.2Simplyput,inthefirstinstance,sincetheoriginsof suchideasintheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturies,therehaveenduredmutu- allynegativeimagesinGermanyandtheUnitedStatesasconcernspolitics,soci- ety, and culture among political elites;3 these well-worn negative images have takenonanewvirulenceinthepresentcrisisbecauseoftheupswinginnation- alistsentimentonbothsidesoftheAtlanticinthewakeofBinLadenistterror. Secondly,theseideasinteractwithdomesticpoliticalfiguresandfactorsthat,in theGermancase,havebeenparticularlyimportantinthetransformationofex- ternalrelationssincethewaningphaseofthefirstGerhardSchrödercabinetaf- ter11September2001.4Thatis,SchröderisverydifferentfromHelmutKohlas concernsGerman-Americanrelations,andhissourceofpowerandinfluencein German politics differs from those of his Atlanticist predecessors. Thus, the analysishereturnstotheroleof GermandomesticpoliticsinBerlin’sexternal policytoday,developmentsthathavenotalwaysmetwithmuchunderstanding amongforeignpolicyelitesontheseshores. Third,thereisthematterofsecurityanddefensepolicyinGermany,particu- larly the German aversion to extraterritorial operations—an aversion that, al- thoughsuchpolicyhasgivenwaytoamuchmoreglobalorientationsince1990, continuestobrakeGermanenthusiasmforsendingsoldiersoverseascomparedto, say,theBritishandFrench.5Asweshallsee,intheformationofsecurityanddefense policyinGermanyandtheUnitedStates,theforcesdubiousaboutU.S.diplomacy andstrategyinGermanyfindtheirecho,asitwere,inthosefiguresandinstitutions skepticalofthephenomenarecentlycaricaturedbyRobertKagan.6 Finally,thearticletakesuptheimplicationsforthefutureofacontinuingor worsening German-American split. This issue is central to the emergence of “NewEurope”versus“OldEurope”andthelong-termeffectsofthisdiplomatic revolutioninthewakeof11September2001. ABENHEIM 65 FROM ENTENTE TO CONFLICT The U.S.-German amity that now seems so precarious is hard won and vitally importanttotheUnitedStatesandtotheworld.7Thesecurityanddefenseties between Washington and Bonn, and later Berlin, represented the success of statecraftthatforthefirsttimeinmodernhistoryforgedadurableCentralEu- ropeanbondtotheAnglo-SaxonandAtlanticrealm,aconnectionthathadbeen impossible in the years from 1848 until 1949.8 Whereas the rise of German mightintheera1870–1939wasaleadingsourceofconcernforAmericanmak- ersofpolicyintheeraoftheworldwars,theintegrationofGermanpowerinto theinternationalsystemofstatesbecameasymbolofpeaceandstabilityinthe yearsfrom1945until1990.Italsodrovethereconstructionandreorientationof WesternEurope,whichformedareliable—andreliablydemocratic—allyforthe UnitedStatesduringandaftertheColdWar.9 ThehighpointoftheGerman-AmericanrelationshipcameinMay1989,as theborderthatdividedGermanyandEuropefirstbegantohemorrhagedeni- zensoftheEastblocintentonabetterlifeintheWest.IntheRhinelandcityof Mainz,thefirstPresidentBushgaveaspeechinwhichheidentifiedtheUnited StatesandtheFederalRepublicas“PartnersinLeadership”andinauguratedan era of good feeling that obtained through October 1990 and German unifica- tion.10TheeventsofthisperiodandG.H.W.Bush’sestimationoftheGerman- AmericanbondmarkedafittingconclusiontotheColdWarandthecenturyof worldwars. Ofcourse,forallthemutualesteemthatGermanyandtheUnitedStatesfos- teredforeachotherintheyearsafterWorldWarII,theleadersofbothcountries enduredintheirpersonaldiplomacyepisodesofstrifeanddiscordthataffected German-American relations.In the first years of the Federal Republic of Ger- many(FRG),theAmericanswronglythoughtthatKurtSchumacher,theleader of the socialist opposition to Konrad Adenauer’s Atlantic statecraft,was a na- tionalistholdover,ifnotaneo-Nazi.11AftertheclimaxoftheBerlincrisisinthe summerof1961,AdenauerbelievedthatJohnKennedyhadlurchedawayfrom the Atlantic statecraft and nuclear strategy of the Eisenhower administration; Adenauer himself shifted toward Charles de Gaulle at the end of his tenure.12 Ludwig Erhard’s chancellorship ended abruptly in 1966, partly as a result of LyndonJohnson’soverbearingattemptstomakeGermanyshoulderadditional burdensofWesterndefenseintheeraoftheIndochinawar.13RichardNixonand HenryKissingerbelievedthatWillyBrandtventuredtoofartowardMoscowin 1969–70withhisabandonmentofAdenauer’sColdWarpoliciestowardCentral andEasternEurope.14HelmutSchmidtandJimmyCarter,despitetheirshared 66 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW left-of-center political views, disagreed sharply about the means and ends of NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganizationstrategyinthesecondhalfofthe1970s.15 Still,clashesofpersonalityandvisiondidnotdisturbthedepthsofGerman- Americanaffinity.Notsoverylongago,newsreportscarriedimagesofChancel- lor Helmut Kohl and President Bill Clinton, two large men meeting over heart-attack-inducing plates of fettuccini in Georgetown as they consolidated thegainsofstatecraftthathademergedfromtheendoftheColdWar.Thereand later,amidtheorgan-meat-orienteddelicaciesofKohl’shomeregion,thePalati- nate,theconservativeGermanleaderandtheDemocraticAmericanpresident laterexpandedNATOandledGerman-Americandiplomacytonewheightsof cooperationandeffectiveness.Itmaybe,though,thatthesefeastsheraldedthe lasthurrahofthecomfortabletransatlanticentente. ThepresentconditionoftheGerman-Americanconnectionsurelycontrasts withtherecent,butseeminglylonggone,past.TheGermanchancellorwageda populistcampaignagainstU.S.foreignpolicytowinreelectionin2002.Ameri- canandGermandiplomatshavebeenonoppositesidesofthegreenfelttablesat the United Nations Security Council and the North Atlantic Council amid name-calling and feats of diplomatic sleight of hand that do no honor to the memoryofDeanAcheson,KonradAdenauer,orLuciusClay.AseniorAmerican officialhasgroupedGermanywithLibyaandCubaasexamplesofcountriesop- posedtoU.S.interests.OthervoicesarecallingforboycottsofGermangoods— demandsechoedinsporadic,informalrefusalsbyGermancompaniestosupply goods to the U.S.market—or punitive acts of defense “realignment”that will greatlyweakentheGerman-Americanbond.Beyondgivingventtofrustrations at a relationship gone seriously awry, such rhetoric augurs a troubled future. Moreover,thesepronouncements,aswellastheyellowjournalismofthetabloid electronicpress,recalltheescalationofwordsandeventsbetweenthesinkingof theLusitaniainthespringof1915andtheU.S.entryintoWorldWarIin1917. ThepresentbreakdowninGerman-Americanrelationsbegantotakeshape aftertheinitialshockofSeptember2001dissipatedandU.S.armedforcescoun- terattackedtheterrornetworkintheHinduKush;atthesametimetheUnited StatesgaveshortshrifttoanysubstantialNATOsupportintheAfghanopera- tion,putativelyasameansofavoidingtheperceivedsetbacksofthe1999NATO campaigninKosovo.ThisphasehasreinvigoratedinpartoftheAmericanbody politicananti-Europeanandanti-Germanfeelingnotseenfordecades,doingat thesametimemuchthesameamongcertainelitesinGermanywhohavebeen anti-Americanintimespast,notablyfromthemid-1960suntiltheearly1980s. If thisdevelopmenthadantecedentsinthepast,however,neverdidthesephe- nomenacrossthethresholdinbilateralrelationsthatwastraversedin2002. ABENHEIM 67 IDEAS AND THEIR CONFLUENCE IN GERMAN DOMESTIC POLITICS ThiswriterwasinSloveniaon11September2001,aspartoftheconstruction ofwhatinothercirclesisnowcalled“NewEurope.”Whilewaitingtoreturnto theUnitedStatesfromVienna,hewatchedthereactionsof peopleinCentral Europetothecalamityhere.OnesawsympathyforAmerica,thevictim,and fear of further attacks targeting other Western powers—a combination that ledtoexpressionsofsolidaritythatechoedtheNorthAtlanticCouncil’sinvok- ingofArticleVoftheNATOpactwithinhoursoftheattack.Suchcompassion wassurelygenuine,butinsomesectorsothersentimentssoonemerged.From theearliestmomentsoftheaftermath,onealsosawthebeginningsofmisun- derstanding based on old anti-American prejudices in both the popular dis- courseandpoliticalformulationsofcertainelitesandmakersofopinion.This misapprehensionconcernstheinabilityof certainGermanstointerpretfully AmericanhistoryandU.S.ideasaboutpolicyandwarthatappeartocontra- dictwhathasbecome,formorethanafewmembersofthepresentgeneration ofpowerholdersinGermany,adogmaofpeaceinallcircumstances.Professor JeffreyHerfhasbestdescribedthisphenomenonas,first,anunderestimation amongtheGermanleftof thevicesof appeasementintheera1933–39—that is,theinabilitytounderstandthefailuresoftheWesttopreempttheNazire- gimeandthehighpricetheworldwastopay;16andsecond,asthetendencyto engageinaformofWillyBrandt’sOstpolitik(“transformationthroughprox- imity,”atermcoinedin1963byBrandt’spressspokesman,EgonBahr)inevery conceivablediplomaticsituation,whethersuchstatecraftiswarrantedornot. ThepresentGermanleadershipviewseventsinflexiblyintermsofitsowndis- tinctideologicallegacy.17 German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder holds office as a Social Democrat,a representativeofGermany’slargestcenter-leftparty,incoalitionwiththeGreen Party,thelatterhavingemergedinthepoliticalandsocialupheavalof thelate 1960sand1970s,andnowpartofthepoliticalestablishment.TheSocialDemo- craticParty(SPD)isalsothecountry’soldestpoliticalparty,inthesensethatits members today trace their direct organizational and ideological roots to the middleofthenineteenthcentury,theeraofBismarck’sGermanunificationand thenation’stumultuousfirstrepublicanexperiment.TheSPDisalsotheparty thatmoststoutlyresistedtheNazimarchtopowerin1930–33.Itisapartywitha strong pacifist tradition,or at least a deep skepticism about the use of armed force.Nonetheless,in the 1950s and 1960s,key Social Democratic figures had signalrolesintheestablishmentofanewarmyintheFRG.Innosmallpartbe- causeof theparty’sexperienceswiththetotalitarianleftbothbeforeandafter the Nazi regime, the SPD, unlike many European socialist parties, actively 68 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW resistedcommunismbefore1933andafter1945,particularlyintheformofpar- tiesledmoreorlessopenlyfromMoscowduringtheColdWar. Atthesametime,however,thepartyremaineddubiousofthefreemarket,see- ingitselfasthearbiterofa“thirdpath”toresolvethetensionsofcapitalandlabor, aswellasthegeopoliticalconflictbetweenthecapitalistWestandthetotalitarian East.BeforeandafterthefoundingoftheFederalRepublicofGermanyin1949, thishabitofthoughttranslatedtoresistancetoAmericanantisocialistinfluences inwesternGermany,whilethenewcenter-rightparty,theChristianDemocratic Union,atpainstodistinguishitselffromthereactionaryandnationalisttradition oftheprewarright,adoptedastrong,pro-Americanstance.HelmutKohlrepre- sentedsuchpolicyfrom1982until1998,asdoesthepresentleaderoftheopposi- tion,AngelaMerkel.ThefondestSocialDemocraticnotionsof anindependent, neutralGermany,forgingamiddlewaybetweengreatpowers,endureintheSPD’s theoretical substance today. At the same time, the anti-Soviet, pro-Atlanticist wingoftheSPDthatheldswayfromtheendofthe1950suntiltheearly1980s— bestrepresentedbythecareerofHelmutSchmidt(chancellor1974–82)—hasno effectivesuccessorsinSchröder’scabinetorintheleft-of-centercampofGerman politics as a whole. In this vein, the present German-American troubles might be said to have theirdistantoriginsaquarterofacenturyagowhenHelmutSchmidtpassedthe apogeeofhispowerandmanyofthepersonalitiesonbothsidesofthepresent German-Americantensionsperhapsfirstdevelopedantipathiesforoneanother. These developments transpired in the second half of the 1970s,amid the col- lapseofsuperpowerdétenteandtherevivaloftheColdWarin1979–80,thepe- riod of the Iranian hostage crisis,the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,and the electionofRonaldReagan.Beforethepresentepochofterror,then,thepotential for a German-American clash came into starkest relief during the debates be- tween 1977 and 1987 about the deployment of the so-called Euromissiles, NATO’sresponsetoSovietnuclearblackmail.18TheansweroftheGermanleftto suchstatecraftreflectedamisreadingof the1930sbypro-détenteforcestrans- mutedintothelate1970sandearly1980s.Germanadvocatesof anopeningto Moscow misunderstood the fact that the Soviet attempt to overawe the West withtheSS-20medium-rangerocketwasbornofmotivesthatbrookednocom- promise.Further,thefarleftinGermanyfailedtoappreciatetheefficacyofthe North Atlantic strategy of the dual-track approach of the Harmel doctrine— which,beginning in December 1967 and continuing until 1989,fostered a re- ductionofEast-WesttensionsbutalsosufficientNATOdefenseinthefaceofthe Soviettheaterandstrategicbuildup.19ThesuddenendoftheColdWarobviated thedebateamidnationalunificationinpeace,butthereturnof wartoEurope andelsewhereinthe1990srevealedthatthediscordanceofthinkingaboutforce ABENHEIM 69 andstatecrafthadhardlyvanished.Despitewhatseemstobeconsensusinthe FRGontheSchrödercabinet’srefusaltobackthe“coalitionofthewilling”inthe waragainstIraq,thisGermanconflictaboutforceandstatecrafthasgrownfar moreintensesince11Septemberandwilllikelypersistinthewakeoftheannihi- lationoftheIraqiarmedforcesinMarch–April2003.20 Thisphenomenonofafarleftthatcanconceiveofstatecraftonlywithanex- plicitcritiqueofU.S.policyofstrengthhasaDoppelgängerinastraininAmeri- can political thought that is ascendant at the moment. The opposite of an anti-American Gerhard Schröder is the anti-European and especially anti- German-socialist dogma that might be said to exist among the foreign-policy elites of the American right.21 Beyond traditional doubts in some U.S.quarters about European and German socialists, or outright opposition to them, a EurophobicschoolofthoughthasoperatedinpartoftheAmericanforeign-policy elitesinceatleasttheearly1970s.22ThisgrouporiginallydoubtedthegoalsofWilly Brandt’s statecraft and later deplored any lessening of tension with the Warsaw Pact—which,intheirview,couldonlyleadtothe“Finlandization”ofWesternEu- rope.23Thisschoolalsoworriedin1983–84thatared-greencoalitionwouldresult inanewdiplomacyàlaTauroggenandRapallo,withtheFRGmarchingalongside theUSSRagainsttheWest.24Surelytheworkof RobertKagan,whichassertsun- bridgeableideologicaldifferencesbetweenEuropeandtheUnitedStates—thatis, thepithyVenus-and-Marsanalogyofstrategicgeography—takesmorethanapage fromthebookoftheseEurophobesandthestrategicdebatesoftheirday.25 In other words, Germany’s leftist anti-Americanism collides in the United States with rightist anti-German or anti–continental European sentiments in the current debate over grand strategy.These two notions cause an escalatory diplomaticblowandcounterblowofname-callingandinvective,aswitnessedin themonthsbeforetheoutbreakofwarinlateMarch2003.26 THE PRIMACY OF DOMESTIC POLITICS IN GERMANY’S FOREIGN POLICY With the beginning of the new century,the political burdens arising from the conjunctureofGermanunificationandweaknessesoftheGermansocialmar- ket economy (which were detectable even before 1989) became ever more daunting. The tasks of economic and social renewal preoccupy the national leadership amid a widespread sense of social and political entropy and crisis. Theseconcernsreceivelittleornosympatheticanalysisamongpoliticalelitesin theUnitedStates,whodismisstheadventofpeacealongtheEuropeanColdWar battlementsandtheextensionofNATOandtheEuropeanUnionasasideshow atbest.ThiscircumstanceleavesAtlantic-mindedGermansfeelingabandoned bytheireldersibling,theUnitedStates. 70 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW Inthisvein,forinstance,thecatastrophicfloodsofsummer2002inthefive new federal states only served to make Germans more concentrated on their ownaffairsversusthewiderworld.MuchliketheChernobylexplosionof1986, the event accentuated the importance of ecological international relations— thatis,thefloodsinDresdenseemedanaugurofglobalwarming,athreatmore palpablethanal-Qa‘idakamikazesinjetliners.Moreenduringly,Schröder’sat- tentionisdominatedbyGermany’seconomicstraits,asthecountrycomestore- semble 1970s Britain before the Thatcherite free-market coup de main.In the lastdecade,theeconomicgrowthrateinGermanyhasaveraged1.6percent— the rate in 2002 was a dismal 0.2 percent.27 Officially, unemployment hovers near12percent,afigurethatincludesneithertheunderemployednorwomen who,thoughnowjobless,canbecountedashousewives.Intheeasternpartof thecountry,whereworkersbylawearnnomorethan80percentofthewagethat a western German worker makes for the same job, the unemployment rate is much higher,and disaffection for the state and society,expressed through ex- tremepoliticsandviolentgangactivity,runsconcomitantlyhigh. Itgoeswithoutsaying,then,thattheGermanleadershiphasplentytoworry aboutathome.Interestingly,thewarinIraqmayultimatelyhelpeaseGermany’s economic woes, as it might activate an “exception clause”in the European Union’sStabilityandGrowthPact,whichtheGermanscouldciteasareasonfor suspendingstrictcriteriathattheFederalRepubliccannotmeetinitscurrentcon- dition.Undertheexceptionclause,heftyfinesforrecentviolationswouldbedis- missed,andthewayforincreaseddeficitspendingtospurtheeconomywouldbe cleared.28Nonetheless,theheadofGermany’slaboroffice,aSocialDemocrat,in- sists that the war and “geopolitical uncertainty”are hindering recovery.29 ThepoliticalcastofthewartimeeconomicanalysisinGermanycontinuesthe basicdomestic-politicalfactofanti-Americanismasacampaignissue.Chancel- lorSchröderstoodforreelectioninthesummerof2002.Hisonce-popularcabi- net had by then become enfeebled by the national economic sclerosis,unable and increasingly unwilling to free itself from the vise grip of the trade-union movement,where many cabinet members found their ideological home,to say nothingoftheirelectoralsupport.However,theeconomy—particularlythedra- maticpolicyinitiativesthatthemoribundGermanmarketwouldrequire—made for difficult contests for politicians interested in being all things to all voters. As the German election campaign took shape—and as the focus of U.S. counterterror strategy shifted from the Afghan expedition against the Taliban andal-Qa‘idatopreparationsforthemilitaryoverthrowoftheSaddamHussein regime—theSPDalsofounditselfcircumscribedbythepacifismofitscoalition partners.These partners were the Green Party and the so-called Party of Ger- manSocialism(PDS),theStalinistsuccessortotheformercommunistpartyof ABENHEIM 71 theGermanDemocraticRepublic.ThePDSkeptastrongholdonvoters’hearts and minds in the eastern part of the country—in part by promising the anti-AmericanpeaceplatformthattheEastGermanleadershadalwaystalked aboutbutneverdelivered. Thus,whenSchröder’schallengerfromthecenterright,EdmundStoiber,the Bavarian minister-president (governor),asserted on the campaign stump that GermanyshouldsupporttheUnitedStatesagainstIraqinthewaronterrorism, Schröderfoundhimselfanotherissue.Schröder’scampseizedonStoiber’sposi- tiontoexploitseveralfactorsindomesticpolitics.Withhisevermorestrident expressionsofoppositiontoU.S.strategy,theincumbentchancellorappealedto pacifistsandtoskepticsofGermany’sWesternorientationintheex-GDR.Fur- ther,heputthepro-Americanheirsof KonradAdenauerandHelmutKohlon thedefensiveand,eitherbyaccidentorbydesign,emboldenedthefringeright andleftintheirlatentanti-Americanphobias.Attheclimaxof theSeptember campaignSchröder’sjusticeminister,HertaDäubler-Gmelin,longcriticalofthe administrationofjusticeintheUnitedStates,inatalktounionmembersinthe southwesternGermanstateofBaden-WürttemberglikenedtheAmericanpresi- denttoAdolfHitler—justoneweekafterthefirstanniversaryofthe11September attacks.30HercommentsbroughtaboutherresignationfromtheSchrödercabinet immediately after he won reelection,but her swift departure did nothing to di- minish the escalation ofvitriol and bad feeling between Berlin and Washington. Hereinreemergedthedilemmaof Germansocialismandstatepower,force andstatecraft,thathasoperatedsincetheendof thenineteenthcentury.Once more,then,theunhappyexperienceofGermansocialistswitharmedpowerand the international system loomed within domestic politics. Surely in years to cometheSchröderelectionstrategyof2002anditsattendanteffectswillstand alongsideearlierepisodesthattoretheSPDapart.31Themostrecentoftheseul- timately self-destructive allergic reactions to the use of armed force occurred whentheleftwingoftheSPDsandbaggedHelmutSchmidtoverNATOstrategy inthelate1970sandtheearly1980s.Whenthedustandrhetoricsettled,theSo- cialDemocratsnolongerheldthechancellor’sofficeandthenewGermanlead- ersfacedsomelong-termrepairworktotheGermanimageabroad,particularly in the eyes of the U.S.policy elite.Schröder’s version of the new era,however, mightyetprovetobeevenmoreprofoundinitslong-termeffects. SECURITY AFFAIRS IN THE GERMAN VIEW The November 2002 North Atlantic Council summit in Prague invited seven “PartnershipforPeace”/MembershipActionPlancountriestoaccedetoNATO. Totheextentthatthemeetingplayedoutcordially,itfalselypresagedalullinthe name-calling between Washington and Berlin. However, the American
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