DTIC ADA524258: Calling the Sino-Soviet Split

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The CIA andDouble Demonology*
Calling the Sino-Soviet Split
HaroldP. Ford
Sino-Sovietrelationsare in a critical Mao (cid:145)I~se-tung(cid:146)s regime had rn
phasejustshortofan acknowledged umph~d in Chinaand then allied itself
anddefinitivesplit. There is no longer formal~ywith the Soviet Union. Com
much ofaflindamentalresolution of munistNorth Koreahad invaded the
d~ffi(cid:146)rences. In ourview, thechances Repub1licofKorea. Communist China
thatsuch a splitcan beavoidedin had in~ervened massivelyin thatwar.
1962areno betterthan even. The 1.~SSRhad provided its Commu
nist allies with militaryassistance,
NIE11-5-62, February 1962(cid:146) including Soviet-piloted MiGs. The
(cid:147) troublewas, among US policymakers
Ambassador GeorgeKennan:]Insum such a~i image ofSino-Sovietsolidarity
Onceit widelybelieved ma?y, itseems to me that Chinese- persist~d long after the Moscow(cid:151)
was Sovietrelations bidfairto receive, in Beijing relationship had in fact begun
that the USSR and thecomingmonths, a certain ease to ftay~badly.
Communist China ment.... An environmentofcontinued
were
sharp, militaiy bipolarity willleave the Furthermore, that image persisted
firm allies actingin concert twopartnerslittlechoice butto repress long a~er officers from various CIA
to spread Communist theirdij55Łrencesandcariy on. Ambas units l~iad begun to alert consumers
sador Charles (Chzp) Bohlen:]Jam that a Sino-Soviet breakwas definitely
influence everywhere they inclinedto agree with George. there developI.ing.4 Not all CIAofficers were
could in the world. In the is nottheslightestsign thatany.a.djust ofocnheat~imgiend: some remained reluctant
early 1950s, there was dmiesnptusteofhathveebbaeseinceolreamreentisnporfotcheasts. Ctoomr~iunistthebilrolcosnogl-ihdearlidtyv.ieAlwloifn all,
much to support that howe~(cid:231)er, thedominantvoice ofCIA
Comments on NIE11-5-62, analysts was out in front ofthe rest of
image. May 19622 the Intelligence Community (IC) in
trying~
(cid:145)9 to alertpolicymakingconsum
TheSovietparty is opportunistand ers th4t the United States might
revisionist; itlacksanydeep knowledge some4ayface asignificantly changed
ofMarxism; its ideasaboutdisarma strategicsituation.
mentareabsurd;peaceJiilcoexistence
couldmean nothing, exceptasa tactical This 4rticle treats the highlights of
weapon to deceive theenemy; theSoviet that Sino-Soviet story: thejudgments
idea ofa division oflaboramongthe CIA ~fficers made in the years up to
countries ofthesocialistcamp is wrong; 1963,(cid:146) bywhich time estrangement
andChina mustgo herown way. betw4n Moscow and Beijing had
becoi~e publicly evident; why these
DengXiaoping, November 196O~ CIA officers came to hold those par
ticula1 views; what theywere up
Once itwaswidelybelieved that the again~t in trying to promote their
Harold P. Ford held senior USSRand Communist Chinawere heresy amidst many policymakers
positions in both the National firm allies acting in concert to spread who remained true believers; and the
impacjt
Communist influence everywhere they these CIA officers(cid:146) judgments
Intelligence Council and the
Directorate ofOperations. could in theworld. In the early 1950s, had(cid:151)for did not have(cid:151)on
therewas much to support that image. policymakers.
* (cid:147)Double demonology(cid:148) is the author(cid:146)s phrasefortheefforts byanalystsofSovietand Chineseaffairs in th~ 1950s andearly 1960s to
exploreandhighlight thedeepeningsplitbetween the two Communistpowers, or(cid:147)demons(cid:148). 57
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Sino-Soviet
(cid:147)
The Sino-Soviet heresy in
CIAranks began early
as as
1952. In 1953, CIA(cid:146)s
. . .
Judgments at CIA Foreign Documents dons, for whatever cause, may quite
probably be signalized first in diver
thediff~(cid:146)rences betweenPeiping Division] published the gent assertions regarding theoretical
andMoscowaresobasicandareso first major analytic study matters.(cid:148)9
muchaproductofthedifferentsit
uations andproblems in the two alerting readers to Sino These first appearances ofany
countries thatanygenuine resolu Soviet differences. thought ofsignificant differences
tionofthefiindamentaldifferences possibly developing between Mos
is unlikely. 9, cow and Beijingwere no clarion
NIE 13-60, December 196O~ calls, but their messages were none
theless heretical at a time when the
From the outset ofStalin(cid:146)s 1950 alli Sino-Soviet Relations.(cid:148) That study dSionmoi-nSaonvitetviseowliwdaarsitdye,fivnoiitceeldyboyne of
acdenoccnaetdiwen,iutithnhgoMsfaeoorantTahsleey-sbttesuttnweghr,opaanrdt ofa dbirifeffelryinigdeSnotviifeitedantdwoChcihineefseareparsoopfa sonoemeCoatmmthiee,timyeoua(cid:146)vse, (cid:147)Ifseeynout(cid:146)vheemseaelln.(cid:148)
were con ganda: Soviet aid to China(cid:146)s war
vinced that bitter differences
underlay the Sino-Soviet relationship effort in Korea, aonrdbitC.h6ina(cid:146)s status in The next notch in Sino-Soviet propa
the Communist
faced tough hurdles. One involved ganda differences identified by FDD
the outward appearance ofRussian- and FBIS officers followed the death
Chinese cooperation and a wide In 1953, FDD published the first ofStalin. In May 1954, in a study
spread beliefthat the West was major analytic study alerting readers titled (cid:147)Some Aspects ofSino-Soviet
under attack, worldwide, by a mono to Sino-Soviet differences, (cid:147)Chinese Relations Following Stalin(cid:146)s Death,(cid:148)
lithic Red bloc. Another hurdle was and Soviet Views on Mao as a Marx theypointed out that Beijing was sys
America(cid:146)s domestic fixation on Com ist Theorist and on the Significance tematically building up Mao(cid:146)s
munism. For years, most senior US ofthe Chinese Revolution for the international doctrinal stature, a
Kremlinologists and policymakers Asian Revolutionary Movement,(cid:148) by move which (cid:147)attested to the political
remained hesitant to accept intelli Philip Bridgham, Arthur Cohen, strength and liberty ofthe Chinese
gencejudgments that Sino-Soviet and LeonardJaffe.7 It stressed two Communist Party.(cid:148) In the authors(cid:146)
discordwas growing. Central to such Chinese claims, voiced inJune 1951 view, this indicated that Beijing had
hesitance was the fact that, until on the occasion ofthe 30th anniver assumed the right to devise Commu
about 1960, there was little hard evi sary ofthe founding ofthe Chinese nist programs and strategies in
dence to backjudgments that Communist Party: that (cid:147)Mao had SoutheastAsia, an area which for
seemed to many to be based heavily made a new contribution to Marxist- decades had been the (cid:147)exclusive
on tea-leafinterpretations ofwhat Leninist theory in his ideological authority ofMoscow.(cid:148)10
Soviet and Chinese media were writings on the Chinese revolution,(cid:148)
saying. and that (cid:147)Mao(cid:146)s theory, generalizing Theword (cid:147)conflict(cid:148) in Sino-Soviet
the experiences ofthe Chinese revo relations first appeared in November
The Sino-Soviet heresy in CIA ranks lution, was applicable to the colonial 1954 in an FBIS study, (cid:147)Points of
began as early as 1952, at a time revolutionary movement as a Sino-Soviet Conflict on Far Eastern
when the United States was fighting whole.(cid:148)8 After pointing out how the Policy.(cid:148) This piece identified two
Communist bloc forces in Korea. Soviet response had been remarkably areas in which Soviet and Chinese
One ofthe earliest CIA publications cool to these claims, the authors con propaganda (cid:147)persuasively suggest
mentioning differences between Mos cluded that, (cid:147)Differences in longstanding and still not entirely
cow and Beijingwas published viewpoint on these questions may resolved divergences on policy in the
jointly by the Foreign Documents represent latent, but nonetheless Far East.(cid:148) The two principal such
Division (FDD) and the Foreign vital, tensions in the relations issues: the rate at which the Chinese
Broadcast Information Service between Soviet and Chinese economy should be industrialized
(FBIS), on 30 April 1952, titled Communist leaders. In fact, a and socialized (and thus become
(cid:147)Propaganda Evidence Concerning deterioration in Sino-Soviet rela independent ofthe USSR); and the
58
Sino-Soviet
In April 1956. after
. .
attacking the USSR(cid:146)s (cid:147)cult
ofthe individual,(cid:148) a]
degree to which Moscow should sup Chinese People(cid:146)s Daily] already ruled by Communist parties;
port China in opposing the West in what the relationships should be
Asia.1(cid:146)1 article showed no among Communist parties; and how
embarrassment in hailing best to exert Communist pressures
Thereafter, FBIS authors, under the against theWest. We now know
direction ofPaul McPherson, contin Mao as (cid:147)our great leader(cid:148) that, b~y that year, Sino-Soviet
ued to alert readers to siowiy and lauding his (cid:147)all-out discord behind the scenes had
growing signs ofSino-Soviet discord. becon1e bitter. For example, Mao(cid:146)s
defense ofthe theories of
By 1956, these had become much minutes ofa conversation he had
more apparent. InApril 1956, FBIS Marxism-Leninism.(cid:148) with ~ugosIav Communists in Sep
alerted its readers to a Beijing Peo tembe~ 1956 are replete with
ple(cid:146)s Dailyarticle that attacked the ~9 critici~ms ofStalin for having seri
USSR(cid:146)s (cid:147)cult ofthe individual(cid:148) and ously ~njured the Chinese
certain (cid:147)important mistakes(cid:148) Stalin Comrpunist Party over the years.
had made: an excess ofzeal in elimi Special Studies Group Beginping in the 1920s, wrote Mao,
nating counterrevolutionaries, lack (cid:147)Thes~ mistakes originated in Sta
ofvigilance before WorldWar II, lin,(cid:148) a~nd in the course ofsigning the
failure to develop agriculture suffi In 1956, meanwhile, following Chi Sino-Soviet alliance pact in February
ciently, mistreatment ofYugoslavia(cid:146)s nese media criticism ofthe USSR(cid:146)s 1950 ff1 became even more disgusted
apostasy(cid:151)and, most notably, squashing ofuprisings in Poland with Stalin]; I quarreled a lot with
(cid:147)crudely(cid:148) applying his directives and Hungary, CIA made its first for him in Moscow.(cid:148)15
con
cerning China. Then, after attacking mal organizational attack on the
the (cid:147)cult ofthe individual,(cid:148) this Sino-Soviet question. This was the Togei~het with studies on other ques
Chinese article showed no embarrass establishment within the Office of tions,~the SSSG(cid:146)s officers created a
ment in hailing Mao as (cid:147)our great Current Intelligence (0CI) ofa special series ofmajor examinations
leader(cid:148) and lauding his (cid:147)all-out Sino-Soviet Studies Group (SSSG), ofSit~o-Soviet discord. Titled Esau
defense ofthe theories ofMarxism- commissioned to examine Chinese studies, the group chose that name
Leninism.(cid:148) leadership questions and Sino-Soviet expli~itly to reflect the younger
relations. That same year, the SSSG brother(cid:146)s undercutting ofthe older
By 1958, FBIS(cid:146)s analysts were high published its first major study on broth~r(cid:146)s birthright. In mid-1959,
lighting Moscow(cid:146)s cool reception of Sino-Soviet differences: The Chinese the first Esaustudy, (cid:147)The SovietAtti
China(cid:146)s commune and Great Leap View oflnterbiocRelations.(cid:146)3 Organi tude Toward Communes,(cid:148) chiefly
Forward programs; by 1959, FBIS zationally, the SSSG drew in examined Moscow(cid:146)s attitude toward
was also focusing on East European Chinese and Soviet experts from the USSR(cid:146)s own experience with
and North Vietnamese praise ofthe OCI, FDD, FBIS, and the Office of comncunes.16 The SSSG produced
Great Leap Forward. This unprece Economic] Research and Reports five mote Esaustudies in 1959. All
dented Soviet satellite independence (ORR). SSSG(cid:146)s specialists included focus~d on China(cid:146)s launching ofits
was unacceptable to Moscow. By Walter P. (Bud) Southard, Philip own (ill-fated) commune program.
September 1960, FBIS was pointing Bridgham, Arthur Cohen, Harry And all emphasized Moscow(cid:146)s igno
to some specific Soviet (cid:147)intensive GDeolnmaalnd,ZaSegtorMiaat.d(cid:146)4irosian, and rance~ofthat program(cid:146)s inception, its
pressures(cid:148) on China: the first warn shar~ critiques ofChina(cid:146)s com
ings that China might face exclusion munes, and the fact that the Soviet
from the Communist bloc; demands The Deputy Director for Intelligence and (Chinese parties by 1957 had
that bloc members subordinate their (DDI) was perceptive in establishing begu~i making (cid:147)diametrically oppo
(cid:147)national interests(cid:148); increasingly this group. With the advantage of site(cid:148) ~ntetpretations ofsupposed
explicit charges that (cid:147)dogmatists(cid:148) hindsight, numerous scholars now international Communist Declara
were engaging in divisive activities date the beginnings ofSino-Soviet tionsl(cid:146)~ In 1959, the DDI also
that endangered world Communism; estrangement to differences that estab~ished a special interoffice corn
and an implicit call that the Chinese developed in 1956 over how best to mittee, chaired by R. Jack Smith, a
Communist Party recant.12 build (cid:147)Communism(cid:148) in states member ofthe Office ofNational
59
Sino-Soviet
(cid:147)
In the early 1960s, I argued
that deep-seated
differences China(cid:146)s
over
Estimates (ONE), (cid:147)to survey the acquisition ofnuclear Chinese consider that (cid:147)the papacy
assets ofDDI components for investi has moved toAvignon; they are in a
gating the question ofthe Sino weaponswere central to the stage ofdevelopmentwhich needs a
Soviet relationship and to ascertain initiation and aggravation myth ofinfallibility; and they do not,
what is being done in terms ofcollec moreover, feel themselves implicated
tion, analysis, and production.(cid:148)8 ofSino-Soviet discord. in past Soviet mistakes.(cid:148)23
(cid:145)9
In 1960, the SSSG produced four
In 1959, I stressed interacting dis
more major Esaustudies. Pointingout cord existing within both the
how Sino-Sovietdiscord had become
Chinese Communist Party and Sino
more acute during 1958-60, these andhis SSSG colleagues had been
pieces emphasizedhow Sovietspokes doingforsome time.19 Soviet relations; the fact that Beijing
menwere nowseverelycriticizing (cid:147)is nowvery much on the make in
China(cid:146)s commune and Great Leap world politics at a time when Soviet
leadership has apparently decided
Forwardprograms, how differences More CIAHeretics
had escalatedconcerningthe bestways that there is much to be gained by
to build Communismat homeand to Meanwhile, several members of resort to seductive, less crude meth
spread itabroad, andwhetherChina(cid:146)s ONE(cid:146)s staffhad begun to join the ods ofconquest(cid:148); and that
commune program should be a model ranks ofthe heretics arguing Sino differences over China(cid:146)s acquisition
forothersocieties inAsia. These stud Soviet discord. These officers ofnuclearweapons were apparently
ies also pointed up howChina(cid:146)s included Chester Cooper, Richard becoming an increasing point ofdis
communeprogram(cid:151)to the disgust of Shryock, James Billington, John cord both within China and in its
Moscow(cid:151)had foundwarm reactions Whitman, Louis Sandine, and relations with Moscow.24 In the
amongcertain oftheUSSR(cid:146)s satellite myself. The most senior, Cooper, early 1960s I argued that (cid:147)deep-
regimes. In addition, theynoted that took leading role: early 1954, seated differences over China(cid:146)s acqui
a as as
Maowas insistingmuch greater risks he set up meetings ofONE and sition ofnuclearweapons were
should be taken in pushing theWest, SSSG officers to discuss Sino-Soviet central to the initiation and aggrava
nowthat the USSRhaddeveloped differences,20 and he was later instru tion ofSino-Soviet discord,(cid:148) though
ICBM capabilities. By 1961, Esau mental in urging CIA(cid:146)s analysts to that discord was the product as well
studieswere able to detail howaflood focus more effort on the Sino-Soviet ofcompeting revolutionary strate
ofSoviet and Chinese documents, estrangement, and in particular on gies, theological pretension, struggle
clandestinelyacquired in 1960, clearly how it might affect US interests.21 for supreme Communist authority,
established thatMoscowand Beijing and fundamental disagreement
over
openlyquarrelingand acknowl
were Along the way, in a memorandum whether Stalin should be praised or
edgingthat their relationship had on (cid:147)The Big Commune Heresy,(cid:148) buried.25 Radio Moscow later con
become badlyestranged.
written in November 1958, Shryock firmed that there had been serious
pointed out how China(cid:146)s leaders Sino-Soviet differences over nuclear
Therewas amuch broader readership were trumpeting their commune pro weapons:
ofSSSG(cid:146)s findings in 1962, when gram as a momentous event in world
Princeton UniversityPress published history, whereas high-level S(cid:146)oviet offi
TheSino-Soviet Conflict,written by cials were completely ignoring it. The Chinese leadershave been at
one ofthe SSSG(cid:146)s officers, Donald Shryock concluded that (cid:147)whether (cid:149) greatpains to obtainpossession of
Zagoria. Thiswas aperceptive, unique deliberate or no, the Chinese have nuclearweapons. Theystrenuously
work, widelyacceptedsince that time started something too big to be long tried(cid:151)this is nosecret(cid:151)to getthe
as one ofthe first publications that ignored.(cid:148)22 Billingtonwrote that by Soviet Union togive them the
spelledout in unambiguous detail the 1959 the alleged common ideological atomicbomb. The CPSUandthe
causes and character ofthe Sino-Soviet bond between Moscowand Beijing Soviet Governmentnaturally
conflict. The book(cid:146)s strength layin the had become of(cid:147)minor importance in couldnotconsiderthis, since it
fact that in writingit, Zagoriahad the relationship and is likely to mi~hthaveledto the mostserious
borrowed heavilyfrom theworkhe become increasingly so(cid:148), and that the consequences.26
60
Sino-Soviet
(cid:147)
(cid:149)
ONE Director Sherman
Kentwrote in 1960,] (cid:147)The
Sino-Soviet dispute is
By 1960, ONE(cid:146)s front office had genuine, bitter, and The final text ofthe next NIE on the
become supportive ofthe positions covers subjec~ (100-3-60) was much less
those ONE staffmembers had been a broad range of firm at out a possible Sino-Soviet
taking. In May 1960, ONE(cid:146)s Acting fundamental policies.,, ruptur~ than many ofCIA(cid:146)s analysts
DirectorAbbot Smith wrote DCI (ONE?s included) had been champi
oning.~The
Dulles that Soviet detente tactics 9, NIE did state that there
toward theWest had provoked (cid:147)the had been a (cid:147)sharp increase in dis
bitterest and most fundamental Chi cord(cid:148) ~n the Sino-Soviet relationship
nese Communist disagreement with and that it (cid:147)is not a monolith.(cid:148) But,
Soviet policyyet evidenced.(cid:148)27 Later afterji~kdging that that relationship
that year, ONE Director Sherman contai~ied (cid:147)elements ofboth cohe
Kpuetnetiwsrgoetneu,in(cid:147)Teh,ebitStienro,-aSnovdiecotvderissa cadovmanmtoagne,obajnecdtiPveeispianngd(cid:146)s mcuotnutailnuing scioonncha~Addeddivtihsaitotn,h(cid:148)e tchoeheEssitviemfaotreces
r~main
broad ran~e offundamental dependence on Moscow, will serve (cid:147)will stronger than divisive
policies.(cid:148) to prevent anysignificant weakening forces ~t least through the~eriod of
ofSino-Soviet ties at least through this estimate five years].(cid:147)~(cid:147)
1960.(cid:148)~(cid:176) In 1957, the coordinating
Cautious NIEs process kept the IC(cid:146)s judgments sim
ilarly cautious; NIE 13-57 A Different NIE Tune
CIA officers also played leading roles concluded that conflicts ofinterest
in producing the IC(cid:146)s authoritative would (cid:147)probably(cid:148) arise between the The n~essage ofthe next NIE on the
judgments on the state ofrelations two powers, but that it would be subjec~ (13-60, 6 December 1960)
between Moscow and Beijing. The (cid:147)highly unlikely(cid:148) that either side was su~stantially different, at last
views ofthese coordinated National would (cid:147)permit such conflicts to coming to the view that the differ
Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) con impair Sino-Soviet solidarity.(cid:148)3(cid:146) ences ~erween Beijing and Moscow
cerning the degree ofRussian- The following year, NIE 13-58 were s~ great that (cid:147)any resolution of
Chinese discord lagged behind the the fundamental differences is
made similar judgments. By 1959,
judgments ofthe individual CIA obvious Sino-Soviet differences had unlike~y.(cid:148)34 Three reasons explained
ohafohfweiecaevdresor.f,UtNphIeEisnttvioileltw-hsdeowemeairrnlaeyntd1e9fi6im0nasigt,eely aarnidseGnrceoantcLeeranpinFgoCrhwianrad(cid:146)sprcoogmrammusn;e jtihunidJsguncl~h~eann1tg9.e6dF0,irMsmto,uscicthowawmsohrkaendocsowunndfditedhnealntyt
China(cid:146)s instigation ofthe Quemoy
asomliodnargitpyo.lTichyemaIkCerhsadofaSdidnroe-sSsoevdiethte Matsu offshore island crisis; and aChnidnau1nitloatleeraavlel,y(cid:147)woirtdheirnedtihtes emxopnetrths.(cid:148)in
whether the USSR(cid:146)s acquisition of Secon~1,
Sino-Soviet relationship as early as it had become known that
1952, at a time when most observers nuclear weapons meant that greater, during the year Chinese and Soviet
considered China to be a tool ofthe or more cautious, risks should now spoke~men had angrily confronted
Soviet Union, and concluded that be run against the West. In 1959, one another in a series ofinterna
Beijing, unlike the USSR(cid:146)s East Euro the IC admitted the presence of tional Communist gatherings of
satellites, (cid:147)directly and numerous differences in the two unrivaled bitterness, climaxed by the
pean was not
powers(cid:146) relationship, judging that
completelycontrolled by the Krem CPSq(cid:146)s 22nd Congress in Novem
lin,(cid:148) and retained (cid:147)some capability (cid:147)the reconciliation ofSino-Soviet ber. Third, and most important, an
for independent action and a capabil interests will probably become unpre~edented breakthrough had
ity to exert an influence upon the increasingly difficult,(cid:148) particularly occurred in clandestine collection
shaping ofCommunist policy in the with respect to (cid:147)nuclear weapons, regar4ing those encounters: the for
Far East.(cid:148)29 attitudes and tactics toward the eign afid domestic intelligence
West, and patterns ofeconomic and servic(cid:231)s ofthe United States and of
By 1956, the IC agreed that certain social development(cid:148). Yet that NIE severa~ friendly countries obtained
difficulties did exist between Mos still concluded that Moscowand copies1 ofmanyofthe angryletters
and Beijing, but concluded, Beijing would find (cid:147)no feasible the Soviets and Chinese had distrib
cow
(cid:147)Although potential conflicts of alternative(cid:148) to maintaining their uted. ~mong this new evidence
interest exist, we believe that alliance.32 docur~ienting Sino-Soviet bitterness
61
Sino-Soviet
(cid:147)
Knowledge ofChinese-
Russian history the
was
primary factor convincing
was a denunciation Khrushchev had CIA] analysts that break Sources ofSino-Soviet Discord
made ofthe Chinese for being a
Tsreoetksiknygiwtaesr.a35nd (cid:147)madmen(cid:148) who were was brewing. Iwillneverforgetthatnightin
Nanking, when the Chinese
9~
Communists(cid:146)liaison officer,
By 1963, when the Sino-Soviet HuangHua, toldme overand
estrangement had become widely evi overagain how much he hated
dent, the IC at last agreed that the theRussians(cid:145)guts.
ideological and policy differences
(cid:147)basic issues(cid:148) behind that discord
were (cid:147)incompatible national and between the two countries.(cid:148)39 WalterP. (Bud) Southard43
party interests,(cid:148) and that (cid:147)the Chi
nese Communists show no signs of In September 1960, DCI Dulles told With occasional exceptions, until the
relenting.(cid:148)36 In focusing on compet the NSC that CIA had (cid:147)a great deal windfall ofclandestine reporting
ing national interests as the basic ofdocumentation(cid:148) on the Sino occurred in the 1960s, the principal
source ofSino-Soviet discord, the IC Soviet dispute, and that among this source materials demonstrating
at last validated what many CIA ana evidence was an 84-page Soviet direc growing Sino-Soviet discord had
lysts had long been stressing. tive to all Communist parties been the many (unclassified) broad
informing them that China had bet casts, speeches, and articles that
ter shape up, or Soviet aid to it Beijing and Moscow had published
would be (cid:147)reduced or eliminated.(cid:148)40 over the years, haranguing one
CIA(cid:146)s 1960 NSC Briefings
In October, Dulles told the NSC another indirectly by criticizing third
that the Soviets were apparently parties or citing supposed historical
Meanwhile, by 1960, the much working to confront the Chinese precedents. The analysts out front in
firmer evidence being received had with the unanimous condemnation appreciating this growing estrange
enabled senior CIA officers to keep ofall the world(cid:146)s Communist par ment were those officers who
the National Security Council ties.41 And, near the close of 1960, immersed themselves in this vast
(NSC) well informed ofthe growing Dulles informed the NSC ofwhat body ofmaterials and were able to
discord in Moscow(cid:146)s relationships CIA had learned concerning the just- decode the respective polemics.
with Beijing. As early as December completed 22nd Congress ofthe Some read these materials in the orig
1959, Deputy Director for Plans CPSU, stating that from their study inal Russian or Chinese; others relied
(DDP) Richard Bissell was assuring ofthe manifesto published by that on the excellent publishing by FBIS
the NSC that the IC (cid:147)is unanimous conference (cid:147)CIA experts have iso (and the British) ofdaily translations
that Sino-Soviet] strains are genuine lated 17 issues dividing Communist and occasional analyses.
and not a fabrication.(cid:148)37 InApril China and the USSR(cid:148); also, that the
1960, DCI Allen Dulles told the chiefChinese delegate to the confer But knowledge ofChinese-Russian
NSC that three questions principally ence Chou En-lai] (cid:147)was said to have historywas the primary factor con
marked the Sino-Soviet dispute: made a four-hour speech attacking vincing these analysts that a break
whether war was inevitable; whether Khrushchev personally.(cid:147)42 was brewing: they recognized that
the Westwas increasing preparations the Chinese Communists had come
forwar; and whether peaceful coexist All in all, 1960 was a good Sino to power largely unaided by Moscow
ence was possible.38 (cid:145)When Acting Soviet year for CIA: the collection of and, at times, despite it. These offic
DCI Charles Cabell briefed the NSC evidence had been excellent; the ers(cid:146) conviction that China
was a
inAugust 1960, reporting that heretical views long held by many of wholly unique phenomenon within
Khrushchevhad said (cid:147)only madmen theAgency(cid:146)s analysts had at last the Communist world stemmed
and maniacs regard war as inevita begun to become canon; and the from their appreciation ofthe many
ble,(cid:148) Vice President Nixon asked DCI and other senior CIA officers clashes ofinterests that had marked
Cabell whether he was (cid:147)completely had become convinced ofthe extent Chinese-Russian relations over the
sure(cid:148) that there was a real difference and genuineness ofSino-Soviet dis years.
ofview between the USSR and cord and had passed those
on
China; General Cabell replied that conclusions to the government(cid:146)s top Continuing Chinese anger at Russia
(cid:147)in his opinion there were real policymakers. for having taken enormous territories
62
Sino-Soviet
(cid:147)
(cid:147)When Stalinwalked into
the in which Sino
room
Soviet talks being
were
from China in years past was central held,] seemed artillery(cid:146) pieces.49 Stalin had been far
to Sino-Soviet controversy. CIA(cid:146)s her everyone to more c~ncerned with the strategic
etics were aware that there had been stop breathing, to freeze. securit~(cid:146) ofSiberia than with broth
numerous borderwars beginning as He brought danger, erly tie~ to the CCP. AtYalta, the
far backas the 17th century; that tsa Soviet union bound itselfby formal
rist Russia had acquired over 500,000 an atmosphere offear.(cid:148) treaty t~o Chiang Kai-shek(cid:146)s govern
square miles ofterritoryclaimed by (cid:151)N. T. Federenko ment, and then continued its
China and that this had dismayed diplon~atic recognition ofthat gov
successive Chinese officials(cid:151)impe (Stalin(cid:146)s interpreter) ernment until the Soviet treatywith
rial, Nationalist, and Communist(cid:151) 9, Mao w~s signed in early 1950, four
who alike referred to the Russians dis month~ after the People(cid:146)s Republic
dainfully (cid:147)long noses(cid:148); that after ofChii~iahad been created.
as
Russia(cid:146)s new Bolshevik government
had in 1919 disowned previous 1934-35 to 25,000, and the territory
unequal treaties, it had proceeded to which made up the (Communist) Bitter Negotiations
make Mongolia a Soviet satellite, a regions ofChinawas reduced by 99
territoryofmore than 1 million percent.(cid:148)46 In addition to suborning Considerable friction had surrounded
square miles; and that at the close of Chinese Communist officers, Mos the cor~summation ofthe 1950
WorldWar II the Soviet Union not cow had purged Soviet officials Soviet-~hinese alliance. The negotia
onlyhad regained EastAsian assets it believed to be too close to the Chi tions were long and bitter; the
had lost toJapan in 1905 (Port nese. The USSRhad lent the CCP Chines~e resisted some ofMoscow(cid:146)s
Arthur, Dairen, and railroad rights in some support over the years, but it deman~Js, and Stalin treated Mao
Manchuria), but also had then looted had given Chiang Kai-shek(cid:146)s Nation badly. ~nJanuary 1950, US Secretary
Manchuria and heightened the alist Chinese far more military ofState DeanAcheson told the
USSR(cid:146)s covert influence in China(cid:146)s assistance than it had provided to Natior~al Press Club that the USSR
northwestern province ofSinkiang.44 Mao(cid:146)s forces. Chiang(cid:146)s Whampoa was trying to annex parts ofChina.50
Chinese anger on these scores was MilitaryAcademyhad depended Afew ~jIays, laterAcheson noted pri
mirrored in 1954, when China pub heavily on Soviet advisers. And the vately chat in Moscow Mao was said
lished a geography book showing operational leadership ofChiang(cid:146)s to be (cid:147)highly dissatisfied with
Mongolia as still part ofChina and subsequent triumphant northern attem~ted exactions on China(cid:148); that
picturing the huge areas Russia had expedition in the mid-1920s was itwas rumored that Chou En-lai had
wrested from China by (cid:147)unequal (cid:147)almost completely in the hands of told th~ Soviet delegation he (cid:147)would
treaties.(cid:148)45 Soviet] General Bleucher.(cid:148)47 resign rather than accede(cid:148) to Russian
deman(cid:146)ds; and that the Kremlin
was
seekin~
Another prime source ofdiscord, By 1940, in China(cid:146)s warwithJapan, to introduce Soviet (cid:147)advisers(cid:148)
known to those familiar with Rus thanks to active Soviet military sup into Chinawhose real aim would be
pen~trate
sian(cid:151)Chinese history, was the port ofChiang, Soviet pilots to the CCP and bring the
disdainful manner in which the destroyed 986Japanese planes. (cid:147)Chin~se party and government appa
Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) According to Soviet authorA. A. ratus c~m~letely under Stalinist
control.(cid:148)5
had often treated the Chinese Com Martynov, (cid:147)more than 100 Soviet
munist Party (CCP) over the years. hero-pilots were killed in these
Trying to fashion the CCP in its battles.(cid:148)48 A.t. t.he close ofWorld Since that time, considerable testi
own image, the CPSU had pushed War II, the Soviets did turn over mony has verified the view that those
negoti~tions
the fledgling Chinese Communists great quantities offormerJapanese were indeed bitter. N.
into disastrous urban rebellions in arms to the Chinese Communists, T. Federenko, Stalin(cid:146)s interpreter,
recall4l
the 1920s and early 1930s. Mao later but in 1945-46 Chinese Nationalist that (cid:147)The very room where
claimed that, as a result ofthose forces acquired far greater quantities the tal~cs were held was like a stage
disasters, the Chinese RedArmy, ofcapturedJapanese arms(cid:151)twice as where a demonic showwas being
(cid:147)which in 1929 was comprised of many rifles, six times as many acted out. When Stalin walked in,
300,000 fighters, was reduced by machineguns, and 10 times as many everyo~e seemed to stop breathing,
63
Sino-Soviet
(cid:147)
CIA(cid:146)s Young Turks found
themselves occasionally
frustrated by conservative
to freeze. He brought danger, an within the Internal Disagreement
atmosphere offear.(cid:148)52 And pressures
we now
know Mao complained in 1956 to Agency. These usually] ThistaffOCI(cid:146)s SSSGJcompiled
P.F. Yudin, the USSR(cid:146)s Ambassador took the form ofsenior thedata thatpermittedCIA to
in Beijing, that for some time during leadthe way(cid:151)against fi~rious
his stay in Moscow in 1950: officers watering down opposition eI~ewhere(cid:151)in charting
drafts. thestrategicconflictbetween
Stalin refrainedfromanymeetings SovietandChinesestyles ofdicta
with me. From myside, therewas 9, torshipanddoctrinethatwasbasic
anattempttophonehim in his to thedefinitivesplitin 1960.
apartment, butthey respondedto
methatStalin isnothome. All RayS. Cline56
thisoffended andldeci.d.e.dto knowledge; possible Chinese acquisi
me.
wuuannpdileteriattsaoakunettnacototnthvhieenr.g(cid:228)as.Jcalth~iaro.tnhetrTohaoeknnpdlaatonce Kttihoorwnuasrohdfcnbhueectvlt(cid:146)seerarbreewlgeaiatnpinooninsnsg;wimtohvethse BstyeecpoendtrianstChwiintehstehohsiestoofrfyi,cesrosme
other CIA officers maintained that
with I.VIKovalevandINTI United States; and, especially, Mao(cid:146)s
the indirect indications ofSino
Foendearnenekxocu,rswihoonparroopuonsdedthtehactoIugno nbuocalsetatrhawtarC.hIinnaMacoyul1d95su8rvMiaveoasaid: mSoavtieedt.dTihsecosredosfhfiocuelrds tneontdbeedovebreesti
to
try. Isharplyrejectedthisproposal either those steeped in the study of
andrespondedthatlprefer (cid:147)to sleep Ifwarbreaksout, itisunavoidable Communist theory and the USSR
or
through itattheclacha. (cid:147)~ thatpeople willdie. Wehaveseen certain senior generalists whose
wars killpeople. Many times in broad responsibilities prevented
China~pasthaIfthepopulation
CIA(cid:146)s heretics had noted signs them from immersing themselves in
many
ofgrowing Sino-Soviet discord well has been wipedout.. . . We have trying to decode Sino-Soviet polem
before the receipt ofexcellent clan atpresentno experience with ics andwho were reluctant to go out
destine reporting in the 1960s. atomicwar. Wedo notknowhow on a limb against what had long
Following the death ofStalin in many mustdie. Itis betterifone- been conventional wisdom, includ
1953, Beijing published Maoist pre halfareleft, thesecondbestis one ing the wisdom ofsome ofthe
third. Afterseveralfive-year
tensions to ideological and policy . . . country(cid:146)s most respected senior
plans Chinal willthen develop
leadership ofthe Communist experts on Communist affairs.
world.54 In 1956, Chinese angerwas andrise up. Inplaceofthe totally
destroyedcapitalism willob
evident concerning Khrushchev(cid:146)s de we CIA(cid:146)s Young Turks found them
Stalinization and the USSR(cid:146)s suppres tainperpetualpeace. Thiswillnot selves occasionally frustrated by
sion ofPolish and Hungarian bea badthing.55 conservative pressures within the
protests against Soviet rule. In 1957, Agency. In most cases in the late
one reason Mao(cid:146)s (cid:147)Let a Hundred For US intelligence analysts, aware 1950s and early 1960s, these took
Flowers Bloom(cid:148) experiment proved ness ofmanifold Sino-Soviet the form ofsenior officers watering
so briefwas that it producedwide differences became much clearer in down drafts, leaving little in theway
spread, embarrassing criticisms ofthe 1960, when the USSRsuddenly ofsharp messages to consumers that
Soviets. It was likewise known that, pulled out all its advisers from Sino-Soviet discordwas mounting.57
by 1958-59, numerous sharp differ China, over and above the break Nor were bureaucratic pressures
ences ofviewhad arisen on a through in documented evidence of absent. The SSSG(cid:146)s Philip Bridgham
number ofsubjects: Beijing(cid:146)s sharp discord. Thus, by the end of told the author ofthis article that
on
commune and Great Leap Forward 1960, the long-held views ofCIA(cid:146)s one occasion, a senior person in a
programs; China(cid:146)s shelling ofthe heretics had at last begun to be veri competing office had sought unsuc
Nationalist-held offshore islands, fied. Thejourney there had not been cessfully to have the SSSG
undertaken without Moscow(cid:146)s prior an easy one. disbanded.58 According to another
64
Sino-Soviet
(cid:147)
For beyond
some years
1963, few CIA officers
a
still held that Sino-Soviet
interviewee, an analyst who refused discord fraud, Ambassador Marshall Green.65 For
to recant his Sino-Soviet heresywas was a the mo~t part, however, policymak
given a negative fitness report and deliberately orchestrated ers lagged several years behind them
left that office.59 by Moscow and Beijing to and CIA(cid:146)s heretics. Here are a few
exampl1es ofwhat the heretics in CIA
Nowhere in CIAwere opposing deceive the West. and St~te were long up against:
views on Sino-Soviet relations more
sharply exchanged, however, than (cid:149) Walt~Rostow, 1954: We see no
those between a small special group signs ofincipient Titoism; we see
ofsenior analysts chosen by the DCI much that makes it most unlikely
explicitly for their knowledge of in th~ foreseeable future.66
Communist theory and Soviet As we all subsequentlylearned, in
affairs, and few heretics from OCI, 1969 these supposedly nonantagonis (cid:149) Assis~ant Secretary ofState for Far
a
OmeNeEt,inganidn o1t9h6e0r,otffhieceesx.cIhnanogneessbuacchk ftiicrecfoinghttrsadaincdtiloonsss cofamliefetaolionncglude E1a9s5t~e:rnMAafofaiTrsse-WtaulntgeranRdoboetrhtesron,
and forth the table took the China(cid:146)s borders with the USSR.61 Chinese Communist leaders are
across
following form. who~ly dedicated to the cause of
For some years beyond 1963, a few international Communism under
CIA officers still held that Sino the l~adership ofMoscow. They
The senior experts on Communism: Soviet discordwas a fraud, deliber slavi~hly follow the twists and
ately orchestrated by Moscow and ofMoscow-directed
turns
(cid:147)You guys who think there(cid:146)s a lotof Beijing to deceive the West. Most of orth~doxy.67
growingSino-Sovietdiscordsimply those officers were members ofCIA(cid:146)s
have 19th-century minds.(cid:148) Counterintelligence Staff, whose (cid:149) Vice~President Nixon, 1959: The
chief, James Angleton, had been con Vice~President asked whether there
The heretics: vinced ofsuch a view by a Soviet was ~ny dissenting opinion in the
defector, Anatoly Golitzyn. That IC o(cid:146)n whether there was a real
view nonetheless remained a minor strai~ in the relations between the
(cid:147)What doyou mean by that?(cid:148) ity interpretation within theAgency. USSR and China. Was there, for
exan~iple,
any opinion that Khrush
(cid:147)You think the matter between the chev~ might be seeking to build up
Soviet Union andChina is one largely External Resistance the ~ppearance ofdifferences
ofclashingnationalinterests.(cid:148) between the two countries?68
The difficult hurdle for CIA(cid:146)s
most
(cid:147)Exactly.(cid:148) double demonologists was outside (cid:149) President Eisenhower, 1960: Presi
theAgency: itwas the proclivity of dent~ Chiang Kai-shek] said it is
manysenior policymakers to brush imp~ssible for the Chinese
(cid:147)Well, you(cid:146)re wrong. You don(cid:146)t appreci offintelligence analyses ofgrowing Con1imunists to split from the
ate thefactthatin Communisttheory estrangement as being too theoreti Sovi~t Russians. He stated emphati
a differentiation is made between what cal, inferential, and, for cally that the Communist bloc
too some
areconsideredantagonisticcontradic years, too contrary to continuing out works as a bloc, pursues a global
tionsandnonantagonistic ward signs ofcooperative Soviet and schehie, and no party to the bloc
contradictions. Whatwe have in the Chinese policies. There were notable can rake independent action.
presentSino-Sovietcaseare non-antag exceptions within the Department of Pres~dent Eisenhower rejoined that
onisticcontradictions. That(cid:146)s whyyou State, ofwhose officers argued he f?und nothing in President
some
with 19th-century minds
guys are themes similar to those ofCIA(cid:146)s ana Chiang(cid:146)s exposition with which he
wrong.(cid:148) lysts. These State officials included diff~red. President Eisenhower
Allen S. Whiting, Counselor;62Assis said~that .du.r.ing the past seven or
(cid:147)Well, atleastthat(cid:146)s betterthan having tant Secretary ofState Roger eight months he had made several
13th-century minds. (cid:145)60 Hilsman;63 Herbert Levin;64 and trip~ and had talkedwith a num
65