DTIC ADA524256: Planning Satellite Reconnaissance to Support Military Operations

12 Pages·0.74 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

A NewDoctrine
Planning Satellite Reconnaissance To Support
Military Operations
Thomas Behling and Kenneth McGruther
The nation(cid:146)s intelligence agencies the veryintelligence support systems
face a dual challenge: how to come upon whikh the doctrine depends.
to grips with presidential tasking to Comman~iers using the new doctrine
become more directly supportive of would ha~(cid:146)e to do so using reconnais
current military operations, while sance sate1llites extrapolated from the
also adjusting to a new national mili intelligen~e needs ofthe early 1990s.
tary doctrine that is still being
developed. The presidential order
Two oth~r problems compound this
was issued in 1995. The new military situation.~The first is the rapid deyel
By the time the military disoscuterdinien, J1o9i9n6tVainsdioanmp2l0i1fi0e,dwians opment c~fcommercial space and the
determines intelligence 1997 in a document called (cid:147)Con increassipnag~cleifkreeleilhyowoidllthbaetcooumreabtihlriteyat
requirements to supportits cOeppetrsatfioornSsu.p(cid:148) pMoeratniwnghiJloei,ntthe global teoneuds.eUS~success in Operation
new doctrine, it maybe too pCloalndniWnagrstpraurcatduirgemt,oirnecplluacdeintghethe DfersoemrtouSrtbsurpmersitoermimnefdorimnatliaorgneppraerdti
late to influence decisions role the Intelligence Community cated on ~paceborne intelligence.
about the very intelligence (IC)(cid:146) should play, still is unfolding. Iraqi acc~ss to similar data sources
virtu~dly denied. Today, three
was
support systems upon different ~JS companies plan to
which the doctrine The fundamental premise ofJV2010 launch c9mmercial imagery systems
is that the operational commander before 2q00 and are offering data
depends. will enjoy information superiority(cid:151) from and~access to these systems to a
(cid:145)9 the abilityto see and hear virtually wide range ofgovernments and com
everything ofimportance in any mercial ii~iterests. By 2010, at least
engagement. It may be a decade or 10 nations will have their own imag
more, however, before the military erysystei~s with resolution to 1
sufficiently understands the implica meter or less. Once others begin to
tions ofthe new doctrine to impose take adva~ntage ofspaceborne intelli
the associated intelligence require gence technology, at a minimum
ments for targeting, damage there will be a narrowing ofthe gap
assessment, simultaneous operations, we enjoy~d in the Gulfwar. As oth
and the like. ers come~to understand the space
Thomas Behling is Deputy reconnaissance business, covert mili
Director ofthe Office ofArchitec This raises some difficult problems. tary oper~ations such as General
tures, Assessments, andAcquisition Our current generation ofsatellites is Schwart~kopf(cid:146)s (cid:147)Hail Mary(cid:148) maneu
at the National Reconnaissance reaching obsolescence and will have ver prob~blywill become far more
Office. Kenneth McGruther is a poi to be replaced within the next 5 to difficult ~o keep secret.
icyconsultant to that office. 10 years. Given design and develop
ment lead-times, decisions about the Second, ~he awareness that accompa
The views expressed in this article are next generation ofreconnaissance sat nies acce~s to space will bringwith it
those ofthe authors and do not ellites are being made now. As a inevitabl~ incentives to deny the use
reflect official policies or positions of result, by the time the military deter ofspace ~o others in time ofconflict
the Department ofDefense, the mines intelligence requirements to or crisisjln the worst case, interdic
NRO, or the CIA. support its new doctrine, it may be tion could include attacks on our
too late to influence decisions about satellite ~econriaissance systems or
113
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1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
1999 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1998 to 00-00-1999
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Planning Satellite Reconnaissance To Support Military Operations
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
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Center for the Study of Intelligence,Central Intelligence REPORT NUMBER
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13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
Studies in Intelligence. Volume 42, No. 5, Winter 1998-1999
14. ABSTRACT

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ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON
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Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
Reconnaissance
Satellite and
systems
information systems have
be built from the ground
to
the ground infrastructure that sup with fuller rions, and training. If, asJV2OlO
ports them. Because ofpolicy up a avers, information superiority is the
decisions dating back to the Eisen appreciation ofthe needs linchpin offuture US military
hower administration, there has been ofthe military. doctrine, itwould seem that the IC
a general assumption that use of should have a more central role in the
space was available to all and that 9, militaryplanning process, perhaps
conflict in space was unthinkable. coordinated through the new position
But, following a major Service war ofAssistant Secretary ofDefense for
game in early 1997, Secretaryof build up our in-theater force struc Command, Control, Communica
Defense Cohen was told by those ture and to use our intelligence tions, and Intelligence in the Office of
who had played the Blue (US) side the Secretary ofDefense. The IC also
satellites operational needs.
to serve
National CommandAuthorities, In the future, we may not be so fortu has to continue to recognize the
(cid:147)Future adversaries will seek to Consequently, both satellite equityalready invested in it by the
nate.
reduce our information domi systems and information systems national policymaking community,
nance.... It is to their advantage to have to be built from the ground up and to continue providing support for
render any ofour] space systems use with a fuller appreciation ofthe both long-range planning and crisis
less, thereby giving them parity in needs ofthe military. The NRO can management.
spacewhich ultimately gives them not do it alone; increased
asymmetric advantage.(cid:148)2
cooperation and mutual understand
ing between the IC and operating The NewMilitary Doctrine
It is nowpublic information that forces becoming essential.
are
conflict in space is increasingly an The major difference in the nation(cid:146)s
issue in majorwar games. Space new military doctrine is that it is
defense has been a topic on CBS(cid:146)s A number ofspecific issues have to based on speed, rather than attrition.
be faced. Should build satellite
(cid:147)Charles Osgood Show.(cid:148) Aviation we a That is, the ability to make better
WeekandSpace TechnOlogyhas primarily to support the policy- operational decisions more swiftly, to
devoted increasing attention to space maker, or the military operator? move forces more rapidly in both a
as a potential battleground. There What priorityshould be given to sat strategic and tactical sense, and to do
have been open forums dealingwith ellite system defense, including both far more quickly than any
our space vulnerability, such as one onboard countermeasures? How does adversarywill enable us to use
the advent ofwidespread commercial
that was sponsored by the Institute smaller, more agile forces more effec
for Foreign PolicyAnalysis on Capi remote-sensing satellites affect our tively than any prospective foe and
tol Hill in October 1997. The US strategy for using space? Who, and to resolve any situation before it gets
Space Command has declared that which systems, get priority in a out ofhand. Thus,JV2010stresses
period ofdeclining budgets? These
its primary mission in the future will rapid and flexible maneuver, preci
be space control, rather than merely questions demand answers. Incre sion engagement from afar, and
mental thinking and evolutionary
supporting other commands. focused, just-in-time logistic support
development probablywill not get us instead oflarge logistic bases. But
there.
These developments are a particular underlying the ability to make more
concern at the National Reconnais timely and better decisions is the
sance Office (NRO), which has the The time may have arrived to develop assumption that we will have accu
mission ofdeveloping and operating an IC-wide concept ofoperations, if rate and timely information.
the nation(cid:146)s imagery and signals intel not aformal doctrine, to provide gen
ligence satellites. The manner in eral guidance forsystems planning, Awhole vocabulary has been created
which the NRO, and the broader IC budgetingpriorities, and ongoing to capture the essence ofthis
which it serves, respond to these chal operations. To this end, aJoint Intelli premise. Sensorto shooterimplies that
lenges will be critical to our national gence Operations Directorate might intelligence data will be fed directly
warfighting capability over the next be created within the IC to give focus to the operator holding the trigger of
two decades. In Desert Storm, we to integratingdaily operations with the gun, bomb-release, or missile (if
were fortunate to have the time to militarydoctrine, planning, opera- not to the weapon itself). Dominant
114
Reconnaissance
Itbehooves the intelligence
world and the operating
forces to get together and
battlespaceawarenessrefers to the abil be that requirements then adapted to emerging national
sure
ity ofthe operational commander to and, to a lesser extent, to military
have the big picture in sufficient and capabilities are in requirem~nts. The NRO(cid:146)s ability to
detail to make both broad opera harmony. do so resulted from a combination of
~villingness
tional plans and real-time tactical national to take risks, the
decisions. The revolution in military 9~ fact that ~(cid:147)TRO(cid:146)s programs were
affairsrefers to this new form of based pri~arilyon performance and
information-based warfare. Network- schedule rather than cost, and the
centric warfarerefers to the gridlike low profi~e that organization enjoyed
network system that will make this in the pu1blic budgetmaking process.
information readily available.~ How that will happen is yet to be Those ci~cumstances are shifting, yet
determined. In some sense, the mili it will coptinue to be important that
Somewhat disingenuously,JV2010 tary is willing to leave it to the IC, America keep the lead in informa
simplyposits that superior, real-time, figuring that is their business. But a tion capabilities, along with its
target-quality information will be system designed byintelligence ability tc~ use space effectively.
earvaalilkabelye.asBseuhmipntidontshe.jTahregopnrliimeasreyv etoxrpse,rtwso,urladthmerostthalnikmeliylibtearbyaosepderoan Given tF~e changing circumstances,
one is that everything ofsignificance vtihdeeid,nfaonrdmaitticoonulthdatbecaingnboerapnrtoof the best~vay to link future satellite
about the battlefield will be col what information is actually needed designs t~o future military needs may
lected, fused, transmitted, and made for operational decisionmaking. be to pr~ss for technological innova
available to the commander and that tion within a broad, qualitative
underst~nding
he then will be able to exploit that offuture military
data to make faster, better opera A solution probably can be found: needs. Maintaining our leadership in
tional decisions. Other assumptions our ability to collect, process, and R&D is~essential to continue to
are: command organizations will be communicate data is growing expo maintaii~i America(cid:146)s advantages in
(cid:147)flattened(cid:148) to create more direct con nentially. Butwithoutadequate space. Breakthroughs such as those
understandingofoperationalneeds,
nectivity between the commander in the past may not be necessary, and
and the operating unit; individuals at andwithoutadequate links to theoper it may b~e fiscally prudent not to take
much lower levels will have opera ators themselves, wecouldeasily reach the sorts oftechnological risks
tional decisionmaking authority; and a deadendin the realization of deemed~necessary during the Cold
communications systems will be suffi JV2010. Consequently, itbehooves the War. Bt~t continued technological
cient to carry all this information. intelligence worldandthe operating innovation will be vital to maintain
forces togettogetherandbesurethat the info~mation dominance that
we
These basic underlying assumptions requirementsandcapabilities are in now enjoy, and upon whichJV2010
themselves warrant further consider harmony. To do thatwill mean rests. A~ the National Defense Panel
doing business differently. recentl~
ation. Information superioritywill pointed out, that means
not just happen because ofour supe some false starts will occur; major
artemp1~s
rior technology. For example, in the at innovation rarely succeed
Navy(cid:146)s annual majorwar game last Some Disconnects on the l~irst try. We cannot afford to
summer, GLOBAL-97, which was play it safe, and the penalties for fail
the first major effort by the military Developing satellite architectures ure have to be minimized.
services to examineJV2010at the based explicitly on future customer
grop~ing
operational level, it became evident needs is a departure from the past. In for answers on how to
that information superiority is not a Heretofore, technology itselfwas the deal with the new military doctrine,
(cid:147)given(cid:148) but must itselfbe an opera pacer for developments. The NRO the IC ~ias been asking specific ques
tional objective. Inihort, military encouraged, and then took major tions o~the military. For example, in
planning and operations have to be gambles on, promising technologies an NRO-OSD NetAssessment(cid:151)
sponso~ed
optimized to use superior informa (which to a substantial degree is why war game series called
tion, and to obtain, defend, and the United States now is far ahead of ForwardFocus, the questions have
maximize it in both an absolute the rest ofthe world in its intelli been: What sort ofinformation do
sense and relative to any adversary. gence capabilities). Capabilities were you nerd undervarious conditions?
115
Reconnaissance
How do you want it packaged? How such cases, rapid responsiveness is problems(cid:151)as well as unacceptable
quickly do you need it? The answers not critical. Using Desert Storm as risks in the case ofmanned aircraft(cid:151)
given provide substantial insights. the model, wide-area coverage when overflights are tried short of
But these are small-scale and isolated demands would dictate the best satel full-scale war.
efforts, and they do not yet reflect lite architecture for the future.
broad efforts to harmonize the views In fact, for all the emphasis on opti
ofthe two entities. JV2010suggests otherwise. Rapid mizing satellite and airborne
maneuver and use oflong-range pre collection for battlefield support,
in sum, without explicit and in- cision ordnance presume access to there are, or at least there should be,
depth institutional linkages between precise, dynamic, real-time, target- some major cautions about moving
emerging military doctrine and intel quality data. In the realm ofover too quickly or singlemindedly to do
ligence support system development, head reconnaissance, this means very so. One is that the support which
decisions about intelligence pro rapid revisit point coveragewould be intelligence, Surveillance, and Recon
grams are likely to be based on the priority requirement(cid:151)that is, naisance (ISR) systems need to
outdated assumptions and current the desire to look for specific targets provide to the military may not only
interpretations ofrequirements and at designated locations, roughly be what the militarycalls (cid:147)Intelli
rather than on emerging doctrine, as one uses a highly focused flash gence Preparation ofthe Battlefield(cid:148)
future force structures, and stream light beam. To optimize resolution for locating targets; it also may
lined command organizations. While ofimagery, however, satellites have encompass enemy intentions and
performance improvements will be to be in low orbits, where they can orders ofbattle, as well as detailed
achieved, national assets will not not have access to one place on the and highly focused requirements,
have been optimized for supporting ground for more than a few minutes something more akin to looking for
military operations under the envi per pass. So what theywill be look needles in haystacks.
sioned newstyle ofsuch operations, ing for has to be determinedwell in
and the information superiority on advance. Any last-minute changes in As to the last ofthese, intelligence
which the new military doctrine satellite tasking are difficult, ifnot systems optimized to support the mil
depends will not be realized. impossible, to accomplish.4 itary on the conventional battlefield
may not be particularlywell suited to
the tailored and highly specific data
An example that illuminates the As a result, the demands for respon
point is the debate pertaining to siveness placed on imagerysatellite that need to be collected on given
imagery satellites between what is systems are extreme. Moreover, time individuals and fixed points. Spe
cific, highly focused intelligence
called wide-area coverageand rapid liness has to be metwithout on
revisitpointcoverage. Since Desert compromising the wide-area cover such problems as movement ofter
Storm, most attention has been on age needed to support the strategic rorists or elements ofpotential
of destruction, well
how to support wide-area coverage warning needs ofthe National Com weapons mass as
ofthe battlefield. One reason is that mandAuthorities. Similar issues as drug trafficking and piracy, are
it is easy to describe what is wanted could be raised for SIGINT satel important features ofthe post(cid:151)Cold
from satellites in terms ofarea cover lites. To adapt the architecture(cid:151)not War era ofnational security for both
age: image a large area and then just the satellites but the entire the military and the national policy
figure out what is there bylooking at C4ISRsystem5(cid:151)wiIl require a care customer.
the details. Much attention has gone ful rethinking ofeverything from
into developing systems that can pro system design to intelligence con It is also obvious that the military
vide this capabilitywith a high cepts ofoperation. Some in the IC, will not be the sole recipient ofdata
degree ofassurance. Wide-area cover for example, have emphasized the gleaned through national sensors.
age suffices for strategic purposes role ofaircraft and unmanned aerial Civilian policy officials still are, and
such as finding out who is building vehicles as future collection plat probably always will be, the primary
newsites or pieces ofmilitary equip forms for tactical reconnaissance. day-in and day-out customers for sat
ment, or for fixing the battlefield(cid:151) But these take time to fly to targets ellite-generated material.
that is, taking periodic snapshots to ofinterest, and, as recent events in
determine the location and recent Iraq have demonstrated, airborne sys While operational information, such
movements oflarge-scale forces. In tems create substantial political as locations ofcombat units and
116
Reconnaissance
The customer list
for overhead imagery is
growing, and
as awareness
their movements and emissions ofthe value of national commander, (cid:147)I would be begging for
suggesting imminent attack, is key to our coverage, and that is not acceptable.(cid:148)
spreads, the
military commanders in the field, systems
national policy customers are more national customer demand Until and unless a process is devel
interested in longer term strategic opedwhiFh will ensure that national
warning: which countries provide on those systems is likelyto systems can be relied on, such as
likely threats, what are their inten keep increasing. time shar~ng, task sharing, or build
tions, andwhat force capabilities are ing sufficiently flexible systems so
they developing or are theylikely to that all c~istomers can be supported
develop in the future? In those cases, simultan~ously, this deep-seated mili
long lead-times, more focus on inten tary instipct is unlikely to change.
tions than on immediate capabilities, With all these considerations in Yet these views are maintained at a
and an entirely different way ofput mind, our nationalintelligencesensor high dollkr cost because ofthe redun
ting together the picture are required. systemsprobablyshouldnotbe designed dant cap~bilities that result. Ifthere
solely with the evolvingmilitarydoc is to be a~iy hope ofchanging that sit
All this is compounded by the fact trine in mind, norisdirectmilitary uation, t~e IC must improve its
that the customer list for overhead controlofnationalassets thesolution. understapding of, and cooperation
imagery is growing, and as awareness Alternative solutions are needed with, military operations, and vice
ofthe value ofour national systems because ofthe array ofcustomers for versa.
spreads, the national customer national systems and thewide range
demand on those systems is likely to oftheir intelligence needs. But there Finally, future intelligence linkages
keep increasing. Through civilian is more: there is a fundamental dis to military support have to be
authorities, NRO systems supported trust by the military that in a pinch framed ~(cid:145)ith a broad understanding
assessments in national emergencies it reallywill have access to national about p~tential risks to space opera
such as the Northridge, California sensor information to the extent tions. Otherwise, we risk blundering
earthquake and HurricaneAndrew. needed. into a d~stabilizing situation in
In a Federal EmergencyManage which tI~e disadvantaged side in a
mentAgency interactive exercise in given crisis, feeling desperate, resorts
1996 involving a potentially cata The cultural and doctrinal views of to irratiQnal means to deny us the
strophic earthquake along the New senior military commanders encour use ofspace, or at least ofspace-
Madrid Fault underlying the Missis age the continuation ofbuilding derived aata. Realistic, ifnot extraor
sippi River, participants learned indigenous militarysystems and dinary, threats need to be included
about the information that NRO developing operational plans based in the pfocess bywhich future satel
assets could provide to help them on an implicit assumption that lite syst~ms are designed, assessed,
quickly understand the situation national systems cannot be depended built, arid operated. Ifwarranted,
they had to deal with. As a result, the on. There are several reasons for this, protecti~n concepts could be
NRO was one ofthe first places including inadequate hooks to accept designe~1 into the NRO(cid:146)s satellite
those same state participants turned intelligence from national systems, architectures.
for information in major floods that old-fashioned service parochialisms,
subsequently occurred in the central and, above all, the discomfort mili In a rel~.ted sense, there are signifi
United States. Aviation Weekwent so tary commanders experiencewhen cant po~icy issues associated with this
far as to advocate that (cid:147)reorientation they have to depend on assets they emergir~g threat ofwarfare in space
ofintelligence to support (cid:145)public do not control. As a major studyof that ha1e not yet been adequately
agents(cid:146) that is, nongovernmental lessons learned in Desert Storm put addressed. These issues are as broad
organizations, corporations~ and even it, (cid:147)Combat units are most comfort and sig~iificant as those faced with
individual citizens who pursue inter able and practiced at integrating the adv~nt ofnuclear weapons in the
national political, social, and theirweapons with intelligence and 1950s, and they demand the same
economic objectives] may be the key targeting sensors which are organic.(cid:148) sort of~nalytic and philosophical
to the transformation ofthe Cold Or, in the words ofoneArmyfield rigor a?d innovative thinking as was
War Intelligence Community.(cid:148)
117
Reconnaissance
To today(cid:146)s for
use process
determining the next
generation ofsatellites
done in that era by Herman Kahn, would be like trying to adequatestrategicwarningcapabil
Henry Kissinger, and Others. This is ity, all forthepurposeoffacilitating
not a technological or militaryprob drive down a road looking decisionmaking bythe military
lem. All aspects, however, affect how only in the rearview commander.
the NRO designs the next several
generations ofthe nation(cid:146)s intelli mirror. (cid:149) Devisingmeasures for understanding
gence satellite. and assessing the relative importance
of(cid:147)battlespace awareness(cid:148)
to engage
ment outcomeswill be crucial in
Determining Future Intelligence finally codified. Candidate systems makingassetacquisition, deploy
Needs are evaluated based on their ability to ment, andemploymentdecisions.
satisfy these (cid:147)agreed(cid:148) requirements.
How can military commanders (cid:149) TSRcapabilities have to be included
become comfortable with
more But, given the contemplated changes on CTNC Integrated PriorityLists
vdiedpeentdhienmgwointhnatthieonianlfoarsmseattsiotonptrheoy in our militarydoctrine, to use (annual submissions oftop require
ntnoeoewad,rtwiachnuedlantseotmhteheeyssnepeenceeidfeidicts?whTaahyssetioenfbfoergtin nlitinoekdgxeatoyt(cid:146)sngrleyynipenrirgonacttteoihsoedsnrrfiooevfrearsddvaetioteewlewlnrimmtieaisrnrrwioonoragu.dltTldhhoeabotek wemmanearsnkfuteirsgishnfutgoriretnhfgtauhtcteauyIpraSecbRiamlniailstgiyset)eta.srtsyOhmenerneetswisaabryeyto
which the IC traditionally has
atahtpaeptdrotnaheceerhdeestnoocwhhaeonxigwset.futTtwuhoreemarejaolritoypiesr tcnheeisvsserisshdaoeufsliudgnndbeaedmneonortsaiulnrltpyerinrsdeeea.dctIttiovweapsro ieilnnscdaleunpddeendtdheiannttwTlaySrRfasaisrneetsesaresadscetfsioosrnmosepncetarnmaobed
stihoonusldofbneatdietosoniaglnesda.telOlnitee sigsyes(cid:147)stnaeemmres,a wacocuoludntopfeorrawtehedtihffeerremnitlliyta1r0ytfoor2ce0s tional impact.
bapounrtdtbpfeeotrrthenraa(cid:148):ptsiwosinudabels-tsaatnrrteaiataelcgloiyvcewraargne,insgu,p yfteruiannrdesadhmueernncitena,glbtcehhecaaCnuogsleedtihnWeamrriel.witaWasirtynhodothce (cid:149) Sfrterrqouemiarmseleinfnlsaiotnrtgesrtychsetoemfmlmsoawtnoodofpisentrtraeutlcoltriusgreewnsic,lel
acoglelebcytocrsh.anTghiengotthheermaipxproomfaocrheicsover ahdovweenvtero,fdaenteerwmimnialittiaornyodfocTtSrRine, minogrfeoracuest,oannodmycotmomfeonrswuarrda-toeperat
whatJV2010envisions: fused, inte requirements, and the systems revisions in training, doctrine, and
grated, joint, and responsaive needed to fill those requirements, has command.
intelligence picture that directlysup to become anticipatory rather than
ports thewarfighter. reactive. (cid:149) Howevergood our ability to collect
againstspecificbattlefield opera
Using past practice to determine War games, such as those sponsored tions, it isstill necessary to prepare
which road to take is not helpful. by the Service war colleges, and the battlefield bylearningaboutour
Typically, requirements for intelli games developed specifically by the adversary(cid:146)s intentions in addition to
gence satellite systems have been NRO and OSD, have been found to enumeratingcapabilities andselect
developed by focusing on some be a useful crystal ball. Key insights ing targets.
aspect ofthe threat, or by positing pertaining to TSRthat have emerged
future scenarios and then asking for from thesevarious games include the (cid:149) An adversarythat feels itselfdisadvan
inputs on how much and what sort following observations: tagedbecauseofAmerica(cid:146)s
ofcoverage would be needed to sup dominantabilityto usespace may
port related military operations. Future militarysuccess will depend opt to (cid:147)level the playingfield(cid:148) by
Target sets are compiled, total vol on ourabilityto expedite thefusion- attackingourTSRsystems, either in
ume and capacity performance are analysis-dissemination ioop, collect space oron the ground.
determined from the inputs, and intelligenceon newthreats, provide
these are validated, filtered, reviewed near-continuous coverage ofhigh- (cid:149) Consequently, operational success in
by the Services and the CINCs, and interest targets, and maintain an the theaterwill dependon our
118
Reconnaissance
(cid:147)
Reports from the field
suggest that the NRO has
long since
come a way.
. .
abilityto retain anddefend our Desert Storm in terms of systems ~? that all customers can be
space-based TSR, communications, served based on their need.
andnavigationcapabilities. providingdirectsupportto
operating forces. But the Reports f~om the field suggest that
Space-based threats maybedifficult deep-seated of the NRO1 has come a longway in
concerns
to overcome, unless and untilwe spe just the f(cid:231)w shortyears since Desert
cificallydesign better protection senior military operators Storm in~terms ofproviding direct
schemes into spacecraftdesigns and persist. support to operatingforces. But the
deep-sea~ed
reconnaissance architectures. ofsenior mili
concerns
~9 tary operators persist. What seems to
neede~1
In addition to these emerging trends, be is some sort of(cid:147)partner
conclusions from the first three ing(cid:148) arrangement to achieve related
i~dentical
ggaammeesseorfietsheenFdoorrwsaerddtFhoecunseewdarfor AfrfoimnatlhiemFpoorrwtaanrtdFinosciugshtsetrhiaestwaarosse bcuunotdmemnroostnt~apsdyisntgemosf,mbiaosntsdhioannesm,eudtususaianlngd
more agile intelligence about specific that, in caseswhere players were pre capabilities. An IC-wide (cid:147)concept of
events or activities, contravening the sented with preconflict crisis
traditional and widelyheld under avoidance and military contingency operautsieso~ns(cid:148) to parallel how the mili
doctrine unavoidable.
standing that what is primarily planning situations, theydeemedit tary seems
needed is wide-area coverage in order much more importantto understandan
to (cid:147)fix the battlefield(cid:148) once per day. adversa7y(cid:146)s intentandbehaviorthan The NRb has to think innovatively
Specifically: justto reactto his initiatives. Ifthis is about hc~w to satis& the need ofmili
valid, then military intelligence sup tary con~manders while also
(cid:149) The timeavailablewithinwhich to portwill have to be much broader continui1ng to service its national cus
plan (that is, between the request thanjust target location and identifi tomer b~se. Conceptual solutions are
acrnidtictahlevatriimaeblteoianctd)ewtaesrmtihneinmgostthe JcVat2i0o1n0.(cid:146)sThsiusbtnloetiiomnplciocnattriaovnetnheast nloegeidcaeldca~spawbeilllitays.iBmuptrocvoencdeptteucahlno
specifics ofintelligence thatneed to merely detecting an event or target sgloel-uatgieotn~~cyimply more than just a sin
be provided. and recognizing afew characteristics approach: a broader
may be sufficient, and that under consensus needs to be reached
standing an adversary(cid:146)s intent and among i~hevarious members ofthe
(cid:149) Wide-area coveragewas necessary, plans need not be an explicit design IC on h~w they are to operate in con
but notsufficient, for thesort of goal.6 cert to service their collective
operations envisionedbyIV2010.
customers.
(cid:149) In ambiguous planningsituations, Toward Some Solutions This requires Community-wide
such thoseassociatedwith
as war thinking develop frame
to a common
avoidanceandcrisis management, The IC is going to have to demon work(cid:151)~what the militarywould call a
thedemand tends to increase for strate its ability to deliver. To some (cid:147)Concept ofOperations.(cid:148) At this
in-depth, higherqualityknowl
more extent, it has to: demonstrate awill point, the issues are too broad and
edge on amorecomplex rangeof ingness to relinquish direct the Community too diverse and
objectives aswell as targetsets. operational control ofnational satel stovepi~ed. Butsuccessful precedents
lite and airborne systems in exercises do exisL The Navy, for example,
(cid:149) In combatsituations, militaryopera as well as for operational support; evolved from a stovepiped set of
torsplaced ahighervalue on supplement national support systems autonomous members driven by tech
nology~developments
responsiveness to taskingagainsta by providing commercial imagery in the 1970s to
small anddiscretesetoftargets than directly to the military commander; a cohei~ent organization based on a
detailed information thatwould and build sufficient flexibility into its unifie~strategic planning and force
on
requiremoretime to deliver. satellites and information support development approach under what it
119
Reconnaissance
called the Maritime Strategy in the warfare andnationalsensor systems (cid:149) Assessment tools such as models, sim
I980s. as it relates to framingpolicy ulators, and demonstrators should be
options, strategies, doctrine, and developed to evaluate futuristic con
The foregoing illustrates the com operational patterns. cepts ofoperations rather than old
plexity ofintegratingJV2010, with ways ofdoing business. Measures of
emerging Service capabilities, and All Flag Officers, eitherin theirman Effectiveness for thevalueof
underscores that the development of datoryintroductoryCapstone course information and timehave to be
new ISR capabilities will require tak orin theJointFlag OfficerWarfare incorporated into assessment mod
ing some pragmatic steps before Course taughtatMaxwellAir Force els. To thatend, the NRO should
JV2010can become reality. This is Base, should beprovidedan workwithothers in the IC and in
all the more important, given other expanded modulehaving to dowith the US SpaceCommand to build
ongoing changes that include the theoperational dimensions ofTSRin
families ofmodelsthatwould
changing national security environ militaryplanningandoperations. new
ment, the advent ofthe possibility of be more useful in assessing the opera
warfare in space, the burgeoning use (cid:149) Wargamingandmodelingshould wtihoenanliinmfpoarcmtatoifonac,titviimteie,sainndanfoerrcaes
of for commercial
andsptahceegrowing dependepnucrpeoosefs, continue to be used extensivelyat andweapons are important.
various levels to explore the impor
national policy customers on our tance ofspace-derived intelligence
national intelligence systems. dataand the means ofensuring its (cid:149) Finally, the IC needs to develop a
collection and delivery. (cid:147)concept ofoperations(cid:148) that pro
Specifically, we recommend the fol videsacommon-senseviewofwhat
lcoowmipnlgextoissstuaerst:to deal with these (cid:149) TheNRO shouldcontinue to partic it isabout, how it does itswork, and
ipate in andsupport the major how itsvarious componentsworkin
(cid:149) Consideration should begiven to Servicewargames. htoaralmloonfyitstocupsrtoovmiedres.bettersupport
charteringan institution ofintelli
gencestrategyand operations (cid:149) TheNRO shouldopen adialogue
specificallyto help anticipate uses of with otherTC members andwith the The era inwhich multiple intelli
intelligence as itrelates to evolving CINCs and militaryservices about gence agencies, operating
national strategyandfuture military howdirectoperational control of autonomously and behind the (cid:147)green
operations(cid:151)a Joint Intelligence national reconnaissance assets can be door(cid:148) ofsecurity cloaks and classified
Operations Directorate. This might passed to the operational com budgets, apply the latest and
can
operate alongthe lines thatTRA mander, howthis can be exercised, greatest technology in a fiscally
bDeOaCn addojeusncftortothtehAerNmayt.ioIntamlight aalnodnghowiwthitrweosuelardchwoirntkoiwnhwaatrttihimse, ouvnecrornisdtirnaginreedqumiarnenmeenrtifsoorveirn.teTllhie
DefenseUniversity. Within its char would mean to system parameters.
gtfreoeerrnqcuwteioh;reuedlomedpetenebrtraestmdiifeonovnriaenTllgSoupfRsiueatnsugnrodsefthrideanolttceeptglirilnieigsne wnmClheeeeinadctrhtolomifnibaegesJh-dot3ef-vllreeiealksdeopoptpneoosdsitibfhtioeilroietntshytifawsobroelufiflsohdrt, ganDlaeostnoecDemmeboiaunrndejsgoeidttinhrtaedtmceitctllihyisetieaoTvrneCysroyhtptoaehsdriaetntogviecfolonrosooprmdi
translate them into system require managingandoperatingsatellite ment ofmilitary concepts of
ments; assessingoffensivestrike reconnaissancesystems, aswell as operations. The operational aspects
versus force defensive needs; improv otherplatforms, to supportcrisis or ofobtaining and analyzing intelli
ing understandingofthevalue of militaryoperations. gence, as well as exploiting it in
TSRto combatcampaign-level analy future operations, cannot be assumed
sis byincorporatingTSRinto (cid:149) The NRO shouldencourageandpar away. A new era in national security
campaign-level assessmentmodels; ticipate inanational publicdialogue planning, centered around informa
andengaging in the necessarydia about the implicationsofspace tion superiority and its thoughtful
logueabout thelinkage ofspace becomingafuture battlefield. application, has begun.
120
I (cid:151)
Reconnaissance
NOTES theyessentiallystayin thesameplace
relative toapointon Earth. (cid:145)While
1. The IC generallyrefers to the CIA, these satellitescan perform missions
DIA, National Reconnaissance such as missilewarning, communica
Office, NSA, andNational Imagery tions, andweather reporting, theyare
andMappingAgency, alongwiththe too fatawayto have the resolution
requiredformilitarilyuseful imagery.
intelligence officeswithin the mili
taryservices and somecivilian
agencies. Theircollectiveactivities 5. The term refers collectivelyto
are coordinated, albeitnotdirected, (cid:147)Command andControl, Communi
bythe DirectorofCentral Intelli cations, Computers, Intelligence,
genceandare overseen bythe Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.(cid:148)
President. Over the pasttwo decades, thesevari
ous functions tended to bemerged
2. RichardArmitage and David into oneoverarchingconcept.
McCurdy, two senior policyadvisers, Recently, however, a movement has
playedtheNationalCommand beengrowingto separate intelligence
Authorityin theJanuary 1997war components (ISR) from Command
gameArmyAfterNext. Theyfelt and Control, Communications, and
stronglyenough aboutwhat they Computers; thejuryis still outon
experienced that theyco-drafted alet what Defense Departmentorganiza
terto the SecretaryofDefense tional changeswill result.
advisinghim aboutthe impending
risks having to dowith our useof 6. The December 1997 reportbythe
space inacrisis. Congressionallychartered National
Defense Panel,which the Secretary
3. The termwas placed into thelexicon ofDefense endorsed, challengedthe
byVAdm. Arthur Cebrowski, the DefenseDepartmentto broaden the
Navy(cid:146)s Director forCommand rangeofcontingenciesforwhich
and Control, Communications, forcestructureis planned. Thereport
Computers, andIntelligence, Surveil highlighted, forexample, concentra
lance, and Reconnaissance. tion onhomeland andWMD
defense andlow-level conflict in addi
4. Satellites can be placed in geosyn tion to projectionofconventional
chronous orbit(cid:151)at an altitudeof forces intovarious theaters.
about22,000 nautical miles(cid:151)where
121