DTIC ADA524178: Recollections from the Church Committee's Investigation of NSA

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UnluckySHAMROCK
Recollections from the Church Committee(cid:146)s
Investigation of NSA
L. BrittSnider
In January 1975, I was offered a posi pected breakthrough caused us to
tion as counsel on the staffofthe redirec~ our inquiry along two sepa
Church Committee. I was 30, and rate, but ultimately converging, lines;
Senator Sam Ervin, forwhom I had Peter took the lead on one inquiry,
worked since 1971, had retired and and I tOok the other lead. Over
a
returned to North Carolina. While I period ofmonths, a story emerged
had participated in Senator Ervin(cid:146)s that previouslyhad not seen the light
inquiry into the domestic activities of ofday-~-(cid:151)a story that had long-term
Army intelligence elements during implic~tions for NSA and for the
the Vietnam era, the foreign intelli relatio?ship ofthe Intelligence Com
Over a period of gwehniccehaIpnpaorwatcuosnforfotnhteedU,niwtase,dqSutiattees, wmounriktay~stooptrhoevpirdievdatteheseccotonrt.extOuforr a
months, a story literaliy,foreign to me, as it was to rare Congressional challenge to the
emerged that many ofthosejoining the Church President(cid:146)s authority in the national
Committee staff.
security area.
previously had not
the light of To make matters worse, I was given I decided to write about this episode
seen
the task (alongwith a staffcolleague, primarily to preserve it for the
day(cid:151)a story that Peter Fenn1) oftrying to crackwhat histori~al record. While much ofthe
(cid:149) ~ias
had long-term was perceived to be the most secre story disclosed over the course
tive ofUS intelligence agencies, the ofthe ~hurch Committee(cid:146)s inquiry,
implications for
National SecurityAgency (NSA). there were aspects that never became
NSA and for the Unlike the CIA and FBI, which were public; Given the way the Commit
the agencies principally in the Com tee op~rated, no one other than the
relationship of the
mittee(cid:146)s sights(cid:151)thanks to a number staffers doing the work knew the
Inteffigence ofsensational press accounts(cid:151)there whole story.
had been no press exposØs about
Community to the NSA. Our supervisor, in fact,
private sector. seemed to take particular delight in Initial Futility
pitting Pete and me against this mys
terious Goliath. (cid:147)They call it (cid:145)No We began by asking the Congres
SuchAgency,(cid:148) he said. (cid:147)Let(cid:146)s see sional Research Service (CRS) for
whatyou boys can find out about it.(cid:148) everything on the public record that
It was the first time I had heard the referr~d to NSA. The CRS soon sup
agency referred to this way, and it plied t~is with a one-paragraph
was not long before I understood description from the Government
why. Orgar~ization Manual and patently
a
erron~ous piece from RollingStone
What ensuedwas something ofan maga7~ine.
odyssey that lasted the better
over
part ofayear. It began with a series Striki~g out there, I paid visits to the
offruitless, sometimes comical, SenateArmed Services and
efforts to penetrate NSA(cid:146)s defenses. Appropriations Committees, which
L. Britt Snideris CIA(cid:146)s Inspector ((cid:147)They must have done something,(cid:148) were r1esponsible for NSA(cid:146)s annual
General. our boss wailed.) Then, an unex fundii~ig. Only one staffperson on
43
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Recollections from the Church Committee’s Investigation of NSA
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Shamrock
each committeewas cleared for NSA spaces near the main entrance and never before had an oversight rela
information, and I managed to obtain were met by our broadly smiling tionship with the Congress. That
appointments with each. Both com (cid:147)handlers.(cid:148) After going through the became painfully clear as our investi
mittees had budget and program data normal security checks, we were gation progressed.
on NSA, but nothing that dealt with escorted to the top floor into the
oversight. Neither ofthe staffers I large and imposing office ofthe NSA
interviewed was aware ofNSA ever Director. At the time, this wasAir A Breakthrough
doing anything to raise oversight con Force Lt. Gen. LewAllen, who came
cerns. (cid:147)You(cid:146)ve got to understand,(cid:148) I across as a stern, no-nonsense sort, In May 1975, after Peter and I had
was told, (cid:147)they focus on foreign and, based on all we had been able to been struggling in vain for weeks, the
targets.(cid:148) learn in advance ofthe meeting, was Committee received from the Rock
a man ofimpeccable integrity.L efeller Commission3 a copy ofthe
Regrouping, Peter and I decided to (cid:147)family jewels,(cid:148) the name given to a
try to identifysome former NSA Genera! Allen welcomed us and roughly 800-page compilation ofthe
employees willing to spill the beans motioned for us to sit at the large recollections ofCIA employees who
on their old agency. Using the con conference table in his office. (cid:147)Well, had previously been directed by then
nections ofothers on the staff, we gentlemen,(cid:148) he began, (cid:147)what can we DCIJames Schlesinger to identify
managed to identify a handful of do for you?(cid:148) any past abuses or improprieties in
NSA retirees living in theWashing which CIA mayhave been involved.
ton areawhom we contacted and I wanted to respond, (cid:147)Well, General, Buried within this infamous tome
interviewed. While we were encour you might begin by running through were two references to NSA. The
aged by theirwillingness to talkwith all your abuses and improprieties,(cid:148) firstwas a reference to an office in
us, the most egregious (cid:147)abuses(cid:148) we but, with no arrows in our quiver, we NewYork that CIA had provided
were told aboutwere complaints were hardly in a position to be so NSA for the purpose ofcopying tele
about how NSA allocated its parking bold. We toldAllen wewould like to grams. The other disclosed that CIA
spaces among employees and about a be given more information about the had asked NSA to monitor the com
few cases oftime and attendance Agency(cid:146)s organization and activities, munications ofcertain US citizens
fraud. None ofthe people we inter and he offered to arrange whatever active in the antiwar movement.
viewed had any knowledge ofNSA(cid:146)s briefings we might require.
having undertaken surveillance At lastwe had something to sink our
againstAmerican citizens. It became These occurred over the ensuing teeth into. We decided that I would
clear to us from these interviews that weeks, and implicitly the message run down the reference to the office
NSA(cid:146)s operations were so compart came through: (cid:147)Whatever you do, in NewYork, and Peter, together
mented that, unless we had the right kids, don(cid:146)t screw this up(cid:151)it(cid:146)s impor with a young lawyer who had since
person, others were not apt to know. tant to the country.(cid:148) In fact, the joined the staff, would look into the
How, though, did we find the right briefings did give us a considerably request to monitor the communica
person? At that point, we did not improved understanding ofNSA(cid:146)s tions ofthe antiwar protesters.
even have an organization chart. mission and accomplishments, but
they failed to identify a single avenue I began by making an oral inquiry to
We decided to try the front door and that appeared promising from an NSA, asking for an explanation of
asked for a meetingwith the Direc investigative standpoint. Part ofit the reference in the (cid:147)family jewels(cid:148) to
tor. Itwas our first trip to Fort was due to our own ignorance and the NewYork office and any docu
Meade, and, although ourvisit pre uncertainty in terms ofwhere to ments that maypertain to the matter.
dated the construction ofthe (cid:147)new(cid:148) probe and how hard to push, and Weeks passed without a response. In
headquarters building, the size ofthe part ofit was due to NSA(cid:146)s uncer July, out ofgrowing frustration, I
old complex was daunting. NSAwas tainty in terms ofwhat to share with prepared a list ofwritten interrogato
housed in an enormous glass edifice, us. Given the current highly intru ries thatwere sent to NSAover the
with large parabolic antennas on its sive nature ofCongressional Chairman(cid:146)s signature. This at last
roofand surrounded by acres of oversight, it may seem strange that in produced a response, albeit one in
parking lots. We were given visitors(cid:146) 1975 NSAwas an agency that had which NSA said the subject was so
44
Shamrock
In early August, a
leak appeared
press
in an article in
sensitive that it could be briefed only The Story ofSHAMROCK
The New York Times
to Senators Church and Tower, the
Chairmanandrankingminoritymem alleging that NSA had I waste~l little time in locating Dr.
ber, respectively. My efforts to eavesdropped Torde1~a. To my surprise, he readily
on
arrange such a briefing failed, how agreed to see me. On a Sunday after
ever, largely because ofthe difficulty the international noon in September 1975, Ivisited his
in getting the two Senators together communications of home in suburban Maryland. While
at the same time. he gree~ed me politely, Tordella was
US citizens. clearly uncomfortable with the whole
In earlyAugust, a press leak appeared yidoeuango,f~~wciotnfhidliitntlgeiknnsoowmleedognee like me,
ailnlaegninargtitchlaetiNnSTAhehNadeweaYvoerskdrToipmpeesd apprec~ation ofintelligence, wohro was,
far he knew, hell-bent mak
the international communications as as on
oofnUS citizens.4 The article dis telegrams that appeared to be ing NSA look bad.
cussed in general terms the matters encrypted. We be~an by questioning each other
wsfooerurwtceheereoCfoincmvomenissttiidtgeaerteaibngl,ewaceonlnldstiterwNnaSasAt.iao5n While telegrams sent by US citizens acobnovuety~~utrhebiamcpkrgersosuinodns.I wIastri(cid:147)reedstpoon
as as sible,(cid:148) interested only in the facts.
The leak had the salutary effect, how to foreign destinations were also
ever, ofbreaking the bureaucratic present in the tapes NSA received, He saiadbhoeutwatshenCootmsmoiwtotrereieadndabwohuatt
logjam that hadstymied us. With the the briefer said that, as a practical mitemiagsI~t make ofthe (cid:147)facts.(cid:148) He
asNrileSdlceeoAgroadtft,iotolNhndeSsmAsnetoowrwtayh.naattmSeaoad,tbttrioeinreeflxoiapntflegpaAwuiubnaglsuiitscst, m(cid:147)Wtahete(cid:146)rtereera,ltnsotooufofbn,u(cid:148)eshyeevjeusrsatildko.eoekTpehidenagtpurtpohgewrmia.tmh aRsSisOHgkCheAIda~Mrm.~RdeOItwhtCheoanlKtdbhtIehigkamatn.nelaawHsedtaiebdssociuiogntuhtreoSsdetHahoelAnoMng
being arranged. had been terminated in May, he told
early e~ening. The he talked,
more
me, by order ofthe Secretary of the more he seemed to relax.
I can remember the clean-cut, ear Defense. I asked ifthe Secretary had
nest man in his early forties who met ended it because he knew the Com SHAIv~ROCKactuallypredatedNSA,
with me, butI do not recallhis name. mittee was on to it. (cid:147)Not really,(cid:148) he which ~(cid:145)as created by President Tru
It was true, he said, that NSA had said, (cid:147)the program just wasn(cid:146)t pro man in 1952. It had been essentially
had access for many years to most of ducingvery much ofvalue.(cid:148) a cont~nuation ofthe military censor
the international telegrams leaving ship p~ogram ofWorld War II.
NewYork City for foreign destina Copie~ offoreign telegraph traffic
tions. The program was codenamed When I asked howlong this had been had be~en turned over to military
SHAMROCKand known to only a going on, he said he did not know. intelligence during the war, and,
few people within the government. When I asked how it had begun, he when the war ended, the Army Secu
YEvoerrkyodnayt,heatcroauirniearndwernettuurpnetdotNoew said he did not know. When I asked rtihtiysAcog~ennticnyue(.ASAAl)l tshoeugbhitg itonthearvnea
who had approved it, he said he did
Fort Meade with large reels ofmag tional carrierswere involved, Tordella
netic tape, which were copies ofthe not know. I then askedwho would said, (cid:147)but none of(cid:145)em ever got a
international telegrams sent from know, andhe saidhe thoughtthe only nickel for what they did.(cid:148)
NewYork the preceding day using person alivewho would know the
the facilities ofthree telegraph com whole storywould probably be (cid:147)Dr. Tordella thought the companies had
pelaenciterso.niTcahlelytpapreoscewsosuedldfotrhietnembse of Tordella.(cid:148) That namewas familiar to dbeenetnTasrsuumreadnatantdheAtttiomrentehyatGePnreersail
foreign intelligence interest, typically me. Louis Tordella had been the civil Tom clarkwere aware ofand
telegrams sent byforeign establish ian DeputyDirector at NSAfor many approyed the continuation ofthe
ments in the United States or years and had recently retired.6 program, but he did not know ifany
45
Shamrock
(cid:147)
SHAMROCK just
without
ran on a
great deal of
subsequent President orAttorney attention citizens were looked at, the compa
General had ever been briefed on it. nies had no knowledge ofit.
He did say he had personally briefed from anyone.
Secretary ofDefense Schlesinger on (cid:145)9 I countered with the observation
the program in 1973, and, to his that, by making the tapes available to
knowledge, Schlesinger had been the the government, the companies had
only Secretary to have such a brief to know theywere providing the
ing, at least before Tordella(cid:146)s that years would sometimes go by wherewithal for the government to
retirement. without his hearing anything about use them however itwanted. They
SHAMROCK. Itjust ran on, he had to bear some responsibility.
Tordellawent on to describe in detail said, without a great deal of atten
how the program evolved. During tion from anyone. This comment caused Tordella(cid:146)s tem
the 1950s, paper tape had been the per to flare for the first time during
medium ofchoice. Holes
were I asked ifNSA used the take from our interview. The companies were
pscuanncnheeddtionctrheeatpeaapnerelteacpteroannidc ttrheanns StiHonAalMcRomOmCunKictaotsipoynsonofthAemeirnitecranna wneotrerejsupstondsoibilneg,whheatreittheeragtoedv,ertnhemyent
mission. Every day, an NSA courier asked them do because they
would pick the reels ofpunched citizens. Tordella responded, (cid:147)Not to were
ptaakpeerthtaepmebtauhcaptkwteorFeorlteftMeovaedre.andIn ptheersese.k(cid:148)inNdsSoAfwcaosmmnuontiicnatteireosntsedasina sabesycsuutrrhieetdyC.iotmIwmfaitsthetiiemrepr,oorlitetawwneotruetlodenxsaputobisjoeencdatl
stwheitecahreldy t1o96m0asg,nettheiccotamppea.niWehsile the fruelwe,cahseessawihd,erbeutthheensaaimdesthoerfeAwmeerreia tsuhitesm, atondemibtawrorualsdsmdeinstc,ouirfangoetoltahewr
companies were agreeable to continu can citizens had been used by NSA to companies from cooperatingwith US
select their international
irentgaitnhethperorgeerlasmo,ftmhaegynweatinctetdapteo. nicatioonust, and to the extent thcios mwamsu intelligence for years to come.
This necessitated NSA(cid:146)s finding done, the take from SHAMROCK
pt1la9ap6ec6se,ttTohoemrcdaØoklmelpaacnohipaiedesspweoerfrstoehneaulsmilnaygg.snoeautIgnihct wdthoaanutc,ledatwaitltshohehttahivemseeebtcehreeitneHrusioas.rttoeHndeiPnnlaoantc7ecdor yIteetrtowltdoouhdleidtmebrtehmaittnreetahtheeodC,woimtnmhceiltuwdthieonlegehtmahedat
involvement ofthe companies. We
assistance from the CIA to rent was being considered, the Nixon parted amicably, but he clearly had
oNfSfiAcecsopualcdediunpNliecawteYotrhekmCaigtnyestoicthat atdumrinniinsgtorvaetrioSnHhaAdMtRhoOuCghKt taobotuhte misgivings abouthow thiswould turn
tapes there. This lasted until 1973, FBI, but the FBI did not want it. omuatn.ifeHsits.distrust ofpoliticians was
Tordella said, when CIA pulled out
ofthe arrangement because ofcon When I asked ifitwas legal for NSA
caerrrnasngreadisfeodrbiytsiotswlnawoyfefrisc.e sNpSacAe itnhen ctiotirzeeands,t8heheterlepelgireadm,s(cid:147)Yoofu(cid:146)lAlmerhiacvaento The Companies
Manhattan.
ask the lawyers.(cid:148)
Several days after my interviewwith
Tordella recalled thatwhile many Tordella, an NSA official briefed the
NSA employees of I noted that I would have expected Committee in closed session,
were aware
SHAMROCK, only one lower-level the companies themselves to be con confirming essentiallywhat Tordella
manager(cid:151)who reported to him cerned, and Tordella remarked that, had told me about SHAMROCK.
directly(cid:151)had had ongoing responsi (cid:147)the companies are whatworry me
bility for the program over the years. about this.(cid:148) He said thatwhatever It was clear that the issue for the
The first person who served in this they did, they did out ofpatriotic rea Committee was likely to be the com
capacity had started doing it in 1952 sons. They had presumed NSA panies themselves and how to treat
and had continued until he retired in wanted the tapes to look for foreign them in its report. We decided to
1970. Another personwas appointed intelligence. That was NSA(cid:146)s mis explore for ourselves the companies(cid:146)
to take his place. Tordella recalled sion. Ifthe telegrams ofAmerican involvement to see whether they
46
Shamrock
were as oblivious to the implications The executive from Western Union from the government. I said that if
oftheir conduct as Tordella and the International gave a slightly different we exp~sed them, it would cause
NSA briefer contended. version ofthe operation. He said them p~iblic embarrassment and per
that in his company, employees haps su~ject them to lawsuits,
would microfilm copies ofoutgoing thereby~making it difficult for US
We sought pertinent documents and international telegrams that would intellig~nce agencies to obtain the
witnesses from each ofthe three then be picked up by a government cooperation ofprivate companies in
companies involved: RCA Global, courier. the fun~re. Fritz countered that the
ITT World Communications, and compar~ies had a duty to protect the
Western Union International. No All the companywitnesses testified privacy oftheir customers. In his
one could find any record whatso that their companies had assumed view, tl~ey deserved to be exposed. If
ever ofan agreement with NSA or NSAwas using the telegraph traffic the Committee did notdo it, itwould
ASA setting forth the terms ofthe only for foreign intelligence pur become~the subject ofcriticism itself.
operation. Only RCA Global could poses. It did not occur to any of So, for the time being, the names
produce awitness who had been them that NSAmight have used their stayed i~i, and the draft report was
involved in establishing the arrange access to look for the international submit~ed to NSA for security
ment afterWorldWar II; the other telegrams ofAmerican citizens, nor review.
two companies could produce a few they that their companies
were aware
witnesses(cid:151) mid-level executives(cid:151) had ever sought assurances from The next step in the process took
who had become aware ofthe NSA on this point. Moreover, all place on 28 October 1975, when the
arrangement over the course ofits were adamant that their companies Committee met in executive session
existence. I deposed each ofthe wit had never received any compensa to consider what it would do with
nesses the companies identified. tion or favoritism from the respect to the matters the staffhad
government in return for their been in~(cid:146)estigating: SHAMROCK
cooperation. and the NSA (cid:147)watch list.(cid:148)9 Lieuten
The RCA Global executive, then
Gei~ieral
retired, was the most colorful and ant sch~duleAdllen, the NSbeAfoDrieretchteor,
forthright ofthe lot. He offered no was to appear
apologies forwhat he or the company ActionWithin the Committee Comm~ttee the following day in pub
lic session. Itwould be the first time
had done. He said theArmyhad come
to him and asked for the company(cid:146)s Based upon the information I had that an NSA Director had appeared
cooperation, and, by damn, that was developed, I prepared a report on in publ~c before a Congressional
enough for him. SI-IAMROCK for the Committee, committee, and the Committee was
outlining the facts as we then knew meetin~ on the 28th to get its ducks
them. I submitted it to the Commit in a row.
The executive from ITT World Com tee ChiefCounsel, FrederickA. 0.
munications, bycomparison, came to (cid:147)Fritz(cid:148) Schwarz, a lineal descendant The Fo~rd administration had agreed
the deposition surrounded by a pha ofthe toy store magnate on leave to allowAllen to testify publicly
lanx ofcorporate lawyers who from a Wall Street law firm, with a about the (cid:147)watch list(cid:148) but had
proceeded to object to every ques recommendation that the Committee refused~to allow him (or anyone else)
tion I asked once I had gotten past notmake public the names ofthe totestifyaboutSHAMROCK. While
the man(cid:146)s name and position. I three cooperating companies. NSA h~td little to say about the accu
pointed out to them that this was the racy of~the draft report on
United States Senate(cid:151)not a court of Fritz called me into his office to dis SHAMROCK, it objected to making
law(cid:151) and, iftheywanted to object to cuss the report and told me he the rep~rt public. Without a knowl
the questions I was asking, I would disagreed with my recommendation edgeab~e advocate for NSA(cid:146)s position
have a Senator come in and overrule that the companies not be identi in the room, however, Chairman
every one oftheir objections. They fied. I pointed out to him that the Church rather easily obtained consen
piped down after that and allowed companies had cooperated purelyout sus froi~n a bare quorum ofthe
the witness to respond to my ofpatriotic motives and, as far as we Comrn~ttee(cid:151) without taking a
questions. knew, had never received anything vote(cid:151)i~hat the SHAMROCK report
47
Shamrock
(cid:147)
Senators were
bothered that
the telegrams of
should be made public, notwithstand Americans had for ofit, but whyshould that make it
ing the administration(cid:146)s objection. classified?
This action by Senator Church and years been handed
the Committee was based on a provi over to an In what I recall was largely a party-
sion in the resolution establishing the
Committee that allowed it to release mtelligence agency. liignneorveotet,hetPhreesCiodmemnti(cid:146)sttoebejevcottieodnstoand
information in its possession, classi
9, to publish the report with the three
fied or not, by majorityvote. companies identified therein. It
remains to this day the only occasion
After the meeting, however, Senator and take (cid:147)up down(cid:148) I know ofwhere a Congressional
Tower and other Republican an or vote on
mem disclosure. committee voted to override a presi
bers who had not been present began dential objection and publish
voicing their displeasure with the
information the President contended
Chairman(cid:146)s action. In a rare display In the next few days, the Committee was classified.
ofadministration concern, President met to consider the disclosure of
Ford telephoned the Chairman and SHAMROCK. For the first time A few days later, 6 November
oitmhpelrormienmgbtehresmotfotrheecoCnosmidmeirt.teWehile stiionncse,tAhtetoCronmemyitGetneeerablegEadnwaorpedrLaevi, h1a9d75w,ritthteenC,hainicrlmuoadnninrgetahdethe reporotfI
the Chairman may have been confi speaking expressly on behalfofthe the companies, into the pubnlaicmersecord
dent he had the votes to maintain his President, personally appealed to the ofthe Committee. The witness table
ptoaskietni.on, no vote had actually been Committee not to publish the was empty that day, the executive
SHAMROCK report on the grounds branch having refused to send wit
that publication would damage testify.(cid:146)(cid:176)
This disagreement the nesses to
among mem national security. Before hushed
a
bers played itselfout in public the hearing room, Levi made an elo
fGoelnleorwailngAldiaeny(cid:146)satttehseticmoonncyl.usSieonnaotfor quent appeal to the Committee, Belated Discoveries
objecting to the publication ofthe
Church raised the matter himselfand report, and, in particular, to disclos
proceeded to describe SI-IAMROCK ingthenames ofthe threecompanies. For all practical purposes, my investi
in general terms, alluding to the Levi(cid:146)s arguments generally mirrored gative work on SHAMROCK ended
i(cid:147)ctlholemegmpa.al,niIaennsdh(cid:148) iistsbvuidietswcn,loottshuearcepturwaoolgluryladnmanwmoaitsng ftthheoewsyewweIoeuhklasddbemfaordee,ttahonedFdraiIytw.zaSschhwoapriznga wmCiootmvhmeitdthteoenCeh.taoioIrtnmhaMenra(cid:146)srtcasrhkesc1ift9oa7rt6i,tohnhe,oanwd I
carry
harm national security. ever, as the Committee staffwas at
work putting together its final seven-
According to Church, moreover, the In the discussion that followed, how volume report, a lawyer in the Gen
Committee had acted in accordance ever, with Levi out ofthe room, it eral Counsel(cid:146)s office at the
with its rules. Senators Tower, Gold soon became clear which way the Department ofDefense called me to
water, and Baker challenged him on wind was blowing. Senators were say that (cid:147)a lower-level employee(cid:148) at
both substantive and procedural bothered that the telegrams ofAmeri NSA had recently discovered a file
grounds, among other things, reveal cans had for years been handed over relating to SHAMROCK and, while
ing that President Truman had to an intelligence agency. Whatever (cid:147)it did notreallychangeanything,(cid:148) he
approved the program and contend its legality, it should not have hap asked whether I would be interested
ing that disclosure ofthe details pened. The program was now in seeing it.
would have far-reaching repercus terminated. Whywould it matter if
sions for US security. In what it were disclosed? Whywas the The file proved to be a mother lode
seemed a pre-ordained finale to the identification ofthe companies a ofinformation. In it were internal
discussion, Church gave in to the dis national security concern? Yes, the memorandums oftheArmy Signal
senters, agreeing that the Committee reportmight be embarrassing to them SecurityAgency that described visits
would consider the matter further and they might even get sued because byArmy representatives to the three
48
Shamrock
I found it highly
suspicious that these
documents had
international telegraph companies in been located by the With the failure ofthe effort to enact
August 1945 at the conclusion ofthe legislation, the companies in 1949
war and reflected the initial responses government months sought(cid:145)and obtained assurances from
ofthe companies. ITT World Inter after the Committee(cid:146)s Forrest(cid:224)l(cid:146)s successor, LouisJohnson,
national at first refused to cooperate, that theywould not be prosecuted.
but went along after itwas told that investigation had On thi~ occasion, Johnson said he
sp~aking
the presidents ofRCA Global and closed. was on behalfofthe Presi
Western Union had agreed to cooper dent ai~d theAttorney General as
ate ifAttorney General Tom Clark ~9 well.
said the operation was (cid:147)not illegal.(cid:148)
ITT said it would cooperate on the I foun4 ithighlysuspicious that these
same basis. docun~ents had been located by the
government months after the Com
These documents filled out the pic mittee~s investigation had closed.
Ahafcotcweeorvrtedhrie,nAgtuhtgeoupsttrheo1gA9rr4am5mymbemeegetaminonrgsashonwrdtialt,yh tiunre19e4v7enthfeurtthhrere.e cTohmepyanrieeflsechtaedd that a(tWthhyiswjeurncetutrhee?y)stiTllhleoodkoicnugmfeonrttshem
out an opinion from the Attorney sdeonutg,htAtatsosrunreayncGeesnefrraolm,tahnedPSreecsrietary atlhseoccoa~r1tpadnoiuebst(cid:146)scolnaimthsetvheartatcihteyyocfo(cid:146) uld
General. It involved all the interna
tional telegraph offices ofthe three ofDefense that their cooperation in find no documentation pertaining to
companies, not simply those in New teshseenStiHalAtMoRthOeCnKatipornoalgrianmterweasst and ScoHncAeMi~RneOdCtKhe.hiAgfhteesrtallel,vetlhsisofhtahdeir
York, but those in Washington, DC,
San Francisco, and San Antonio as tFheadtertahleyprwoosuelcudtinoontfboerstuhbejiercatcttoivi cfoorurpoyr~aatres.maWniatghetmheenCtofmomriatttleeaest
well.
ties. In fact, the documents showed about to go out ofbusiness, how
that Secretary ofDefenseJames For ever, there was no time for me to
The file also indicated that the con restal, stating that he was speaking investigate the failure to produce
cerns ofthe companies over the for the President, had met with repre these documents earlier. I had to be
legality oftheir cooperation did not sentatives ofITT and RCA in contei~it that they had arrived in time
abate once the operation began. In December 1947 and provided such to be ~eflected in the Committee(cid:146)s
an internal memo written more than assurances, but with a warning that final r~port.(cid:146)2
ayear later, theArmy noted that, he could not bind his successors in
because ofthe concern over the office. Western Union representa
legality oftheir conduct, the compa tives were briefed subsequently on Denouement
nies had limited knowledge ofthe this meeting.
operation to two or three individuals Several weeks after the Committee
in each company. In apparent follow-up to this meet issued its final report, I walked over
ing, the documents showed that to the1House side ofthe Capitol to
With the discovery ofthis file, I set Secretary Forrestal inJune 1948 qui attend a hearing ofthe subcommit
about revising the chapter ofthe etly tried to have Congress amend tee ch~aired by Bella Abaug, the
Committee(cid:146)s final report that dealt section 605 ofthe Communications (cid:147)gentlewoman(cid:148) from New York, as
w~s
with SHAMROCK to incorporate Act of 1934 in awaywhich would she referred to by her col
the new information. About a month have made the companies(cid:146) coopera leagues. Her hearings brought to
later, in April 1976, as I was putting tion in SHAMROCK clearlylegal. mind~the days ofNero, when Chris
the final touches on the revision, I He met informallywith the Chair tians ~were thrown to the lions for
received a call from the Department men ofthe Senate and House sport. Ms. Abzug(cid:146)s (cid:147)red meat(cid:148) that
ofDefense, this time advising that Judiciary Committees to explain the particular day consisted ofexecutives
nine more documents pertaining to situation, and an amendment was from RCA Global, ITT Interna
SHAIvIROCKhad been discovered at drafted to accomplish the objective. tional, andWestern Union
the National Archives and were en The amendment was never reported Interhational. As I leaned back
route to me. by either committee.11 against the wall ofthe hearing room,
49
Shamrock
I saw many ofthose I had met I also came to think that the 5. The leakapparentlydid come from
months before. investigation, in the long term, had a the Committee or, more likely, its
beneficial effect on NSA. With no staff; members were notyetengaged
cBoeurladt,inMgs.theAbwzitungesmsaesdeasitonclleyarshsehe dreisenicree,tNoSunAdeardgooptaendotvheerry ssturcihngeexntpe hotoonwpeNrvSoeAvre.,ctoLhnieckleCuosmimovmseitltystwuechehowsatihtseuauctniuaolbnpsrl,iet
(cid:147)stood solidly for the privacy ofthe rules in the wake ofthe Church Com was. Theepisodedid make us far
American people and squarelyagainst mittee to ensure that its operations morewaryofdiscussingwith thestaff
the corporate thugs ofthis country were carried out in accordance with whatwewere doing.
who thought they could rough applicable law. Where the communi
run
shod over the rights oftheAmerican cations ofUS citizens were 6. Tordellawas DeputyDirectorofNSA
people.(cid:148) (I am paraphrasing hde.) I concerned, I can attest from my per from 1958 until 1974.
knew theywere getting a bum rap, sonal experience that NSA has been
but they had no defenders that day. especially scrupulous. As upsetting 7. The Huston Plan was devised by
One oftheir attorneys turned and and dembralizing as the Church NixonWhite House aideTom Hus
caught my eye in the back ofthe Committee(cid:146)s investigation undoubt ton to organize the resources ofthe
rtoolodmy,onuosdod.ing grimly as ifto say I sedylsytewmasw,hiitcchaukseeedpsNiSt wAitthoiinnstthietute a vgteiosevtweesrrsnoafmnetdnhteotathdoemrcisonuiosnpttpreoartsiaeondnt.itwoatrhepro
bounds ofUS law and focused on its
And the companies(cid:146) troubles would essential mission. Twenty-threeyears 8. The issue oflegalitystemmed from
not end there. Jn the weeks that fol later, I still take some satisfaction applicabilityofsection 605 ofthe
lowed, theywould be sued byagroup from that. CommunicationsActof1934 to the
ofpeople claiming their rights had companies(cid:146) activities. Section 605 on
been violated by the SHAIvIROCK its face prohibitedpeople involved in
program. NOTES sendingorreceivingforeign commu
nications bywire, that is, the
employees oftelegraph companies,
AafsteIrwtahlekheedarbiancgktthoatthdeayS,enitatoeccsuirdered 1. aPnettetroFDeenmnocisrantoiwcacapnodliitdiactaelscaonnsdult fcroommmudniivcualtgiinognsthteocootnhteerntpseoopflet.hosIen
to me that none ofthis would be frequentlyappears on Geraldo Rivera 1968, section 605 had been amended
happening ifnot for me. Yet I hardly Live, Hardball, and othertalkshows. bya newwiretap law to clarifythat it
felt like gloating. Indeed, I was was not meant to preclude the
somewhat shaken to see the conse 2. I have sinceworked closelywith Gen employees oftelegraph companies
quences I had predicted to Fritz eralAllen (who retiredsome timeago) cformommudniivcualtgiinognsthwehcoosneteanctqsuiosfitwiiorneby
Stochpwasasr.zFaofrewthmeomnotmhesntbe,foIrweacsoomveer aPCsroeamsmimdieesnmstb(cid:146)sieornFooarfneidtgheansAIasntpmeielnlmi-bgBeernrocewonAfdthvei ctoheurgtoovredrern.meWnhtihlaedab1ee9n72suSbujpecrtemofea
scf(cid:147)peuooctimtusoerroe,nbecaydosodDpotreuh.rbeatTt.woieroldHnle(cid:148)alwdliiantwhthee,atrdhmiensfpeforaairfcveta,dt?e simtnohotrereyngerBaiomtnayed.rldls.toilwlHtaeomsmaeenemtosofdciaomynpsteihcdacenarbahlbeelydid Ctmanauaiopttguihhrloottanrawipcltoahysssaesetdecoisusnsaruviugrottegylhsevoipsirdutniuregzapdeltohtwscehioeerns1esPtt9(ria6wetp8isustithwdifoieoournnrttael
actuallydeciding this issue), no court
Because I decided to stay in govern 3. The Rockefeller Commissionwas cre had ever applied this principle to over
ment and, indeed, served in positions atedbyPresident Ford in 1974 to ride the prohibition contained in
that offered a vantage point, I came lookinto allegations ofCIAinvolve section 605.
to see that relations between intelli- ment in monitoringdomesticpolitical
gence agencies and the private sector d1i9s7s5en,t.fivIetmiossnutehdsirasftreerpotrhteoCnhu6rJcuhne 9. The (cid:147)watch list(cid:148) referred to a list of
endured. Lawyers became more Committeehad been formed. names ofUS citizens used byNSA to
involved than they used to be, but select the international communica
questions oflegalitywere no longer tions ofsuch citizens from its
ignored or unresolved. Agreements 4. HriotryrAogcekn,cNyicRheoploarst,ed(cid:147)NaEtaivoenasldroSpepcinug vhiolddeidngbsy,SiHncAluMdRinOgCtKhe.teNleSgAramhsadpro
were put inwriting and signed by the on Most Private Cables,(cid:148) TheNew begun doingthis in theearly 1960son
responsible officials. York Times, 8August 1975, p. 1. alimited basis inorder to monitorUS
50
Shamrock
citizen travel to Cubaand threats to
the President. In 1967, however, the
listwas expanded to include the
names ofUS citizens involved in anti
war and civil rights disturbances,
ostensiblyto determine anyforeign
influenceoversuch persons. In 1973,
at the height ofthis activity, the
names of600 US citizenswere on the
list. In the fall of1973, however, in
response to concerns raisedbyAttor
ney General Elliot Richardson
regarding its legality, the (cid:147)watch list(cid:148)
program was terminated.
10.AttorneyGeneral Leviwas present in
the hearingroomwhen the Chairman
read thestatementand did subse
quentlytestifyon the legal issues
surroundingNSA(cid:146)s foreign intelli
gence activities, buthedid not
mention SHAMROCKin his
testimony.
11. The SenateJudiciaryCommittee
voted to allowthe Chairman discre
tion to report the amendment to the
floor or not, but, because ofthe
DefenseDepartment(cid:146)s reluctance to
have thematterdiscussedon thefloor,
the amendmentwas never reported
out bythe Chairman.
12. The description ofthe SHAMROCK
program appears at pages 765-776 of
Book III, SupplementaryDetailedStaff
ReportsonIntelligenceActivitiesandthe
RightsofAmericans, Final Report of
the Select Committee to StudyGov
ernmental Operationswith respect to
IntelligenceActivities, US Senate,
1976.
51