DTIC ADA523807: Good Games: Challenges for the War-Gaming Community

10 Pages·0.1 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

“GOOD GAMES”
Challenges for the War-Gaming Community
Stuart H.Starr
I
n1999,theNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganizationissuedatechnicalreportlay-
ingouta“Codeof BestPractice”forcommandandcontrolassessment.1Al-
though specifically aimed at command and control, this document offers a
framework for thinking about the changing nature of war gaming. In the
opinion of numerous practitioners and observers, war gaming has reached a
turning point: the changing basis of international security at the dawn of the
twenty-firstcenturymakesgaminganespeciallyvaluabletool,butafundamen-
talreformationofgamingisrequiredforittoachieveitspotential.
TheCodeof BestPractice,asaunifyingandoverarchingframework,allows
ustotakestockofthepresentstateofwargaming,tohighlighttheprimarychal-
lengesthatthewar-gamingcommunityfaces,andtoproposestepstoimprove
everyaspectofwargaming.Itmakesfourcentralpoints.
First, as shown in figure 1, the framework of a good war game should be
broadlybasedontheprinciplesofsoundoperationalanalysis.Thusthecorner-
stoneofanygamemustbeaclearandunambiguousformulationoftheproblem
tobeaddressed—thereasonthegameistobeplayed.Agame’ssponsorsneedto
articulate very clearly the real issues of interest so that designers may develop
(forthesponsors’approval)aconceptualframeworkwithinwhichtheseissues
canbesuitablyanalyzed.
Second,astheNatodocumentinstructs,thegame’sdesignersshouldidentify
and address organizational and cultural issues that
Dr.StarrisDirectorofPlansattheMITRECorporation
emerge from the conceptual framework. What as-
inMcLean,Virginia.Anearlierversionofthispaperwas
preparedfordeliveryatawar-gamingconferenceatthe sumptions are to be accepted, for example, about
Naval War College in March 2000.
the values, behavior, and decision processes of the
variousplayers?
Naval War College Review, Spring 2001, Vol. LIV, No.2
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Third,thewargamemustdeviserelevantscenarios.Asiswidelyunderstood,
nosinglescenarioisadequateforthefullrangeofissuesfoundinamajorgame.
Sponsorsshouldexpecttobepresentedwith“families”ofscenarios;asystematic
and efficient mechanism
FIGURE 1
togenerateappropriateal-
WAR-GAMING FRAMEWORK
ternativescenariosallows
a game to focus on the
mostinterestingaspectsof
Problem Formulation Organization/Culture theproblembeingstudied.
Fourth,Nato’sCodeof
Scenarios Best Practice envisions
the use of “measures of
Measures ofMerit merit”todrawoutinsights
about the game’s results;
Data Tools & TheirApplications forcontemporaryscenar-
ios,hierarchiesofinterre-
Risk & Uncertainty Report lated—and, increasingly,
nontraditional—measures
arenecessary.Thesemea-
sures,inturn,requirethe
collectionofappropriatedataandtheapplicationofsuitableanalyticaltoolsto
beuseful.Forinstance,ancillarytoolscanbeusedtoperformanalysesbeforea
game(perhapstodefinefruitfulpartsof“scenariospace”),duringit(toassess
“moves”),andafterit,especiallytorelateoutcomestomeasuresofmerit.The
NatoCodeconsidersitvitaltoperformriskanalysestoilluminatetheuncertain-
tiesassociatedwiththeissuesof interesttothesponsor;manyagamepartici-
pant (and sponsor) has drawn a misleading inference from the idiosyncratic
outcomeofasinglegame.Finally,theresultsoftheassessmentsmustbedoc-
umented,sotherecanbebothpeerreviewsandafoundationuponwhichfuture
analysescanbebuilt.
Althoughfigure1doesnotformallyspecifyit,theCodeofBestPracticeem-
phasizes that an extensive feedback arrangement is needed to share insights
among individuals carrying out these successive processes as game planning
progresses. Further, the overall team must be an interdisciplinary one—com-
prisingoperationsanalysts,war-gamedesigners,experimentaldesigners,com-
puterscientists,socialscientists,andsoon—ifitistoaddressalloftheissuesof
concern to a sponsor. A “good game,”then, blends clear problem formula-
tion,technicalvirtuosity,accuratedata,scenariocreativity,appropriatedecision
rules,andcredibleevaluationprocedures.Therestofthisarticletreatssomeof
thesepointsingreaterdepth.
STARR 91
PROBLEM FORMULATION
There is no shortage of problems amenable to useful analysis by war-gaming
techniques.Infact,policymakersarelikelytofindwargamingthemosteffective
toolforclarifyingmanyissuesandsetsofissuesthatcanbeexpectedtocometo
theforegroundinthenearandmiddleterm.Letushereconsiderafewproblems
forwhichwargamingcouldbeparticularlyappropriate.
Strategic Visions. An indication of the variety of problems to which gaming
mightbeappliedasananalyticaltoolisthesetofthreelistsofstrategicprob-
lemsassembledrecentlybyformersecretaryofdefenseWilliamJ.Perryandfor-
mer assistant secretary of defense Ashton B. Carter, in their book Preventive
Defense.2 Their “A list”comprises potential (and possibly preventable) future
matters that could threaten the
The overall team must be an interdisciplinary survival,wayof life,andposition
one—comprising operations analysts, intheworldof theUnitedStates
war-game designers, experimental designers, (such as a resurgent and hostile
computer scientists, social scientists, and so on. Russia, uncontrolled prolifera-
tionofweaponsofmassdestruc-
tion,orcatastrophicterrorism).The“Blist”containsdirectthreats(deterrable
throughreadyforces)tovitalAmericaninterests(forinstance,majortheater
wars).The“Clist”citesproblems(likeKosovo,Bosnia,andSomalia)that“indi-
rectlyaffectU.S.securitybutdonotdirectlythreatenU.S.interests.”3Manyof
theseissues,particularlythoseonthe“Alist,”haveyettobeexploredadequately
inwargames.
HomelandDefense.Initsrecentreport,“SeekingaNationalStrategy:AConcept
for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom,” the congressionally estab-
lishedHart-RudmanCommissionemphasizestheneedtoenhancewhatitcalls
“homeland security” to deal with emerging world threats.4 A third and final
phaseofthatstudywilladdressavarietyofassociatedquestions:Areresponsi-
bilities,authorities,andaccountabilitiesclear?Dointegratingmechanismsex-
ist?Whatcapabilitieswillbeneeded?Istheoverallcapacitysufficient,andifso,
willitcontinuetobe?5Asuitablydesignedsetofwargameswouldbeapromis-
ingwaytoilluminatetheseissues.6
OperationalTempo.Oneofthedrivingissuesinthe1997QuadrennialDefense
Reviewwasthenecessitytodevise“architectures”andpersonnelpoliciestoal-
lowU.S.forcestorespondtooperationaldemandsthatwereexpectedtobehigh
enoughtoputpressureonunittrainingandmaintenance,aswellasmoraleand
retention.The“DynamicCommitment”wargamewasdevelopedandplayedto
addressthatissue;itisbeingrevisedtoservethesameneedfortheQuadrennial
DefenseReviewof2001.7Thatgame—whichistoplayasinglescenario,drawn
randomlyfromalistofsixty-one“vignettes”—isitselfacaseinpoint,showing
92 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
thatcontemporarygamingdoesnotreflectsufficientunderstandingofrisksand
uncertainties.The consequences of a particular vignette being played out in a
singlegame,andofdrawingconclusionstherefromaboutlevelsofdemandsthat
canbeplacedonU.S.equipmentandpersonnel,areworrisome.
ServiceTransformation.Eachofthemilitaryservicesisinthemidstofsweeping
modernizationdesignedtotakeadvantageofopportunitiesofferedbytheinfor-
mationage.SpecificinitiativesincludetheNavy’snetwork-centricwarfare,the
Army’s“FutureCombatSystemforSmallerScaleContingencies,”theairexpedi-
tionary forces of the Air Force,
Howcanscenariosbekept(inAlbertEinstein’s and“OperationalManeuverfrom
formulation) as simple as necessary— theSea”oftheMarineCorps.War
but no simpler? games have contributed to pre-
liminary assessments of each of
theseconceptssingly,buttherehasbeennoattempttogamethetotalityoftheir
effects.Doingsowouldappeartobeahigh-prioritymatter.
JointVision2020.Thechairmanof theJointChiefsof Staff,intherecentdoc-
trinalwhitepaperJointVision2020,conceives“ajointforcecapableoffullspec-
trum dominance, persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any
formofconflict.”8Thedocumentreaffirmsastheprerequisiteoffull-spectrum
dominancefouroperationalconcepts—dominantmaneuver,precisionengage-
ment,focusedlogistics,andfull-dimensionalprotection—identifiedinanear-
lier white paper, Joint Vision 2010. These four operational concepts in turn
dependonthreefactors:interoperability(jointforce,interagency,andmultina-
tional),innovationleadingtotransformation,and“decisionsuperiority”(toal-
lowcommandersto“makebetterandfasterdecisionsthantheiropponents”).
Allof thesefactors,aswellastheirrelationshiptothecentraloperationalcon-
ceptsofJointVision2020,areveryattractivesubjectsforgaming.
ORGANIZATION AND CULTURE
IngamesplayedbycoalitionalliespriortoOperationDESERTSTORM,differences
in cultures were sometimes recognized as a major factor.For instance,British
analyses reflected a particular appreciation of Iraqi characteristics that pro-
foundlyaffectedtheplanningandoperationalconceptsof theBritishforcesin
thetheater.9
Cultural differences were again acknowledged as central strategic factors in
1999,duringNato’scoerciveaircampaigntoterminateinternecinehostilities
in Kosovo. The subsequent debate about what actually prompted Slobodan
Milosevic’sacquiescencetoNato’sdemandshasproducedatleastoneanalysisof
theculturalandpoliticaldynamicsoftheSerbianleadership.10
STARR 93
Ithasbeenwidelyappreciatedthatwargamesrequireamuchbettertheoreti-
calbasisthanisnowavailablefortreatingthesemattersinfutureconflictsitu-
ations.Onepotentialsourceof somenecessaryinsightmayemergefromwork
beingdoneintheOfficeofNavalResearchon“AdaptiveArchitecturesforCom-
mandandControl.”Itexaminesthecommand-and-controlstaffsofvariousna-
tionsforpertinent“culturalartifacts”andtheirpotentialinfluenceondecision
making.Inaddition,thewar-gamingcommunitywoulddowelltodrawonthe
effortsof sociologistsandpoliticalscientists,whocouldanalyzetheunderlying
cultural forces at work in such recent operations as Somalia and Kosovo,and
whocanbeconsultedinplanninggamesforprospectiveinvolvementinforesee-
ablecrises.
SCENARIOS
Today,basicissuesintheselectionanddevelopmentof scenariosarebeingex-
amined. Can a baseline scenario be used for a series (or “cluster”) of games?
Howcanscenariosbekept(inAlbertEinstein’sformulation)assimpleasneces-
sary—but no simpler? Can “excursions” into important issues be accommo-
dated,andifso,inwhatways?
Clearly,nosimpleanswerstothesequestionsexist,butthereisafundamental
principle that game designers today should acknowledge—that no single sce-
nariocanadequatelyilluminateriskanduncertainty.Thechallengeistodevelop
an efficient mechanism for finding and exploring regions of “scenario space”
wherekeyfactorsplayinsignificantways.TheNatoCodeofBestPracticeoffers
oneapproachtotheproblem,ascenarioframeworkthatsubsumesthreemajor
categories—externalfactors(thepolitical,military,andculturalsituation),the
capabilities of actors (friendly and adversary forces,noncombatants),and the
environment(geography,terrain,andweather).
Asanillustrationofhowsuchaframeworkmightbeusedtodevelopabase-
line scenario (and possibly scenario excursions),consider a methodology that
enumeratesthefactorsapplicabletoagivengame.11Foreachofthosefactors,a
numberofvalues(specificgeographies,particularordersofbattle,etc.)canbe
assigned,eachmakingascenariomoreorlesschallenginginsomerespectthatis
significantintermsofagame’sobjectives.Betweenthebounding(“easy,”“very
difficult”)valuesforeachfactorlietheelementsofapotentiallyinterestingbase-
linescenario;alternativescenarioscanbereadilyproducedforsensitivityanaly-
ses by selecting different values for particular factors. In effect, this approach
generates a very large experimental-design matrix, each cell of which corre-
spondstoaspecificscenario.Intraditionalscientificexperimentation,anum-
ber of iterations would be run for selected matrix cells in order to achieve
statisticallymeaningfulresults;statisticaluncertaintywouldbeafunctionof
94 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
thenumberofcellsexaminedandthenumberofindependenttrialsofeach.In
wargames,ofcourse,a“fullfactorialexperiment”wouldbeimpossible;still,it
wouldbeprudenttoplayatleastasamplingof variants—a“sparse,fractional
factorialexperiment.”
Closely related to scenarios is consideration of risk and uncertainty.As the
Code notes,a useful way to display and characterize areas of uncertainty in a
game is to play variations of the
Today’s state-of-practice technology simply scenario.In doing so,however,it
collects stand-alone collaboration tools— is important to take account of,
however, the state of the art has advanced to and offset,the effects of learning
the point of integrating those capabilities into thatoccursintheplayof agame.
“virtual buildings.” Forinstance,thesequenceofvari-
ationsshouldanticipateandmin-
imizethe“carryforward”insightsobtainedineachvariation;onewaytodothis
istomakethenewproblemappeardifferenttotheparticipantsbuthaveitcon-
tain the same essential stimuli. It will almost certainly not be possible to run
enoughiterationstoboundmeasuresof meritastightlyasaphysicalscientist
wouldwish;nevertheless,tosomeextentwelldesignedpre-andpostgameanal-
ysescanrefinethoseestimates.
Amorebasicissueistheestimationofrisk.Riskanalysisasadisciplineiswell
developedinanumberoffields,suchastheinsuranceindustryandstockbro-
kerages, but in the context of national security there is little agreement even
aboutthedefinitionofriskitself.Thisisbecomingapressingissue,becausethe
congressionalmandateoftheQuadrennialDefenseReviewspecificallyrequires
“a comprehensive discussion of [the] national defense strategy of the United
Statesandtheforcestructurebestsuitedtoimplementthatstrategyatalowto
moderate level of risk.”12 To meet this requirement the national security com-
munitywillneedtoagreeondefinitionsofrisk,definitionsthatareamenableto
evaluationinfuturewargames.
MEASURES OF MERIT
Fordecadesgamershaveemployedthefamiliaroperations-analysisdeviceof
“measures of effectiveness” to structure game outcomes and relate them to
sponsors’concerns.Inrecentyears,however,theconceptof measuresof effec-
tivenesshasbeenbroadened,resultingintheideaof “measuresof merit.”13As
discussedintheNatodocument,thisconceptionnotonlyembracestheconven-
tional measures of effectiveness but allows a linked hierarchy of increasingly
specificmetricstobeconsideredaswell.Forexample,theevaluationmeasures
ofagamemightemploymeasureseachofwhich“nests”withinthenexttopro-
videbothbroadanddetailedattentionasappropriate.Anexamplefollows:
STARR 95
•
Measuresofpolicyeffectiveness,assessingtheextenttowhichthe
participantsinanoperationareabletoachievenationalorinternational
securityobjectives;
(cid:127)
Measuresofforceeffectiveness,examiningthepurelymilitaryeffectivenessof
aforceintermsofitsprimarytask(suchasthetimerequiredtohaltan
attack);
(cid:127)
Measuresofmissioneffectiveness,appraisingtheabilityofthemilitaryforce
toperformkeysubordinateorsubsidiarymissions;
(cid:127)
Measuresoffunctionalperformance,evaluatingthesuccessofaparticular
weaponsystemorcommand-and-controlorganizationinimportanttasks,
suchastargetengagement;
(cid:127)
Dimensionalparameters,thepropertiesorcharacteristics(suchas
bandwidthandresistancetojamming)ofaspecificsystem,suchasa
communicationsnetwork.
Gamedesignersmightusefullydevisemeasuresforeachlevelofthishierar-
chy, and analysts might explore their relationships during the course of the
game.Atthelowerendofthehierarchy,extensiveanalyseshavebeenperformed
for traditional warfare;that literature is being expanded upon to embrace
informationsuperiority.14Itwouldbenecessary,however,toformulatemean-
ingfulmeasuresofmeritforthetopofthehierarchy.Inonepromisingeffortin
this direction, economic measures were used to reflect the societal impact of
militaryoperations.15Participantswereaskedtoestimatetheeffectthatpostu-
latedcrisesmighthaveonsuchindicatorsastheDowJonesIndustrialAverage,
thepriceofabarrelofcrudeoil,ortheexchangeratebetweenthedollarandthe
deutschemark.
AstheNatoCodeofBestPracticeconcludes,gamesarenotsuitableforevery
analyticalquestion.Indeed,nosingleassessmenttechniqueislikelytobesuffi-
cient(seetable1).Sincegamesareincreasinglylikelytoaddresssuchconceptsas
informationsuperiorityandinformationdominance,assessmenttoolsmustac-
countforbothfriendlyandadversaryinformationprocesses.Inaddition,disci-
pline is necessary; formal experimental-design matrices may be advisable, or
multipleiterationsofincreasinglyfine-grainedanalyticalroutinesmayhaveto
bedone(forinstance,insuccessiveattemptsbeforeagametoidentifyfruitful
aspectsof thescenarioenvironment,clarifyassumptions,assignvaluesforkey
parameters,andmodeldetails).
Newly developed sophisticated collaboration tools may revolutionize war
games by allowing geographically dispersed individuals to participate fully in
deliberations and decisions. Today’s state-of-practice technology simply
96 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
collects stand-alone collaboration tools—like video teleconferencing, shared
whiteboards, and Internet chat rooms. However, the state of the art has ad-
vancedtothepointof integratingthosecapabilitiesinto“virtualbuildings”in
which participants interact in real time. Efforts are under way to improve
“scalability”(usefulnessforvariousnumbersofplayersandcomplexitiesofsce-
nario)andtodealwithsecurityissuesregardingthetransmissionofgamedata.
TABLE 1
SPECTRUM OF CANDIDATE ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES
Typical Ops/ LeadTime
Techniques Systems People Resources Credibility
Application Mission Create Use
ClosedForm; Assumedor Relatively Weeksto Weeksto Fairto
Analysis Analytical Simulated
Statistical Simulated Modest Months Months Moderate
ForceonForce
Models; Assumedor Monthsto Weeksto
Constructive Simulated Simulated Moderate Moderate
Communication Simulated Years Months
Systems
Wargames;
Monthsto Weeksto Moderateto
Virtual Humanin Simulated Real Simulated High
Years Months High
theLoop
CPX* Realor Weeksto
Live Real Real VeryHigh Years High
FTX** Simulated Months
AfterActionReports; Extremely
ActualOps Real Real Real N/A N/A VeryHigh
LessonsLearned High
*CPX-CommandPostExercise
**FTX-FieldTrainingExercise
Oneofthemajoradvantagesthattheseemergingcollaborativegamingtools
offeristhepossibilitythatprincipals—commanders,headsof agencies,senior
executives—willbeabletoparticipatepersonally.Thedemandsonthetimeof
such individuals normally make it difficult for them to get involved in war
games,especiallyiftravelisinvolved;typicallytheymustdelegatesuchmatters
tosubordinates.Distributed,collaborativewar-gamingtechnologieswillmake
itpossibleforactualdecisionmakerstoplay,increasingboththefidelityofthe
games and the real value of the entire activity by educating the principals di-
rectlyabouttheintricaciesandnuancesoftheproblemsbeingconsidered.
NOTES
1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization,Code of 2. Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry,Pre-
Best Practice (COBP) on the Assessment of C2, ventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for
RTO Technical Report 9, AC/323(SAS)TP/4 America(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Insti-
(Hull, Que.: Communication Group, Inc., tution Press, 1999).
March 1999).
3. Ibid., p. 11.
STARR 97
4. Gary Hart and Warren Rudman,Seeking a 9. Discussions with Jim Moffat of the Defence
National Strategy: A Concept for Preserving Se- Evaluation and Research Agency, U.K. Minis-
curity and Promoting Freedom,Phase II Re- try of Defence, 4 April 2000.
port (Washington, D.C.: Commission on
10. Barry R. Posen, “The War for Kosovo, Ser-
National Security/21st Century, 2000), avail-
bia’s Political-Military Strategy,”Interna-
able on the World Wide Web:
tional Security,Spring 2000, pp. 39–84.
http://www.nssg.gov (15 April 2000).
11. See the author’s “Developing Scenarios to
5. “Hart-Rudman Panel to Focus on Homeland
Support C3I Analysis,” inAnalytic Ap-
Security in Final Phase,”Inside the Pentagon,
proaches to the Study of Future Conflict,ed.
25 May 2000, pp. 1, 19–20.
Alexander Woodcock and David Davis
6. The Hart-Rudman Commission’s final re- (Clementsport, N.S.: Canadian Peacekeeping
port, “Road Map for National Security: Im- Press of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian In-
perative for Change,” was released on 15 ternational Peacekeeping Training Centre,
February 2001 (available on the World Wide 1996), pp. 291–300.
Web: http://www.nssg.gov/PhaseIIIFR.pdf).
12. Public Law 106-65-Oct. 5, 1999,Statutes at
It concluded that protecting the homeland
Large113: 716.
against twenty-first-century threats “should
13. For a discussion, see North Atlantic Treaty
be the primary national security mission of
Organization,Code of Best Practice.
the United States.” The report proposes an-
swers for the institutional and organizational 14. IS Metrics Workshops sponsored by David
issues cited above, but it does not obviate the Alberts (Office of the Assistant Secretary of
need for war games to assess critically the via- Defense for Command, Control, Communi-
bility and desirability of the proposed cations, and Intelligence [OASD (C3I)]) and
solutions. by John Garstka (Office of the Director for
Command, Control, Communications, and
7. “Services Meet Snags in Readying Dynamic
Computers [J6], Joint Staff).
Commitment War Games,”Inside the Penta-
gon,27 April 2000, pp. 1, 17–8. In March 15.Jeffrey Sands,The Critical Link: Financial Im-
2001 the Pentagon announced that Dynamic plications of Threats to National Security(a re-
Commitment had been postponed port on the Economic Security Exercise,
indefinitely. cosponsored by the U.S. Naval War College
and Cantor Fitzgerald, Newport, R.I., Decem-
8. Henry H. Shelton [Gen., USA],Joint Vision
ber 1997).
2020(Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff;
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., June 2000).