DTIC ADA523621: The Joint Forces Air Command Problem: Is Network-Centric Warfare the Answer PDF
Preview DTIC ADA523621: The Joint Forces Air Command Problem: Is Network-Centric Warfare the Answer
THE JOINT FORCES AIR COMMAND PROBLEM Is Network-centric Warfare the Answer? Major William A.Woodcock,U.S.Air Force TheAmericanmilitary’sbiggestproblem?Itletstechnologydrivestrat- egy,ratherthanlettingstrategydeterminetechnology. BRIG.GEN.DONMORELLI,USA(RET.) T hemarriageofnetwork-centricwarfareandthejointforcesaircomponent commander concept represents a “military-technical revolution” in aero- spacecommandandcontrol.1Thecurrentsystemiscumbersome,anditisfall- ingbehindinitsabilitytodealwiththefast-pacedwarfareoftoday.Byitsnature, network-centricwarfare(NCW)couldaddressmanyoftheshortfallsofthecur- rentjointaircomponentsystem.Itwillnot,however,changethefundamental natureofwar,norcanitsolveallofthecurrentproblemsofthejointforcesair component commander (JFACC). This article will examine the potential and limitationsofnetwork-centricwarfareintermsofcommandandcontrolandin thecontextoftheJFACC. Network-centric warfare—the “effective linking or networking of knowl- edgeableentitiesthataregeographicallyorhierarchicallydispersed”—promises to raise command and control to new levels of efficiency.2 Conceptually, NCWprovidesbattlespaceentitieswith“sharedbattlespaceawareness”through interconnectivityandnetworkingtechniques.3These MajorWoodcockisafighterpilotwithfourteenyearsin F-111andF-16aircraft,includingOperationsDESERT techniques in turn allow the movement of informa- STORMandSOUTHERNWATCH.Hewasamemberof tionanddecisionsatratesandefficienciespreviously theSeventhAirForcestaff,WeaponsandTactics,as- unattainable. These “virtual organizations” can use signedtotheKoreantheaterjointforcesaircomponent commander, involved in all aspects of air operations “commonoperationalpictures”to“self-synchronize,” centerfunctions.A2001graduateoftheNavalWar potentially reducing the fog and friction of war as College,hereceivedtheRedRiverValleyFighterPilot’s wellasshorteningdecisionandexecutiontimes.4The AssociationAwardforanearlierversionofthisarticle. Heiscurrentlyassistantdirectorofoperationsofthe555 abilitytorelayacommonpictureofthewarandshare Fighter Squadron at Aviano Air Base, Italy. information with geographically dispersed sensors, decisionmakers,andweaponplatformswouldreduce Naval War College Review, Winter 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 1 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2003 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2003 to 00-00-2003 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER The Joint Forces Air Command Problem: Is Network-centric Warfare 5b. GRANT NUMBER the Answer? 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval War College,686 Cushing Road,Newport,RI,02841-1207 REPORT NUMBER 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 15 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 WOODCOCK 125 thetimeittakesthemcollectivelytoobservethesituation,orientthemselvesto theproblem,decidewhattodo,andact.5Suchfasterdecisionmakingwouldin- creasetheflexibility,lethality,andspeedofairpower. Nonetheless,andforallthatnetwork-centricwarfarepromisestobringtothe joint forces air component commander,there are problems that it cannot fix. Conflicts in or problems with doctrine, inadequate or convoluted command andcontrolstructuresandprocedures,andpoordecisionmakingwillremain. Inanycase,itcannotchangethenatureofwarfare.“Warisanactofhumanin- tercourse”;6thetechnologyof NCWcangoonlysofartocorrectuniquelyhu- man problems. Additionally, limitations are likely to arise in relation to the specificsofrequiredcommandandcontrolsystems,connectivity,orthevalidity of theJFACCconceptitself.Thesemattersarenecessarilybeyondthescopeof thisarticle,whichassessesthelikelihoodthatnetwork-centricwarfarecandra- matically increase the efficiency and flexibility with which air warfare is conducted. Initscurrentform,thejointforcesaircomponentcommanderisthecentralele- mentoftheconceptthat(intheviewoftheU.S.AirForce)combinescentralized commandandcontrolofairassetswithdecentralizedexecutionofairwarfare.7 Underjointdoctrine,thejointaircommander,whosefunctionistocontrolair andspacepowerinagivenareaofoperations,isappointedbyandworksdirectly for the joint forces commander.8The JFACC concept also incorporates key ten- ets of specifically Air Force airpower doctrine: “Air and Space power must be controlled by an airman who maintains a broad strategic and/or theater per- spectiveinprioritizingtheuseoflimitedairandspaceassetstoattaintheobjec- tives of all U.S. forces in any contingency across the range of operations.”9 Historyisfullofexamplesoftheperilsofdividingupairpowerassetsandofthe advantagesofcentrallycontrollingthem.10TheAirForcebelievesthatparceling airpowerouttovariousagenciesandamongvarioustaskswillnegateitsinher- ent qualities of mass, flexibility, and transcendent scope—that is, its freedom from limitation by geography,water depth,road conditions,etc.The service’s doctrinedeclaresthatthejointforcesaircomponentcommandershouldbe“an airmanwhomaintainsabroadand/ortheaterperspective,”forreasonsof per- spective that would become particularly relevant with the advent of network- centricwarfare. THE ISSUES AsapreliminarytoevaluatingNCW’spotentialcontribution,itisimportant tounderstandtheproblemsandissuesofthecurrentorganizationandtasks of joint forces air component command. Most prominent are a myriad of 126 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW difficultiesarisingfromcentralization:mostofthefunctionsforwhichthejoint aircommanderisresponsible—planning,coordinating,allocating,tasking,and executingairoperationsinaccordancewiththejointforcescommander’sobjec- tives—areconductedinasingleairoperationscenter.11Thefirstofthiscategory of issuesisthattheconcentrationof tasksmakestheairoperationscenter(or AOC)acritical—andvulnerable—nodeinthecommandandcontrolofamajor elementofU.S.militaryforces.Itsdestructionwouldvirtuallycrippleairopera- tions.Alloftheairoperationscenter’sfunctionsaresingular;therearenoback- ups for them. The system has no “redundancy”in this respect; it cannot deal withalossoftheAOC. Second,duetoitssize—ithasastaffofroughly1,300andconsiderableequip- mentandotherinfrastructure—theairoperationscenterisbothcumbersome anddifficulttomove.Deploymentrequiresasubstantiallogisticaleffort.12The large “footprint”of an air operations center also puts a premium on physical plant;AOCsmustnowbehousedinlarge,hardenedfacilities.Anysensitivityof hostnationstothepresenceofalargenumberofAmericansandrepresentatives ofU.S.coalitionpartnersaddstotheproblemsoflocatingthecenter. Inaddition,theAOC’slargesizemakesitdifficulttoestablishaboardaship. The absence of the sea-basing option in a world in which suitable facilities ashoremaynotbeavailableisaseriouslimitation.Anafloatjointforcesaircom- ponentcommanderwouldenjoygreatlyincreasedflexibility,especiallyinsitua- tionsinwhichtheNavyprovidesthepreponderanceofairpower.13 Thecurrentstructureisalsoinflexiblewithregardtocontingenciesandcircum- stances.ThewarinKosovohighlightedthisdeficiency.AstheDefenseDepartment laterreportedtoCongress,“OperationAlliedForcehighlightedtheneedfortheDe- partmenttodevelopexpeditionaryairoperationscentersandequipthemwithsup- porting resources and manpower to enable U.S. forces to create combined air operationscentersthatcanbetailoredtothecrisisathandanddeployedquickly.”14 Underthecurrentstructure,thecommandandcontrolof aerospacepower resides by definition in a single person. The amount of information and the scopeandrapidityofdecisionmakinginvolvedinplanningandexecutinganair campaignisenormous,farbeyondthephysicalcapabilitiesof anyonehuman being.15 In practice,the bulk of this effort is shouldered by the air operations centerstaff.However,thecommander,inperson,remainsthefinalauthority— andisthereforeasinglepointoffailure.Ifthejointaircommanderweresome- howremovedfromthebattle,theramificationscouldbecatastrophic. Afinalproblemrelateddirectlytocentralizationisthatkeepinganairopera- tions center staff trained for its wartime functions is a mammoth task.Com- mand and control involves perishable skills that atrophy in the absence of training.TheexperienceofULCHIFOCUSLENS,ajointandcombinedcommand WOODCOCK 127 andcontrolexerciseseriesconductedbytheSeventhAirForceintheRepublicof Korea,isillustrative.Toassumeitswartimeconfigurationfortheseevolutions, theSeventhAirForce’sairoperationscenterrequireshundredsof augmentees fromothercommands.Manymorepeopleareneededjusttorunthesimulation and represent the roles of the various coordinating entities. An exercise like ULCHIFOCUSLENSisproductiveandeffective,butitisexpensiveandtimecon- suming,anditmeetsthetrainingneedsofonlyasingleJFACC. Asidefromthespecificproblemscausedbythecentralizednatureofthecur- rentstructure,therearefundamentalweaknessesinseveralbasicproceduralar- eas.Anumberofprocessesthathavebeenreasonablyeffectiveinthepastareno longerabletomeetthedemandsofmodernwarfare. Thefirstoftheseistheairtaskingorder,thesingle-sourceplanforallairop- erationsinanareaofoperationsinatwenty-four-hourperiod.Theairtasking orderassignstoindividualunitstheirtargets,weapons,andarrivaltimesover those targets. Second, it tells all “players” what will be going on For all that network-centric warfare promises aroundthemastheyexecutetheir to bring to the JFACC, there are problems that missions; this “deconfliction” is it cannot fix. critical to the execution of aerial operations,toavoidfratricideand duplicationofeffortandincreasethesafetyofflight.Already,however,agiven day’s air tasking order takes anywhere from thirty-six to forty-eight hours to produce.16Bythetimetheorderisissued,themajorityofitsassumptions,analy- ses,andtargetingdecisionsareoutofdate. Asecondissueisthatoftargetrecognitionandidentification,oneofthemost severelylimitingfactorsinthehigh-speedwarfareoftoday.Theneedforspeedis particularlycriticalintheprosecutionof“time-sensitive”(thatis,moving)sur- facetargets.Theproblemtheyrepresentisnotnewbutisreceivingincreasedvis- ibility in light of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, mobile surface-to-airmissilelaunchers,andtheaterballisticmissiles.Toooften,bythe timethetargetisanalyzedandidentified,itisnolongervisible.Thelimitingin- herentfactorsintheprosecutionoffleetingtargetsaretheprocessesofdetection and identification. Current technology has not caught up with requirements; thesetasksarenotbeingperformedrapidlyenough.Anothervitalpieceof the identification puzzle is the threat of fratricide. In DESERT STORM, coalition forces suffered 107 casualties to friendly fire.17 In a casualty-conscious world, andforatechnologicallyadvancedmilitary,thisisunacceptable. Thislitanyofproblemswiththejointforcesaircomponentcommandstruc- tureoftoday,aslongasitis,isnotall-inclusive.Thereareotherproblems,such as service doctrine disputes, connectivity, and joint integration. Network- 128 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW centricwarfarecannotaddressthem;however,ithasgreatpotentialtobringim- provementstotheparticularproblemareaswehavediscussed. WHAT NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE CAN DO FOR THE JFACC Network-centric warfare’s major contribution in the arena of command and controlwillresideinitsabilitytoassimilatelargeamountsofdata,translatethe dataintocoherentandusefulinformation,andprovideconduitsthatallowthe keydecisionmakerstocommunicateandcollaborateatspeedscurrentlyunreal- ized and then quickly pass their decisions to weapon platforms. Additionally, NCW will distribute shared “awareness” to all battlespace entities. It is these qualities that must be capitalized upon if the current shortcomings of joint forcesaircomponentcommandaretobealleviated. Byitsverynature,theconnectivityNCWprovidespermitsdecentralization of thejointforcesaircomponentcommandinfrastructure.Networkingwould enablea“virtual”airoperationscenter;18itsfunctionswouldnolongerneedto be collocated. The vulnerability of the AOC would be reduced, and therefore thatofthecommandandcontrolsystemaswell—itwouldnolongerhaveasin- gle“pressurepoint.”Ageographicallydispersedsystemis,bynature,lesssuscep- tible to attack and collapse.Additionally,networking would allow for parallel operations,andthusforredundancyatcriticalnodes.Forexample,analternate joint air commander and staff, themselves geographically distributed, might monitoroperations;shouldtheJFACCbeforcedtomoveorbelostincombat, thealternatecouldtakeoveroperationsseamlessly.Single-pointfailurescould virtuallybeeliminated;therobustnessofsuchasystemwouldbeinvaluableas theintensityofwarfareincreases. The ability of NCW to decentralize functions also makes possible “reachback,” by which functions could be located in relatively safe locations, perhapsthecontinentalUnitedStates.19Evenwelltotherear,suchfunctionsre- mainonthenetwork,connectedtoalltheothernodes.Theabilityofanairoper- ations center simply to “reach back”to a Defense Department agency,say,for supportwouldyieldseveralbenefits. First,it would reduce the size of the center’s staff.The fact that not all seg- mentsoftheAOCstaffdeploywouldmeanlessequipment,fewerpeople,anda smallersupportbasetobemovedforward.Thisinturnmakestheairoperations center more able to use austere facilities. It also minimizes U.S. and coalition presenceonforeignsoil. Second,thejointforcesaircomponentcommandercouldmoveaboardship. Aswehaveseen,JFACCsarecurrentlyhinderedfrommovingtoseabythesize oftheirstaffsandthecommand-and-controlsystemstheyrequire.20Afloatop- erationsareadvantageousforseveralreasonsinadditiontothosealreadynoted. WOODCOCK 129 Inagivensituation,acarrierbattlegroupmaybefirstonthescene;whenthe mainfocusofeffortshiftedtowardtheland,thetransitiontoashore-basedjoint aircommanderwouldbegreatlyeasedifanorganizationwerealreadyfunction- ingatsea.Afloatoperationsmaynotalwaysbetheoptionofchoice,butnetwork- centricwarfarepromisestomakethemaviableoption. Third,NCW-basedreachbackwouldallowspecializedagenciestoparticipate effectivelyinforwardoperations.Insocomplexanundertakingasnationalse- curity,pocketsofspecialexpertiseandcapabilityinevitablyemerge.Suchorga- nizations such as the Joint Warfare Analysis Center, the Defense Threat ReductionAgency,CHECKMATE,andmanyothersprovideunique“skillsets”in vitaldisciplines.21However,inaneraof reducedmanninganduncertainbud- gets,theyarelessandlessabletosendforwardfullycapabledetachmentstosup- portstaffsincombatareas;network-centricitywouldallowjointaircommanders and their staffs to tap such expertise at its various sources,rapidly,efficiently, andastheyneedit;networkingwouldalsoallowairoperationscenterstodele- gatesomeoftheirworkloads. As an example of the force-multiplying effect of rear-area expertise in the planningandexecutionofairwarfare,takethecaseofhardened,deeplyburied targets,todayanemerging“targetset.”Vitalenemycommand-and-controland weapons-of-mass-destruction facilities are typically protected in this way.Lo- catingthemandgatheringandanalyzingintelligenceonthemaredifficultand time-consuming tasks. Network-centric organization would allow data to be sent,forinstance,totheJointWarfareAnalysisCenter,whichpossessesthespe- cialistsandanalyticaltoolsnecessarytodiscernwhethervalidtargetshavebeen foundandif so,todeterminethebestwaytoattackthem.Theirsolutionswill probably be of better quality than those air operations centers could produce themselves. Finally,notwoscenariosarethesame,arealitythatplacesapremiumonthe flexibilityofanairoperationscenter.NotallcomponentsofthenotionalAOC structureareneededinallsituations.Network-centricwarfarewouldallowthe joint forces air component commander to tailor a virtual organization to the taskathand.ByvirtueofsuchNCWfundamentalsasreachbackandnetwork- ing,only organizations necessary for a given mission need be “brought to the fight.”Thispointisparticularlyrelevantforsuchmajorheadquartersasregional commands; indeed, the current crisis management philosophy of European Commandistobuildjointtaskforcesfromthegroundup,tailoringthemtomeet particularcrises.22Thisapproachrepresentsamarkeddeparturefromthetradi- tional concept of standing task forces and air operations centers;23 network- centricwarfareshouldgiveregionalandjointtaskforcecommanderstheabilityto form trained air component command structures on short notice. 130 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW Network-centric warfare will mitigate a subtle danger inherent in reliance upon a centralized decision-making entity—the equating of the concepts of “command”and“control.”Theyhavebeeninexorablylinkedforyears,butthey are very different notions.Command has been defined as “the exercise of au- thorityanddirectionbyaproperlydesignatedcommanderoverassignedforces intheaccomplishmentof themission.”24“Control,”jointdoctrinedeclares,“is inherentincommand.”25Evenso,“control”embracesthe“proceduresemployed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces andoperationsintheaccomplishmentofthemission.”26Inshort,commandis authority,andcontrolisaprocess.Ultimately,commandauthorityoverajoint force’s air and space assets rests with its air component com- Thesystemhasno“redundancy”inthisrespect: mander; network-centricity will it cannot deal with a loss of the air operations significantly enhance the JFACC’s center. ability to exercise it. Improved connectivity with subordinates willenhancethejointaircommander’sabilityto“directpeopleandorganizations into actions to accomplish missions.”27 Networkingwillalsoallowjointforcesaircomponentcommanderstodele- gatecontrolmoreeffectively.Theprimaryrationaleinthepastforcentralized commandandcontrolwasthatgenerallyonlythecommanderhad“thewhole picture.”28 NCW makes it possible to extend, to levels not previously feasible, “distributivecontrol”—delegationofresponsibilitiesandprocessestolevelsor organizationsbestsuitedtothem—andtherebyachievenotonlylessenedvul- nerabilitybutfasterdecisioncyclesandoperationaltempos.Inanetwork-centric force, vital information is distributed to all appropriate levels of control, de- pendingonthemission;expertsinparticulardisciplines—giventheknowledge andauthorityrequiredtoassess,decide,act,andcontrol—canachievesmaller andmoreefficientresponsecyclesthanwereeverbeforepossible. Properly trained subordinates,with clear and firm guidance from the joint forces air component commander, will be informed and connected decision makers.In a network-centric system,however,the onus is on commanders to ensurethatacorrectunderstandingoftheiroverallintentionsandtheobjectives of particular operations pervades the control structure. “Mission-type or- ders”—tellingsubordinateswhatneedstobedone,nothow—issuedthrougha networkinconjunctionwithairtaskingorderswillprovidecontrolelementsthe guidancetheyneed.29Properlydesignedandreinforcedbyeducation,training, anddoctrine,centralizedcommandanddecentralizedcontrolwouldallowthe jointforcesaircomponentcommandertoemployaerospacepowerwithmaxi- maleffectiveness. WOODCOCK 131 Training,however,aswehavepointedout,isoneofthemostpressingshort- comings of air component command. The level of skill in the command and control of aerospace power is presently inadequate.30 Here again, network- centricconceptswouldbringinanewera. ThecurrenteffortintheAirForcetoeliminatetheexpertiseproblemisthe “AOCasaWeaponsSystem”program.31Theconceptistomakethetrainingof membersofcentersmirrorthatgivenforweaponsystems,suchasfightersand bombers.AOCstaffswillberequiredtomaintaincomplexqualificationscom- mensurate with their wartime roles. Presently, initial training is given at the CommandandControlWarriorsSchool,adivisionoftheCommandandCon- trol Training Innovations Group at Hurlburt Field, Florida.32 Final mission- qualificationtrainingisaccomplishedwithintheassignedairoperationscenters. The current major deficiency is fidelity; interactions with agencies that are geo- graphically distant or not manned in peacetime must be simulated. Network- centricorganization,becauseitwouldkeeptheentirevirtualAOCconnectedatall times,wouldraisethefrequencyandqualityoftraining. Theoretically, virtual battles can be fought within the existing network;33 however,thatinvolveslarge,cumbersome,off-boardcomputersystems,suchas a system known as the Air Warfare Simulator.NCW architecture would allow higher-fidelitytrainingbyconnectingexistingsystemssoastoreplicateanac- tual battle space.34 Its “virtual environment”capabilities could simulate battle spaceswithinthearchitectureof thesystem.35Sinceallinvolvedentitieswould beconnectedtothesystemanyway,deploymentsofmassesofpeopleandequip- ment to support training would be eliminated.Network-centricity would im- provetherealismandvalueofwargamingandtraining,atagreatreductionin cost. Thiscapabilitywouldalsomeanthatmorepeoplecouldbetrainedperunit oftimeinAOCoperations.Sinceairpowerisaninherentlyjointendeavor,com- bined and joint training is crucial. With the necessary equipment, allies and otherservicescouldtraininthevirtualenvironment.Jointforcesaircomponent commandersofotherservices—anywhere,includingaboardship—couldtrain withavirtualairoperationscenter.Intheprocess,jointaircommanderscould tailor their organizations and think out exercising lines of communication, command-and-control relationships,information flows,and decision-making processes in advance. Air operations centers should not be limited to ad hoc, “come as you are”responses to crises; network-centric warfare can bring this principletoreality. Oneofthefundamentalcharacteristicsofnetwork-centricwarfare—flexi- bilitythroughabilityto share battlespace awareness—candirectlyaddress one of the most cumbersome and inflexible aspects of the current joint air 132 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW componentsystem,theairtaskingorder.Asnotedearlier,productionofATOs isalengthyprocess.Becausetheyrepresentanentiretheater’saireffort,theycan beoverninehundredpagesinlength.36NCWoffersamoreresponsiveandless burdensomeapproach.Sharedbattlespaceawareness,intheformofacommon operationalpicture,wouldalreadybeavailabletoallplayers;infact,theywould haveadegreeofsituationalawarenessnotpreviouslypossible.Taskingcouldbe transmitted to individual subordinates, in plain view of all interested parties. Becausetheorderscouldthereforebetimelier,theycouldbetterreflectchanging battlespacesituations.Additionally,fratricidecouldbevirtuallyeliminated.Be- causeallcommandswouldpossessareal-timeandaccurate“picture”ofthebat- tle space,even in the heat of battle they would be able to identify definitively theirtargetspriortoengagingthem;theirdisplayswouldalertthemiftheywere abouttoengagea“friendly.” Further,awell-fusedpicturewouldbringimprovementstoanotherareawe havementionedasaweakness:thedetection,identification,andprosecutionof time-sensitive surface targets.37 By the time the air tasking order is issued, the The necessary advances—more majority of its assumptions and targeting responsivetaskingofintelligence, decisions are out of date. surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; rapid sharing and analysis oftherawinformation;andtransmissionofhigh-fidelity,“targetable”datatoa weapon platform in time to use it—will be hallmarks of network-centric warfare. The prosecution of moving surface targets and theater missile defense (TMD)havemanyinformationneedsincommon,includingtimelydetection, accurateanalysisandidentification,andimmediatecommunicationwithweap- onssystemscapableof engagingtargets.Inanetworkedenvironment,thereis no necessity,as now,to compete for this information (which might be closely heldbyagenciesforclassificationorbureaucraticreasons);itcanbesharedbe- tweenandcollaboratedonbypeoplenotnecessarilyatthesamelocation.Such collaborationinrealtimeconstitutes“self-synchronization,”aprerequisitefor the quick and efficient prosecution of such difficult but important targets.38 Agencies and commands specializing in moving ground targets and TMD,re- spectively,cancollaboratenotonlyinanalysisbutinselectingthebestmeansto strike the target. A weapon platform normally assigned to one of these func- tionalareascanbeusedtoattackatargetoftheother.Withtheproperdelega- tion of control, both surface and theater-missile targets could be disposed of withrapiditynotpossibletoday.
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