DTIC ADA522808: The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia

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THE GROWING PROSPECTS FOR MARITIME SECURITY
COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Lieutenant John F.Bradford,U.S.Navy
T
heseadominatesSoutheastAsia,coveringroughly80percentofitsarea.The
region’s islands and peninsulas, wedged between the Pacific and Indian
oceans,bordermajorarteriesofcommunicationandcommerce.Thustheeco-
nomicandpoliticalaffairsofSoutheastAsiahavebeendominatedbythesea.In
thepremodernperiod,portssuchasSvirijayaandMalaccaestablishedempires
baseduponseapowerinareawaters.InsucceedingcenturiesEuropeanwarships
andtheirheavygunswerethekeystocolonization.Todaymorethanhalfofthe
world’s annual merchant tonnage traverses Southeast Asian waters; its oceans
andseasyieldvastrevenuesinsuchindustriesasfishing,hydrocarbonextrac-
tion,andtourism.Infact,morethan60percentofSoutheastAsianstodaylivein
orrelyeconomicallyonthemaritimezones.However,theseaisalsothesource
ofavarietyofdangersthatnotonlymenacetheprosperityoflocalpopulations
butdirectlythreatenthesecurityofstates.Thosedangersincludeterritorialdis-
LieutenantBradford,aSurfaceWarfareOfficer,wasin putes, nonstate political violence, transnational
2003–2004anOlmstedScholarattheInstituteforDe- crime,andenvironmentaldegradation.Maritimese-
fense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological
curity, accordingly, is at the forefront of Southeast
University, Singapore, earning an MSc in strategic
studies.Hisnavalservicehasincludedassignmentsas Asianpoliticalconcerns.
navigatorofthedocklandingshipUSSFortMcHenry Successful response to maritime security threats
(LSD43),forwarddeployedtoSasebo,Japan;firstlieu-
requires international cooperation, because those
tenant of the guided-missile destroyer USS John S.
McCain(DDG56),basedinYokosuka;AssistantPlans threats are primarily transnational. As Singapore’s
Officer,CommanderNavalForcesJapan;andSouth-
deputyprimeministerhaseloquentlyexplained,“in-
eastAsiaPolitico-MilitaryOfficerontheNavyStaff.He
dividual state action is not enough. The oceans are
iscurrentlytrainingtoassumedutiesasthechiefengi-
neer of the guided-missile destroyer USS Stethem indivisible and maritime security threats do not re-
(DDG 63). spect boundaries.”1 Southeast Asian cooperation is
currentlyinadequateintermsofthemaritimethreat;
Naval War College Review, Summer 2005, Vol. 58, No. 3
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The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast
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Asia
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64 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
however,structural,economic,andnormativefactorsareleadingtogreaterco-
operation.Inthelastfouryearstherehavebeennotablestepsforward,andthe
factorsresponsibleforthemshouldsoonproducegreatercooperation.
ThisarticlediscussesthethreatstomaritimesecurityinSoutheastAsia,de-
scribesthefactorstendingtowardstrengthenedmaritimesecuritycooperation,
and argues that networks of bilateral relationships may be more fruitful than
purelymultilateralarrangements.Thefirstsection,ahistoricaloverviewofmar-
itimecooperationinSoutheastAsiafromtheendoftheColdWarthroughDe-
cember2004,isfollowedbyasurveyofcontemporarymaritimesecuritythreats.
Thearticlethendiscussesfivesignificantfactorsthatnowfavorimprovedmari-
timecooperation.Itconcludeswiththevariousformsthatfuturecooperation
mighttakeandspeculationastowhicharemostlylikelyinlightofevolvingstate
interestsandconstraints.
Itisnecessaryfirsttolimitthescopeofanalysis.Warfareisunlikelytobreak
outamongmembersof theAssociationof SoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN).
Accordingly,thefocushereisoncooperationtocounterextraregionalandtrans-
national threats,rather than to prevent interstate conflict.In that context,the
concernisnotsimplycooperationbutoperationalizedsecuritycooperation.Co-
operation,in its broad sense,occurs when states,in order to realize their own
goals,modifypoliciestomeetpreferencesofotherstates.“Operationalized”se-
curitycooperationisaspecifictypeanddegreeofcooperationinwhichpolicies
addressingcommonthreatscanbecarriedoutbymidlevelofficialsofthestates
involvedwithoutimmediateordirectsupervisionfromstrategic-levelauthori-
ties.Consultationandinformationsharingbetweensecurityministriesareex-
amplesof“cooperation,”whereasthedataassessmentandintelligencebriefing
by combined teams of analysts would involve operationalized cooperation.In
themaritimeenvironment,internationalstaffconsultationsexemplifycoopera-
tion.Ahighlyorchestratedandcloselysupervisedcombinedsearch-and-rescue
exercisewouldbeconsideredverythinlyoperationalizedatbest.Complexnaval
exercisesandregularlyscheduledcombinedlawenforcementpatrolsaremore
substantialexamplesofoperationalizedcooperation.
MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
SINCE THE COLD WAR
In 1991,Southeast Asia was regarded as a relatively stable region in which the
maturityofASEANhadmadesignificantcontributionstomanagementofdis-
putesbetweenmemberstates.DuringtheColdWar,theregionhadbeenpolar-
izedbetweenthecommunistandfreemarketstates,butthecollapseof Soviet
supportrelaxedtensionandproducedageneralreconciliationbetweenthetwo
camps. The addition of Laos and Vietnam in 1992, and of Cambodia and
BRADFORD 65
Myanmar in 1995, to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation—originally con-
cludedin1976forthepeacefulsettlementofintraregionaldisputesinaframe-
work of absolute respect for state sovereignty—cemented the inclusion of the
formercommunist-blocstatesintotheASEANcommunity.Similarly,by1991the
region’sfewremainingcommunist-inspiredinsurgencieshadbeenlocalized,and
almost all ofits states had earned unquestioned international legitimacy.2
Taiwan
China
Tropic of Cancer
Hong Kong
Burma
Hanoi
Luzon 20°
Laos TGounlfk oinf Hainan South Strait
Vientiane
Rangoon
(Yangon)
Thailand PIsalarancdesl Philippine Sea
Vietnam Manila
Coco Islands
Bangkok
Coco Channel China
Andaman
Islands Cambodia
Philippines Pacific
Andaman Gulf of PPhennohm Ho Chi Minh City SIsplarantdlys Palawan 10°
Sea Thailand
Nicobar Sea
Islands Sulu Sea
Ipil
Six Degree Channel
Banda Aceh AcehPenang Brunei Sabah ArchSuipluelago Ocean
Malaysia
Kuala Lumpur Singapore Sarawak Celebes Sea
Malacca Strait Sipadan, Litagan Is.
Singapore
Maluku
Strait of Malacca Borneo Molucca Archipelago 0°
Sea
Sumatra MaSktraasistar Celebes
Palembang
Indian
Java Sea Banda Sea
Ocean JakartaJava Indonesia
Flores Sea
Bali
Timor
10°
Timor
Sea
100° 110° 120° 130° Australia
Therevolutionarystructuralchangesthataccompaniedtheendof theCold
War complemented regional dynamics already in motion—improvements in
domesticsecurity,rapideconomicdevelopment,andthematuringof regional
identity—toproduceanenvironmentconducivetoincreasedcooperationand
the reorganization of security priorities in Southeast Asia. Analysts quickly
identified maritime security as a major concern.3 Many studies focused on
state-to-statenavalconflict,butsomelookedbeyond“traditional”threatstoex-
amineadiverserangeof broader,“nontraditional”maritimeconcerns,suchas
ocean resource management, changes in patterns of commercial shipping,
66 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
transnationalcrime,andenvironmentalpollution.4Evenasthesestudieswere
goingon,regionalstateslaunchedcooperativeeffortstoaddressmaritimesecu-
rityissues.
The enhanced maritime security cooperation developed during the decade
immediatelyfollowingtheColdWarhasbeencalled“particularlynoteworthy”
and“notable.”5In1992,ASEAN’sfirstcommuniquéonasecurityissue,“Decla-
rationontheSouthChinaSea,”emphasized“thenecessitytoresolveallsover-
eignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful
means”and urged “all parties concerned to exercise restraint with the view to
creating a positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes.” In the
sameperiod,ahandfulof newinstitutionsemerged.Forexample,theIndone-
sian South China Sea
Though transnational maritime crime rarely presents Workshops (known as
a direct threat to states, piracy and robbery at sea are the SCS Workshops)
such severe problems that they are now perceived to sought to reduce the
do just that. likelihood of interstate
conflict in the South
ChinaSea,whiletheCouncilforSecurityCooperationintheAsiaPacificMari-
time Cooperation Working Group (CSCAP-MCWG),the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) Working Group on Maritime Security, and the Western
Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) tackled Southeast Asian issues within the
broaderAsia-Pacificmaritimecontext.6However,progressatthispointwasalmost
entirely limited to transparency, dialogue, pledges of greater future cooperation,
andothermaritimeconfidence-andsecurity-buildingmeasures(MCSBMs).7
Bytheendofthetwentiethcentury,cooperationwasnotyetsufficientlyori-
entedtotheregion’snewnontraditionalsecuritythreats,andthefewexamples
of operationalized cooperation were very weak.Several Cold War–era defense
arrangements,suchastheFivePowerDefenseArrangements(FPDA)andvarious
bilateralU.S.securityagreements,wereadaptedtonewfunctions.However,the
usefulnessoftheFPDAwasquestioned,andtheAmericanpresenceinSoutheast
AsiahaddecreasedwiththewithdrawalofmilitaryforcesfromthePhilippines
in1991andlimitationsplacedbyCongressonmilitary-to-militarycontactswith
Indonesia beginning in 1993.8 There were new operationalized cooperation
endeavors; such pairings as Indonesia-Malaysia, Malaysia-Cambodia, Brunei-
Australia, Singapore-India, and Malaysia-Philippines initiated bilateral naval-
exerciseprograms.Of thesenewbilateralagreements,theMalaysia-Singapore,
Singapore-Indonesia,andMalaysia-IndonesiacoordinatedpatrolsintheStrait
ofMalaccawerethemostoperationalized.However,shipboardofficersprivately
lamented that bilateral coordination of these patrols amounted to little more
thanexchangesofschedules,towhichinmanycasespartnersdidnotadhere.9
BRADFORD 67
From2000to2002,aseriesofeventspropelledtheSoutheastAsianmaritime
sectorfromthepost–ColdWaryearsintothenewworldofthetwenty-firstcen-
tury.ThefirstwastheFebruary2000bombingofthePhilippineferryOurLady
Mediatrix,whichkilledfortypeopleandwoundedanotherfifty.Theattackwas
blamedontheMoroIslamicLiberationFront;however,beingregardedasjustan-
otherstatisticoftheongoingviolenceinthesouthernPhilippines,ithadlesspsy-
chological impact than the next transformative event, the October 2000
suicide-boat attack on the guided-missile destroyer USS Cole (DDG 67). Al-
thoughtheattackonColeoccurredinAden,outsideSoutheastAsia,thepublic-
itygeneratedandthefactthatthispowerfulattackhadsucceededagainstoneof
the U.S.Navy’s most sophisticated warships raised awareness about the mari-
timeterrorthreatinSoutheastAsiaandstartedsecurityexpertstherethinking
aboutthedangersintheirownregion.Third,arashofamphibiouskidnapping
operations carried out by the Abu Sayyaff Group—especially high-profile
kidnappings of Western tourists from resorts on Sipadan,Malaysia,in March
2000andinPalawan,Philippines,inMay2001—demonstratedthecapabilities
ofSoutheastAsia’sindigenoustransnationalmaritimeterrorists.
The possibility of truly unbearable terrorist attacks was driven home for
SoutheastAsianson11September2001.Afewmonthslater,Singaporeanintel-
ligence discovered a series of al-Qa‘ida-related plots to attack several interna-
tionaltargets,includingvisitingAmericanwarships,inthatislandstate.These
findingswerecorroboratedbythediscoveryofplanningvideosanddocuments
inAfghanistan.InDecember2001theferryKalifornia,transportingChristians
inIndonesia’sMalukuArchipelago,wasbombed.Theattackkilledten,injured
forty-six,andbeganacycleofviolenceinwhichseveralotherpassengervessels
wereattacked.10
Maritime Southeast Asia completed its initiation into the “age of terror”in
October 2002.On the 6th,Islamist terrorists struck the tanker Limburg in the
Arabian Sea, demonstrating that international maritime trade was a target.
Finally,the12OctobertriplebombinginBaliprovedthatSoutheastAsiawason
thefrontlinesofinternationalterrorism.Today,whilesomeSoutheastAsiaoffi-
cialsandcaptainsofindustryremain“indenial,”terrorismhasbecomethepre-
eminentsecurityissueintheregion,andmaritimeterrorisbroadlyrecognized
asaverydangerousthreat.
Accordingly,maritimesecuritycooperationinSoutheastAsiaisnowdevelop-
ingmorequicklythanintheprecedingdecade.Stateshavedemonstratedgreater
commitmenttoexpandingMCSBMsandoperationalizingcooperation.Appro-
priately,thebulkofthenewcooperationhasbeenorientedtowardsuchtrans-
nationalthreatsasterrorismandpiracy.Althoughconsiderableobstaclesremain
andstateshavenotbeenequallyproactive,commitmentshavebeenreinvigorated
68 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
andseveralnewarrangementscreated.Clearstatementsofrenewedinterestin
improvingcooperationincludetheJune2003“ASEANRegionalForum[ARF]
StatementonCooperationagainstPiracyandOtherThreatstoMaritimeSe-
curity”andthe“WorkProgrammetoImplementtheASEANPlanofActionto
Combat Transnational Crime,” which was endorsed by the January 2004
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime.More concretely,most
regionalshippersandnearlyallmajorportfacilitiesachievedcompliancewith
theInternationalMaritimeOrganization’sDecember2002InternationalShip
and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) before or shortly after its July
2004 deadline.Also in 2004,Singapore acceded to the Rome Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
(known as the SUA Convention). Singapore’s accession was considered by
many analysts as an important step toward wider regional acceptance of the
SUAConvention.
Examplesofnewoperationalizedinterstatecooperationbegantoemergeal-
mostimmediatelyafter9/11,whentheUnitedStatesbeganincludingcounter-
terrorism packages in its bilateral exercises with regional states and sent naval
forces to assist the Philippines against the Abu Sayyaff Group. Indigenous
operationalized cooperation also began to grow.In September 2003 Thailand
andMalaysiaannouncedthat,concernedaboutinsurgentsandterrorists,they
hadinvigoratedcooperativemaritimepatrolsinthenorthernStraitofMalacca.
InJune2004,ameetingofFDPAdefenseministersinPenang,Malaysia,decided
to orient their organization for the first time toward nontraditional maritime
security,focusingoncounterterrorism,maritimeinterception,andantipiracy.
InJuly2004Singapore,Indonesia,andMalaysiabeganaprogramoftrilateral
coordinatedpatrolsthroughouttheStraitofMalacca.Thesepatrolsareofpar-
ticularsignificance,foranumberofreasons.First,thestrongendorsementgiven
byregionalmediaandthepositivepublicresponsetothefirstpatrolsdemon-
stratedthedesireof governments
From 2000 to 2002, a series of events propelled to appear committed to the pro-
the Southeast Asian maritime sector from the gramandwidespreadsupportfor
post–Cold War years into the new world of the theproject.Indonesia’sDecember
twenty-first century. 2004 mobilization of two mari-
time patrol aircraft and four
warships to recover a hijacked
Singaporeantugexemplifiestheprogram’spositivebenefits.Second,thisisthe
firstsignificantlyoperationalizedmultilateralcooperationinSoutheastAsiato
develop without an extraregional partner. Commitment to operationalizing
maritimesecuritycooperationcontinuestogrow;IndiaandThailand,neigh-
boringstatesthatcontrolthenorthernapproachestotheStraitofMalacca,have
BRADFORD 69
expressedinterestinjoiningthepatrols,andthefoundingstateshaverespondedfavor-
ably.Nonetheless,officersdirectlyinvolvedinthepatrolsstateprivatelythatthetrilateral
patrolsareoftenmattersmoreof“show”thanofrealutilityandthatitistoosoonto
assesstheirimpactonpiracy,smuggling,andothermaritimecrimesinthestrait.
InNovember2004sixteencountries(theASEANmembersplusChina,South
Korea,Japan,Bangladesh,India,andSriLanka)concludedtheRegionalCoop-
erationAgreementonCombatingPiracyandArmedRobberyagainstShipsin
Asia (ReCAAP). This agreement, first proposed by Japanese prime minister
JunichiroKoizumiatthe2001ASEAN-plus-ThreeSummitinBrunei,hadbeen
deadlockedformonthsbydisagreementoverwheretolocatetheReCAAPInfor-
mationSharingCenter(ISC),whichwouldmaintaindatabases,conductanaly-
sis, and act as an information clearinghouse. As explained by the Indonesian
Foreign Ministry’s Director for ASEAN Politics and Communications,
sensitivitystemmedfromthepossibilitythattheISCmightpublishreportsun-
fairly critical to member states.This official shared that concern,arguing that
theInternationalMaritimeBureauPiracyReportingCenterhasmisrepresented
incidents in Malaysia waters as having occurred on the Indonesian side of the
StraitofMalaccabecausethecenterislocatedinKualaLumpur.11
ReCAAPisapositivestep,beinganindigenouspan-Asianinitiativedevised
primarily to deal with piracy, a phenomenon most conspicuous in Southeast
Asia. The fact that members ultimately agreed to locate the ISC in Singapore
demonstrateswillingnesstocompromiseinordertoadvancemaritimesecurity
issues.However,theagreementdoesnotobligatememberstoanyspecificaction
otherthansharinginformationthattheydeempertinenttoimminentpiracyat-
tacks; furthermore, the ISC’s funding will be based on “voluntary contribu-
tions.”12 Although not insignificant, ReCAAP alone will not eradicate Asian
piracy.
Takentogether,thesemanydevelopmentsconstitutesignificantprogress.Di-
alogue and information sharing have been enhanced,states seem firmly com-
mitted, and some states have begun to operationalize their maritime security
cooperation.However,thefewoperationalarrangementsthathavebeencreated
areinsufficienttocounterthegravemaritimethreatstheregionfaces.
CONTEMPORARY MARITIME SECURITY THREATS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Althoughtheregionalstateshavedeclaredcommitmentstosettlingdifferences
peacefully,thethreatoftraditionalconflictcannotbecompletelyruledout,and
theproximityofinternationalsealanesguaranteesthatanysuchconflictwould
haveveryseriousimplications.Onepotentialtriggerforsuchconflictisthe
remaining territorial disputes between states. Other, less traditional security
70 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
concerns pose a more immediate threat. These include terrorism and insur-
gency;transnationalmaritimecrime;andharmtothemaritimeenvironment.
TerritorialDisputes
Territorialdisputes,mostofthemmaritimeinnatureandinvolvingconflicting
claims to either islands or littoral waters, contribute to interstate tension in
Southeast Asia.Among the disputes with significant maritime dimensions are
thePhilippineclaimstoSabah,overlappingclaimstoeconomicexclusivezones,
andmultilateraldisputesoverislandsandwatersintheSouthChinaSea.One
suchissuewasseeminglyresolvedin2002,whentheInternationalCourtofJus-
tice (ICJ) ruled in favor of Malaysia over Indonesia with regard to claims to
SipadanandLitiganislands.Similarly,MalaysiaandSingaporehavesubmitted
to the ICJ for arbitration a dispute regarding sovereignty over Pedra Blanca
(PulauBatuPuteh),anislandintheSingaporeStraitwithanimportantaidto
navigation that is passed by about fifty thousand ships every year. However,
giventhehistoryof MalaysianactivitiesthatSingaporeregardsasprovocative,
thelatterstilldevotessizableforcestosustainingitsclaim.Otherdisputeshave
evenlessprospectforresolutioninthenearfuture.
ThemosttroublesomedisputesarethoseintheSouthChinaSea,whereIn-
donesia,Malaysia,Brunei,the Philippines,Vietnam,China,and Taiwan assert
conflictingclaimstoseaandislandterritories.13Theseclaimsaredeemedtobe
of vitalimportance,becausethearchipelagicseasmayhavevastpetroleumre-
sourcesandtheislandsarestrategicallypositionedforsupportofsea-lanecon-
troloramphibiouswarfare.Inrecenthistoryclaimantshaveclashedviolently,
and the possibility of renewed fighting (short of open warfare) clearly exists.
Thecurrentsituationis“volatileandcould,throughanunexpectedpoliticalor
militaryevent,deteriorateintoopenconflict.”14Anyescalationcoulddisruptthe
SouthChinaSea’shugevolumeofshipping,withgraveconsequences.15In2002
theASEANmembersandChinaindicatedtheirdesiretominimizetheriskby
agreeing to a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.
However,thedeclarationissomethinglessthanabindingcodeofconductora
consensusaboutthewayforward;theSouthChinaSearemainsaflashpoint.16
TerrorismandInsurgency
SeveralSoutheastAsianguerrillaandterroristgroupspossesssubstantialmari-
timecapabilities.Since2000,al-Qa‘ida,theMoroIslamicLiberationFront,the
Abu Sayyaff Group, Jemaah Islamiyah, the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia, the
GerakanAcehMerdeka,andLaskarJihadhaveallbeensuspectedofplanningor
executingmaritimeattacks.Othergroupshaveusedtheseatotransportweap-
ons,moveforces,andraisefunds.
BRADFORD 71
The most successful has been Abu Sayyaff,which has conducted dozens of
successfulmaritimeoperationsinthesouthernPhilippines,metropolitanMa-
nila,andEastMalaysia.In1995,AbuSayyaff conducteditsfirstlarge-scaleat-
tack: amphibious forces landed by boat, torched the Philippine town of Ipil,
robbed seven banks, and killed about a hundred people. Abu Sayyaff gained
globalnotorietyin2000and2001whenitkidnappeddozensofpeople,among
them Filipinos,Malaysians,Chinese,Europeans,and Americans,in a series of
raidsonvillages,resorts,andshipsinandneartheSuluandCelebesSeas.De-
spitealarge-scalegovernmentoffensivebackedbyAmericanforces,Philippine
officialshaveconfirmedAbuSayyaffclaimsofresponsibilityforthe26February
2004sinkingofSuperferry14nearManila,inwhich116peoplewerekilled.17
AlthoughsofarlesssuccessfulinmaritimeSoutheastAsiathanAbuSayyaff,
al-Qa‘ida and its close regional allies Jemaah Islamiyah and the Kumpulan
MilitanMalaysiahavedemonstratedtheirintenttoconductlarge-scaleopera-
tionsagainsttheU.S.Navyandglobaltrade.Since2000,regionalsecurityforces
havedisruptedhalfadozenplotstoattackAmericanwarshipstransitingnarrow
waterwaysorvisitingportsinSoutheastAsia.18The2002attackontheLimburg
demonstratedal-Qa‘ida’sdesiretostrikethepetroleumdistributioninfrastruc-
ture,adesirealsoconfirmedbyal-Qa‘idaliterature,includingaDecember2004
edictissuedbyOsamabinLaden.Therehasalsobeenincreasingconcernthat
al-Qa‘idaoritsaffiliatesmightuseamerchantvesseltoadministeracataclysmic
attack—perhapsanuclearbomb,radiological“dirtynuke,”orotherweaponof
massdestruction—inashippingcontainer.Alternatively,alargepetroleum,liq-
uefiedgas,orchemicalcarriercouldbehijackedandeithersunkinakeywater-
wayorcrashedintoaportfacilityorpopulationcenter,turningthevessel’scargo
intoagiganticbomb.Manyofthesescenarioscouldcauseunprecedentedlossof
lifeandeconomicdisruption.19
TransnationalMaritimeCrime
Transnationalmaritimecrimeinvolvessucheconomicallymotivatedactivityas
piracy,smuggling,andillegalmigration.Transnationalmaritimecrimehassub-
stantialsecurityramifications.Itiscostlyinhumantermsandisamajordrainon
nationalresources.Furthermore,ithasasynergeticeffectthatexacerbatesinter-
stateconflictandnonstatepoliticalviolence.Forinstance,illegalmigrationfuels
tension between Malaysia and Indonesia. Transnational maritime crime pro-
videsterroristandguerrillagroupsthemeanstomoveweaponsandpersonnel,
raisefunds,andrecruitnewmembers.Forexample,theGerakanAcehMerdeka
isheavilyinvolvedinthesmugglingofpeople,weapons,andothercontraband
across the Strait of Malacca to sustain its struggle against the Indonesian