DTIC ADA521843: Are We Ready for an Interagency Combatant Command?

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

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Interagency
Combatant
Command?
By CHRIS TOPHER L. NAL ER
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s the United States conducts and deter terrorist and conventional threats. tary combatant command is the model for
the war on terror, it is evident Is the Nation agile enough to respond glob- the United States to deter and defeat adver-
from experience, doctrine, and ally, short of a major theater war? The opera- saries and engage regional partners in the
strategy that the conflict will tions conducted after September 11, 2001, in 21st century. Properly structured to include
not be resolved solely through either military the Philippines and Central and Southwest interagency representation, a combatant
strength or diplomatic maneuvering. The Asia prove that we can respond, but are commander’s headquarters and associated
combination of all instruments of national we postured to sustain this war and, at the staff would provide the nucleus for inter-
power allows the United States and its allies same time, prepare for future conflicts? This agency reorganization.
the full spectrum of options to respond to article argues that an integrated civil-mili-
The Interagency Process
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher L. Naler, USMC, is a G–3 operations planner with the II Marine Expeditionary  The Armed Forces routinely participate
Force. in interagency operations in the United States
26    JFQ / issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu
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Are We Ready for and Interagency Combatant Command?
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Naler
and abroad. Early inclusion of interagency capacities of the U.S. military on that battle- would reside in one organization empowered
considerations in military assessments, field were finally the realization of the dream to plan, execute, and assess complex contin-
estimates, and plans would facilitate civil- that was the Goldwater-Nichols Act.”3 gency operations with the full measure of the
military integration of effort. The interagency The U.S. Government is now ready to combined instruments of national power.
process in the United States, under the follow the DOD lead and embrace unify-
National Security Council, focuses on the ing legislation that extends this integration Instruments of National Power
appropriate functions for military and non- beyond the military. General Pace continues As a direct result of the terrorist attacks
military participants and facilitates unified his challenge to the interagency through the of September 11, the National Security
action in pursuit of national objectives. lens of 30 years of observation: “In the 1980s, Strategy for Combating Terrorism outlined
Deterrence and engagement are we had the best Army, the best Navy, the an expanded version of the instruments of
dynamic responsibilities tasked primarily to best Air Force, and the best Marine Corps national power:
unified combatant commanders through the in the world, but they did not work jointly.
National Military Arguably today, we The struggle against international ter-
an integrated civil-military
Strategy and Joint have a great State rorism is different from any other war in
Strategic Capabilities combatant command is the Department, a our history. We will not triumph solely or
Plan. The Depart- great Department even primarily through military might. We
model for the United States to
ment of State, of Defense, a great must fight terrorist networks, and all those
Central Intelligence deter and defeat adversaries Department of who support their efforts to spread fear
Agency (CIA), and Treasury”4 that are around the world, using every instrument of
and engage regional partners
other agencies are not working jointly. national power—diplomatic, economic, law
the key players; General Anthony enforcement, financial, information, intel-
each can become lead Federal agencies in the Zinni, USMC (Ret.), former commander of ligence, and military. Progress will come
National Security Strategy (NSS). The single U.S. Central Command, offers a correspond- through the persistent accumulation of suc-
entity that coordinates these efforts is the ing perspective: “In Washington there is no cesses—some seen, some unseen.6
one place, agency, or force that directs inter-
National Security Council (NSC), the Presi- agency cooperation. The only such coop- The traditional diplomatic, information,
dent’s principal forum for considering national eration is on an ad hoc, person-to-person military, and economic instruments are listed,
security and foreign policy matters with his or group-to-group basis. So if you have a but the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the
senior national security advisors and cabinet problem like putting Iraq back together after role of the Department of Justice and this is
officials. The NSC also serves as the President’s Saddam...there’s nowhere to start.”5 General evident in the purpose of the legislation: “To
principal arm for coordinating these policies Zinni’s comment coupled with General Pace’s deter and punish terrorist acts in the United
among various government agencies.1 challenge coalesce the observations of two States and around the world, to enhance law
former combatant commanders on where enforcement investigatory tools, and for other
This 1949 construct may have been suf- problems exist and potential remedies might purposes.” This expanded horizon for the
ficient in the Cold War, but the 21st century be found. Justice Department illustrates the acknowl-
requires greater agility to respond to both An integrated civil-military combat- edgment of capabilities that have historically
domestic and foreign threats. The NSC is ant command is the model for the United existed but were not stated in the NSS.
the correct model for planning and assess- States to deter and defeat adversaries and Absent from the list is the acknowledge-
ing our national security strategy, but it is engage regional partners in the 21st century. ment of U.S. health care and environmental
not optimized to coordinate and implement Properly structured to include interagency capabilities. As a leader in these areas, the
this strategy on a daily basis. General Peter representation, a combatant commander’s United States provides a breadth of knowl-
Pace, USMC, as Vice Chairman of the Joint headquarters and associated staff would edge to assist regional partners in preserving
Chiefs of Staff, pointed out that there was provide the nucleus for reorganization. Inte- life and natural resources. This capability is
no one underneath the President who could grating interagency representatives into key beyond the common perception of deter-
follow through on decisions and order dif- leadership and staff positions would create rence, but it could serve critical needs if coor-
ferent agencies to accomplish what must be a cohesive group that would feel the pulse dinated with other instruments of national
accomplished. He asked, “Do we then need of the region and be guided by the NSS to power. This is the heart of regional engage-
a Goldwater-Nichols—like event for the follow the President’s intent. This operational ment, and it could be the vanguard for U.S.
interagency?”2 headquarters would serve as the strategic engagement in Africa and Asia.
The success of the Goldwater-Nichols interpreter for subordinate units and institu- A more inclusive list of instruments
Department of Defense Reorganization tions within the area of responsibility (AOR). of national power should include diplo-
Act of 1986 is evident when an empowered The geographic and functional combatant matic, informational, military, economic,
unified combatant command leads a coali- commanders would possess the infrastruc- law enforcement, financial, and health and
tion of over 40 countries in multiple regions ture and resources to assemble an integrated environmental. Recognizing the additional
executing the war on terror. The intent of the civil-military staff that incorporates the capa- instruments of power would bring supple-
act has come to fruition in less than 20 years. bilities into a model for unity of effort. The mentary agencies into the overall effort for
In Iraq, for instance, “the capabilities and characteristics of each interagency partner both domestic and foreign activities. The
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 / JFQ    27
INTErAGENCY ComBATANT CommAND
traditional J–1 and J–4 sections. The direc-
Proposed Interagency Command Structure
tor is a DOD Human Resource SES–2 and
the deputy is a DOD O–7. The director-
Combatant ate conducts joint and interagency billet
Commander
management as a primary function similar
Military Deputy Civilian Deputy to the current supervision of joint billets
Commander Commander
within DOD. Each agency is responsible for
recruiting, selecting, and managing quali-
fied personnel. The directorate works with
Personnel Information Financial/Economic Cultural Legal and
and and Development and Communications Environmental the military components and participating
Resources Intelligence Requirements/Acquisitions Health
agencies in prioritizing resources with a
foundation stemming from the traditional
Strategy categories of military supplies. The prioriti-
Standing Joint Force Joint Interagency
and
Headquarters Element Operations Coordination Group zation of these resources, in support of the
commander’s engagement strategy or crisis
response, provides the interagency staff
and subordinate units a unified effort at the
regional headquarters.
representation of each instrument in an inte- tentious. One solution is legislation authoriz- The Directorate of Financial/Economic
grated combatant command would link the ing the Secretary of Defense oversight of Development and Requirements/Acquisi-
operational headquarters to the individual agencies outside of his department, allowing tions would combine the J–7, J–8, and J–9
agencies’ strategy within a regional construct. the chain of command to remain intact and staff functions in current unified combat-
Equipping regional combatant com- provide unity of effort. The commander’s ant command structures. The director is a
manders with the full spectrum of inter- oversight would be similar to a tactical Department of the Treasury or Department
agency representation would create agile, control relationship, directing the other agen- of Commerce SES and the deputy a DOD
engaged, and responsive organizations. The cies only in the roles and missions prescribed O–7. Experimentation, transformation, and
ability to interpret and execute strategy at the by their cabinet level secretaries. research and development would reside at
operational level headquarters would provide Deputy commanders are congruent U.S. Joint Forces Command. The directorate
continual engagement through all agencies with the Army model of an assistant division maintains the traditional budgeting require-
represented in the headquarters and afford commander (support) and assistant divi- ments of the command, but economic devel-
all participants a role in responding to con- sion commander (maneuver). The civilian opment is its key function. The directorate
flicts and contingencies. Representatives or deputy commander is drawn from the State has the expertise and ability to communicate
teams would maintain communication with Department’s Senior Executive Service (SES). with regional partners to engage all facets
their respective agencies and communicate The deputy is an experienced State executive of the economic environment (such as
relevant information through the integrated or, in the case of U.S. Northern Command, infrastructure, agriculture, banking, market
staffs to the combatant commanders, which a Department of Justice executive. The State economy, currency valuation, and trade
would lead to greater agility and diversity of Department position fulfills the prerequisite imports/exports) that assist the Nation in
perspectives on the combatant commanders’ to assignment as a bureau director. The regional and potential global market par-
staffs and increase problem-solving capabili- deputy is concurrently the ranking State rep- ticipation. This economic element is a core
ties accordingly. resentative and the director of the Joint Inter- capability that complements the daily engage-
agency Coordination Group. In the absence ment strategy of a combatant command. As a
Headquarters and Staff Concept of the commander, the deputy would fill the barometric instrument that measures the eco-
A typical unified combatant command billet and operate within Title 10 parameters. nomic environment, the directorate provides
headquarters, circa 2005, has a traditional The military deputy commander is a a wealth of information to the commander,
structure that reflects the principal staff DOD O–9 and would serve in accordance his staff, and the associated agencies as they
directorates. Using this structure as the with current Title 10 requirements. He would monitor the AOR.
baseline, I propose the staff concept shown be required to perform the duties of the com- The Directorate of Strategy and Opera-
the figure above, which would incorporate mander in the event of vacancy. tions would merge the J–3 and J–5 responsi-
interagency representation into the direc- Principal Staff. Principal and deputy bilities. Its director is an O–8 and the deputy
torates. Each of these new staff sections is directors would include a combination of is a DOD SES–2. The directorate contains
described below. civilian and military personnel. The command the traditional current operations, future
Command Group. The combatant com- group, in conjunction with the assistant operations, and plans sections as well as an
mander would be retained in the current departmental secretaries from the various exercise division. Additionally, it possesses
structure with a four-star general or admiral. agencies, would provide nominees to maintain the hub for staff action in the Operational
The commander’s responsibilities would parity in the staff composition (see figure). Planning Element, which facilitates all plan-
remain as written in Title 10, United States The Directorate of Personnel and ning requirements pertaining to exercises
Code. Who the commander reports to is con- Resources would combine the functions of and operations. The element is a cross-func-
28    JFQ / issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu
Naler
tional planning cell of military and civilian career diplomat as director, with a DOD O–8 directorate provides expertise throughout
expertise. Each directorate would have as deputy. The director is a unique feature the spectrum from personal to institutional
representation in planning and execution of of this integrated staff. The Secretary of health issues. The assistant director has exper-
the command’s mission, directed by Strategy State appoints this position as a capstone for tise in environmental concerns ranging from
and Operations and orchestrated through the grooming executive leaders and Ambassa- conservation to development. The deputy
Operational Planning Element. dors. The ability to combine regional exper- director has oversight of U.S. legal issues
The Directorate of Information and
combining information and intelligence into
Intelligence would combine the J–2 and J–6
functions. The director is a CIA SES–2 and one directorate provides efficiency in the analysis and
the deputy an O–8. Intelligence is fused from
dissemination to decisionmakers
multiple sources and authorities:
n Title 10, Armed Forces (DOD) tise with mature diplomatic relationships pro- in conjunction with regional requirements
n Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Proce- vides unmatched access for engagement in through close coordination with the director
dure (Justice) the AOR. Subordinate staff directors fill such of cultural communications. The deputy’s
n Title 22, Foreign Relations and Inter- billets as coalition support groups, political primary duty consists of the traditional staff
course (State) advisers, and religious and tribal envoys. The judge advocate and legal adviser roles.
n Title 50, War and National Defense director coordinates with area Ambassadors The Standing Joint Force (SJF) Head-
(CIA) intelligence resources. and chiefs of mission and conducts liaison quarters Core Element would be an addi-
with nongovernmental, private volunteer, and tional duty for one of the Directorate of Strat-
Combining information and intel- international organizations to balance the egy and Operations deputies. The director is
ligence into one directorate would provide regional network and information exchange. a DOD O–7 and leads the SJF headquarters
efficiency in the analysis and dissemination The Directorate of Legal and Envi- to augment the designated Service compo-
to decisionmakers. Management of band- ronmental Health would focus on legal and nent command to form the initial nucleus
width is collocated with the highest volume health issues in the AOR. The director is a for the joint task force (JTF) staff. Interaction
consumers. Department of Health and Human Services with the integrated staff provides unmatched
The Directorate of Cultural Com- SES–1 assisted by a DOD O–7 staff judge synergy for the JTF commander through
munications would employ a State SES–2 advocate or a Justice Department SES. The direct access to all appropriate
State Department representative 
and Marines working with 
citizens in Al Anbar 
mes J. Vooris)
mera (Ja
Ca
mbat
Co
Division
Marine
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 / JFQ    29
INTErAGENCY ComBATANT CommAND
Barry Loo)
Squadron (
Refugees International officials meeting with  munications
m
Pakistani military during Operation Lifeline, Co
December 2005 Space
th30
agencies in one headquarters. This core various positions would be the responsibil- tary qualifications of joint specialty officers.
element corresponds with current joint doc- ity of individual agencies. Recruiting and Prospective directors would take a capstone
trine, but staff representation would allow selecting could thus require personnel to equivalent course to prepare for SES-level
the JTF commander to focus on operational depart from traditional career paths. DOD, service in a regional or functional combatant
and tactical issues by reducing some strategic within the interagency construct, would need command.
layers in the current staff model. to broaden its intermediate and top-level A complementary solution to inter-
The Joint Interagency Coordination Service schools to ensure that its personnel agency education, similar to the National
Group would be organized in accordance appreciate the newly included agency’s cul- Defense University, would be a National
with current doctrine. Staff representation tures, roles, and mission within the NSS. All Security University that mirrors the format
provides the JTF commander with resident agencies would need to adjust their formal and intent of the George C. Marshall Euro-
expertise in the headquarters and facilitates education, and, ideally, civilian undergradu- pean Center for Security Studies. Students
unity of effort throughout the command ate and graduate schools would follow suit as from the interagency community, instead of
by integrating interagency members into they prepared candidates for civil and mili- other nations, would participate in tailored,
the staff and eliminating the necessity for tary professions. professional education and research and dia-
multiple reach-back nodes once deployed. Similar to current requirements to logue, and in thorough examination of issues
The interagency composition of the head- educate DOD personnel, the interagency confronting client agencies. Students would
quarters allows the group to focus on tactical community would call for additional quotas have an opportunity to identify common
coordination and direct support of the JTF. to established Service and joint schools, such values, create interagency friendships, work
The combatant headquarters works the seam as the Army Command and General Staff toward common understandings, and build a
between operational authorities and strategic College and Joint Forces Staff College. Selec- more peaceful and cooperative political and
diplomacy. This affords the JTF commander tion of candidates for a combatant command security environment. The National Security
a strategic shield and allows a focused effort would focus on personnel who, like their University structure would allow an open
on the current crisis. military counterparts, are in mid-level man- forum for security development, as opposed
agement, providing seasoned individuals to the focus of defense-oriented institutions.
Professional Education confident in their agencies’ capabilities and
The organization of the staff as shown who are recognized experts in their agencies’ Budget Wars
in the figure would provide the framework communities. Completing tours in combat- Aligning multiple agencies within the
for interagency integration. Sustaining the ant commands would furnish occupational Government should create efficiencies and
billets and grooming the right individuals for designations for civilians similar to the mili- reduce redundancy. Each agency would need
30    JFQ / issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu
Naler
to review its roles and missions, a process An Investment capabilities. The entity that could conduct
similar to the Quadrennial Defense Review. The Goldwater-Nichols Act helped this type of coordination is an integrated,
The entire interagency community would move the Department of Defense toward a interagency unified combatant command.
highlight seams and overlaps. Infrastructure, more effective joint approach to warfighting,
communications, and redundant person- where instead of merely deconflicting, the The headquarters and staffing model
nel skills would be the first candidates for Services were to work together in ways that outlined here provides a framework for effec-
consolidation. In a study at the Center for created power beyond the sum of their indi- tive deterrence and engagement. Empower-
Strategic and International Studies, a team of
one could argue that the executive branch is stovepiped
190 experts concluded:
much like the Services were 20 years ago
the U.S. national security apparatus requires
significant reforms to meet the challenges of vidual capabilities. To achieve that joint warf- ing the combatant commander with all the
a new strategic era. As part of its transfor- ighting capability, each Service had to give instruments of national power will allow
mational efforts, the Department of Defense up some turf, authorities, and prerogatives. unprecedented capabilities. Inherent in the
must adapt not only to the post–Cold War, Today, one could argue that the executive structure is accountability of civil-military
post-9/11 security environment but also must branch of Government is stovepiped much cooperation, but that natural tension is har-
cope with many “hidden failures” that, while like the four Services were 20 years ago. nessed into a model that maximizes unity of
not preventing operational success, stifle neces- In 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald effort. JFQ
sary innovation and continue to squander Rumsfeld emphasized to the 9/11 Com-
critical resources in terms of time and money. mission the success of military institutions NOTES
Many organizational structures and processes that looked beyond their hallowed pasts
initially constructed to contain a Cold War and gained more than they invested. Such 1 National Security Council, National Secu-
superpower in the Industrial Age are inappro- landmark legislation as the Goldwater- rity Council’s Function, available at <www.white-
priate for 21st-century missions in an Informa- Nichols Act adopted today could similarly house.gov/nsc>.
tion Age.7 unify the interagency community. The effect 2 Jim Garamone, “Pace Proposes Interagency
Goldwater-Nichols Act,” American Forces Press
of Goldwater-Nichols on DOD has proven
Service, September 7, 2004, available at <www.
DOD, as the largest budget consumer, the resourcefulness of its authors in think-
defenselink.mil/news/Sep2004/n09072004_
would gain capabilities through increased ing beyond Service cultures and traditions.
200409077.html>.
unity of effort. This type of change is feasible, Using this construct as an interagency model
3 Ibid.
and all participants must recognize that their provides the type of internal transformation 4 Ibid.
historical contributions to the Nation, while required for external integration. Former 5 Chris Strohm, “Former Commander Calls
valued, may not be efficient going forward. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General for New Military-Civilian Planning Organization,”
Various actions would help implement this Henry Shelton, USA (Ret.), in his congres- December 7, 2004, available at <www.govexec.
construct: sional testimony following operations in com/dailyfed/1204/120704c1.htm>.
Kosovo, highlighted the need for interagency 6 The National Security Strategy of the United
States for Combating Terrorism, February 2003,
n A legislative watershed event similar integration before and during conflict
available at <www.whitehouse. gov/nsc/nss.pdf>.
to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 would resolution:
7 Clark A. Murdock et al., Beyond Goldwa-
serve as the catalyst for the interagency com-
ter-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic
munity to adopt this integrated construct. We all must move forward with our efforts to
Era, Phase I Report (Washington, DC: Center for
n Achieving balance in the command achieve increased levels of integrated inter-
Strategic and International Studies, March 2004), 6,
positions, key principal staff billets, and agency planning now. To better support other available at <www.csis.org/isp/gn/>.
action officer positions throughout the agen- agencies, DOD needs to give greater consider- 8 Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint
cies would maintain viable parallel career ation to political, diplomatic, humanitarian, Chiefs of Staff Posture Statement before the 106th
tracks. economic, information, and other nonmilitary Congress, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Ser-
n Incorporation of agency policies and activities in defense planning. In addition, the vices, February 8, 2000.
procedures into the combatant command’s U.S. Government must establish dedicated
standard operating procedures would mechanisms and integrated planning processes
facilitate synthesis of agency cultures and to ensure rapid, effective, well-structured, mul-
perspectives. tiagency efforts in response to crises.8 Subscribe
n Recruitment and selection of person-
nel through professional education must An investment in personnel and educa- to JFQ:
target unity of effort. tion would allow agencies to communicate
n Shifting resources throughout the and coordinate in an unprecedented manner.
interagency community by capitalizing on the It is not enough to synchronize during
efficiencies gained through combining capa- complex contingency operations; the inter- ndupress.ndu.edu
bilities would eliminate redundancy. agency community must integrate into a team
with a common focus and complementary
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 / JFQ    31