DTIC ADA521722: Orchestrating Instruments of Power for Nationbuilding

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

power for nationbuilding
Ambassador John D. Negroponte leaving 
Kirkuk Business Center after meeting with 
local officials in 2004
orchestrating instruments of
Cullen)
power for nationbuilding Myles
D.
Air Force (
S.
U.
By Henry W. S trat man
a
ccording to the former political culture that foster voluntary coopera- nizations: the U.S. Embassy Baghdad, which
senior adviser to the Coali- tion and the limitation of state power; and the replaced the CPA, and the Multi-National
tion Provisional Authority provision of general security, to establish a safe Force–Iraq (MNF–I), which replaced
(CPA), Larry Diamond: and orderly environment.1 Combined Joint Task Force–7. MNF–I was
established as a combined, multinational,
Any effort to rebuild a shattered, war-torn He goes on to say that all these components and joint four-star headquarters to exercise
country should include four basic components: are interrelated, serving as the pillars upon the command, control, and integration of
political reconstruction of a legitimate and which a new nation and government must political and military efforts at the strategic
capable state; economic reconstruction, includ- be built. level. Coordinating and synchronizing efforts
ing the rebuilding of the country’s physical Following the transfer of authority from between the U.S. Embassy and the multina-
infrastructure and the creation of rules and the Coalition Provisional Authority to the tional force—given “philosophical and opera-
institutions that enable a market economy; Iraqi Interim Government on June 28, 2004, tional differences of civil-military institu-
social reconstruction, including the renewal (or the orchestration of these four components tions” (the clash of cultures)—was one of the
in some cases, creation) of a civil society and became the responsibility of two new orga- greatest challenges facing the leaders of these
organizations, Ambassador John Negroponte
Major General Henry W. Stratman, USA, served as Deputy Chief of Staff for Political-Military-Economic 
Integration for Multi-National Force–Iraq, Baghdad. 
32    JFQ / issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu
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Orchestrating Instruments of Power for Nationbuilding
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National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,260 REPORT NUMBER
Fifth Ave SW Fort Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319
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Stratman
and GEN George Casey, USA, respectively, did not create them. [The U.S. Government, the CPA) to a State Department lead and
on their arrival in June 2004.2 however,] did much to make things worse. It the establishment of a traditional Embassy.
Both Ambassador Negroponte and did not prepare for stability operations before The team’s main goal was to ensure “a close
General Casey recognized the need to the war, did not carry them out as needed and mutual partnership between the Chief
nurture the fledgling government, reestab- during the war, and had to improvise both of Mission . . . and the Commander, Multi-
lish an infrastructure capable of providing nation building and counterinsurgency opera- national Force–Iraq. . . . Furthermore, the
essential services to the people, and prepare tions once the war was over.3 team was to continue the spirit of ‘jointness’
the Iraqi Security Forces to take on increas- as it support[ed] implementation of the plan
ing responsibility for domestic security The pre-war planning effort showed that the within the [State Department] and DOD.”5
while dealing with a persistent and ruthless Department of State could coordinate an The Interagency Transition Planning
insurgency. Meeting these needs and building analysis of Iraq’s problems with reasonable Team’s work informed the development
of the U.S. Embassy and the initial Joint
both Ambassador Negroponte and General Casey
Manning Document of MNF–I while also
recognized the need to nurture the fledgling government establishing policies and procedures for
clear and effective command relationships
the four pillars necessary to support a secure, competence, but it had almost no operational and rapport between the Embassy’s Chief of
stable, and democratic nation would require capability to develop effective plans for nation Mission and the commander of the newly
an extraordinary level of teamwork and coop- building and was unready to coordinate such formed multinational force.6
eration between the U.S. Embassy and MNF– activity with military security and counter-
I to ensure that efforts were coordinated and insurgency activity. Both the Department of Organizing for Integration Effects
complementary, not in competition. Defense and [U.S. Agency for International In recognition of the fact that security
This article describes the situation in Development] staffs of the State Department efforts were linked to diplomatic, informa-
June 2004 and the means by which General dealing with political and economic aid lacked tional, and economic efforts, Ambassador
Casey organized his staff to overcome expertise . . . in dealing with the planning, Negroponte and General Casey in July 2004
these challenges and ensure integration analysis, program development, contracting, chartered an interagency strategy review
and cooperation between the U.S. Embassy and management burdens of a large country.4 to perform a strategic assessment of the
and the multinational force. Furthermore,
it highlights the ongoing interaction and
synchronization of efforts between the
two to build a stable and secure Iraq while
concurrently conducting counterinsurgent
operations against a multifaceted enemy
intent on derailing these efforts. This is not
a doctrinal solution, as the situation defies a
lockstep approach. Rather, it is presented as
a case study that might inform interagency
planning and cooperation for future efforts
in the war on terror.
Synchronization before Transfer
Published accounts have noted the
significant problems and challenges that
plagued the predecessors to the U.S. Embassy
and MNF–I in dealing with nationbuilding Polish Civilian-Military Cooperation Group 
challenges during the occupation phase. touring new Al Diwaniyah police station
Anthony Cordesman, for instance, was par-
55th Signal Company (Arthur Hamilton)
ticularly critical of the management of the
postconflict period and ad hoc nature of the These criticisms, along with observa- nature of the insurgency in order to refine
coordination between the various agencies of tions from other national security pundits, the MNF–I Campaign Plan and the U.S.
the U.S. Government. He observed that many did not fall on deaf ears. In the months before Embassy’s Mission Performance Plan.
of the problems facing Iraq are the legacy of the transfer of sovereignty to the Interim In July 2004, the team reported:
its formation as a state, exacerbated by the Government and the concurrent dissolution
negligent and oppressive rule of Saddam of the CPA, the Departments of State and the insurgency is much stronger than it was 9
Hussein. Defense established an Interagency Transi- months ago and could deny the Iraqi Interim
tion Planning Team to lay the groundwork Government legitimacy over the next 9
While the invasion did expose the ethnic, polit- for the shift of sovereignty from a Depart- months. In response, the coalition must find
ical, economic, and infrastructure problems, it ment of Defense (DOD)-led effort (through ways to strengthen the Iraqi Interim Govern-
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 / JFQ    33
power for nationbuilding
Commander of Task Force Thunder passing 
colors to Iraqi officer in Makhmur
Kinchen)
Clydell
mpany (
Co
Signal
th55
ment in all dimensions of national power for the planning of political and economic examined how the multinational force could
(political/economic/security) and facilitate effects, the team concluded that the various best advance implementation of the MNF–I
political reconciliation. Otherwise the insur- economic and reconstruction programs Campaign Plan. This team determined that
gency will grow more violent and the election planned or under way were not likely to there was a key role for the military in overall
and constitutional process will be endangered.7 achieve the desired results. political and economic effects planning to
Finally, the team determined that support the establishment of a legitimate
The assessment team recognized that American civilian agencies had limited permanent government, but found that the
MNF–I was more mature than its political penetration into Iraq’s social infrastructure, mission was not well understood and that
and economic capabilities and that all three while the military had substantial penetra- there were no traditional mechanisms or
were hampered by the lack of a unifying tion into Iraq’s political and social landscape organizations to manage this important area.
strategy, inadequate intelligence, ineffective at regional and local levels. The military, The team also concluded that such an organi-
however, had little insight zation could support the commander’s cam-
the nature of the insurgency radically
into the political process in paign plan by identifying the effects MNF–I
changed the operating environment Baghdad. In short, internal forces were generating in strategic cities, con-
systems and processes ducting coordination and analysis of efforts
strategic communications support, and the aimed at producing certain political and to achieve desired effects, and facilitating an
embryonic nature of [Interim Government] economic benefits were proceeding without interagency process to coordinate economic
counterparts.8 overall integration. The Ambassador and and governance efforts of both the force and
Commanding General of MNF–I published the U.S. Embassy.9
The team also found that the economic and a Joint Mission Statement that articulated Based on these strategic assessments,
governance plans developed by the Coali- shared vision and goals and specified politi- General Casey reorganized the MNF–I staff
tion Provisional Authority had assumed a cal, security, and economic tasks that would to achieve greater integration and coordina-
much more permissive security situation; be the focal point of integrated efforts tion of diplomatic and economic strategies
however, the nature of the insurgency radi- mounted by the U.S. Embassy and the multi- between the force and the Embassy, creating
cally changed the operating environment. As national force. a new staff element to that end: the deputy
a result of the new environment and the fact A follow-on analysis by a U.S. Joint chief of staff, political military economic
that no element of the CPA or the Embassy Forces Command team, led by General Gary (DCS PME). The purpose of this organiza-
was organized to integrate military support Luck, USA (Ret.), in August 2004, further tion was to oversee MNF–I policy develop-
34    JFQ / issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu
Stratman
ment, political-military interactions and to teamwork given tangible expression by that General Casey instilled in the multina-
integration of governance and economic lines the chief of mission and the Commanding tional force.
of operation with coalition embassies, the General working together, the establishment Complementing this high-level com-
Embassy’s Iraqi Reconstruction Management of forums for robust information exchange mitment to integration was the professional
Office (IRMO) and Project and Contracting and planning, and the optimal organization relationship established between the Embas-
Office, the Corps of Engineers Gulf Region and integration of large staffs. sy’s political-military counselor, Ambassador
Division, and the Iraqi government. Of these factors, the commitment Ron Neumann, and the DCS PME, Major
General Casey charged commanders between General Casey and Ambassador General Hank Stratman, USA. In addition,
with supporting reconstruction and commit- Negroponte to establish a close working PME developed a working rapport with the
ted resources for it. The Gulf Region Engi- relationship is the most important. General Embassy’s political and economic counsel-
neers, in coordination with the IRMO, inte- ors and the IRMO director. Their frequent
the real mechanics of
grated efforts to support the $18.4-billion Iraq contact and coordination have enabled
Recovery and Reconstruction Fund program. interaction take place at a high degree of integration and synergy
At the strategic level, DCS PME worked to between MNF–I and Embassy actions. This
the action officer level
fill the gaps in this program, recommending relationship was enhanced when the Embassy
the use and prioritization of other funding populated its political-military section with
sources, where feasible and acceptable, to Casey acknowledged as much in testimony experienced political officers who were com-
support the execution of priority projects. As to the Senate Armed Services Committee on fortable working with the military and by the
security became an increasing emphasis, dif- June 24, 2004: placement of a liaison officer from DCS PME
ficult reprogramming decisions for the project within the staff. Additionally, the Embassy
appeared. DCS PME played an integral role in The Commander, MNF–I, and the U.S. established a two-person State embedded
establishing the priorities for reprogramming Ambassador will work closely in formulating team for each division to liaison with the
funds from electricity and water to security strategic direction and ensuring unity of effort Embassy and work directly for the division
and justice requirements. The teaming rela- in support of the Interim Government of Iraq. commander.
tionship was critical to integrating MNF–I Creating a secure and stable Iraq requires Although a commitment to teamwork
reconstruction efforts and maximizing the careful coordination of military operations and is vital to an environment of integration, the
benefits to the Iraqi people and economy.10 objectives with other elements of U.S. national real mechanics of interaction take place at
In addition to the DCS PME, the power, including economic, political, diplo- the action officer level, which requires robust
reorganization of the MNF–I staff included matic, and informational objectives. Establish- forums for information exchange and plan-
the formation of a deputy chief of staff for ing a close and effective working relationship ning. As with any large organization, there
strategic communication to create synergy with the new Ambassador and the government are recurring meetings in the daily routine.
between public affairs and information agencies working out of the U.S. Embassy is Both the Embassy and MNF–I staffs were
operations and to integrate coalition informa- a priority goal for me. I will also serve as his able to integrate, synchronize, and coordi-
tion operation efforts with those of the Iraqi principal military advisor.11 nate issues, ideas, and actions by inviting
government. Additionally, the deputy chief participants from the other organization. Not
of staff for operations was relocated to the These were not hollow platitudes, but a com- only did this promote inclusion and build
Embassy compound to synchronize effects mitment to a “one team, one fight” approach teamwork between Embassy and MNF–I staff
within the multinational force and to provide
an interagency strategic operations center.
With these new organizations, General Casey
would achieve the integration of MNF–I
actions with those of the U.S. Embassy. The
Embassy, in turn, would have a single coor-
dinating point for a wide variety of issues at
the MNF–I, corps, and major subordinate
command levels.
Factors Influencing Integration Martens)
MamconaNodnr FTyd–S rianaIicn,na ctctsoheeitmde it o hIperneflafi aofsqloh riGu tmpsno,ee dvonneipontrsltnge tt mhhoanfere o dtnlhue ttaesgh shhEet amtbIvhnebeeti enaierrsgn is mjytoh ay ene dd Group, Pacific (Edward G.
successful election in January 2005. That mera
level of integration between two inherently mbat Ca Sreooldpieenrisn agn odf  Uth.Se.  NSatajatfe  TDeeapcahritnmg eHnots opfiftiaclial at 
disparate organizations is attributable to Co
three key factors: the high-level commitment Fleet
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 / JFQ    35
power for nationbuilding
sections, but it also fostered ownership for between the civil/diplomatic and military which there is full respect for political and
actions and decisions resulting from these cultures of the Embassy and the MNF–I and human rights.”13
meetings. are important venues for stimulating strategic Perhaps the most substantive dem-
The most notable of these routines decisionmaking, communication exchange, onstration of interagency integration and
include the MNF–I daily Battle Update and integration. teamwork between the Department of State
Assessment, chaired by the multinational and DOD is found in a classified cable from
force Commanding General and attended by Key Outcomes the Secretary of State titled “U.S. Government
the deputy chief of mission, the political/mili- One of the first products of the team- Position on Political/Security Principles,
tary counselor, and the IRMO director; the work and integration between the U.S. and Priorities for Iraq Reconstruction.”14
Embassy Country Team meetings, chaired Embassy and MNF–I was the publication of Although drafted in Washington, the political
by the chief of mission and attended by the the Joint Mission Statement on August 16, and security objectives and priorities aligned
DCS PME and his policy division chief; and 2004. While it remains classified, the docu- precisely with the priorities of the chief of
the IRMO daily senior consultant meetings ment was crucial to Embassy and MNF–I mission and Commanding General.
and weekly program reviews, attended by the efforts and probably unprecedented in its
scope. As General Casey Integration and the Government
noted in his letter transmit- A capable and representative govern-
ting the document to subor- ment is clearly priority one for Iraq. Thus,
dinate commands: there has been a logical shift of MNF–I focus
to the governance and economic lines of
Recognizing that the Multina- operation. During its existence, the Interim
tional Force’s effort in Iraq is Government, with assistance from the coali-
inextricably linked to that of tion, worked to form the basics of a govern-
the U.S. Embassy...this doc- ment and prepare for elections. Reconstruc-
GEN George Casey, USA,  ument is intended to facilitate tion and economic development were modest
Commander of Multi-National 
unity of effort by focusing all as the insurgency increased in intensity, and
Force–Iraq, transferring 
elements of U.S. and coali- now the Transitional Government faces much
Husaybah to Iraqi forces
tion power and influence in greater challenges. Not only must it continue
the theater on executing our the efforts of the Interim Government, but it
2d Marine Division Combat Camera (Neill A. Sevelius)
counterinsurgency effort. also must take the lead in the counterinsur-
PME policy division. These forums provide gency fight while learning how to deal with
the senior Embassy leadership and the While the title of the document might an increasingly influential parliament, draft-
MNF–I situational awareness of operations suggest a missive of limited scope, the Joint ing a constitution, and preparing for another
and actions across all lines of operations: Mission Statement was much broader. It constitutionally-based national election.
security, governance, economics, and focused Embassy and MNF–I priorities and Building capacity and helping the
communicating. identified the political, security, and eco- Interim Government succeed will require
As the Iraqi governing body evolved nomic tasks required to achieve the desired continued coordination and engagement with
from interim to transitional, the campaign strategic effects detailed in the campaign plan the government. The centerpiece of the U.S.
plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom grew and mission performance plan.12 Embassy and MNF–I engagement strategy is
increasingly complex, requiring an even Due to the evolutionary nature of the to work with the various leaders and minis-
greater degree of integration in the gover- operating environment, the Ambassador and tries of the Iraqi government. The Embassy
nance and economic lines of operation. Two the Commanding General revised the Joint and the force maintain frequent contact and
new forums were established to facilitate Mission Statement following the election work closely with the prime minister, deputy
information exchange and planning between in January 2005. The chief of mission and prime minister, and cabinet-level ministers
the Embassy and MNF–I. In February 2005, the Commanding General recognized the and ministerial advisers. This work can only
the IRMO director, economic counselor, and need to articulate the way ahead in order to succeed if the actions of both bodies are fully
DCS PME began meeting twice a month to build the government’s capacity to lead the integrated and their interlocutors are speak-
assure situational awareness on the issues, nation. Entitled “A Plan for the Year Ahead: ing with one voice to the Iraqi government.
strategies, and priorities regarding the recon- Transition to Self-Reliance” and published The interaction with the govern-
struction of key infrastructure and the provi- in February 2005, this second Joint Mission ment is highlighted by the actions of the
sion of essential services to the Iraqi people. Statement communicated the primary and Embassy and the Multi-National Force–Iraq
Starting in March 2005, the chief of mission mutually supporting goals of helping the in providing guidance and mentorship to
and the Commanding General established a Transitional Government diminish the insur- the deputy prime minister and the national
Strategic Mission Council forum to enhance gency and prepare Iraqi Security Forces and security adviser. The Embassy and MNF–I
unity of effort, which provides a forum for the government to begin accepting the coun- have developed recommended policy guid-
issue resolution on matters impacting the terinsurgency mission lead and to complete ance on a variety of significant security,
political and military situation in Iraq. Both the timetable laid out for achieving a “federal, governance, and economic issues. The DCS
of these forums have proven effective bridges democratic, pluralistic, and unified Iraq, in PME has prepared numerous coordinated
36    JFQ / issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu
Stratman
talking papers for the Commanding General
Marines patrol market area 
to help Iraq’s political leaders analyze issues of Port-au-Prince, Haiti
and promulgate the policy decisions to
address the problems and challenges facing
this burgeoning democracy, thereby putting
an Iraqi face on the solution while building
the capacity to govern. Working together,
the U.S. Embassy and MNF–I promote
management strategies to enable the govern-
ment to assimilate the multitude of issues
and information commensurate with the
etmhsteean sbtel,Ii cnasuhntremdigt rycea,on tgmtio oomnvfe wguronnitvaihcen artctnheimeo, neIenc nrotetenaarolli mmmcas iGp.ca odcveietvyren ilno-p - Camera (Eric C. Ely)
ment was particularly noteworthy in the mbat
bina tNtloe vteom erbaedri 2ca0t0e4 i.n Fsourrcgeesn otsn i tnh Fe aglrluojuanhd Division Co
communicated to MNF–I that various Marine
security measures restricting movement and d2
enforcing curfews on the citizens of Fallujah
were needed to protect military and civilian be built from scratch and refined over time as U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 108th
lives and to ensure mission success. MNF–I capacity grew and new challenges surfaced. Congress, 2d session, April 22, 2004.
worked with the Embassy to refine these U.S. Embassy and MNF–I organizations 6 U.S. Mission Baghdad Interagency Plan
requirements and obtain Iraqi government will continue to adapt to provide nation- brief, May 4, 2004.
7 Building Legitimacy and Confronting
approval of emergency decree restrictions, building requirements to Iraq’s transitional
Insurgency in Iraq, team report, July 15, 2004.
integration with the Interim Government was particularly 8 Ibid.
9 L. Hawley, “An Analysis of the DCS for
noteworthy in the battle to eradicate insurgents in Fallujah
Political and Economic Effects,” August 19, 2004.
10 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region
which provided the optimum operational and constitution-based governments while Division Organization and Budget brief, June 27,
flexibility. The government’s commitment serving U.S. Government interests. The 2005.
to see politically sensitive operations such lessons learned from the Iraqi experience 11 U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services,
as the elimination of the Fallujah safe haven apply to future endeavors requiring the inter- “Advance Questions for General George W. Casey,
through to completion set the conditions for agency efforts of a U.S. Embassy staff and a Jr., U.S. Army, Nominee for Commander, Multi-
a free and fair election. joint or coalition force headquarters. JFQ National Force–Iraq,” available at <www.senate.
gov/-armed_services/statement/2004/June/Casey.
pdf>.
Dialogue, cooperation, and teamwork NOTES
12 MNF–I/Embassy Joint Mission Statement,
are necessary elements of the relationship
February 7, 2005.
between the U.S. Embassy Baghdad, Multi- 1 Larry Diamond, “What Went Wrong
13 United Nations Security Council
National Force–Iraq, and the Interim Gov- in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs 83 (September/October
Resolution 1546, “The Situation between Iraq and
2004), available at <www.foreignaffairs.org/
ernment in order to achieve the vision of a Kuwait,” June 8, 2004.
20040901faessay83505/larry-diamond/what-went-
vibrant and democratic Iraq. That teamwork 14 U.S. Department of State, cable 061748Z
wrong-in-iraq.html>.
resolved many of the difficulties cited prior APR 05, SECSTATE 6360, U.S. Government Posi-
2 Joint Publication 3–08, Interagency Coor-
to the transfer of authority on June 28, 2004, tion on Political/Security Principles and Priorities
dination During Joint Ventures, vol. I, available at
and established the foundation on which to for Iraqi Reconstruction.
<www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_08v1.
ensure mission success. pdf>.
There was no doctrine outlining the 3 Anthony Cordesman, U.S. Policy in Iraq: A
steps to accomplish this team relationship. It “Realist” Approach to its Challenges and Opportuni- JFQ direct
was achieved through initiative and a high- ties (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
level commitment to teamwork, through International Studies, August 6, 2004), 2–3, avail- to you!
robust forums for information exchange and able at <www.csis.org/component/option,com_
csis_pubs/task,view/id,1831/>.
planning, and by organizing for integration.
4 Ibid., 27.
This cooperation did not occur simply by
5 Marc Grossman, “The Iraq Transition:
throwing the organizations together, nor did ndupress.ndu.edu
Obstacles and Opportunities,” testimony before the
it happen overnight. With the exception of
the resolve for teamwork by many, all had to
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 / JFQ    37