DTIC ADA519804: Rumsfeld, the Generals, and the State of U.S. Civil-Military Relations

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RUMSFELD, THE GENERALS, AND THE STATE OF U.S.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
Mackubin Thomas Owens
I
ntheSummer2002issueoftheNavalWarCollegeReview,theeminenthistorian
RichardKohnlamentedthestateof civil-militaryrelations,writingthatitwas
“extraordinarily poor, in many respects as low as in any period of American
peacetimehistory.”1ThearticlewasbasedonthekeynoteaddressthatProfessor
KohnhaddeliveredaspartofaNavalWarCollegeconferenceoncivil-military
relationsinthespringof1999.Accordingly,thefocusofattentionwasonprob-
lemsthathadbedeviledtheClintonadministration.
Someof themosthighlypublicizedof thesecivil-militaryproblemsreflected
culturaltensionsbetweenthemilitaryasaninstitutionandliberalciviliansociety,
mostlyhavingtodowithwomenincombatandopen
Dr.OwensisAssistantDeanofAcademicsforElectives
homosexuals in the military. The catalogue included
attheNavalWarCollege.EarninghisPhDinpolitics
fromtheUniversityofDallas,hehastaughtattheUni- “Tailhook,”theKellyFlinnaffair,thesexualharassment
versityofRhodeIsland,theUniversityofDallas,Catho-
scandal at Aberdeen, Maryland, and the very public
licUniversity,theMarineCorpsSchoolofAdvanced
Warfighting,BostonUniversity,andattheNavalWar exchange regarding homosexuals between newly
Collegeasprofessorofnationalsecurityaffairs.Heisa electedPresidentBillClintonontheonehandandthe
seniorfellowattheForeignPolicyResearchInstitutein
uniformed military and Congress on the other.
Philadelphia and has been a consultant to the Los
Alamos National Laboratory, Headquarters Marine Otherexamplesofcivil-militarytensionsincluded
Corps,andtheJointStaff.Dr.OwenswontheSilver the charge that Gen.Colin Powell,then chairman of
StarasaMarineCorpsinfantryplatooncommanderin
theJointChiefsofStaff,wasillegitimatelyinvadingci-
Vietnam;heretiredfromtheMarineCorpsReserveasa
colonelin1994.From1990to1997,Dr.Owenswasedi- vilianturfbypubliclyadvancingopinionsonforeign
torinchiefofthequarterlydefensejournalStrategic
policy.Duringthe1992presidentialcampaign,Powell
Review.Hisarticlesonnationalsecurityissueshaveap-
published a piece in the New York Times warning
peared in many well known periodicals, and he is
coeditorofthetextbookStrategyandForcePlanning, aboutthedangersof interveninginBosnia.Notlong
for which he wrote two chapters.
afterward,hefollowedupwithanarticleinForeignAf-
fairsthatmanycriticizedasanillegitimateattemptby
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2006, Vol. 59, No. 4
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OWENS 69
a senior military officer to preempt the foreign policy agenda of an incoming
president.Critics argued that Powell’s actions constituted a serious encroach-
mentbythemilitaryoncivilian“turf.”Theyarguedthatitwasunprecedented
for the highest-ranking officer on active duty to go public with his disagree-
mentswiththepresidentoverforeignpolicyandtheroleofthemilitary.
Closely related to the contention that the military had illegitimately ex-
pandeditsinfluenceintoaninappropriateareawastheclaimthattheU.S.mili-
tary had, in response to the
supposed lessons of Vietnam,
What does “pushing back” by the uniformed
succeededinmakingmilitary,not
military mean for civilian control of the
political, considerations para-
military?
mount in the political-military
decision-making process—dic-
tatingtociviliansnotonlyhowitsoperationswouldbeconductedbutalsothe
circumstancesunderwhichitwouldbeused.Thisrolereflectedthepost-Vietnam
viewdominantwithinthemilitarythatonlyprofessionalmilitaryofficerscould
betrustedtoestablishprinciplesguidingtheuseofmilitaryforce.
Takingitsbearingsfromtheso-calledWeinberger-PowellDoctrine,asetof
rulesfortheuseofforcethathadbeendraftedinthe1980s,theU.S.militarydid
everythingitcouldtoavoidwhatcametobeknown(incorrectly)as“nontradi-
tionalmissions”:constabularyoperationsrequiredfor“imperialpolicing”—for
example,peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.The clearest example of a
service’sresistancetoamissionoccurredwhentheArmy,arguingthatitsproper
focus was on preparing to fight conventional wars, insisted that the plans for
U.S.interventionsinBosnia,Kosovo,andelsewherereflectthemilitary’sprefer-
encefor“overwhelmingforce.”Asonecontemporarysourcereported,themili-
tary had a great deal of influence on the Dayton Agreement establishing an
ImplementationForce(IFOR)toenforcepeaceinBosnia-Herzegovina.Accord-
ingtoClintonadministrationofficialsquotedinthestory,theagreement“was
carefullycraftedtoreflectdemandsfromthemilitary....Ratherthanbeignored
. . . the military, as a price for its support, has basically gotten anything it
wanted.”2
Finally,thereweremanyinstancesof downrighthostilityonthepartof the
militarytowardPresidentClinton,whoseanti-militarystanceasayoungman
duringtheVietnamWaryearsdidnotendearhimtosoldiers.Manyinterpreted
suchhostilityasjustonemoreindicationthatthemilitaryhadbecometoopar-
tisan(Republican)andpoliticized.
Some observers claimed that the civil-military tensions of the 1990s were a
temporaryphenomenonattributabletotheperceivedanti-militarycharacterof
theClintonadministration.Butcivil-militarytensionsdidnotdisappearwith
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70 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
the election and reelection of George W.Bush as president.If anything,civil-
militaryrelationshavebecomemorestrainedasaresultof clashesbetween
the uniformed services and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld over his
commitmenttothepresident’sagendaof“transforming”theU.S.military—re-
shapingitfromaheavy,industrial-ageforcedesignedtofighttheUSSRduring
theColdWartoamoreagile,information-ageforcecapableofdefeatingfuture
adversariesanywhereintheworld—andtheplanningandconductofU.S.mili-
taryoperationsinAfghanistanandIraq.
Theactionsonthepartof somemilitaryofficerstoundercutRumsfeldand
his polices in pursuit of their own goals—anti-Rumsfeld leaks to the press,
“foot-dragging,” “slow-rolling,” and generally what Peter Feaver has called
“shirking”—arenotindicativeofa“crisis”inAmericancivil-militaryrelations.
But they do suggest that civil-military relations are now unhealthy and out of
balance.3
REVOLT OF THE GENERALS?
In April of this year, a number of retired Army and Marine generals publicly
calledfortheresignationofSecretaryRumsfeld.Muchofthelanguagetheyused
wasintemperate,somedownrightcontemptuous.Forinstance,Marinegeneral
Anthony Zinni,Tommy Franks’s predecessor as commander of Central Com-
mand,describedtheactionsof theBushadministrationasrangingfrom“true
dereliction,negligence,andirresponsibility”to“lying,incompetence,andcor-
ruption.”HecalledRumsfeld“incompetentstrategically,operationally,andtac-
tically.”One has to go back to 1862 to find a senior military officer, active or
retired,condemningaciviliansuperiorsoharshlyinpublic.
Observersof whatthepresscalledthe“revoltof thegenerals”believedthat
theseretiredgeneralofficerswerespeakingonbehalfofnotonlythemselvesbut
manyactive-dutyofficersaswell.Whiletherearenolegalrestrictionsthatpre-
vent retired members of the military—even recently retired members—from
criticizingpublicpolicyortheindividualsresponsibleforit,therearesomeim-
portantreasonstosuggestthatthepublicdenunciationofcivilianauthorityby
evenretiredofficersundermineshealthycivil-militaryrelations.
Firstofall,asKohnhasobserved,retiredgeneralandflagofficersareanalo-
goustothecardinalsoftheRomanCatholicChurch.Assuch,thepublicisun-
likelytodistinguishbetweentheviewsofretiredofficersandtheviewsofthose
whoarestillonactiveduty.Second,becauseoftheirstatus,publiccriticismby
retiredofficersmayinfactencourageactive-dutyofficerstoengageinthesortof
behaviorthatundermineshealthycivil-militaryrelations,signalingtothemthat
itisacceptable,forinstance,toundercutpolicybyleakstothepressandother
methodsof “shirking.”Finally,suchactionsonthepartof retiredofficersmay
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OWENS 71
convinceactive-dutyofficersthat,byvirtueoftheiruniforms,thelatterareenti-
tledto“insist”thatcivilianauthoritiesacceptthemilitary’spolicyprescriptions.
Theimpliedthreathereismassresignation,which,asweshallseelater,isforeign
totheAmericanmilitarytradition.
ThecentralchargesinthecaseagainstSecretaryRumsfeldincludewillfully
ignoringmilitaryadviceandinitiatingthewarinIraqwithaforcethatwastoo
small,failingtoadapttothenewcircumstancesoncethingsbegantogowrong,
failingtoforeseetheinsurgencythatnowragesinthatcountry,andignoringthe
needtoprepareforpostconflictstabilityoperations.
Criticism of Rumsfeld by uniformed officers is predicated on two assump-
tions.Thefirstisthatsoldiershavearighttoavoiceinmakingpolicyregarding
theuseofthemilitaryinstrument,thatindeedtheyhavetherighttoinsistthat
theirviewsbeadopted.Thesecondisthatthejudgmentofsoldiersisinherently
superiortothatofcivilianswhenitcomestomilitaryaffairs.Intimeofwar,ci-
viliansshoulddefertomilitaryexpertise.Bothof theseassumptionsareques-
tionable at best and are at odds with the principles and practice of American
civil-militaryrelations.
First,intheAmericansystem,theuniformedmilitarydoesnotpossessaveto
overpolicy.Indeed,civilianshavetheauthoritytomakedecisionseveninwhat
wouldseempurelymilitaryaffairs.Inpractice,asEliotCohenhasshown,Amer-
icancivil-militaryrelationsdonotactuallyconformtowhatsomehavedubbed
the“normaltheoryofcivil-militaryrelations,”whichholdsthatciviliansdeter-
minethegoalsofwarandleavethestrategyandexecutionofthewartotheuni-
formed military.4 Cohen illustrates in Supreme Command that such successful
wartimepresidentsasAbrahamLincolnandFranklinRoosevelt“interfered”ex-
tensivelywithmilitaryoperations—oftendrivingtheirgeneralstodistraction.5
Second,when it comes to military affairs,soldiers are not necessarily more
prescientthancivilianpolicymakers.Thisisconfirmedbythehistoricalrecord.
DuringtheAmericanCivilWar,AbrahamLincolnconstantlyproddedGeorge
McClellan,commandinggeneralofthelargestUnionforceduringtheCivilWar,
the Army of the Potomac,to take the offensive in Virginia in 1862.McClellan
justasconstantlywhinedthathehadinsufficienttroops.DuringWorldWarII,
notwithstandingtheimageofcivil-militarycomity,thereweremanydifferences
between Franklin Roosevelt and his military advisers. Gen. George Marshall,
chiefofstaffoftheU.S.Armyandthegreatestsoldier-statesmansinceWashing-
ton, opposed arms shipments to Great Britain in 1940 and argued for a
cross-channel invasion before the United States was ready. History has vindi-
catedLincolnandRoosevelt.
ManyareinclinedtoblametheU.S.defeatinVietnamoncivilians.Butthe
AmericanoperationalapproachinVietnamwasthecreatureoftheuniformed
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72 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
military.The generally accepted view today is that the operational strategy of
Gen.William Westmoreland (commanding the U.S.Military Assistance Com-
mand,Vietnam)emphasizingattritionofthePeople’sArmyofVietnamforces
ina“warof thebigbattalions”—aconceptproducingsweepsthroughremote
jungleareasinanefforttofixanddestroytheenemywithsuperiorfirepower—
was counterproductive. By the time Westmoreland’s successor could adopt a
morefruitfulapproach,itwastoolate.6
During the planning for Operation DESERT STORM in late 1990 and early
1991,Gen.NormanSchwarzkopf,commanderofU.S.CentralCommand,pre-
sentedaplancallingforafrontalassaultagainstIraqipositionsinsouthernKu-
wait,followed by a drive toward Kuwait City.The problem was that this plan
would have been unlikely to achieve the foremost military objective of the
ground war—the destruction of the three divisions of Saddam’s Republican
Guard. The civilian leadership rejected the early war plan presented by
CentComandorderedareturntothedrawingboard.Therevisedplanwasfar
moreimaginativeandeffective.7
“PUSHING BACK”AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
ThecornerstoneofU.S.civil-militaryrelationsisciviliancontrolofthemilitary,
aprinciplethatgoesbacktotheAmericanRevolutionandtheprecedentestab-
lishedbyGeorgeWashington,whowillinglysubordinatedhimselfandhisarmy
to civilian authority. “Washington’s willing subordination, of himself and the
armyhecommanded,tocivilianauthorityestablishedtheessentialtenetofthat
service’sprofessionalethos.Hisextraordinaryunderstandingofthefundamen-
talimportanceofcivilpreeminenceallowedaprofessionalmilitaryforcetobe-
gintoflourishinademocraticsociety.Allofourmilitaryservicesareheirtothat
legacy.”8
TheverypublicattackonRumsfeldbyretiredofficersfliesinthefaceofthe
American tradition of civilian control of the military.Should active-duty and
retiredofficersof theArmyandNavyin1941havedebatedpubliclytheLend-
Leaseprogramortheoccupationof Iceland?ShouldDouglasMacArthurhave
resignedovertheEurope-firststrategy?Shouldgeneralsin1861havediscussed
inpublictheiropinionsofLincoln’splantoreprovisionFortSumter,airedtheir
viewsregardingtherightoftheSouthtosecedefromtheUnion,orarguedthe
prosandconsofissuingtheEmancipationProclamation?
In support of their actions,many of Rumsfeld’s critics have invoked a very
importantbookbyH.R.McMaster,DerelictionofDuty:LyndonJohnson,Robert
McNamara,theJointChiefsofStaff,andtheLiesThatLedtoVietnam,thesubject
ofwhichisthefailureoftheJointChiefstochallengeDefenseSecretaryRobert
McNamaraforcefullyenoughduringtheVietnamWar.9Manyservingofficers
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believethebookeffectivelymakesthecasethattheJointChiefsofStaffshould
havemoreopenlyvoicedtheiroppositiontotheJohnsonadministration’sstrat-
egyofgradualismandthenresignedratherthancarryoutthepolicy.
ButasKohn—whowasMcMaster’sacademicadviserforthedissertationthat
becameDerelictionofDuty—hasobserved,thebook
neither says nor implies that the chiefs should have obstructed American policy in
Vietnam in any other way than by presenting their views frankly and forcefully to
their civilian superiors, and speaking honestly to Congress when asked for their
views. It neither states nor suggests that the chiefs should have opposed President
Lyndon Johnson’s orders and policies by leaks, public statements, or by resignation,
unless an officer personally and professionally could not stand, morally and ethically,
to carry out the chosen policy.10
This serious misreading of Dereliction of Duty has dangerously reinforced the
increasinglywidespreadbelief amongofficersthattheyshouldbeadvocatesof
particularpoliciesratherthancontentingthemselveswiththeirtraditionalad-
visoryrole.
Kohnwritesthatasurveyofofficerandcivilianattitudesandopinionsunder-
takenbytheTriangleInstituteforSecurityStudiesin1998–99discoveredthat
“manyofficersbelievethattheyhavethedutytoforcetheirownviewsoncivil-
iandecisionmakerswhentheUnitedStatesiscontemplatingcommittingAmer-
icanforcesabroad.”When“asked
Civil-military tensions did not disappear with whether military leaders should
the election and reelection of George W. Bush beneutral,advise,advocate,orin-
as president. sistonhavingtheirwayinthede-
cision process” to use military
force, 50 percent or more of the
up-and-coming active-duty officers answered “insist,”on the following issues:
“settingrulesofengagement,ensuringthatclearpoliticalandmilitarygoalsex-
ist,developingan‘exitstrategy,’”and“decidingwhatkindsofmilitaryunitswill
beusedtoaccomplishalltasks.”Inthecontextofthequestionnaire,“insist”defi-
nitelyimpliedthatofficersshouldtrytocompelacceptanceofthemilitary’srec-
ommendations.11
Ironically,somejournalistswhonormallywouldrejecttheideathatmilitary
officers should “insist” that elected officials or their constitutional appointees
adoptthemilitarypositionseemtobeallforitwhenitcomestotheBushadmin-
istration and Donald Rumsfeld. For instance, in a March 2005 column for the
WashingtonPosthandicappingthefieldofpossiblesuccessorstoAirForcegeneral
RichardB.Myersaschairmanof theJointChiefsof Staff,DavidIgnatius,citing
Dereliction of Duty, raised a central question of U.S.civil-military relations: To
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74 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
whatextentshouldtheuniformedmilitary“pushback”againstthepoliciesofa
president and his secretary of defense if the soldiers believe the policies are
wrong?12Ignatiuswrotethat“whenyouaskmilitaryofficerswhoshouldgetthe
job,thefirstthingmanysayisthatthemilitaryneedssomeonewhocanstandup
to...Rumsfeld.ThetensionbetweenRumsfeldandtheuniformedmilitary,”he
continued,“hasbeenanopensecretinWashingtonthesepastfouryears.Itwas
compoundedbytheIraqwar,butitbeganalmostfromthemomentRumsfeld
tookoveratthePentagon.Thegrumblingabouthisleadershippartlyreflected
themilitary’sresistancetochangeanditsreluctancetochallengeabrilliantbut
headstrongcivilianleader.ButinIraq,Rumsfeldhaspushedtheservices—espe-
ciallytheArmy—nearthebreakingpoint.”
“The military is right,”concluded Ignatius.“The next chairman of the JCS
mustbesomeonewhocanpushback.”Butwhatdoes“pushingback”bytheuni-
formedmilitarymeanforciviliancontrolofthemilitary?
LINCOLN AND MCCLELLAN: A CASE OF “PUSHING BACK”
PerhapstheclearestexampleofanAmericangeneralwho“pushedback”against
civilianleadershipbecausehedisapprovedofadministrationpolicyisMaj.Gen.
GeorgeB.McClellan.MilitaryhistorianstendtotreatMcClellanasafirst-rate
organizer,equipper,andtrainerbutanincompetentgeneralwhowasconstantly
outfoughtandoutgeneraledbyhisConfederatecounterpart,RobertE.Lee.That
maybetrue,butthereismoretothestory.McClellanandmanyof hisfavored
subordinatesdisagreedwithmanyofLincoln’spoliciesandindeedmayhaveat-
temptedtosabotagethem.McClellanpursuedthewarhewantedtofight—one
that would end in a negotiated peace—rather than the one his commander in
chiefwantedhimtofight.ThebehaviorofMcClellanandhissubordinatesulti-
matelyledLincolntoworrythathisdecisiontoissuetheEmancipationProcla-
mationmighttriggeramilitarycoup.
Thereisperhapsnomoreremarkabledocumentintheannalsof American
civil-militaryrelationsthantheletterMcClellangavetoLincolnwhenthepresi-
dentvisitedtheArmyofthePotomacatHarrison’sLandingontheJamesRiver
inJuly1862.McClellan,whohadbeenwithinthesoundofRichmond’schurch
bells only two weeks earlier,had been driven back by Lee in a series of battles
knownastheSevenDays.McClellan’sletterwentfarbeyondthedescriptionof
the state of military affairs that McClellan had led Lincoln to expect.Instead,
McClellanarguedagainstconfiscationof rebelpropertyandinterferencewith
theinstitutionofslavery.“Asystemofpolicythusconstitutionalandconserva-
tive,andpervadedbytheinfluencesofChristianityandfreedom,wouldreceive
thesupportofalmostalltrulyloyalmen,woulddeeplyimpresstherebelmasses
andallforeignnations,anditmightbehumblyhopedthatitwouldcommend
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OWENS 75
itselftothefavoroftheAlmighty.”McClellancontinuedthatvictorywaspossi-
bleonlyif thepresidentwaspledgedtosuchapolicy.“Adeclarationof radical
views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present Armies,”
makingfurtherrecruitment“almosthopeless.”13
Advicefromageneral,howeverinappropriate,isonething.Butforageneral
toactonhisownwithoutconsultinghiscommanderinchiefsmacksofinsubor-
dination.InearlyJune1862,whiletheArmyofthePotomacwasstillmovingto-
ward Richmond, McClellan had designated his aide, Col. Thomas Key, to
represent him in prisoner-of-war negotiations with the Confederates, repre-
sentedbyHowellCobb.ButMcClellanhadgonefarbeyondthetechnicalissue
athand,authorizingKeytoinvestigatethepossibilityofpeacebetweenthesec-
tions.In response to Cobb’s assertion that Southern rights could be protected
onlybyindependence,Keyrepliedthat“thePresident,thearmy,andthepeople”
hadnothoughtofsubjugatingtheSouthbutonlydesiredtoupholdtheConsti-
tutionandenforcethelawsequallyinthestates.McClellanapparentlythoughtit
waspartofhisdutytonegotiatewiththeenemyonthetermsforendinghostili-
tiesandtoexplaintothatenemythepoliciesandobjectivesofhiscommanderin
chief,withoutlettingthelatterknowthathewasdoingso.
McClellandidnottrytohidehiseffortsatpeacenegotiationsfromLincoln.
Indeed,hefiledKey’sreportwithSecretaryofWarEdwinM.Stantonandasked
him to give it to the president.Stanton acceded to McClellan’s request but re-
mindedhimthat“itisnotdeemedproperforofficersbearingflagsoftruceinre-
specttotheexchangeofprisonerstoholdanyconferencewiththerebelofficers
uponthegeneralsubjectoftheexistingcontest.”14
Asforhisownproperresponsibilities,McClellan’sgeneralshipwascharacter-
izedbyanotablelackof aggressiveness.Hewasaccusedof tarryingwhenGen.
JohnPope’sArmyofVirginiawasbeinghandledveryroughlybyLeeatSecond
Manassas. Indeed, one of Pope’s corps commanders, Fitz-John Porter, clearly
servingasasurrogateforMcClellan,wascourt-martialedforallegedfailureto
cometoPope’saidquicklyenough.Amonthlater,McClellanwasaccusedoflet-
tingLeeslipawaytofightanotherdayafterAntietam;soonthereafter,Lincoln
relievedhim.
IhavecometobelievethatMcClellan’slackof aggressivenesswastheresult
notof incompetencebutof hisrefusaltofightthewarLincolnwantedhimto
fight.He disagreed with Lincoln’s war aims and,in the words of Peter Feaver,
“shirked”by“dragginghisfeet.”15Atthesametime,McClellanandsomeofhis
officersdidnothidetheirdisdainforLincolnandStantonandoftenexpressed
this disdain in intemperate language. McClellan wrote his wife, “I have com-
mencedreceivinglettersfromtheNorthurgingmetomarchonWashington&
assume the Govt!!”16 He also wrote her about the possibility of a “coup,”after
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76 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
which“everythingwillbechangedinthiscountrysofarasweareconcerned&
myenemieswillbeatmyfeet.”17Hedidnotlimittheexpressionof suchsenti-
ments to private correspondence with his wife. Lincoln and his cabinet were
awareoftherumorsthatMcClellanintendedtoput“hisswordacrossthegov-
ernment’s policy.”McClellan’s quartermaster general,Montgomery Meigs,ex-
pressedconcernabout“officersofrank”intheArmyofthePotomacwhospoke
openlyof“amarchonWashingtonto‘clearoutthosefellows.’”18
SuchloosetalkdidnothelpMcClellanorhisarmyintheeyesofLincoln,who
understoodthathemusttakeactioninordertoremindthearmyofhisconstitu-
tionalrole.HedidbydiscipliningMaj.JohnKey,aidedecamptothegeneralin
chief,HenryHalleck,andbrotherofMcClellan’saide,theaforementionedCol.
ThomasKey.LincolnwroteMajorKeyoflearningthathehadsaidinresponseto
aqueryfromabrotherofficerasto“why...therebelarmy[wasnot]baggedim-
mediately after the battle near Sharpsburg [Antietam],” that “that is not the
game.Theobjectisthatneitherarmyshallgetmuchadvantageoftheother;that
bothshallbekeptinthefieldtilltheyareexhausted,whenwewillmakeacom-
promiseandsaveslavery.”19
Lincoln dismissed Key from the service,despite pleas for leniency (and the
factthatKey’ssonhadbeenkilledatPerryville),writingthat“itiswhollyinad-
missible for any gentleman holding a military commission from the United
States to utter such sentiments as Major Key is within [i.e., by an enclosure]
provedtohavedone.”HeremarkedtoJohnHay“thatiftherewasa‘game’ever
amongUnionmen,tohaveourarmynottakeanadvantageoftheenemywhenit
could,itwashisobjecttobreakupthatgame.”Atlastrecognizingthedangerof
suchloosetalkonthepartofhisofficersandsoldiers,McClellanissuedageneral
ordercallingforthesubordinationofthemilitarytocivilauthority:“Therem-
edyforpoliticalerrors,ifanyarecommitted,istobefoundonlyintheactionof
thepeopleatthepolls.”20
Onthesurface,criticismofBushadministrationpolicybyretiredofficersis
not nearly as serious as the actions of McClellan, whose “foot-dragging”and
“slow-rolling”underminedtheUnionwareffortduringtheWarof theRebel-
lion.Nonetheless,thethreattohealthycivil-militaryrelationsposedbythere-
cent, seemingly coordinated public attack by retired generals on Secretary
RumsfeldandBush’sIraqpolicyisserious,reinforcingasitdoestheillegitimate
beliefamongactivedutyofficersthattheyhavetherightto“insist”ontheirpre-
ferred options and that they have a right to “push back” against civilian
authority.
Butthefactisthatthesoldier’sview,nomatterhowexperiencedinmilitary
affairsthesoldiermaybe,isstillrestrictedtotheconductofoperationsandmili-
tarystrategy,andevenhere,asCohenshows,thecivilianleadershipstillreserves
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