DTIC ADA519335: Close Encounters at Sea: The USNS Impeccable Incident

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CLOSE ENCOUNTERS AT SEA
The USNS Impeccable Incident
Captain Raul Pedrozo,JAGC,U.S.Navy
O
n 23 March 2001,the hydrographic survey ship USNS Bowditch (T-AGS
62)wasconductingroutinemilitarysurveyoperationsinChina’sclaimed
exclusiveeconomiczone(EEZ)intheYellowSeawhenitwas“aggressivelycon-
1
fronted”byaChineseJianheuIII–classfrigateandorderedtoleavetheEEZ. Be-
inganunarmednavalauxiliaryvessel,Bowditchchangedcourseandleftthearea
asinstructed.Afewdayslater,theU.S.embassyfiledastronglywordeddiplo-
matic protest with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Bowditch re-
turned to the area of the encounter, this time with an armed U.S. escort, to
2
continueitsmission.
Eight years and a new U.S. administration later, the People’s Republic of
China(PRC)hasonceagaintakenaggressive,unsafe,andunprofessionalac-
tion against an unarmed naval auxiliary vessel—this time the ocean surveil-
lance ship USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23)—that was engaged in lawful
military activities in China’s claimed EEZ. On 8 March 2009, five PRC ves-
sels—a navy intelligence ship, a government fisheries-patrol vessel, a state
oceanographicpatrolvessel,andtwosmallfishingtrawlers—surroundedand
harassed Impeccable approximately seventy-five
CaptainPedrozoisamemberoftheNavalWarCol-
miles south of Hainan Island in the South China
lege’sInternationalLawDepartment,intheCenterfor
3
Naval Warfare Studies. Previously he was the Staff Sea. The fishing trawlers maneuvered within
JudgeAdvocatetotheCommander,U.S.PacificCom-
twenty-fivefeetofImpeccableandthenintentionally
mand.HehasalsoservedasaSpecialAssistanttothe
stopped in front of it, forcing Impeccable to take
UnderSecretaryofDefenseforPolicyandastheheadof
the Navy’s International and Operational Law emergencyactiontoavoidacollision.4TheU.S.gov-
Division.
ernmentprotestedthePRC’sactionsasreckless,un-
professional, and unlawful. China responded that
Naval War College Review, Summer 2009, Vol. 62, No. 3
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Close Encounters at Sea: The USNS Impeccable Incident
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102 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
Impeccable’spresenceinChina’sclaimedEEZhadbeeninviolationofChinese
5
domesticlawandinternationallaw. Impeccablereturnedtotheareathenext
day under escort of a guided-missile destroyer, the USS Chung-Hoon (DDG
93).
The PRCposition withregardtocoastal-state control over foreign military
activitiesintheEEZisthreefold:nationalsecurityinterests,resource/environ-
mental protection,and jurisdiction over marine scientific research (MSR).As
discussedindetailbelow,thePRC’spositionisinconsistentwithinternational
law(includingthe1982UNConventionontheLawoftheSea)andstateprac-
tice.ThePRC’spositionisalsosomewhatdisingenuous,asPRCnavalunitsrou-
tinely conduct submarine operations, military survey operations, and
surveillance/intelligence-collectionoperationsinforeignEEZsthroughoutthe
Asia-Pacificregion.
In short, nothing in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS)changestherightofmilitaryforcesofallnationstoconductmilitary
activitiesintheexclusiveeconomiczone.Moreover,priortoandsubsequentto
theadoptionofUNCLOSmilitaryforceshaveroutinelyconductedmilitaryac-
tivitiesseawardofthetwelve-nautical-mileterritorialseawithoutcoastal-state
noticeorconsent.Theseactivitiesincludetask-forcemaneuvering,flightopera-
tions,militaryexercises,weaponstestingandfiring,surveillanceandreconnais-
sance operations (and other intelligence-gathering activities), and military
marinedatacollection(militarysurveys).
THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
Allcoastalstatesmayclaimatwo-hundred-nautical-mileEEZ(article57).Com-
bined,theseEEZclaimsencompassalargeareaof theworld’socean—nearly30
6
percent—thattwentyyearsagowasconsideredtobehighseas. TheEEZisacrea-
tureofUNCLOS,whichcreateditforthepurposeofgivingcoastalstatesgreater
control over the resources adjacent to their coasts out to two hundred nautical
miles(articles56and57).CoastalstateswerealsograntedjurisdictionintheEEZ
overartificialislandsandstructures,MSR,andprotectionandpreservationof
theenvironment(article56).Unfortunately,overtheyearssomecoastalstates
likeChinahavesoughttoexpandtheirjurisdictionintheEEZbyattemptingto
exercise control over non-resource-related activities, including many military
activities.Theseillegalcoastal-staterestrictionsintheEEZtakemanyforms,in-
cluding prohibitions on military marine data collection (military surveys and
hydrographicsurveys),requirementsofpriornoticeorconsenttoconductmili-
taryactivities,environmentalconstraintsonsovereignimmunevesselsandair-
craft,andnational-securityrestrictions.Theseexcessiveclaimshavenobasisin
customaryinternationallaworinUNCLOS,andtheyhavebeendiplomatically
PEDROZO 103
protestedbytheU.S.governmentandoperationallychallengedbytheU.S.Navy
andAirForceundertheFreedomofNavigationProgramsince1979.
MilitaryActivitiesintheEEZ
Militaryusesof theseasareclearlyarecognizedrightunderinternationallaw.
Forcenturies,thenaviesof theworldhaveoperatedandtrainedinwaterssea-
ward of other nations’ territorial seas without constraint or the consent of
coastalstates.Thisextensivestatepracticeconfirmsthatmilitaryactivitiesatsea
arelawfulundercustomaryinternationallawandconsistentwitharticle2(4)of
theUNCharter.UNCLOSreaffirmsthisconclusionbylimitingmilitaryactivi-
ties in only a few narrow circumstances: while ships are engaged in innocent
passage,transitpassage,andarchipelagic-sea-lanespassage(ASLP)(articles19,
20,39,40,52,and54).Otherinternationalinstrumentsalsosupporttheposi-
tionthatmilitaryactivitiesatseaarelawful.Forexample,theInternationalMar-
itime Organization/International Hydrographic Organization World-wide
Navigational Warning Service specifically recognizes military activities at sea,
such as naval exercises and missile firings, as proper, for which “naval area”
7
warningsaretobeissued. Annex15totheChicagoConventionregardingAero-
nautical Information Services similarly provides that military exercises that
8
posehazardstocivilaviationareappropriatesubjectsfornoticestoairmen.
NothinginUNCLOSorstatepracticechangestherightofmilitaryforcesof
allnationstoconductmilitaryactivitiesintheexclusiveeconomiczonewithout
coastal-statenoticeorconsent.TheEEZwasnotcreatedtoregulatemilitaryac-
tivities. Proposals during the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III) to include residual coastal-state security interest rights in the
9
EEZwereconsideredandrejected. UNCLOSarticle56makesclearthatcoastal
stateshavelimitedsovereignrightsintheEEZforthepurposeofexploring,ex-
ploiting,conserving,andmanagingthenaturalresourcesof thezoneandwith
regardtootheractivitiesfortheeconomicexploitationandexplorationof the
zone.Thecoastalstatealsohaslimitedjurisdictionwithregardtotheestablish-
mentanduseofartificialislands,installations,andstructures,marinescientific
research,andtheprotectionandpreservationofthemarineenvironment.Inex-
ercisingitsrightsandperformingitsdutiesintheEEZ,thecoastalstateistohave
dueregardtotherightsanddutiesofotherstatesandactinamannercompati-
blewiththeprovisionsofUNCLOS.
Pursuanttoarticle58of UNCLOS,allstateshavethehigh-seasfreedomsof
navigationandoverflightreferredtoinarticle87ofUNCLOSandotherinter-
nationallylawfulusesofthesearelatedtothesefreedoms,suchasthoseassoci-
ated with the operation of ships and aircraft. As evidenced by long-standing
statepractice,theterm“otherinternationallylawfuluses”doesnotrefersolely
104 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
tonavigationandoverflightrightsbutincludesalllawfulmilitaryactivities.This
point was clearly articulated by the American delegation to the UNCLOS III
1983:
All States continue to enjoy in the [EEZ] traditional high seas freedoms of navigation
and overflight and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other interna-
tionally lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms, which remain qualitatively
and quantitatively the same as those freedoms when exercised seaward of the zone.
Military operations, exercises and activities have always been regarded as internation-
ally lawful uses of the sea. The right to conduct such activities will continue to be en-
10
joyed by all States in the exclusive economic zone.
Theonlylimitationontheuserstate’srightsandfreedomsisareciprocaldue-
regardrequirement.Inthisregard,onecanenvisionlimitedsituationswhere
legitimatemilitaryactivitiesmaybeadjustedtorespectcoastal-stateresource
rightsintheEEZ—forexample,aproposedweaponsexerciseincloseproxim-
itytoanactiveoffshoreoilplatform.Butthesesituationsaretheexception,not
therule,andcannotbedictatedunilaterallybythecoastalstate.Asdiscussed
below,althoughforeignsovereign-immunevesselsdonothavetocomplywith
coastalnations’domesticenvironmentalregulations,U.S.Navyvesselsoperate
with due regard for the marine environment. For example, when operating
low-andmidfrequencysonarsystemsanywherearoundtheworld,U.S.Navy
vessels voluntarily apply marine-mammal mitigation measures that provide
extensiveprotectionfortheenvironmentbasedonthebestavailablescience.
ThePRChasrecentlyindicatedthatsonarusemayharmmarinemammalsand
fishstocksinitsEEZ.However,thereisnoevidencethattheNavy’ssonaruse,
while applying these scientific protective measures, impacts either marine
11
mammalsorfish. ThesemeasuresaredesignedtoallowtheNavytotrainre-
alisticallywithoutharmingtheenvironment,andtheyfarexceedthe“duere-
gard” requirement of article 58. In short, the PRC has no right under
internationallawtoforcetrainingrestrictionsormitigationmeasuresonfor-
eignsovereignimmunevesselsoperatinginitsEEZ.
AlthoughcoastalstatesenjoyenvironmentaljurisdictionintheEEZ,appli-
cation of environmental controls on foreign warships,naval auxiliaries (like
Impeccable and Bowditch), and other government-owned or -operated non-
commercialvesselsandaircraftoperatingintheEEZisstrictlylimited.Article
236makesclearthattheprovisionsofUNCLOS“regardingtheprotectionand
preservation of the marine environment do not apply to any warship, naval
auxiliary,other vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a state and used,for
the time being, only on government non-commercial service.” The only re-
quirement is that such vessels and aircraft are to act in a manner consistent
PEDROZO 105
with the environmental provisions of UNCLOS, so far as is reasonable and
practicabletodoso,andtotheextentthatitdoesnotimpairtheoperationsor
operationalcapabilitiesofsuchvesselsandaircraft.
ItisalsoimportanttonotethatwhileUNCLOSdoesplacecertainlimitations
onmilitaryactivitiesatsea,theserestrictionsarelimitedtoshipsengagedinin-
nocentpassage,transitpassage,andASLP.Forexample,article19limitscertain
military activities in the territorial sea, such as threat or use of force, use of
weapons,intelligencegathering,actsof propaganda,launchingandlandingof
aircraft and other military devices, and marine data collection (hydrographic
surveys and military surveys). Article 52 applies these same limitations to
archipelagicwaters.Articles20and52providethatsubmarinesmustnavigate
onthesurfacewhenininnocentpassageintheterritorialseaorarchipelagicwa-
ters.Articles39and54prohibitthethreatoruseofforcewhenshipsareengaged
in transit passage or archipelagic-sea-lanes passage.Finally,articles 40 and 54
prohibitsurveyactivitiesforshipsengagedintransitpassageorASLP.Nosimi-
larlimitationsareincludedinpartVofUNCLOSandthereforetheydonotap-
ply to foreign warships, military aircraft, or other sovereign, “immune”ships
andaircraftinandovertheEEZ.Thisconclusionisconfirmedbythenegotiat-
ing history of UNCLOS: efforts to include “security interests” as a protected
12
coastal-stateinterestintheEEZfailed.
Chineserelianceonthe“peacefulpurposes”provisionsofUNCLOS(articles
88,141,and 301) to regulate military activities in the EEZ is also clearly mis-
placed.Article301providesthat“inexercisingtheirrightsandperformingtheir
dutiesunderthisConvention,StatesPartiesshallrefrainfromanythreatoruse
offorceagainsttheterritorialintegrityorpoliticalindependenceofanystate,or
inanyothermannerinconsistentwiththe principlesof internationallawem-
bodiedintheCharteroftheUnitedNations.”Identicallanguagecanbefoundin
article 2(4) of the UN Charter and in UNCLOS article 19.2(a). State practice
since the adoption of UNCLOS confirms that the “peaceful purposes”provi-
sionsdonotcreatenewrightsorobligations,nordotheyimposerestraintson
traditionalmilitaryoperationsatseathatareconsistentwithinternationallaw,
including the UN Charter. These provisions simply require states to exercise
theirrightsandperformtheirdutiesunderUNCLOSinaccordancewiththeir
duty under article 2(4) of the UN Charter torefrain from the threat or use of
forceagainsttheterritorialintegrityorpoliticalindependenceofanystate.Mili-
tarysurveillanceandreconnaissanceoperationsininternationalairspace,how-
ever,donotequatetoa“threatoruseofforceagainsttheterritorialintegrityor
political independence of any state.” Long-standing state practice, as well as
UNCLOS,supportstheconclusionthatsuchoperationsarelawfulandconsis-
tent with the UN Charter. In this regard, UNCLOS article 19 makes a clear
106 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
distinctionbetweena“threatoruseof forceagainstthesovereignty,territorial
integrity or political independence of the coastal state”and “any act aimed at
collectinginformationtotheprejudiceofthedefenseorsecurityofthecoastal
13
state.” Bothareprohibitedintheterritorialseaforshipsengagedininnocent
passage,buttheyareclearlydistinctandindependentactivities.UNCLOSarti-
cle19(2)makesasimilardistinctionbetween“threatoruseofforce”andother
militaryactivitiesatseathatareconsistentwitharticle2(4)oftheUNCharter,
suchasmilitaryexercises,weaponstesting,useofordnance,andmilitarymarine
datacollection(militarysurveysandhydrographicsurveys).
MarineDataCollectionintheEEZ
Althoughcoastalstatescanclearlyregulatemarinescientificresearchintheex-
clusive economic zone,marine data collection is much broader.“Marine data
collection”isageneraltermreferringtoalltypesof collectionactivitiesatsea,
including MSR,military surveys,and hydrographic surveys.UNCLOS applies
differentrulestoeachoftheseactivities,dependingonwheretheactivitiestake
place.
“Marinescientificresearch,”incontrast,indicatesactivitiesundertakentoex-
pandscientificknowledgeofthemarineenvironmentanditsprocesses.Classesof
data collected could be related to oceanography, marine biology, fisheries re-
search,scientificoceandrillingorcoring,orgeologicalorgeophysicalstudies.The
data is usually shared among the public and scientific communities. Hydro-
graphicsurveys,ontheotherhand,areconductedtosupportsafetyofnavigation.
Thedatacollectedisnormallyusedtoproducenauticalchartsandsimilarprod-
ucts.Thatis,hydrographicsurveyisnotMSR.Neitherismilitarysurveyconsid-
eredtobeMSR,becauseitisconductedformilitary,notscientific,purposes.The
datacollectedmaybeeitherclassifiedorunclassified;itisnormallynotreleasedto
thepublicorscientificcommunityunlessitisunclassifiedandwascollectedon
thehighseas.Suchcollecteddatacouldbeoceanographic,hydrographic,marine
geologicalorgeophysical,chemical,acoustic,orbiological.Althoughthemeansof
datacollectionareoftensimilarandtothecoastalstatemayappearindistinguish-
ablefrommarinescientificresearch,itisthemilitaryorsafetyusetowhichthe
data is put that distinguishes military surveys and hydrographic surveys from
MSR.
OnthebasisofthesedistinctionsandtheplainlanguageofUNCLOS,military
surveys and hydrographic surveys remain high-seas freedoms and may be con-
ductedinforeignEEZsandonforeigncontinentalshelveswithoutcoastal-state
noticeorconsent.Coastal-stateconsentisonlyrequiredforsuchsurveyactivities
interritorialseasandarchipelagicwaters.ThefollowingprovisionsofUNCLOS
support this conclusion:
PEDROZO 107
(cid:129)
Researchorsurveyactivitiesareinconsistentwithinnocentpassage(article
19[2][j]).
(cid:129)
Shipsintransitpassageorarchipelagic-sea-lanespassagemaynotcarryout
researchorsurveyactivities(articles40and54).
(cid:129)
PartXIIIappliesonlytoMSRanddoesnotrefertosurveyactivities.
WHY THIS IS IMPORTANT: THE EP-3 INCIDENT
Inordertoavoidconflictandpotentialmiscalculationsatseaandintheairbe-
tweenU.S.andChineseforces,bothsidesneedtohaveaclearunderstandingof
theirrespectiverightsinandovertheEEZascoastalanduserstates.Wecertainly
14
donotwantarepeatof theEP-3incident. Onthemorningof 1April2001,a
weekaftertheBowditchincidentdiscussedearlier,twoChineseF-8fighterair-
craftinterceptedaU.S.EP-3thatwasconductingaroutinereconnaissanceflight
about seventy miles south/southeast of Hainan Island. After making several
closeapproachestotheAmericanaircraft,oneoftheF-8slostcontrolandcol-
lidedwiththeEP-3.TheF-8waschoppedinhalf;thenoseconeandnumber-one
propelleroftheEP-3wereseverelydamaged.TheChinesepilotejectedbutwas
never found and was presumed dead. The EP-3 was forced to make an emer-
gencylandingattheLingshuimilitaryairfieldonHainan.Thecauseofthecolli-
sionisstillamatterof dispute.ThePRCclaimsthattheEP-3swervedintothe
flightpathandrammedtheF-8.TheUnitedStatesclaimsthattheF-8raninto
thelarger,slower,andlessmaneuverableEP-3.Iwillnotgointothedetailshere
butwouldonlysuggestthatthelawsofphysicsdonotsupporttheChineseposi-
tion—andleaveitatthat.
Some of the legal issues raised by the PRC following this incident included
thevalidityofcoastal-statesecurityinterestsintheexclusiveeconomiczone,the
legalityofsurveillanceandreconnaissanceflightsovertheEEZ,andtheapplica-
bilityofthedue-regardrequirementwhenconductingairintercepts.
As previously discussed, coastal states lack security interests in the EEZ.
NothinginUNCLOSsupportsthePRCposition.Similarly,theChineseposition
thatthefreedomofoverflightreflectedinUNCLOSarticle58isanarrowright,
includingonlytherighttotransittheairspaceabovetheEEZ,isnotsupported
byUNCLOS,otherinternationalagreements,orstatepractice.Onthecontrary,
thenegotiatinghistoryofUNCLOSandstatepracticebefore,during,andafter
UNCLOSsupporttheconclusionthatfreedomsofnavigationandoverflightin
theEEZarebroadfreedoms;itiscoastal-staterightsintheEEZthatarenarrowly
limited.Aswehaveseen,UNCLOSarticle58isquiteclear:allstatesenjoythe
freedomsof navigationandoverflightandotherinternationallylawfulusesof
theseasrelatedtothesefreedoms,suchasthoseassociatedwiththeoperationof
108 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
shipsandaircraft.Long-standingstatepracticesupportsthepositionthatsur-
veillanceandreconnaissanceoperationsconductedininternationalairspacebe-
yondthetwelve-nautical-mileterritorialseaarelawfulactivities.Sincetheend
of World War II, surveillance and reconnaissance operations in international
airspacehavebecomeamatterofroutine.Manynations,includingthePRC,en-
gage in such activities on a routine basis. Moreover, as previously discussed,
UNCLOSarticle19.2(c)prohibitsintelligence-gatheringactivitiesbyshipsen-
gagedininnocentpassagethroughtheterritorialsea—asnotedabove,nosimi-
larprohibitioniscontainedinpartVof UNCLOS,andtherefore,surveillance
andreconnaissanceactivitiesarepermittedintheEEZ.ThePRChasanobliga-
tionunderUNCLOSarticle56toexerciseitslimitedresource-relatedrightsin
theEEZwithdueregardfortherightsofotherstatestoengageinlawfulmilitary
activities,includingsurveillanceandreconnaissanceoperations,inthezone.
WithregardtosurveillanceandreconnaissanceflightsovertheEEZ,itisalso
importanttonotethatcoastalstateslackcompetencetoregulatemilitaryactivi-
tiesintheairspaceabovetheEEZ.Articles2and49ofUNCLOSmakeclearthat
theairspaceabovetheterritorialseaandarchipelagicwatersisnationalairspace,
subjecttocoastal-state/archipelagic-statesovereignty.Similarlanguageisfound
inarticle1oftheConventiononInternationalCivilAviationof1944(knownas
the Chicago Convention) with regard to the territorial sea. Beyond the
twelve-milelimit,however,isinternationalairspace.NeitherUNCLOSnorthe
ChicagoConventiongrantcoastalstatesanyauthorityovermilitaryaircraftop-
eratingininternationalairspaceabovetheEEZ.Coastal-statesovereignrightsin
thezonearelimitedtotheseabed,itssubsoil,andthewaterssuperjacenttothe
seabed,withoneexception—thecoastalstatehassovereignrightswithregardto
theproductionofenergyfromthewinds(UNCLOSarticle56).Therefore,noth-
inginUNCLOSprovidesalegalbasisforregulatingmilitaryactivitiesintheair-
spaceabovetheEEZ.UNCLOSdoes,however,clearlyprovidethatintheEEZall
statesenjoy,amongotherthings,freedomofnavigationandoverflightandother
internationallylawfulusesofthesea.Theonlycaveatisthatinexercisingtheir
high-seasfreedomsintheEEZ,statesshallhave“dueregard”totherightsand
duties of the coastal state and shall comply with the laws and regulations
adoptedbythecoastalstateinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofUNCLOSand
otherrulesofinternationallaw“insofarastheyarenotincompatible”withpart
VofUNCLOS(article58,emphasisadded).Similarly,theprovisionsoftheChi-
cagoConventiondonotapplytostateaircraft,whichincludeallaircraftusedin
military,customs,andpoliceservices.Theonlyrequirementisthatstateaircraft
15
flywith“dueregard”forthesafetyofnavigationofcivilaircraft.
PEDROZO 109
THE WAY FORWARD
The PRC can expect U.S.warships,military aircraft,and naval auxiliaries like
Impeccable and Bowditch to continue to operate in its claimed EEZ, in accor-
dance with the rights and freedoms guaranteed to all nations under interna-
tionallaw.IfthePRChasanissuewithcontinuedAmericanmilitarypresencein
itsEEZ,thePRCshouldraiseitsconcernsnotviabridge-to-bridgecommunica-
tions,intheopenpress,orviadiplomaticprotestsbutdirectlywiththeUnited
Statesandattempttoreachamutuallyacceptablesolutionwithinthecontextof
16
the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA). Some have sug-
gested that it may be time for the United States to negotiate an INCSEA-like
17
agreement with China to avoid confrontations of this nature. However,I do
notbelievesuchanagreementisnecessary,astheMMCAwasspecificallyestab-
lished to facilitate consultations between the U.S.Department of Defense and
thePRCMinistryofNationalDefenseforthe“purposeofpromotingcommon
understandings regarding activities undertaken by their respective maritime
18
andairforceswhenoperatinginaccordancewithinternationallaw.” Unfortu-
nately,MMCAhasfailedtoliveuptoexpectationsinthisregard,primarilybe-
causeofthePRC’sunwillingnesstoengageinaseriousdebateonthisimportant
issue.Asolutioncanbereachedifbothsidesactingoodfaithandapplythem-
selves,butasthesayinggoes,“ittakestwototango.”Iwouldpointtothe1989
UniformInterpretationofRulesofInternationalLawGoverningInnocentPas-
sage,agreedtobytheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionaftera1988BlackSea
“bumping”incident,asanexampleofhowtwonationswithdifferingviewscan
reach a mutually acceptable solution to a politically charged national-security
issue.(Inthe1988case,theissuewastherightofinnocentpassageofwarships
through the territorial sea without prior notice to or consent of the coastal
19
state.)
Untilamutuallyacceptablesolutionisreached,PRCshipsandaircraftshould
immediatelyceasetheiraggressive,unlawful,andunsafemaneuversinthevicinity
ofU.S.shipsandaircraft,aswasrecentlywitnessednearImpeccable.Inadditionto
complyingwiththeirlegalobligationsundertheCollisionRegulations,Chinese
shipsandaircraftshould—ashasbeensuggestedbytheUnitedStatesonnumer-
ous occasions—also abide by internationally recognized codes and signals.The
CodeforUnalertedEncountersatSea,orCUES,issuedbytheWesternPacificNa-
valSymposium,offerssafetymeasuresandprocedures,aswellasameanstolimit
mutualinterferenceanduncertaintyandtofacilitatecommunicationwhenwar-
ships,submarines,publicvessels,ornavalaircraftmakecontact.Standardsafety
procedures are contained in part 3, standard communications procedures in
part4,and“SelectedSignalsVocabularyandBasicManeuveringInstructions”
in part 5.The NATO publication Multinational Maritime Tactical Instructions