DTIC ADA519318: Maritime Domain Awareness: Myths and Realities

0.11 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS
Myths and Realities
Commander Steven C.Boraz,U.S.Navy
MaritimeDomainAwarenessiswhereitallbegins.Wecannotconduct
theoperationsthatwemustifwedon’thaveagoodsenseofwhat’sout
there,movingon,aboveorunderthesea.
ADMIRALGARYROUGHEAD,INRHUMBLINES,20AUGUST2007
I
twasnotlongaftertheattacksofSeptember11ththatgovernmentofficialsbe-
gandiscussingotheravenuesthatterroristsmightusetoattackAmericanciti-
zens,particularlyinthemaritimedomain.InaspeechdeliveredinJanuary2002,
President George W.Bush noted,“The heart of the Maritime Domain Aware-
nessprogramisaccurateinformation,intelligence,surveillance,andreconnais-
sance of all vessels, cargo, and people extending well beyond our traditional
maritimeboundaries.”1ByNovember2002CongresshadpassedtheMaritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002.2 The National Security Council and the
presidentcontinuedtoexploreissuessurroundingthesafetyandsecurityofthe
U.S.maritimeenvirons.InDecember2004,thepresidentsignedNationalSecu-
rity Presidential Directive 41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13,
whichestablishedpolicyguidelines.ItalsodirectedthesecretariesofHomeland
Security and Defense to lead the federal effort in developing a comprehensive
nationalstrategythatwouldbetterintegrateandsyn-
Commander Boraz, an eighteen-year veteran of the
U.S.Navy’sintelligencecommunity,iscurrentlythe chronizeexistingdepartment-levelstrategiesanden-
Assistant Program Manager for Maritime Domain
suretheireffectiveandefficientimplementation.The
Awareness at Program Executive Office, Command,
interagency Maritime Security Policy Coordinating
Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelli-
genceinSanDiego,California.HeservedasaFederal Committeewasestablishedtoserveastheprimaryfo-
ExecutiveFellowattheRANDCorporationfrom2004
rum for coordinating government maritime security
to2005.Hehaspublishedinseveralprofessionaljour-
nalsandiscoeditorofReformingIntelligence:Obstacles policies;itdeliveredaNationalStrategyforMaritime
toDemocraticControlandEffectiveness(Austin:Uni- Security in September 2005.3 Eight additional plans,
versity of Texas Press, 2007).
includingtheNationalPlantoAchieveMaritimeDo-
Naval War College Review,Summer2009, Vol. 62, No.3 mainAwareness,buttressthenationalstrategy.4
Report Documentation Page Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington
VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it

does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
2009 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Maritime Domain Awareness: Myths and Realities
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
Naval War College,686 Cushing Road,Newport,RI,02841-1207 REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF
ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 10
unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR)
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
138 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
Inresponse,thedepartmentsofHomelandSecurity,Transportation,andDe-
fenseidentifiedexecutiveagentstoleadtheireffortstowardachievingmaritime
domainawareness(MDA):theCoastGuard,theMaritimeAdministration,and
theNavy,respectively.
TheCoastGuardhasrecentlyestablishedtheNationwideAutomaticIdentifi-
cation System, a robust command-and-control network designed to improve
maritime safety and security at the nation’s highest-priority ports and coastal
zones.CustomsandBorderProtection,anotherHomelandSecurityagency,has
the Container Security Initiative and the Customs-Trade Partnership against
Terrorism(C-TPAT).5
TheMaritimeAdministrationhelpeddeveloptheMaritimeSafetyandSecu-
rity Information System (MSSIS), participates in the MDA executive steering
committee,and is tasked by Congress to be the “Information Advocate of the
MarineTransportationSystem.”6
TheNavy,foritspart,haspushedtheconceptofthe“thousand-shipnavy”;7
at least one senior advocate has declared that “it is virtually indisputable that
MDAistheenablingmissionsupportingSeaStrike,SeaShield,andSeaBasing,
and is a primary focus of what FORCEnet will ultimately do.”8 MDA is a key
componentintheNavy’snewmaritimestrategy,ACooperativeStrategyfor21st
CenturySeapower,whichnotes,“Tobeeffective,theremustbeasignificantlyin-
creasedcommitmenttoadvancemaritimedomainawareness(MDA)....Mari-
timeforceswillcontributetoenhanceinformationsharing,underpinningand
energizing our capability to neutralize threats to our Nation as far from our
shoresaspossible.”9
TheSecretaryoftheNavyhasdeemedMDAimportantenoughtodirectthe
servicetodevelopa“cross-functionalteam”fromtheoperationalstaff andac-
quisition communities to implement an initial MDA capability in the Central
andPacificCommandareasofresponsibilityandonthewestcoastoftheUnited
StatesbyAugust2008;thesecretarycommittedmorethan$300milliontodoing
so.10ThereareliterallyhundredsmorepublicandcommercialMDA-relatedac-
tivitiesbeingdeveloped.
MDAisalsoacontemporarydebatetopic.Thisjournal,forexample,haspro-
videdamplespacetothemaritimestrategyandMDA,anditroutinelypublishes
articles regarding maritime security.11 Also, maritime security figures promi-
nentlyinliteratureissuedbythinktanks.12
Evenwithoutsuchextensiveandvariedactivity,itwouldbeclearthatMDAis
acornerstoneofnationalsecurity,asmorethan80percentoftheworld’strade
travels by water.13 Nonetheless, operators, acquisition professionals, defense
contractors,andpolicymakersstillfindmaritimedomainawarenessadifficult
idea.Thisisthecasebecauseofwidespreadmisperceptionsaboutwhatittakes
BORAZ 139
toachieveMDA,whoshouldimplementit,where,andhow.Thisarticleisin-
tendedtoaddressandclearawaysomeofthosestumblingblocks.
Myth:“TheNavyHasAlways‘Done’MDA”
The reality is that navies of the world,both ancient and modern,have always
gathered data on their maritime environments to gain situational awareness
thattheirmissionsrequired,whetherbasicnavigationorfindinganenemyar-
madaandstoppingitbeforeitcouldattack.Manyarguethattherehassimply
beenachangeinthedetails;infact,however,thatwouldbeakintosayinghu-
manityhadbeen“doing”physicsbeforeIsaacNewton—thecontextoftheMDA
we’vebeen“doing”andthatoftheMDAweneedtoachievearevastlydifferent.
Thisistrueforthreereasons.
First, the scale of “doing” MDA has dramatically expanded; massive
amounts of data on all aspects of maritime activity must be collected, then
cross-referenced,“fused”(generallyspeaking,correlatedacrosssources),and
analyzed,inordertodetectanomaliesthatmayindicatethreat-relatedbehav-
ior.14Thecomputingpowerrequiredisinordinatelygreaterthanthecapacity
ofthe“greymatter”ofthosekeepingwatch.Forexample,duringtheColdWar
probablyfewerthanathousandshipsweretrackedgloballyatanyonetime.To-
day, hundreds of thousands of ships need to be tracked and the links among
theircargoes,crews,andfinancialtransactionssortedout.TheNovember2008
seaborne attacks on Mumbai represent a vivid case in point.The attackers hi-
jackedanIndianfishingtrawler,theKuber,whichroutinelytraveledtoMumbai
fromaportinGujaratStateneartheIndia-Pakistanborder.Approximately950
trawlers,carryingeightthousandfishermen,cometoMumbaieveryyear,over
aneight-monthperiodbeginninginAugust.15Makingtheconnectionsbetween
thesetrawlersandtheterroristswhomaytakeadvantageof suchlogisticsnet-
worksrequiresmuchmorethan“whatwe’vealwaysbeendoing.”
Second,theU.S.Navyhaslettheartsofunderstandingregionalmaritimeac-
tivityanddeterminingtrendsthereinatrophy.Foryears,thiswasamissionas-
signedtoFleetOceanSurveillanceInformationFacilitiesandCenters(FOSIFs
andFOSICs).Staffedwithnavalintelligenceprofessionals,“operators,”andci-
vilian analysts, they provided in-depth analysis of the activities of the navies
(andsomeairforces)inallthemaritimeenvironsinwhichtheU.S.Navyoper-
ated.16 In the restructuring that resulted from the demise of the Soviet Union
and a new U.S. emphasis on joint structures, the missions that FOSIFs and
FOSICs had once met were transferred to Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs).
Whetherbecausethemaritimeenvironmenthaschangedsodrastically—thatis,
noSovietnavy—orbecause,assomecontend,thecenterssimplyignoremari-
timeissuesandfocustheirintelligencesupportoncombatantcommanders(i.e.,
140 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
of unified,or interservice,regional or functional commands) rather than op-
erational forces, is immaterial. The result is less support to naval forces. The
emerging “Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Centers”
(MHQ/MOC)conceptmayfillthegap.MHQ/MOCenvisionsaglobalnetwork
ofNavy-maritimeorganizationsinsupportofnationalrequirements.17Theini-
tialplanestablishesMHQsforeachofthe“numberedfleets”(e.g.,theSeventh
FleetinthewesternPacificOcean,theSixthFleetintheMediterranean,etc.).A
“conceptofoperations”argues:
A key element of both homeland defense and maritime security overseas is achieving
and maintaining global maritime intelligence integration (GMII) and maritime do-
main awareness (MDA), which will require integrating various local and regional es-
timates within a global context. Maritime forces are a key element in this layered
defense of national interests, both in the forward regions and in the approaches to
the continental United States, where the objective is “to detect, deter, and, if neces-
sary, defeat threats en route—before they reach the United States.”18
Applied regional MDA expertise, then, is urgently needed. Imagine, in a
war-fighting context, having to determine the intention of a particular mer-
chantshipforthecommanderoftheSeventhFleet,oroftheentirePacificFleet,
and “turning on the MDA switch”to do so—only to find the circuit not con-
nected.WhentheSovietnavywasatsea,teamskeptchecklistsonitsspecificac-
tivities,pastandpresent;theyknewwhateachonemeantandhadaverygood
ideaastowhatwouldfollow.Today,incontrast,theU.S.Navydoesnothavethe
intelligence, operational, intellectual, or technical capacity to support MDA-
relatedmissionsattheoperationallevelofwar.Partoftheshortfallisbeingad-
dressed by new programs, as well as by the reestablishment of the Advanced
MaritimeOperationalIntelligenceCourseattheCenterforNavalIntelligencein
DamNeck,Virginia,buttheseveryinitiativesareevidencethatthegapexists.
Third, the way the Navy views commercial merchant traffic (traditionally
colorcodedas“white”)haschanged.Whiteshippingusedtobeanavigational
andwatch-keepingproblem—somethingnottocollidewithoratwhichnotto
directmissiles.Nowitisapotentialthreatasevincedbytheal-Qa‘idaattackson
the USS Cole in 2000 and the crude-oil carrier M/V Limburg in 2002, the
Mumbai attacks, and numerous acts of piracy off the Horn of Africa, in the
MalaccaStrait,andelsewhere.
Myth:“MDAIsAllabout‘White’Shipping”
In reality,maritime domain awareness is about considerably more than white
shipping.Aswehaveseen,itputswhiteshippinginanentirelydifferentlight;
however,MDAis“theeffectiveunderstandingof anythingassociatedwiththe
BORAZ 141
globalmaritimedomainthatcouldimpactthesecurity,safety,economy,orenvi-
ronmentoftheUnitedStates.”19Maritimedomainawarenessmeansfindingthe
shipsandsubmarinesoffriendsandfoes,understandingtheentiresupplychain
ofcargoes,identifyingpeopleaboardvessels,understandingtheinfrastructures
withinorastridethemaritimedomain,andidentifyinganomaliesandpotential
threatsinalltheseareas.Navalofficers,however,focusmoreoftenthannoton
securityaspects;forthem,MDAboilsdowntoamaritimetargetingissue.“Tar-
geting,”inthissense,doesnotalwaysinvolvea“kineticeffect”(aweaponstrik-
inganobject).Itmaymeanpointingouttoaboardingteamamerchantvessel
thatitshouldstrikeupaconversationwith;identifyingacargocarrierassuspect
soitcanbeheldoffshoreforinspection;understandingtheflowsof personnel
and cargo at a shore facility; or,when a kinetic targeting solution is required,
pickingoutthewheatfromthechaff.
Myth:“MDAIsTooAmorphousaConcepttoBeUseful”
Inreality—andwhilemaritimedomainawarenesscertainlyhasdifferentmean-
ingsforCaptainsofPorts,mastersofships,andeveryoneinbetween—thecom-
mon requirements of safety, security, the economy, and the environment
resonateamongallitsstakeholders.ThiswasevidentattheMDAConnectivity
Workshop conference held in Newport,Rhode Island,in August 2007 and at-
tendedbyrepresentativesofAustralia,Canada,France,Italy,Japan,NATO,New
Zealand,Singapore,the United Kingdom,and the United States.The interna-
tionalattendeesagreedthat“maritimedomainawareness”wasaflawedrubric
andthatimpliedlinkstotheU.S.globalwaronterrorwereworrisome.Buttheir
primarymaritime-securityconcernsweresurprisinglysimilar:terrorism,illegal
migration,piracy,illegalexploitationofnaturalresources,illegalactivityinpro-
tectedareas,drugtrafficking,armssmuggling,andtheneedforsecurityanden-
vironmentalprotection.Thatis,admittedly,abroadrangeofissues,butthefact
thatsomanydisparatenationssharethemtestifiestotheimportanceof mari-
timedomainawarenessandtheprospectsforpartnershipstoachieveit.
Myth:“MDAIsAllabouttheBlipsonMyMonitor”
TherealityisthatMDAisnotjustabouttheblips;it’saboutwhethertheblips
matter.Aggregatingdisparatedatasetstogenerateausefuloperationalpictureis
anincreasinglycomplextaskbecauseof themassiveamountsof dataavailable
on all aspects of maritime activity. Fusing and analyzing those data may find
anomaliesthatpointtothreatactivityofinteresttodecisionmakers.TheNavy’s
formalMDAconceptlaysitoutasanequation:thatmaritimedomainawareness
equals global maritime situational awareness (the blips) plus maritime threat
awareness(whethertheblipsmatter).20
142 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
Myth:“AllWeNeedforMDAIsAIS”
The Automatic Identification System, or AIS, is indeed a reality. It uses a sig-
nal—a transponder-based collision-avoidance system that transmits and re-
ceivesreal-timenavigationalinformationviaVHFline-of-sightradio—thatcan
besharedfreelyattheunclassifiedlevel.TheInternationalMaritimeOrganiza-
tion(IMO)mandatesitsuseonallpassengerships,tankers,andallotherships
of three hundred gross tons and above.21 AIS is a critical technology that en-
ables MDA. Its use has spawned navigational information networks and
“clearinghouses”in many nations; it is a key component of MSSIS; and it is
availablecommercially.22
However,the Automatic Identification System has its weaknesses.It can be
spoofed,itsuseislooselyenforced(ifatall),anditprovidesinformationonlyon
shipsmandatedbytheIMO;potentialfoesknowhowtouseit,ornotuseit,soas
tohidetheirwhereabouts.Moreover,duetothenatureoftheunderlyingcom-
munications protocol (known as “time-division multiplexing”) that AIS em-
ploys,signaldegradationinhigh-densityenvironmentslimitstheusefulnessof
the system as well as the value of its proposed use on smaller ships. Strategic
partners have produced technical solutions that overcome this liability, by
means of the Global Packet Radio Service, a system in use for many mobile
phones.
The underlying issue is that neither AIS nor any other “silver bullet” will
achievemaritimedomainawareness.MDArequiresallmannerofsensors,data-
bases,data sharing,decision aids,displays,etc.Without databases that can be
rapidlyandadaptivelysearchedtodeveloptrendsonspecificships,AISdoeslit-
tle more than “spam”the maritime “common operational picture”with more
andmoreblips.
Myth:“MDACanBeDoneEntirelyattheUnclassifiedLevel”
Therealityisthatourabilitytofind,fix,track,andtargetisconsiderablyenhanced
whenclassifiedorsensitiveinformationisapplied.Thereisnodoubtthatmuchof
theinformationavailabletoachievemaritimedomainawarenessisunclassified.
Programs like the Container Security Initiative, C-TPAT,MSSIS,and of course
AIShavebeenofconsiderablebenefittosafetyandsecurityinthemaritimedo-
main.Buthowoftenwilloperationaldecisionsbemadeonthebasisofwhatises-
sentiallyanavigational-hazardandship-avoidancesystem?AsViceAdmiralJohn
MorganandCommanderBudWimmerpointout,“MaritimeDomainAwareness
is all about generating actionable intelligence, the cornerstone of successful
counterterroristandmaritimelawenforcementoperations.”23Whileunclassified
information can contribute significantly to “awareness” per se, producing
BORAZ 143
actionable intelligence generally requires classified or sensitive information not
available in the public domain.
Myth:“WeCanJustBuildSomethinglikeICAOfortheMaritimeDomain”
Inreality,themaritimedomainhasuniquecompliancechallenges,basedoncul-
tureandcompetitiveadvantage.TheInternationalCivilianAviationOrganiza-
tion (ICAO),a United Nations agency,codifies principles and techniques and
setsstandardstofacilitatebordercrossingforinternationalcivilaviation.24Ac-
cording to some, the IMO should be able to do the same for the maritime
environment.
ICAO standards are based on the Chicago Convention of 1945–47,a docu-
mentthatwasagreedupononlytwodecadesafterthebirthofinternationalair
travelandsoinfluenceditsformativeyears.Tospeakofsomethingsimilarinthe
maritimedomainfailstotakeintoaccountthatfreedomoftheseashasbeena
criticalaspectof commercialtradeandaninternationalstandardforwellover
twomillenniums.
Moreover,commercialpracticemakestheanalogybetweenthemaritimeand
airdomainsapoorone.Airplanesfileflightplans,takeoff,andland.Shipsfile
sailingplansanddepartbutthen,inasingleextendedvoyage,maychangeflags,
changeowners,changenames,sellcargo,changetheirdestinations,allinanat-
tempt to make, or not lose, money in a volatile, highly competitive shipping
market,andwhileothershipsaretryingtodothesame.
Whilethedevelopmentof internationalstandardsforthemaritimedomain
basedonthosenowineffectfortheairisalaudablegoalandmaybepossible
someday, those who argue for them tend to forget that cultural change takes
time,usuallyproportionatetohowlongaculturehasbeeninplace.Further,the
costwouldlikelymeetwithsubstantialresistancefrommanynations.Establish-
ingICAO-likestandardsinthemaritimedomainissimplynotachievableinthe
nearterm.
Myth:“MDACanBeDoneVirtually”
TherealityisthatmuchofwhattheUnitedStateshaslearnedsincetheterroristat-
tacksof11September2001pointstothelegalandculturalrestrictionsthatham-
peritsabilitytoshareinformation.Thereislittledoubtthatnosingleentityor
agencycanberesponsiblefor,orhasthecapacitytocoordinate,allMDA-related
activity.That fact,coupled with modern network-centric information capabili-
ties, leads to a strong argument that “nodes” generating maritime situational
awarenessmustbelinkedandthatsomeMDAfunctionsmustbedonevirtually.
The present approaches that have worked best include those of the National
Counterterrorism Center (in McLean, Virginia), the National Counterprolif-
erationCenter(inWashington,D.C.),andtheJointInteragencyTaskForces(West
144 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
andSouth),becausetheyputpeopleandsystemsfromdifferentagenciesintothe
samephysicalstructures.Thisenables(infact,forces)informationsharingwhile
ensuring that information does not cross information-security boundaries.
This brick-and-mortar solution might be applied to MDA in the form of
whatmightbecalled“maritimeinteragencytaskforces.”Theywouldcombine
elements of MHQ/MOCs, numbered-fleet command centers, the U.S. Coast
Guard’s Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers, and unified combatant com-
mandsandmightinitiallybestaffedbythoseentities.Theywouldalsoneedap-
propriate operations and intelligence specialists from various government
agencies(someofthemalreadyinthecombatantcommands),selectedalliedna-
tions,andcommercialliaisons.Themissionwouldbetodeliverregionallyfo-
cused expertise and operational support, for areas of responsibilities roughly
coincidingwiththoseofthenumberedfleets.
Thiswouldrequireahardlookatexistingstructuresbothwithinandoutsidethe
continentalUnitedStates,inparticulartherelationshipamongMHQ/MOCs,Joint
IntelligenceOperationCentersineachofthecombatantcommands,andMaritime
IntelligenceFusionCenters.Forinstance,themaritimesecuritymissionoftheJoint
IntelligenceOperationCentersignificantlyoverlapsthatoftheMHQ/MOC,espe-
ciallyoverseas.Giventoday’sresourceconstraints,combiningpeopleandmissions
isworthconsidering.ThesamecanbesaidforcenterswithintheUnitedStatesitself,
wheretheCoastGuardfusioncenterswouldneedtobeaccountedforaswell.
Asidefromtheneedforincreasedinformationsharingandbettersupportto
operationalforces,newtactics,techniques,andprocedureswouldnaturallyflow
from these maritime interagency task forces. While technology will certainly
help,increasedmaritimedomainawarenessisvirtuallymeaninglesswithoutthe
toolsneededbythedecisionmakerswhomustcarryoutoperationalresponses.
Thisisakeypoint,onethatcross-functionalteamshaverepeatedlymade.
Tobesure,“federation”acrossmaritimestakeholders(thatis,adivisionofla-
bor)willcontinuetoberequired.Itisalsoofutmostimporttoget“reachback”
capabilitiesright—theabilityof deployedforcestocall,veryquickly,uponthe
full informational and analytical resources of intelligence commands back
home. That reachback needs to be as responsive to fleets as the FOSICs and
FOSIFsoncewere.Settingupregional“centersofmaritimeexcellence”withthe
rightpeople,equipment,andtrainingwouldbeastepintherightdirection.
Maritimedomainawarenessisneithertracksonascreen,systemsthatmonitor
white shipping, (unachievable) international standards, nor something mari-
time security forces have always done.Nor is it easily achieved.But achieving
maritimedomainawarenessiscriticallyimportantintoday’sgeopoliticalcon-
text,notjusttoguardagainstinternationalterrorismbuttopromotecommerce
BORAZ 145
andsafetyandtorespondtonaturaldisasters,piracy,illegalmigration,andarms
smuggling.
MDAisanimportantpartofthisnation’ssecuritystrategy,andachieving
itwillrequirenewthinkingregardingtherolesof nationalandinternational
maritime-security forces. Establishing “maritime interagency task forces,” or
something similar,will goalong waytowardthat goal.But whatevermeans it
chooses,theUnitedStatesisamaritimenationinamaritimeworld—achieving
maritimedomainawarenessisatwenty-first-centurystrategicimperative.
NOTES
The views expressed here are those of the au- movements of more than ten thousand ves-
thor and do not reflect the official policy or sels from over forty nations are tracked and
position of the Department of the Navy, the updated in real time. See “Volpe Center
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Highlights May/June 2006,”Volpe National
government. Transportation Systems Center,www.volpe
.dot.gov/; and “Global Maritime Domain
1. As quoted in U.S. Homeland Security Dept.,
Awareness Wins Innovations in American
The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Do-
Government Award,” Reuters, 9 September
main Awareness(Washington, D.C.: October
2008, available at www.reuters.com. For more
2005), available at www.dhs.gov/.
on the Maritime Administration, see
2. Public Law 107-295, 25 November 2002. “MARAD Maritime Domain Awareness
3. SeeNational Strategy for Maritime Security Point Paper,”Maritime Administration,
(Washington, D.C.: White House, September marad.dot.gov/documents/.
2005), available at www.whitehouse.gov/. 7. For more on the thousand-ship navy see Vice
4. In addition to the National Plan to Achieve Adm. John G. Morgan, Jr., USN, and Rear
Maritime Domain Awareness, the supporting Adm. Charles W. Martoglio, USN, “The
plans are the Global Maritime Intelligence 1,000 Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network”
Integration Plan, the Maritime Operational (November 2005), and “The Commanders
Threat Response Plan, the International Out- Respond” (March 2006), both U.S. Naval In-
reach and Coordination Strategy, the Mari- stituteProceedings;and Ronald E. Ratcliff,
time Infrastructure Recovery Plan, the “Building Partners’ Capacity: The Thousand-
Maritime Transportation System Security Ship Navy,”Naval War College Review60, no.
Plan, the Maritime Commerce Security Plan, 4 (Autumn 2007), pp. 45–58.
and the Domestic Outreach Plan. 8. “Maritime Domain Awareness: A Global
5. For more on the Container Security Initiative Maritime Security Mission Requiring Inter-
see “CSI Strategic Plan 2006–2011,”U.S. Cus- national Cooperation and U.S. Navy Leader-
toms and Border Protection,www.cbp.gov/ ship,” COMUSNAVEUR white paper,
linkhandler/cgov/. For more on C-TPAT see January 2006.
“Securing the Global Supply Chain: C-TPAT 9.A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Strategic Plan,”U.S. Customs and Border Pro- Seapower,October 2007, reprinted inNaval
tection,www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/ War College Review61, no. 1 (Winter 2008),
cargo_security/ctpat/. pp. 7–19; also available at www.navy.mil/
6. MSSIS collects and disseminates real-time maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf.
data derived from the Automatic Identifica- 10. Secretary Winter directed these activities in a
tion System about vessel movements in the 17 May 2007 memorandum. The $300 mil-
unclassified realm and is freely shared with lion figure comes from several interviews
international partners. At present, with Mr. Marshall Billingslea, the secretary’s