DTIC ADA519290: Army Attack Aviation Shift of Training and Doctrine to Win the War of Tomorrow Effectively

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UnitedStates Marine Corps
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Marine Corps CombatDevelopmentCommand
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES
TITLl!:: Army Attack Aviation Shift ofTraining and Doctrine to Win the War of
Tomorrow Effectively
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FORTHE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES
AUTHOR: Major Todd G. Thornburg
AY 08-09'
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Army Attack Aviation Shift of Training and Doctrine to Win the War of
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Tomorrow Effectively
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Table ofContents
Page
Disclaimer .iii
Executive Summary iv
Preface v
Introduction ' 1
Army Attack Aviation: A Historical Overview 4
Low-Intensity Conflicts inthe 21st Century 6
Mid- to High-Intensity Conflict inthe 21stCentury 8
Army AttackHelicopter Deep Operations 9
Army Attack Close CombatAttacks 1·1..
Joint Close Air Support 13
AirTechnology ' 15
Analysis ' ~ : 16
Conclusion and Recommendations ~ 19
Appendix A - History and Evolution ofArmy Attack Aviation 21
Appendix B ~Army and Army CombatAviation Doctrine 30
Appendix C- Terms andDefinitions 32
Appendix D - CCA and CAS BriefingFormats 37
Bibliography 39
Endnotes 42
11
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Title: Army AttackAviation Shift ofTraining and Doctrine to Win the War ofTomorrow
Effectively
Author: MajorTodd Thornburg, U. S. Army
Thesis: Army attack aviationleaders, through Training and Doctrine Command, should re-focus
its primarymission in doctrine from the strategic/operational deep attack operations or deep
interdiction attacks to close combat attacks (CCA) in orderto supportthe ground commander's
operational objectives inthe currentand future irregularwarfare and conventional operations.
Discussion: Since the introduction ofthe AH-64A Apache Helicopters inthe mid-1980s, the
tank-killing Apaches trained to conductdeliberate deep attack operations 80 to 100 kilometers
across the forward line oftroops (FLOT) to destroy Sovietsecond echelon forces in orderto
preventre-enforcement to the first echelon forces. This coincided with the Army's newAirLand
Battle doctrine. The first battle inwhich the AH-64A Apache helicopter fought the deep attack
missionwas in OperationDesert Storm in 1991 against the Iraqi anti-aircraft radar systems to
"closethe eyes" ofthe enemy in orderfor the Air Force to conduct strategic attacks deep in Iraq.
Since 2001, in Operation Enduring Freedom, the Apaches are fighting against an asymmetric
warfighting enemy. This is asimilar enemy where the first armed helicopter fired its first
weapons platform against an insurgent enemyin Vietnam in 1962. The first armed helicopters
provided close-armedprotectioninVietnam and intoday's battles, the attack aviation units are
providing CCA. TheArmy conducted a deep attack mission during Operation Iraqi Freedom in
2003 duringthe initial phase to destroy elements ofthe Medina Division, butthe lack ofupdated
intelligence, bad weather, andmisuse ofSEAD ending up many aircraft damaged and one
aircraft shotdown withtwo POWs..The friction and fog ofwar will ultimately preventthe units
from conductingthe high-risk mission ofcrossing the FLOT deep into enemyterritory. The
fixed-wing assets by other services, along with the new advancements inthe Unmanned Aerial
Systems should conduct attacks inthe deep battle areato shape the battlefield for the JointTask
Force commanders and the Army attack aviation units need to continueto supportground
commanders with CCAto assist in achieving their operational objectives.
Conclusion: There is aneed for the Army to be ready to conduct any mission against any
adversary, conventional or asymmetric inthe future in support of"full spectrum operations." In
today's wars andthe future's battles, nevertheless, the focus shouldbe ontraining Army attack
aviation aircrews CCA techniques, tactics, and procedures to ensure victory atall levels ofwar.
IV
Preface
Is the U.S. Army Attack Aviation communitypreparingto fight future threats throughout
the world ormaintaining the AirLand Battle concept created in the early 1980s during the Cold
War? Ithinkthat U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, more specifically, the attack
aviation section should analyze the past conflicts and prepare for future threats. History shows
that Army attack aviation units conductedmore close combat attacks, reconnaissance, and
securitymissions than conducting attacks deep into the enemy's second echelonforces to destroy
armored and mechanized forces. The most recent doctrine better identifies the close combat
attack (similartojointclose air support) butfails t6 explainthe future threat ofirregular forces or
insurgentforces. Furthermore,past operations againstfixed sites and smaller units are more
relatedto raids and air interdiction operations. The attack aviation community created anew
term ofInterdictionAttack where the definition is very similarto the oldterm ofair interdiction.
We need to use terms thatthejointcommunity already understands to prevent confusion and
incorporate into the nextgeneration ofdoctrine.
Iwould liketo acknowledge the help from several individuals throughoutthis process.
First, Iwould like to thank Dr. Paul Gelpi for his mentorship, patience, and informative research
and study guidance. COL PeterE. Curryfor reading and providingmentorship and assisting in
framing the problem Iinitiallytriedto identify. Finally, Iwant to thank my wife and two boys
for cheeringme on and understanding weekends atthe library aI1d missing bedtime stories.
v
Introduction
u.s.
As the Army continues its transformation, Army Aviation continues to change as
well. Not only is the Army changingthe structure and organization ofits units, but also the way
ittrains and fights in future wars. Consequently, Army Aviation doctrine should continue to
reform anduse tactics, techniques, and procedures that focus ontypes ofconflict from
conventional war to asymmetric enemies, which will most likely be the future conflicts for the
U.S. military. Fromthe counterinsurgencybattle in Vietnamto the Soviet threat ofthe Cold
War, Army leaders continu.edto evolve Army doctrine to the future threats. Since the Vietnam
War, Army doctrine has continuedto change and develop from three dynamics: "the
reorientation ofthe American national security focus from Indochinato Europe; the increased
range, accuracy, and lethality ofdirect-fire weapons evidentinthe 1973 Middle East War; and
the personal energy and determination ofU.S. ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command's
(TRADOC) first commander, General WilliamE. Dupuy."] These three dynamics, inturn, led
to five major developments and incorporation oftechnology into the Army to assist inthe
possible destruction ofthe WarsawPact inEurope. These newtechnologies and equipment led
the new TRADOC commander, General Don A. Starry, to write the new FM 100-5 Operations
and create the AirLand Battle concept, which identifiedthe need for air powerto help provide
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the ground commanders room to maneuver onthe battlefield.
Sincethe introduction ofthe AR..64AApache Helicopters inthe mid-1980s, the tank
killing Apaches trained to conduct deliberate deep attack operations 80 - 100 kilometers across
the forward line oftroops (FLOT) to destroy Sovietsecond echelon forces in orderto preventre
enforcementto the first echelon forces. The first battle inwhich an AH-64A Apache helicopter
fought inthe deep operations areawas in Operation DESERT STORM in 1991; although some
1
within and out ofthe Army argued thatthe mission was araid. Although the Army requested
development ofthe new AH-64A Apache helicopterto destroy armored and mechanized forces,
attackaviation units provided direct supportto ground units in low-intensity conflicts as in2001
for OperationENDURINGFREEDOM. Apache crews are fighting against an asymmetric
warfighting enemy effectively; a scenario similarto that when the first armed helicopter fired its
organic weapons platform against an insurgent enemy in Vietnam in 1962.
Since the development ofarmed helicopters during the Vietnam War, the tactics used
were to defeat an irregularthreat except for two wars: Operation DESERT STORM and
Operation IRAQI FREEDOMI. In all otherbattles or engagements, the Army armed helicopters
fought againstan irregular enemy, insurgent or othernon-state actor, where the helicopter
provided close-armedprotection or close combat attacks (CCA) in support ofthe ground
commander. In accordance with FM 3-04.126AttackHelicopter Operations, the definition ofa
CCA is "acoordinated attack byArmy aircraft against targets that are in close proximityto
friendly forces. Dueto capabilities ofthe aircraft and the enhanced SA (situational awareness)
ofthe aircrews, terminal control from ground units or controllers is notnecessary. Close.combat
attackis not synonymous with CAS (close air support).,,3 As history has shown, the U.S. attack
helicopterproved successful inthe conventional fight against fixed targets and in direct support
ofground commanders, losingvery few aircraft. Nevertheless, the majority ofthe conflicts since
the mid-1980s were against an irregularthreat that could easilyhamper helicopter operations
with small arms and rocket"'propelled grenade (RPG) launchers, vice the,threat ofsurface-to-air
missiles (SAM) from vehicles orman-portable missiles (MANPAD).
While the Army continues to transform, it is imperative that Army Aviationtransform to
fightthe current and future battles in direct support ofground commanders tlu'ough close combat
2
attacks. Inthe newArmy Field Manual (FM) 3.04-126,AttackReconnaissance Helicopter
Operations, it does not state that the Army attack helicopters units will conduct deep attack
operations, butit does state the newterm ofInterdictionAttack (IA):
An IA is an attackby Army aircraftto divert, disrupt, delay, degrade, or destroy
enemy combatpower before itcan be used effectively against friendly forces. It
cantake place atany point inthe operational environment and canbe hasty or
deliberate. fA is conductedatsuch a distancefromfriendlyforces thatdetailed
integration with groundforces is notneeded. IA combines ground based fires,
attack aviation,unmanned systems, andjointassets to mass effects, isolate and
destroykey enemy forces and capabilities. Deliberate lAs are focused onkey
objectives and fleeting high value targets such as enemy C2 elements, AD
systems, mobile, long-range surface missiles, surface-to-surfacemissiles (SSMs),
4
artillery, and reinforcing ground forces. (Emphasis added)
With such amindset in the Army attack aviation community, it could fail to improve
upon existingtactics, techniques, andprocedures (TTPs), as well as prepare for the future battle.
Moreover, IA is not a new concept inthe Army or in Army aviation. This definition ofIA seems
to be very similarto a raid and the air interdiction definition in the 1982 Army doctrine..Army
aviation shouldnot create new terms that define operations that exist. Thejointcommunity does
not recognize the newterms inthe newArmy attack aviation doctrine, so the Army needs to
revisit its recentlypublished field manual.
Furthermore, with the newtechnology ofUnmanned Aerial Systems (VAS), satellite
operations, long range indirectfire support, and the use ofthe Air Force, Marine Corps, and
Navy fixed-wing assets, Army attack aviation needs to re-focus on supportingthe ground combat
commanders in direct support or as a maneuver force andprovide over-the-shoulder close
combat attacks to help affecttheir battlespace and shapethe battlefield. As stated inthe 2008
National Defense Strategy, "U.S. dominance in conventional warfare has givenprospective
3
adversaries, particularlynOn-state actors andtheir state sponsors, strongmotivationto adopt
asymmetric methods to counter our advantages.,,5
This paperwill identifythe failure ofArmy doctrine to update from past and current
conflicts andto look ahead to future threats. In so doing, itwill also identifythe need for Army
Aviation's doctrine to change to provide the correcttactics, techniques, and procedures to meet
the future threats the U.S. military will face. While the U.S. Army, as awhole, and specifically
Army aviation, continues'to transform to fight the future's battles, army attack aviation needs to
re-focus its primary mission. The shiftfrom strategic/operational deep attack operations or deep
interdiction attacks to close combat attacks (CCA) in orderto supportthe ground commander's
operational objectives inthe current and future irregular warfare and conventional operations
will maximizethe contribution ofArmy aviationto the overall Army mission.
The future warfare the U.S. will face exemplifies the battles ofthe past. The U.S.
military will likely face an asymmetric or irregular threat inthe counterinsurgency battle of
Vietnamto the small-scale low-intensitybattles ofGrenada, ~anama, and Somalia. The next
section ofthis paperwill briefly examinethe creation ofattack helicopters against pastthreats
and the evolution ofthe TTPs.
Army AttackAviation: A Historical Overview
The history ofthe U.S. attack helicopter began during the buildup inthe mid 1960s in
Vietnam(see Appendix A). As the concept ofAir Mobility evolvedto transportthe South
Vietnamese soldiers around the battlefield, so didthe evolution ofthe armed helicopter. The
first armedhelicopter was the UH-1A Huey with"two fixed forward-firing 0.30-calibre M37
machine guns and 16 2.75-inch folding fin aerial rockets, procured from the Air Force.,,6 As the
U.S. combatforces continuedto arrive inVietnam, the Army decided that they required an
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