DTIC ADA518764: The Influence of Just War Perspectives: Implications for U.S. Central Command

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The Influence of
Just War Perspectives
Implications for U.S. Central Command
I
By TyleR RaueRT s terrorism a legitimate method of While state actions that intention-
warfare? Can deliberate attacks on ally target civilians for violence are almost
civilians intended to further a just universally condemned, no corresponding
cause ever be justifiable? Can they be international consensus exists on how to
morally permissible? Morally required? How deal with nonstate actors that do the same.
Three quarters of the miseries and else can the weak possibly defeat the strong? Some consider such deeds as crimes, others
misunderstandings in the world would These are vital questions to U.S. Central see them as illegitimate acts of war, and still
finish if people were to put on the Command (USCENTCOM)—not because others view them as necessary and justifiable
shoes of their adversaries and of the way the combatant command might efforts to repel aggression or occupation. The
understood their points of view. answer them but because of the reply they last perspective is particularly prevalent in the
often receive within the USCENTCOM area Muslim-majority countries of the Near East
—Mahatma Gandhi of responsibility (AOR). where groups such as Hizballah and Hamas,1
widely condemned as terrorist organizations
in the West, enjoy considerable popular
support as legitimate resistance movements.
What does this difference of opinion
on the legitimacy of violence against civil-
ians mean for counterterrorism cooperation
Houghton, Jr.)
Air Force (John L.
S.
U.
Army M1A1 Abrams tank patrols in Baghdad Tyler Rauert is an Assistant Professor in the Near
East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at
the National Defense University.
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 73
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SPECIAL FEATURE | The Influence of Just War Perspectives
with the United States from the nations of the resort to force by nonstate actors and, second, they developed in the broader Middle East
Middle East and Central Asia?2 Will coop- the limitations on the use of force by these and in the West.
eration be half-hearted and only grudgingly players. Such a consensus already exists with While a historical survey of Just War
offered under political pressure? Is where regard to state-to-state violence and is the nec- traditions is beyond the scope of this article, it
one stands on the issue simply a function of essary first step toward authentic cooperation is worthwhile to note that “every civilization
where one sits politically? Not necessarily. to combat terrorism. has tried to impose limits on violence, includ-
While “fundamentalist” interpretations exist This consensus-building requires a ing the institutionalized form of violence we
on all sides, there are still shared tenets on the serious effort among all parties to listen, call war. After all, the limitation of violence is
resort to force and the conduct of hostilities understand, and collaborate, even where the very essence of civilization.”4 These limits
that can serve as the foundation on which to differences seem irreconcilable. One such usually include norms regulating the resort to
build effective counterterrorism cooperation “irreconcilable difference” is that support for force, the jus ad bellum in the Western tradi-
between the United States and the nations of groups such as Hamas and Hizballah is often tion, as well as the conduct of hostilities once
the Near East. dismissed as irrational, misguided, or simply the use of force is initiated, the jus in bello.
This work first examines the impor- anti-Semitic. That may be, but it is also very An examination of the particular limits on
tance of consensus-building to international violence in the two traditions is less important
cooperation. It then draws out how divergent here than an understanding of how the two
today’s threat of global
perspectives on shared principles may inhibit regions approach these limits.
terrorism is such that
international efforts to confront violent non- Use of Force in the Broader Middle
no international effort to
state actors, including the struggle to combat East. The Western perception of Just War
terrorism. Finally, it suggests methods combat it will be effective in the Muslim world is multifaceted. While
for USCENTCOM to bridge this gap and without the voluntary and “most Muslims would agree that interna-
increase the effectiveness of counterterror- enthusiastic cooperation of tional norms of behavior in wartime conform
ism cooperation between America and the to Islamic injunctions on humane behavior
the peoples of the Middle East
nations of the region. toward the enemy,”5 and while efforts within
and Central Asia
the state system to shift international norms
International Cooperation closer to regional understandings have at
The nature of the international system real and is sustained by reasoned argument times proven successful,6 anticolonial senti-
means that the effectiveness of cooperation over and above the emotions and prejudices ments color modern thinking on the just
on any issue is largely a function of the level that may also be in play. Likewise, a widely recourse to force and the conduct of hostili-
of agreement on the norms underpinning it. held view in the region is that the United States ties. Whether framed in terms of nationalist
The customary principles governing conflict considers Hamas and Hizballah to be terrorist arguments or an Islamic idiom, anti-impe-
between states, for example, are widely fol- organizations only because they threaten Israel, rialist sentiments predominate in modern
lowed not only because they are codified in not because of the methods they employ. This discourse on war and peace throughout the
treaties and international conventions,3 but perception is strengthened by past U.S. support broader Middle East. The “Third World
also because they make practical sense as self- to resistance movements in the region that context” of much of the Muslim world, where
imposed restraints on the use of force. They employed questionable means to achieve their colonial subjugation is bitterly resented,
especially make sense when the use of force is goals such as the Afghan resistance against the retains echoes of fear of foreign domination.7
designed to facilitate a return to peace while Soviets. These perceptions diminish the ability Some even argue that “the fundamentalist
minimizing losses on all sides without imped- of the United States and other Western nations attack on Western values is . . . the Muslim
ing the goals of hostilities. The savagery of to work with the peoples of the Muslim world version of the attack on ‘neoimperialism’ that
war is not reduced by international humani- to combat the threat of terrorism. characterizes many Third World polemics
tarian law, but by the voluntary compliance against the current international order.”8
that results from acceptance of the norms that Shared Principles, Divergent Foci This pervasive anticolonial sentiment
underpin it. The law acts as a guide to imple- A basic agreement on the norms has a significant effect on Just War thought in
ment this basic agreement on the practical that underpin limitations on state-to-state the region that often blends national libera-
necessity to limit violence during warfare and violence allows international humanitar- tion perspectives with those of Islam. While
how to do it. ian law to guide state practice in warfare. the majority of medieval writers in the region
Similarly, today’s threat of global ter- At the same time, the tolerance and even focused on legitimate means in warfare,
rorism is such that no international effort encouragement of violence by movements modern writers concentrate on the just
to combat it will be effective without the such as Hamas and Hizballah, which inten- recourse to force, particularly the justice of
voluntary and enthusiastic cooperation, if not tionally target noncombatants, demonstrate the cause, with comparatively little attention
the leadership, of the peoples of the Middle a genuine disagreement over such norms to the legitimate conduct of hostilities. “Con-
East and Central Asia. They must have own- by nonstate actors. This incongruity makes temporary discussions of jihad,” for example,
ership of the international effort alongside the intrinsically motivated cooperation so “now often assert that wars are justified in
Western partners. This ownership will be necessary for states to combat terrorism Islamic law when they are conducted to end
accomplished only after genuine consensus unattainable. The source of this divergence exploitation and oppression by the superpow-
is reached on, first, the justification for the can be found in the Just War traditions as ers or to achieve liberation from the forces of
74 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu
RAUERT
imperialism.”9 The logic holds that if a cause ately focused on the prosecution of conflict tion. Others see the UN Security Council not
is just, any method necessary to further that over the legitimacy of conflict initiation. as a tool to bring legitimacy to international
cause is also just, especially if the partisans One might argue that the preponderance collective action but as simply another way for
of the just cause operate from a point of com- of Western thought on Just War during the the strong to exercise dominion.
parative military weakness, thus eliminating past century is a refinement and institution- Westerners must ask themselves
the need to address considerations of the alization of the limitations on the conduct of whether the just recourse to force has been
legitimate means of warfare. hostilities within international humanitarian subordinated in practice to the conduct
Emphasis on the justice of the cause, law. While a focus solely on the legitimacy of of hostilities. In the zeal to ensure that all
as in the Reformation wars of Europe, to the the recourse to force can lead to an acceptance belligerents abide by the limitations on the
exclusion of the means by which the cause of terrible atrocities in the name of a just cause, conduct of hostilities regardless of the justice
can be justly pursued, ignores the fact that a focus on the just prosecution of conflict to of one’s cause, has the West rendered justice
unspeakable atrocities may be carried out the exclusion of meaningful reflection on the in the resort to force irrelevant? If so, some
in the name of an otherwise worthy end. In just initiation of violence carries unintentional of the most important partners in the inter-
the absence of fully developed norms on the but nonetheless significant undertones of national effort to combat terrorism may view
limitations on conducting hostilities, support neoimperialism. Restraints on the conduct of norms regarding the use of force by nonstate
for groups that pursue just causes unjustly violence seem designed to disarm the weak actors as hypocritical at best and a threat to
will continue to flourish in the Middle East and entrench the injustice of the strong when their sovereignty at worst. Former European
and Central Asia, thus limiting the ability of they are not accompanied by equally stringent colonies may view the limitations on the
regional and Western governments to combat limitations on the prior condition of the just methods and means of violence as a way to
terrorism. recourse to force. keep the weak from fighting the perceived
Use of Force in Western Nations. While The limited analysis of constraints on unjust initiation of hostilities by the strong,
there is a strong emphasis on the justice of the recourse to force that does occur in the West whether through “preemption/prevention”
conflict in the Near East, the Western concep- smacks of colonialism to many. Arguments for or “humanitarian intervention,” therefore
tion of modern Just War theory tends to see the legality of humanitarian intervention and limiting the ability of the two cultures to
conduct in a war as independent of the justice preemptive/preventative war can both be seen, work together against a common threat:
of a war. This perspective, influenced by the rightly or wrongly, as pretexts for the militar- terrorism.
post–World War II creation of the United ily strong to impose their will on the weak.
Nations and the decolonization process that Moreover, the claim that the recourse to force
followed,10 seeks to “civilize” just and unjust is only justified in self-defense or with Security most Western thought
wars alike by asserting that norms governing Council authorization is simply insufficient on political violence is
the conduct of hostilities are applicable when- when it comes to nonstate actors whose causes
disproportionately focused on
ever a situation reaches a certain threshold of are widely seen as just within a given popula-
the prosecution of
active belligerency. The underlying causes of tion. Many would argue that violent resistance
conflict over the legitimacy of
the conflict are seen to have no bearing on its against colonialism or occupation, however
proper conduct, and therefore most Western broadly those terms are defined, is the para- conflict initiation
thought on political violence is disproportion- digmatic Just War—it is self-defense by defini-
DOD (Perry Heimer) mpany (Ronald A. Mitchell)
Co
Signal
th55
Marine gives sack of grain to Somali woman in U.S. and Canadian soldiers board CH–47 Chinook helicopter en route to Tora Bora
Mogadishu during Operation Restore Hope region in Afghanistan
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 75
SPECIAL FEATURE | The Influence of Just War Perspectives
Americans must also ask themselves nonstate violence. It is, however, incomplete. To draw out these nascent consensus-
whether the relative dearth of construc- International humanitarian law is by and building efforts and engender more effective
tive discussion of the just recourse to force, large not designed to deal with nonstate actors international cooperation to combat the
particularly by nonstate actors, might give or the acts of violence they commit, and the phenomenon of terrorism, statesmen, soldiers,
credence to charges of Western double stan- fact that there is ambiguity concerning groups and scholars should encourage a “process of
dards. Upon what principle does the United such as Hamas and Hizballah testifies to the conversation between civilizations, the process
States support or deny the right of nonstate need to augment existing norms. of deliberate non-violent adjustment, dialogue
actors to take up arms? Upon what principle The consensus-building process and and negotiation between competing sources
does it back particular resistance organiza- accompanying international cooperation of norms governing violent conflict.”11 Just
tions? Is support based simply on expediency already exist in many respects. For example, War traditions are a good place to start this
or does it also have to do with the justice of a significant agreement is emerging on the need process; they are dynamic systems of thought
cause and how that cause is pursued? If it is to combat terrorism that is reflected in inter- and practice that offer the guidance of centu-
the latter, the United States is in good stead. national conventions and corresponding legis- ries on the justification for and execution of
If it is the former, we give credibility to those lation in individual countries. This emerging violence, but they are not fixed dogmas. They
who claim that America only condemns as international consensus is a focus of study for did not develop in isolation, and they continue
terrorists those who oppose its interests—that the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) Near to evolve in concert, more mutually influen-
one man’s terrorist truly is another man’s East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies tial than exclusive. They are still evolving and
freedom fighter. Such a perception only (NESA Center) and its partners. While con- adapting to shifting international realities.
undermines efforts at cooperation to combat crete steps are being taken against terrorist Each culture and tradition must critically
a common threat and must be addressed if groups whose causes are not widely seen as examine its understanding of its own Just War
the desire to confront the phenomenon of ter- just in the region and around the world, it is norms as well as the concerns of the others.
rorism is sincere. more difficult to collectively combat groups Scholars, statesmen, and bearers of
with significant support, whose causes are arms in the Middle East and Central Asia
Harmonizing Norms perceived as just, such as Hizballah and will be well served to address limitations on
It is evident that while the United States Hamas. This ambiguity undermines overall the conduct of hostilities more systemati-
and the nations of the Muslim world share counterterrorism cooperation even against cally, even when undertaken in a just cause.
basic principles regarding the just use of groups whose causes are not widely seen as While jus in bello considerations do figure
force, they differ on which components of just, such as al Qaeda. into some of the discourse on war and peace
the various Just War traditions they empha- in the region, they are dwarfed by jus ad
size, with the broader Middle East generally bellum concerns. Moreover, the discussion of
the consensus-building
focusing on the just recourse to force at the the conduct of hostilities that does occur “is
process and accompanying
expense of the just conduct of hostilities and usually undertaken by modernists seeking
the United States tending to subordinate the international cooperation to reinterpret the Qur’an and sunna so that
justice of war to justice in war. This divergence already exist in many respects Islamic injunctions correspond to current
results in different conceptions of the justice international practice”12 rather than seeking
of the initiation of hostilities and limitations
of violence, particularly regarding violence Neeley)
against civilians by nonstate actors in what are Mc
perceived to be just causes. These differences, Chad J.
however, are not irreconcilable, and they do D (
O
D
not indicate that international cooperation
to combat terrorism cannot proceed. They
simply mean that there is hard work to be
done to increase the effectiveness and compat-
ibility of cooperation.
The divide can be bridged by establish-
ing an international consensus on the norms
that characterize the legitimate use of force
by nonstate actors that encompasses both the
resort to force and the conduct of hostilities.
The international community has largely
established such a consensus on the norms
regarding interstate conflict upon which
international humanitarian law is built. That
ongoing effort is one of the great success
stories of modern civilization and serves as
GEN Petraeus and ADM Mullen meet in Baghdad
a useful guide for norm-setting regarding
76 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu
RAUERT
to enter into a dialogue about what norms ism and the justification for violence are International Law Enforcement Academies.
are or should be shared across civilizations. candidly addressed. Combatant command The command might also invite the Coun-
Regional players may also realize a benefit participation in regional center courses and terterrorism Section at the Department of
from devoting attention to whether a just other programs might be increased through Justice or the Homeland Security Center of
cause is a sufficient reason to commence guest-speaking roles or course participation Excellence for the Study of Terrorism and
hostilities or simply one among a number of to allow USCENTCOM personnel more Response to Terror (START) to conduct
necessary conditions. contact with regional players. These regional workshops, seminars, and lectures on ter-
centers may also be a vehicle through which rorism-related topics in the region. START
Moving the Dialogue Forward the command could host events in the already runs a program on intercultural and
Similarly, Western scholars and states- region to focus on these issues at forward inter-religious dialogue among U.S. college
men can move the dialogue on shared norms locations such as U.S. bases and Embassies
forward by more consciously addressing as well as regional states’ defense and civil-
USCENTCOM can stimulate
concerns of the just recourse to force. There ian universities.
intercultural engagement
is precious little discussion on just recourse USCENTCOM may also consider
on the justification and
in the Western world as opposed to the just establishing fellowships at regional centers
conduct of violence, with the notable and to allow up-and-coming officers to conduct management of violence
often unhelpful exceptions of humanitarian command-specific research on perceptions by leveraging programs
intervention and preemptive/preventative war of the justification and management of conducted by other U.S.
discussed earlier. Opinion leaders in the West violence in the region or to allow officers
Government entities
should critically examine whether they would returning from duty in the broader Middle
be willing to give up rights they hold dear in East an opportunity to articulate issue-
the face of a superior opponent they could not relevant thoughts on their experience. The students. The command might assist in
defeat by conventional means. Is the survival command might also sponsor a scholar or expanding this program to include students
of a nation, or of democracy, a sufficiently policymaker from the region as visiting from the broader Middle East or sponsor a
just cause to allow departures from accepted faculty at a regional center to further the regional pre- or postdoctoral fellow in the
norms limiting the conduct of hostilities? exchange of ideas and allow for in-depth START Fellows Program. The U.S. Institute
While the United Nations and understanding. of Peace is yet another resource on which
similar organizations serve the function of The command can serve its interest U.S. Central Command might seek to
intercultural dialogue well on most issues, in fostering dialogue that leads to increased capitalize.
USCENTCOM can constructively engage the cooperation to combat terrorism throughout While collaboration with existing
process of deliberation over the long-term its AOR by strengthening its collaboration programs in the U.S. Government and
just resort to and conduct of violence in the with other elements of national power, par- government-sponsored and -affiliated
broader Middle East in a number of ways: ticularly with the State Department’s Office entities enables USCENTCOM to engage
of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/ in the process of deliberation over the just
n partnering with DOD’s academic CT). The S/CT Regional and Trans-Regional resort to and conduct of violence, they are
regional centers that already engage relevant Affairs Directorate builds political will and by no means the only avenues available. The
players in the USCENTCOM AOR capacity to combat terrorism among inter- United Nations has initiated an “Alliance of
n strengthening relationships and cooper- national partners, making it a natural ally Civilizations,” and the North Atlantic Treaty
ation between the command and elements of in any effort to engage parties in the broader Organization offers multiple opportunities for
the U.S. Government outside of the Depart- Middle East on the issues of the justification engagement.
ment of Defense for and limitations on violence as well as USCENTCOM’s engagement in the
n leveraging international programs other terrorism-related issues. process of intercultural deliberation on these
n examining the possibilities generated U.S. Central Command can stimulate issues might also be facilitated by building
by such initiatives as the joint venture of U.S. intercultural engagement on the justification on the model offered by Sovereign Chal-
Special Operations Command and U.S. Stra- and management of violence by leveraging lenge, which represents the kind of interac-
tegic Command called Sovereign Challenge, the existing programs on terrorism-related tion necessary to respond to the disagree-
a collaborative information-sharing Web topics conducted by other U.S. Government ment over whether terrorism conducted to
portal focused on terrorism-related issues. entities. The State Department’s Anti- further a just cause can ever be justifiable.
Terrorism Assistance Program already goes USCENTCOM could use the Sovereign
Regional centers such as the NESA a long way toward fostering cooperative Challenge Web site as a model for a platform
Center and the George C. Marshall Euro- efforts between U.S. and partner nation law to sustain a network of opinion leaders
pean Center for Security Studies build enforcement personnel, but USCENTCOM and officials in the region, encourage visits
sustained relationships with opinion leaders could also sponsor regional police officers among players in multiple locations, and
and government officials in the USCENT- to attend training programs at the Depart- facilitate workshops and exercises.
COM AOR and also build regional coopera- ment of Homeland Security’s Federal Law Whatever role the command plays,
tion on security issues through an academic Enforcement Training Center, chiefly one of the concrete steps currently being
environment where issues such as terror- through its Counterterrorism Division or taken to encourage dialogue and negotiation
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 77
SPECIAL FEATURE | The Influence of Just War Perspectives
DEADLINE among competing sources of norms on 4 François Bugnion, “Just Wars, Wars of
violent conflict is taking place in July 2008 Aggression and International Humanitarian Law,”
Approaching at the National Defense University. The International Review of the Red Cross 84, no. 847
(September 2002), 523–546.
NESA Center, along with the Inter-Univer-
for JFQ Issue 52 sity Center for Legal Studies at the Interna- 5 Sohail Hashmi, “Saving and Taking Life in
War: Three Modern Muslim Views,” The Muslim
tional Law Institute, will host an event on
World 89, no. 2 (April 1999), 158.
the legal and moral environment to combat
6 See article I of Additional Protocol I to the
transnational threats such as terrorism in
Geneva Conventions of 1977, which seeks to regu-
the Near East and South Asia. This event late the use of violence in struggles for self-deter-
and the edited proceedings to follow should mination. The protocol extends the protections and
engage the perceptions of the justification responsibilities of international humanitarian law
and limitation of violence both in the region (IHL) to insurgents, militias, and other nonstate
and in the Western world at length and are actors engaged in armed hostilities against “colo-
a forum where the process of deliberate nial domination and alien occupation” as well as
“racist regimes” that deny the exercise of self-deter-
conversation and nonviolent adjustment can
mination. While not adopted by all states, most
begin.
notably the United States and Israel, Additional
Protocol I has profoundly affected the international
Addressing the justification for the
understanding of just recourse to force and limita-
resort to force by nonstate actors and the
tions on violence in that it recognizes the legitimacy
limitations on the use of force by these players of nonstate actors to commit acts of violence for
will not end terrorism, nor will it convince political purposes. This instrument was largely the
nonstate actors to give up violence. The test product of actors within the USCENTCOM AOR,
of success in this dialogue will not be that Palestinian territories, and other former colonies as
one side or another wins the argument over well as the Soviet Union. The role of players from
FeaTuRing: the correct answers to the questions posed the broader Middle East in this IHL development
demonstrates the rich and diverse understanding
at the beginning of this article, but that the
Land Warfare differences are acknowledged, examined, of the justification and limitation of force in the
region. Rather than being motivated by Islamic
and in some way accommodated over time
tradition, the formulation of Additional Protocol
so shared norms can be established to enable
and I was colored primarily by nationalism. See James

the community of nations to work together to
Turner Johnson, The Holy War Idea in Western and
U.S. Africa Command combat the common threat of terrorism. Such Islamic Traditions (University Park: Pennsylvania
a process has occurred and continues to occur State University Press, 1997), 615.
regarding violence undertaken by states. This 7 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “War and Peace in
gives us reason to believe that the same result Islamic Tradition and International Law,” in Just
can eventually be achieved with nonstate War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspec-
submissions due by actors. Such a process is in fact already occur- tives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Tra-
ditions, ed. John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson
September 1, ring in subtle ways. Our task is to acknowl-
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991), 205.
edge this development and constructively
8 Sohail Hashmi, “Interpreting the Islamic
2008 engage in it. JFQ
Ethics of War and Peace,” in The Ethics of War and
Peace, ed. Terry Nardin (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1996), 159.
NOTES
9 Mayer, 205.
JFQ Issue 53 1 While Israel and the Palestinian territories 10 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, “Islam and
International Law: Toward a Positive Mutual
do not fall within the USCENTCOM AOR, the
Engagement to Realize Shared Ideals,” American
Featuring: conflict there has reverberations across the Arab
Society of International Law, Proceedings of the
and Muslim worlds. It critically impacts the nations
Global Strategic Outlook Annual Meeting (2004), 160.
in the command’s AOR and is crucial to under-
11 James Cockayne, “Islam and International
U.S. Transportation Command standing how the peoples of the region understand
Humanitarian Law: From a Clash to a Conversa-
terrorism.
2 The Middle East and Central Asia includes tion between Civilizations,” International Review
of the Red Cross 84, no. 847 (September 2002), 623.
all the nations of the USCENTCOM AOR, as well
Submissions Due by Emphasis in original.
as Israel, the Palestinian territories, and Turkey.
December 1, 2008 3 These customary rules were codified over 12 Hashmi, “Interpreting,” 163.
time in the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906,
1929, and 1949, and The Hague Conventions of
1899 and 1907.
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78 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu