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Mark A. Rankin) SE C R E TARY OFDEFE U.S. Navy ( ART NSE N S F N O O R TI M TI ATION ESSAY C O M PE True wisdom in strategy must be practical because strategy is a practical subject. Much of what appears to be wise and indeed is prudent as high theory is unhelpful to the poor warrior who actually has to do strategy, tactically and operationally. Marine Corps officers plan troop movement during  —Colin S. Gray1 combined exercise with Australian military Planning Convergence By Paul J. JudGe I n the Department of Defense (DOD) today, several initiatives are emerging and may seem counterintuitive. However, it is and future force structure throughout the plan- have begun to converge. Adaptive Plan- the iterative process of setting new bounds, ning and programming cycle. DOD must find a ning (AP), Capabilities-based Planning reformulating a plan, and providing results back way to expand CBP horizontally through func- (CBP), and Global Force Management (GFM) to strategists that can ultimately provide insight tional areas, such as operational planning, and are three prime examples. The 2006 Quadren- for decisionmakers. A more meaningful and vertically from the strategic to the tactical level. nial Defense Review Report (QDR) reaffirms beneficial convergence of AP, CBP, and GFM In turn, the military decisionmaking process the DOD commitment to these initiatives and will occur because the iterative process demands (MDMP) can have a consolidated picture for places emphasis on a need to “integrate pro- continuous communication and information- resource decisions. cesses that define needed capabilities, identify sharing among the strategist, force provider, solutions, and allocate resources to acquire warfighting planner, and out-year programmer. Background them.”2 Thus, it is incumbent on DOD to To effectively merge processes and support The Department of Defense is struggling effectively manage the convergence of AP, CBP, decisionmaking, operational planning that uses to shed a longstanding threat-based method and GFM in order to fully support the vision of AP methods must constantly interact with CBP of planning. The method starts by estimating sound decisionmaking in an uncertain defense as employed by defense analysts and program- enemy strengths, weaknesses, and intent. From environment. mers. In fact, the interaction must occur prior this estimate, a scenario is developed to plan The argument of this essay is simple: to the formal start of a DOD planning cycle to against. The process essentially results in a list Placing tight bounds on military operational assist strategy writers in forming the detailed of required forces and assets to win decisively planners will effectively institute a new parameters that will then guide operational in the worst possible circumstances. Threat- planning and military decisionmaking process. planning. Adaptive Planning must also interface based planning typically uses isolated (non- The purpose is to suggest a move away from with GFM as designed by the Joint Staff as a collaborative) analysis and, on the surface, open-ended strategic guidance toward explicit centralized force provider process. The idea is seems adequate because it provides senior intent, assumptions, and constraints. Unlike to unify operational and future force structure leaders a basis for justifying programs and today’s strategic guidance, strictly limiting planning results to objectively support decision- budgets. In fact, a threat-based mindset still available force capabilities and other resources making and revisions in strategy. In addition, pervades DOD today because it is sufficient in will generate more creative planning options interaction between planners at lower levels will competing for annual appropriations. However, and risk mitigation strategies. This idea shape the debate over tradeoffs between current threat-based planning is slowly giving way to Capabilities-based Planning because the Colonel Paul J. Judge, USAF, wrote this article while a student at the Air War College. It won the inaugural  former is very weak in determining an effective 2007 Secretary of Defense Transformation Essay Competition. capability mix within resource constraints. ndupress.ndu.edu  issue 47, 4th quarter 2007 / JFQ    99 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2007 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2007 to 00-00-2007 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Planning Convergence 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,260 REPORT NUMBER 5th Avenue SW Fort Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 6 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 ESSAY WINNERS | Planning Convergence decisionmaking can seem insurmountable. On the other hand, current opportunities dictate that process mergers undertaken without delay can overcome challenges and install a new and effective MDMP. Problem: Who Cares? In DOD, there is a lack of control and coordination on inputs and outputs in the MDMP. The current methodology focuses too Pearsall) meffuocrhts o ann do uatnpaulytss,i sla, ragnedly y aievlodisd as nsy angcghrraovnatiiznegd Camera Squadron (Stacy L. stRatohi tut eurdm aaloiitnsn itfoe hewn.le dF r wb eocucrhokmden gn.se e.i r mst. t.Se eIaevntj’cesotr rlrjyeyu s t vsayptore eayianc rmoed wdfie nD hatghtee idngfsere ynficrnosiusdeuis ’eoDtrrren ao tsttrn riayoyarinilennd: g og “ n It ’s U.S. Soldiers conduct mission planning meeting  mbat to pull things together because they didn’t start with Iraqi officials Co coming together earlier at the lower level. . . . st1 [W]e’re going to fix that.”9 Without well-crafted After the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, and lessons learned from Operations Enduring strategic guidance and a common denominator in-depth defense studies seeking peace divi- Freedom and Iraqi Freedom accelerated the shift for comparisons, planning processes operate dends and force structure realignments became away from threat-based planning and toward independent of each other until it is too late for commonplace. In fact, during the 1990s, “there capabilities-based planning. Since the 2001 effective decisionmaking. When the train wreck were no fewer than five major defense reviews: QDR, there has been solid progress in trans- occurs near the end of a cycle, professional judg- the Base Force (1991), Bottom-Up Review forming operational planning, force structure ment, strength of presentation, and protection of (1993), Commission on Roles and Missions of planning, and military force management. Of interests dominate recommendations. the Armed Forces (1993), Quadrennial Defense course, the transformation is far from complete; The central problem examined in this Review (1997), and National Defense Panel the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and essay is an inability of the combatant command (1997).”3 Concurrently, military strategy simply Execution System (PPBES) and operational operational planning process to effectively shifted from a Soviet-centric threat to a dual planning do not synchronize information inform and complement the PPBES. Three Major Theater War (MTW) threat-based system and analysis in a valuable and comprehensive notable factors contribute to the problem. First, and continued to fight budget constraints based manner for the MDMP. operational planning does not currently use the on a strategy-resource gap.4 Focusing on the gap In addition to CBP, QDR 2006 strengthens CBP construct and align with the PPBES cycle did little to improve standing plans, and very the DOD commitment to change the to achieve credible defense budget decisions. Second, DOD does not integrate planning without well-crafted strategic guidance and a common processes and fails to place equal emphasis on inputs and outputs. Third, meaningful col- denominator for comparisons, planning processes operate laboration among the Office of the Secretary independent of each other until it is too late for of Defense, Joint Staff, combatant commands, effective decisionmaking and Services early in the PPBES and at lower levels is severely lacking. Finding a new course is few if any of the lesser plans, mission sets, and operational planning characteristics of the joint critical in a world of uncertainty and complexity military tasks were directly accounted for in this force. For example, the Department of Defense that includes planning for humanitarian relief, process. is continuing to “shift emphasis to meet the nonstate enemies, traditional large-scale conflict, The idea of laundry listing requirements new strategic environment . . . characterized and stabilization operations. as a way to achieve a grand strategy with full by uncertainty and surprise.”7 This includes knowledge that the needs will be underfunded changing from threat-based planning to AP, CBP, and GFM: operational lingers. However, the seeds of change were capabilities-based planning, peacetime planning Planner’s View planted during all those defense review debates to rapid adaptive planning, single focus threats The priorities and methods employed in the 1990s5 and came to fruition in the 2001 to multiple complex challenges, predetermined by combatant command operational planners Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Accord- force packages to tailored/flexible forces, and (Adaptive Planning) and force structure plan- ing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff J8 at a Military vertical structures and processes (stovepipes) ners (Capabilities-based Planning) are vastly Operations Research Society CBP conference, to more transparent, horizontal integration different. The key variations are found between the 2001 QDR introduced the capabilities-based (matrix).8 Transforming parts of a system the lexicons and taxonomies, starting points and strategy, but its use and implementation were is difficult enough, but ensuring that all the entering arguments for planning, and the time- formally directed in 2003.6 The tragedy of 9/11 parts and processes merge to increase effective lines for resource availability. However, it seems 100    JFQ / issue 47, 4th quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu JUDGE plausible that the starting points could remain This is tantamount to understanding one’s The iterative process yields new and creative different while the lexicons, taxonomies, and own strengths and weaknesses before assessing ways to accomplish objectives as well as new resource timelines could merge into one process. a threat and drawing up plans to oppose an insights into the means to carry them out. The framework (lexicon and taxonomy) of CBP enemy. Overall, the characteristics of AP are Expanding CBP into AP to form a and the force management (resource timelines) sufficient to usher in a new operational planning common framework is not a simple endeavor. of Global Force Management are the founda- process. However, for AP to achieve full poten- There are many tasks related to implementing tion. A closer look at the relationship among tial (that is, creative, flexible, and executable CBP in AP.12 First and foremost is a common AP, CBP, and GFM demonstrates the potential plans), it must be enabled by detailed strategic set of force capability identifiers. DOD is to converge while they are still developing and guidance and constant information exchange making a concerted effort through initia- before institutionalization of separate processes with CBP and GFM. tives such as the Joint Capability Area (JCA) takes root. Detailed strategic guidance improves taxonomy, Linking Plans to Resources work, According to the AP Roadmap, Adaptive operational planning creativity by shifting and the Functional Control Board process. Planning is “the Joint capability to create and focus from developing resource requirements Unfortunately, the proposed identifiers are too revise plans rapidly and systematically, as cir- in a worst-case scenario to options for employ- generic for effective operational planning. The cumstances require.”10 Essentially, AP represents ing a known set of capabilities. In this manner, identifiers must correlate exactly with Service the transformation of joint operational planning a planner seeks to maximize effectiveness with unit designations for use in bounding opera- away from specific threat-based planning using an economy of force that is ready and available tional planners. With exact bounds in mind, a scenario mechanism toward adaptive planning rather than stand satisfied with a notional the key question operational planners begin to using a CBP framework to produce options for mass force. Multiple options across a wider answer is, “What courses of actions are available a wide range of circumstances. This does not spectrum of contingencies mean more deci- suggest that planners ignore threat assessments; sionmaking flexibility as conditions warrant, combatant command and they are still a vital part of AP. One of the under- and the use of actual force status information Service staffs must have a lying AP themes is to account for smaller-scale (location, readiness, availability) improves global perspective contingencies and threats more directly and operational execution readiness. not assume that one well-developed plan (for In addition to details in strategic guidance, the most dangerous scenario) would contain constant information exchange with future if there are only these units and resources to the needed capabilities for lesser cases. Indeed, force CBP and GFM is necessary. Combatant work with?” The iterative process of holding the ability to create or revise a warfighting plan command and Service staffs must have a global units and resources fixed while altering other rapidly as global conditions change, to do it col- perspective. The idea is to conduct continuous plan elements eventually reveals a strategy that laboratively and systematically, and to have the capability and risk tradeoffs until multiple plans is feasible, links risk to capabilities, and balances end product in a realistic, ready-to-execute state and options are executable and are also fairly with many other competing plans and objec- is transformational. balanced with future capability needs. In this tives. Ultimately, with a CBP framework in AP, The seven characteristics of AP provide context, the defined role of CBP in AP is to plans are shaped by resources as much as or a foundation to plan for uncertainty and provide a common framework for information more than resources are shaped by plans. complexity.11 In particular, the seventh charac- exchange and analysis. In other words, CBP The use of CBP in AP does not have teristic—relevant—suggests qualities of detail examines enemy capability while AP evaluates to exactly replicate the application of CBP in and flexibility. If AP is striving to develop plans friendly capability to start a planning cycle, but future force structure planning or in the broader that are more relevant, operational planning both collaborate using the same language and PPBES. Within the current PPBES, future force must start with detailed strategic guidance. This analysis system. Thus, operational planning, CBP initially examines future enemy capabili- means having accurate friendly force allocations, future force planning, and Global Force ties. The capability-based future force planning availability, and readiness information from Management come together. process “starts by identifying plausible worries the force provider through the GFM process. The end result is “apples-to-apples” trad- that a country or an agency might face.”13 From eoff analysis for senior leader this point, strategists and long-term force ADM Edmund P. Giambastiani, USN, speaks at  decisionmaking. These tradeoff structure planners develop a dispersed range Joint and Combined Warfighting School about  decisions are generally within of possible scenarios. Scenario analysis aims to programs and acquisitions or across plans, programs, and reveal potential friendly force capability needs time. However, tradeoffs can that could ensure access and advantage over an extend into many areas, including enemy. In this manner, force structure recom- changes in doctrine, operations, mendations develop to counter future enemy and training, or externally into capabilities. This is the commonly understood interagency and partner nation DOD method of using CBP, but it is not readily capabilities. Instead of updating apparent in the most frequently cited definition. a list of requirements, warfight- According to Paul Davis, CBP is “planning, ers are driven during each cycle under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable to develop or rewrite plans and for a wide range of modern-day challenges and options against a foe using a circumstances, while working within an eco- revised set of specific capabilities. nomic framework.”14 The definition seems very U.S. Air Force (Adam M. Stump) ndupress.ndu.edu  issue 47, 4th quarter 2007 / JFQ    101 ESSAY WINNERS | Planning Convergence close to the AP definition; however, the starting that planning period can satisfy an operational same core planning structure and encouraging points make the two processes different. AP must plan. If not, planners would adjust other compo- lower level interaction that can improve recom- use limited friendly resources to iteratively plan nents of the plan to mitigate shortfalls in capabili- mendations. Finally, execution readiness and against current problem sets, while CBP projects ties and minimize risk while capturing varying risk assessments are more relevant when using enemy capability problem sets and then evalu- options along the way. The results inform strate- globally managed, specific force sets. ates friendly force capability tradeoffs within gists as they prepare the detailed guidance to ini- budget constraints. Stated differently, near-term tiate the next plan cycle and decisionmakers on Implications operational plans must have narrow physical where the next capability dollar should be spent. Setting planning bounds is not new. constraints, while long-term procurement plans Today, changes in resources or shortfalls Strategists have worked through assumptions, have broader fiscal constraints. do not necessarily drive a responsive change in constraints, and mission definitions as a regular The commonly understood CBP a war plan. Planners often maintain a mission part of the planning process. Setting tight limits process is all well and good for a large group and task set and account for resource changes on available forces (capabilities) as part of the of operational researchers and analysts but not and shortfalls by adjusting risk. Process change strategic planning guidance is relatively new. practical for a combatant commander’s staff. needs to occur so an operational plan is rewrit- This is not apportionment or allocation of Combatant command staffs should utilize a less ten or reoriented according to adjustments in unnamed units. Nor is it a starting list of forces analytic CBP application appropriate to joint constraints and capabilities. According to Davis, that may be added to as planning circumstances operational planning that still fully supports “Having platforms, weapons, and infrastructure dictate. Bounding operational planners means a capability-needs comparison throughout a is not enough: What matters is whether the specific unit designations for planning purposes. single defense planning process. Expanding missions could be confidently accomplished The vertical and horizontal integration of DOD the CBP framework into AP will address and successfully.”16 Rapidly completing operational processes depends on debates over specific units define the interactions (inputs and outputs) mission analysis, resetting tasks, modifying an and the capabilities (to include availability and between each element of the PPBES to provide operational plan, and then updating risk are part readiness) they bring to the fight. synchronized support to the MDMP.15 In other of the emerging AP process and are essential to Glossing over the differences in units words, force structure tradeoffs between current improving the feedback loop. through generic allocations or Joint Capability and future forces can be synchronized and Areas (JCAs) introduces unneeded uncertainty justified more clearly through capability needs. today, planners often maintain into the process. It can also decrement the fidel- Permitting operational plans to stand as a set ity of results by generalizing capabilities in order a mission and task set and of unconstrained requirements is incompatible to simplify an otherwise large and complex account for resource changes with defining and prioritizing capability needs. matrix of units. JCAs offer value in terms of and shortfalls by adjusting risk Constraining or bounding available capabilities communicating concepts and categorizing capa- changes the paradigm. bilities but are no substitute for unit designa- To bound capabilities for operational plan- The MDMP tolerates higher risk only tions.18 To compensate, transformation requires ners requires a capacity to allocate or assign an when convinced no other ways or means exist. continuous collaboration using a common initial set of specific forces in light of the global Warfighters and their operational planners are framework and interrelated processes. spectrum of plans and priorities. GFM provides no longer independent actors vying for scarce Expanding CBP further and deeper into a valuable force structure baseline for strategy resources. In fact, “Combatant Commanders AP and GFM is an important step in the trans- writers to bound operational planners over short with new global command responsibilities are formational endeavor. Restricting operational planning periods (1 year or less). In turn, the expected to provide expert opinion and inputs planning with tight bounds promotes a rapid changing global availability of ready units and for the global force management system overseen trial and error process to overcome an inability resources yields a continuous shaping process of by the Pentagon and other national authorities.”17 to find effective solutions in other general or U.S. military plans and capability. Thus, for each To effectively accomplish this task, a synthesized rigorous ways. Of course, there are second- contingency plan that requires capability sourc- planning system must emerge. In turn, strategic order effects to consider. Addressing some of ing, strategists should direct GFM to allocate guidance thinkers can absorb new inputs from the key implications (for example, integrating forces for an entire planning cycle and opera- the GFM system and reset operational planning and synchronizing related processes, recalibrat- tional planners to revise the plan using actual boundary detail for the next planning cycle. ing senior leader focus, and reforming national unit location and readiness data. In summary, the characteristics of AP can strategy documents) will provide a broader DOD currently refers to the activity of converge with CBP and GFM using a common context for what it means to set bounds in bounding capabilities as contingency sourc- language (the lexicon and taxonomy of CBP) operational planning and foster a convergence ing, but the process and mechanism are still and specific force allocation (the contingency of AP, CBP, and GFM. immature and not broadly accepted or prac- sourcing of GFM). Detailed strategic guid- First, functional areas that support joint ticed. Essentially, contingency sourcing is the ance, constant information exchange, and a warfighting capacity will have to adjust processes automated data exchange process of updating common set of force capability identifiers enable and lexicons as DOD transforms the method of allocated forces and specific units. The point the process. Developing operational planning presenting tradeoff decisions to senior leaders. here is to fully develop contingency sourcing in options iteratively entails some trial and error For example, acquisition processes need to go order to connect GFM and AP. This, in turn, can but creativity increases. Furthermore, despite further to create a flexible, adaptable, and reli- enable iterative bounding and CBP linkages. The different starting points, current and future force able means of delivering information technol- concept is to determine if a force allocation for structure decisions benefit by leveraging the ogy. Bureaucratic and legal delays of software 102    JFQ / issue 47, 4th quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu JUDGE U.S. Army South specialist briefs U.S.  Strategic Direction tasks senior leaders The third implication relates to the Southern Command and Ecuadorian  to “identify the key outputs—not inputs—they National Security Strategy and the grand officers during planning and  expect from the Department’s components and strategy it implies. In a world of uncertainty coordination conference determine the appropriate near-, mid-, long- and difficult tradeoff decisions, the unclassified term strategies for achieving them.”22 Does a National Security Strategy and DOD counter- senior leader’s focus on outputs include provid- part documents will disconnect further from ing strategic guidance for a warfighter’s opera- realistic expectations and observable activities. tional plan? It is not clear, but certainly achieving In addition, an effective PPBES with a unified desired outputs starts with controlling inputs and collaborative planning process would neces- Negron) aanll dD pOroDc ecsosmesp. Tono eandtds htoa vthe ea csolinghfutlsyio dni,f fneereanrlty sHitoawtee rveefro, rtmhe oref anraet iloimnaitl ss ttroa tthegei cch dooiccuesm. Feonrts . Miguel A. Sdeenfiinoirt iloenad foerrs n meaurs-t, mdriidve-, tahned s ylosntegm-t etrhmro.u23g h emxeanmtsp tleo, rDemODain c oaus ltdh eayll oawre tahned s ptreartpegetyu daotec tuh-e Army ( unambiguous strategy and timelines. Otherwise, longstanding “strategy-resource mismatch”27; S. U. or networking hardware deliveries disrupt and the schedules for capability need decisions, and acquisition frustrate AP and GFM processes. This, in turn, milestone decisions must become interdependent undermines confidence in transformation and progress in broadening and institutionalizing CBP. As stated by the OSD Director of Program outputs from organizational components will update the documents at a rate commensurate Analysis and Evaluation, a key process objective continue to lack comparability and synthesis. with faster PPBES and operational planning of the Office of the Secretary of Defense is to Finally, a good argument can be made that a cycles; or add a series of classified strategic guid- “integrate and synchronize the requirements “shift to a top down capabilities-based planning ance statements for planning. In any case, the process, PPBE, and the acquisition system.”19 As system that is focused on outputs rather than documents must assist intuitive decisionmaking a framework, CBP can lead the integration, but inputs is a return to the basic principles of the and resource changes rather than inhibit them. only if the acquisition corps delivers enabling PPBS (predecessor to PPBES) implemented In terms of operational planning, a faster technology on agreed dates. by Secretary of Defense McNamara in 1961.”24 AP cycle will require more frequent updates Similarly, key decisions in weapons system Leaders today must provide explicit guidance of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) acquisition processes will have to align to the upfront (inputs), frequently conduct project and publication. Currently, the JSCP is “intended to cycle as well. In other words, the schedules for process reviews, and then evaluate outputs. provide planning guidance to combatant com- capability need decisions and acquisition mile- Senior leaders must also review organiza- manders and service chiefs based on current stone decisions must become interdependent. tional design. Reorganizing staffs could very well military capabilities.”28 However, it often falls The goal is to have flexibility to shift resources become an outgrowth of transforming business short of operational planning expectations in in a world of uncertainty without significant practices and decisionmaking. Christopher terms of content or the timing of an update. impacts or unknown costs to one functional Lamb and Irving Lachow make a good case for Improving the effectiveness of the JSCP is para- area or to DOD overall. Unlike the current reforming DOD decisionmaking and stand- mount if it will include the constraints and force system, a warfighting combatant commander ing up a “Decision Support Cell.”25 Although it sets for warfighting plans. and operational planners will have a better seems impractical in the current budget envi- Fortunately, some strides in changing the chance of satisfying short-term needs20 if capa- ronment to grow a staff or add responsibility to JSCP to improve support to AP are occurring. bility decisions are not consistently hand-tied by overtasked leaders, the three tasks for the Deci- For example, apportioning notional forces is expensive and inflexible acquisition processes. sion Support Cell are vital: fading in relevance. The term apportion is more A combatant commander with a clear voice in appropriate in the old threat-based system but a unified planning process (CBP and GFM) n integrate products for the Secretary of should not be part of the new CBP construct. simply replans and mitigates risk according Defense DOD should simply allocate resources for to strategy with specific bounds that include n improve the quality of decision support to long-range planning. Thus, the important final weapons system procurement decisions. contingency planning and resource allocation step will be how to allocate forces to combatant Another second-order effect is the focus n help senior leaders to develop their intui- commands for planning using GFM data in an of the senior leaders. According to the 2006 tive decisionmaking.26 automated method. Ultimately, this will dictate QDR, “a key measure of success is the extent how CBP works in operational planning and, in to which the Department’s senior leadership is At a minimum, senior leaders need train- turn, how solutions integrate with future force able to fulfill” six core functions.21 The potential ing because the system is complex, and neither structure plans. of specifying units as part of writing strategy general nor rigorous solutions are likely to In summary, three implications only begin and linking AP to CBP directly serves each surface. Managing the converging relationship to delve into the possible issues at hand. Planning function. However, resolving strategic guidance between AP (contingency planning), CBP (inte- for simultaneous contingencies, dependence on force bounds for use in operational planning grated products), and GFM (resource alloca- foreign capabilities, mismatch between the vision may conflict with the first listed function, Stra- tion) can serve the same purpose as a Decision and funding, expectations of other instruments tegic Direction. Support Cell. of national power, and unintended consequences ndupress.ndu.edu  issue 47, 4th quarter 2007 / JFQ    103 ESSAY WINNERS | Planning Convergence could all come into play. Driving a top-down span the spectrums of planning, programming, 10 Department of Defense, Adaptive Planning PPBES that includes strict bounds on operational budgets, and warfighter execution. Roadmap, 2005 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 13, 2005), v. planners should have careful and thorough The implications of setting tight bounds 11 The seven characteristics of Adaptive Planning consideration. Practically, time is of the essence, on operational planners are complex; therefore, are rapid, iterative, flexible, collaborative, networked, and momentum in many segments of DOD there will be hesitancy and resistance to trying seamless, and relevant. See Adaptive Planning is already under way. How to write strategy in it. Practically, managing detailed inputs at the Roadmap, 2005, 1.1. order to merge processes for the benefit of deci- strategic level is an intensive exercise but is also 12 These tasks include force capabilities iden- sionmakers may be the first order of business. a key part of a top-down driven decisionmak- tification and sourcing; wargaming; plan/project ing system. Theoretically, framing resources management (both within and across plans and Final Argument in detail contradicts the traditional mindset of projects); assessment of nonkinetic effects; interagency This essay has argued for strategic guid- issuing broad assumptions and constraints and coordination; Global Force Management; and plan ance with specific bounds for each operational expecting the operational and tactical levels to annex development. See Military Operations Research plan. The goals for force planning have hardly develop options by working through issues. The Society, Capabilities Based Planning: The Road Ahead, workshop proceedings (Alexandria, VA: Institute for changed in the last 10 years. DOD must take current fight and those of tomorrow “compel us Defense Analyses, October 19–21, 2004), 3. assertive actions to achieve these goals. The to rethink our assumptions, to reconfigure our 13 John Kamensky, “Capability-Based Planning: next step is to integrate emerging initiatives forces, and to reinvigorate our alliance.”31 Opera- Responding on Demand in a Post–September 11 such as Adaptive Planning, Capabilities-based tional planning can no longer have loose ties to World,” PA Times 28, no. 6 (June 2005), 8–9. Planning, and Global Force Management in future force planning; it must utilize the same 14 Paul K. Davis, Architecture for Capabilities- order to advance planning and force structure CBP framework to interject warfighter needs Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and Trans- decisionmaking. In so doing, planning conversa- in a useful way. In the end, the consequences of formation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 1. tions between combatant commanders and the instituting bounds on operational planners will 15 Boyd Bankston and Todd Key, “White Paper on Secretary of Defense will improve in three core require close monitoring. However, continuing Capabilities Based Planning (Draft),” paper presented ways. First, a deeper synthesis of information with the unbounded status quo assumes integra- at Military Operations Research Society, Capabilities and analysis will have occurred at lower levels tion will occur incrementally over time or by Based Planning: The Road Ahead, 11. 16 Davis, 1. and across functional areas. Second, risk discus- some unidentified, unifying catalyst. 17 Christopher J. Lamb, Transforming Defense, sion will center not on shortfalls in requirements The time has arrived to shift emphasis from Occasional Paper (Washington, DC: National Defense but on capability tradeoffs in light of multiple transformational initiatives to the interaction University Press, 2005), 19. options and timeframes. Third, top-down deci- among these maturing processes. Tight Global 18 Causes of difficulty in analytic architecture for sions on capabilities will have a greater effect on Force Management bounds on forces available in CBP include system complexity, the need for numerous DOD ability to adjust to changing threats, lessen an iterative Adaptive Planning process adds rigor, subjective judgments, the many legitimate consider- institutional resistance, and build unity of effort. communicates with Capabilities-based Planning, ations other than combat capability that affect defense The simple act of clearly defining and limiting and presents tradeoff decisions in a new way. expenditures, and a constantly changing environment. available forces for an operational plan is an DOD must focus on inputs, process, and outputs 19 Kenneth J. Krieg, key briefing to Military important facet of altering the PPBE system. In to best inform strategic choice. One is not more Operations Research Society, Capabilities Based Plan- fact, bounding operational planners may serve important than another. JFQ ning: The Road Ahead, slide 17. as a stepping stone toward the integration of the 20 Bankston and Key, 9. NoteS 21 The six core functions are strategic direction, PPBES and the MDMP. identity, capital acquisition and macro resource alloca- DOD continues to press for transforma- 1 Colin S. Gray, “Why Strategy is Difficult,” Joint tion, corporate decisionmaking, performance assess- tion and the use of a CBP framework to guide Force Quarterly 34 (Spring 2003), 81–86. ment, and force employment. See 2006 Quadrennial decisionmaking. According to the Joint Defense 2 Department of Defense, 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 66. Capabilities Study, “the adoption of a capabilities- Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department 22 Ibid. based approach provides capabilities to address a of Defense, February 6, 2006), vi–viii. 23 Bankston and Key, 10. wide range of potential adversaries or other secu- 3 Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working 24 Walker, 3. rity challenges, thus mitigating the uncertainty of Group, Report of the National Defense University 25 Christopher J. Lamb and Irving Lachow, current threat projections.”29 A National Defense Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group “Reforming Pentagon Decisionmaking,” Joint Force University paper states the critical importance of (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, Quarterly 43 (4th Quarter, 2006), 68. November 2000), 7. 26 Ibid., 70. a “transparent and well understood process” that 4 Ibid., 7. 27 Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working is “integrated at the strategic, operational, and 5 Ibid., 16. Group, 7. tactical levels”—all made possible by “institution- 6 Evan M. Chanik, key address to the Military 28 Jeffrey B. Kendall, “Capabilities-based Military alizing a capabilities-based approach to defense Operations Research Society Capabilities-Based Plan- Planning: The Myth” (Research paper, National War decisionmaking.”30 Both the 2001 and 2006 QDR ning Conference, Alexandria, VA, April 4, 2006. College, 2002), 7. call for the adoption of capabilities-based force 7 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, vi. 29 Walker, 7. planning, adaptive operational planning, and 8 Ibid., vi–vii. 30 Lamb, 31–33. global management of forces. As these initia- 9 Quoted in Stephen K. Walker, “Capabilities- 31 Brian M. Jenkins, “Redefining the Enemy: tives mature, the pressure to integrate them will Based Planning: How It Is Intended to Work and The World Has Changed, but Our Mindset Has Not,” escalate so senior leaders can make decisions that Challenges to Its Successful Implementation” (Master’s RAND Review 28, no. 1 (Spring 2004), 16–23. thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2005), 2. 104    JFQ / issue 47, 4th quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu

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Mark A. Rankin) SE C R E TARY OFDEFE U.S. Navy ( ART NSE N S F N O O R TI M TI ATION ESSAY C O M PE True wisdom in strategy must be practical because strategy is a practical subject. Much of what appears to be wise and indeed is prudent as high theory is unhelpful to the poor warrior who actually has to do strategy, tactically and operationally. Marine Corps officers plan troop movement during  —Colin S. Gray1 combined exercise with Australian military Planning Convergence By Paul J. JudGe I n the Department of Defense (DOD) today, several initiatives are emerging and may seem counterintuitive. However, it is and future force structure throughout the plan- have begun to converge. Adaptive Plan- the iterative process of setting new bounds, ning and programming cycle. DOD must find a ning (AP), Capabilities-based Planning reformulating a plan, and providing results back way to expand CBP horizontally through func- (CBP), and Global Force Management (GFM) to strategists that can ultimately provide insight tional areas, such as operational planning, and are three prime examples. The 2006 Quadren- for decisionmakers. A more meaningful and vertically from the strategic to the tactical level. nial Defense Review Report (QDR) reaffirms beneficial convergence of AP, CBP, and GFM In turn, the military decisionmaking process the DOD commitment to these initiatives and will occur because the iterative process demands (MDMP) can have a consolidated picture for places emphasis on a need to “integrate pro- continuous communication and information- resource decisions. cesses that define needed capabilities, identify sharing among the strategist, force provider, solutions, and allocate resources to acquire warfighting planner, and out-year programmer. Background them.”2 Thus, it is incumbent on DOD to To effectively merge processes and support The Department of Defense is struggling effectively manage the convergence of AP, CBP, decisionmaking, operational planning that uses to shed a longstanding threat-based method and GFM in order to fully support the vision of AP methods must constantly interact with CBP of planning. The method starts by estimating sound decisionmaking in an uncertain defense as employed by defense analysts and program- enemy strengths, weaknesses, and intent. From environment. mers. In fact, the interaction must occur prior this estimate, a scenario is developed to plan The argument of this essay is simple: to the formal start of a DOD planning cycle to against. The process essentially results in a list Placing tight bounds on military operational assist strategy writers in forming the detailed of required forces and assets to win decisively planners will effectively institute a new parameters that will then guide operational in the worst possible circumstances. Threat- planning and military decisionmaking process. planning. Adaptive Planning must also interface based planning typically uses isolated (non- The purpose is to suggest a move away from with GFM as designed by the Joint Staff as a collaborative) analysis and, on the surface, open-ended strategic guidance toward explicit centralized force provider process. The idea is seems adequate because it provides senior intent, assumptions, and constraints. Unlike to unify operational and future force structure leaders a basis for justifying programs and today’s strategic guidance, strictly limiting planning results to objectively support decision- budgets. In fact, a threat-based mindset still available force capabilities and other resources making and revisions in strategy. In addition, pervades DOD today because it is sufficient in will generate more creative planning options interaction between planners at lower levels will competing for annual appropriations. However, and risk mitigation strategies. This idea shape the debate over tradeoffs between current threat-based planning is slowly giving way to Capabilities-based Planning because the Colonel Paul J. Judge, USAF, wrote this article while a student at the Air War College. It won the inaugural  former is very weak in determining an effective 2007 Secretary of Defense Transformation Essay Competition. capability mix within resource constraints. ndupress.ndu.edu  issue 47, 4th quarter 2007 / JFQ    99 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2007 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2007 to 00-00-2007 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Planning Convergence 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,260 REPORT NUMBER 5th Avenue SW Fort Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 6 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 ESSAY WINNERS | Planning Convergence decisionmaking can seem insurmountable. On the other hand, current opportunities dictate that process mergers undertaken without delay can overcome challenges and install a new and effective MDMP. Problem: Who Cares? In DOD, there is a lack of control and coordination on inputs and outputs in the MDMP. The current methodology focuses too Pearsall) meffuocrhts o ann do uatnpaulytss,i sla, ragnedly y aievlodisd as nsy angcghrraovnatiiznegd Camera Squadron (Stacy L. stRatohi tut eurdm aaloiitnsn itfoe hewn.le dF r wb eocucrhokmden gn.se e.i r mst. t.Se eIaevntj’cesotr rlrjyeyu s t vsayptore eayianc rmoed wdfie nD hatghtee idngfsere ynficrnosiusdeuis ’eoDtrrren ao tsttrn riayoyarinilennd: g og “ n It ’s U.S. Soldiers conduct mission planning meeting  mbat to pull things together because they didn’t start with Iraqi officials Co coming together earlier at the lower level. . . . st1 [W]e’re going to fix that.”9 Without well-crafted After the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, and lessons learned from Operations Enduring strategic guidance and a common denominator in-depth defense studies seeking peace divi- Freedom and Iraqi Freedom accelerated the shift for comparisons, planning processes operate dends and force structure realignments became away from threat-based planning and toward independent of each other until it is too late for commonplace. In fact, during the 1990s, “there capabilities-based planning. Since the 2001 effective decisionmaking. When the train wreck were no fewer than five major defense reviews: QDR, there has been solid progress in trans- occurs near the end of a cycle, professional judg- the Base Force (1991), Bottom-Up Review forming operational planning, force structure ment, strength of presentation, and protection of (1993), Commission on Roles and Missions of planning, and military force management. Of interests dominate recommendations. the Armed Forces (1993), Quadrennial Defense course, the transformation is far from complete; The central problem examined in this Review (1997), and National Defense Panel the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and essay is an inability of the combatant command (1997).”3 Concurrently, military strategy simply Execution System (PPBES) and operational operational planning process to effectively shifted from a Soviet-centric threat to a dual planning do not synchronize information inform and complement the PPBES. Three Major Theater War (MTW) threat-based system and analysis in a valuable and comprehensive notable factors contribute to the problem. First, and continued to fight budget constraints based manner for the MDMP. operational planning does not currently use the on a strategy-resource gap.4 Focusing on the gap In addition to CBP, QDR 2006 strengthens CBP construct and align with the PPBES cycle did little to improve standing plans, and very the DOD commitment to change the to achieve credible defense budget decisions. Second, DOD does not integrate planning without well-crafted strategic guidance and a common processes and fails to place equal emphasis on inputs and outputs. Third, meaningful col- denominator for comparisons, planning processes operate laboration among the Office of the Secretary independent of each other until it is too late for of Defense, Joint Staff, combatant commands, effective decisionmaking and Services early in the PPBES and at lower levels is severely lacking. Finding a new course is few if any of the lesser plans, mission sets, and operational planning characteristics of the joint critical in a world of uncertainty and complexity military tasks were directly accounted for in this force. For example, the Department of Defense that includes planning for humanitarian relief, process. is continuing to “shift emphasis to meet the nonstate enemies, traditional large-scale conflict, The idea of laundry listing requirements new strategic environment . . . characterized and stabilization operations. as a way to achieve a grand strategy with full by uncertainty and surprise.”7 This includes knowledge that the needs will be underfunded changing from threat-based planning to AP, CBP, and GFM: operational lingers. However, the seeds of change were capabilities-based planning, peacetime planning Planner’s View planted during all those defense review debates to rapid adaptive planning, single focus threats The priorities and methods employed in the 1990s5 and came to fruition in the 2001 to multiple complex challenges, predetermined by combatant command operational planners Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Accord- force packages to tailored/flexible forces, and (Adaptive Planning) and force structure plan- ing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff J8 at a Military vertical structures and processes (stovepipes) ners (Capabilities-based Planning) are vastly Operations Research Society CBP conference, to more transparent, horizontal integration different. The key variations are found between the 2001 QDR introduced the capabilities-based (matrix).8 Transforming parts of a system the lexicons and taxonomies, starting points and strategy, but its use and implementation were is difficult enough, but ensuring that all the entering arguments for planning, and the time- formally directed in 2003.6 The tragedy of 9/11 parts and processes merge to increase effective lines for resource availability. However, it seems 100    JFQ / issue 47, 4th quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu JUDGE plausible that the starting points could remain This is tantamount to understanding one’s The iterative process yields new and creative different while the lexicons, taxonomies, and own strengths and weaknesses before assessing ways to accomplish objectives as well as new resource timelines could merge into one process. a threat and drawing up plans to oppose an insights into the means to carry them out. The framework (lexicon and taxonomy) of CBP enemy. Overall, the characteristics of AP are Expanding CBP into AP to form a and the force management (resource timelines) sufficient to usher in a new operational planning common framework is not a simple endeavor. of Global Force Management are the founda- process. However, for AP to achieve full poten- There are many tasks related to implementing tion. A closer look at the relationship among tial (that is, creative, flexible, and executable CBP in AP.12 First and foremost is a common AP, CBP, and GFM demonstrates the potential plans), it must be enabled by detailed strategic set of force capability identifiers. DOD is to converge while they are still developing and guidance and constant information exchange making a concerted effort through initia- before institutionalization of separate processes with CBP and GFM. tives such as the Joint Capability Area (JCA) takes root. Detailed strategic guidance improves taxonomy, Linking Plans to Resources work, According to the AP Roadmap, Adaptive operational planning creativity by shifting and the Functional Control Board process. Planning is “the Joint capability to create and focus from developing resource requirements Unfortunately, the proposed identifiers are too revise plans rapidly and systematically, as cir- in a worst-case scenario to options for employ- generic for effective operational planning. The cumstances require.”10 Essentially, AP represents ing a known set of capabilities. In this manner, identifiers must correlate exactly with Service the transformation of joint operational planning a planner seeks to maximize effectiveness with unit designations for use in bounding opera- away from specific threat-based planning using an economy of force that is ready and available tional planners. With exact bounds in mind, a scenario mechanism toward adaptive planning rather than stand satisfied with a notional the key question operational planners begin to using a CBP framework to produce options for mass force. Multiple options across a wider answer is, “What courses of actions are available a wide range of circumstances. This does not spectrum of contingencies mean more deci- suggest that planners ignore threat assessments; sionmaking flexibility as conditions warrant, combatant command and they are still a vital part of AP. One of the under- and the use of actual force status information Service staffs must have a lying AP themes is to account for smaller-scale (location, readiness, availability) improves global perspective contingencies and threats more directly and operational execution readiness. not assume that one well-developed plan (for In addition to details in strategic guidance, the most dangerous scenario) would contain constant information exchange with future if there are only these units and resources to the needed capabilities for lesser cases. Indeed, force CBP and GFM is necessary. Combatant work with?” The iterative process of holding the ability to create or revise a warfighting plan command and Service staffs must have a global units and resources fixed while altering other rapidly as global conditions change, to do it col- perspective. The idea is to conduct continuous plan elements eventually reveals a strategy that laboratively and systematically, and to have the capability and risk tradeoffs until multiple plans is feasible, links risk to capabilities, and balances end product in a realistic, ready-to-execute state and options are executable and are also fairly with many other competing plans and objec- is transformational. balanced with future capability needs. In this tives. Ultimately, with a CBP framework in AP, The seven characteristics of AP provide context, the defined role of CBP in AP is to plans are shaped by resources as much as or a foundation to plan for uncertainty and provide a common framework for information more than resources are shaped by plans. complexity.11 In particular, the seventh charac- exchange and analysis. In other words, CBP The use of CBP in AP does not have teristic—relevant—suggests qualities of detail examines enemy capability while AP evaluates to exactly replicate the application of CBP in and flexibility. If AP is striving to develop plans friendly capability to start a planning cycle, but future force structure planning or in the broader that are more relevant, operational planning both collaborate using the same language and PPBES. Within the current PPBES, future force must start with detailed strategic guidance. This analysis system. Thus, operational planning, CBP initially examines future enemy capabili- means having accurate friendly force allocations, future force planning, and Global Force ties. The capability-based future force planning availability, and readiness information from Management come together. process “starts by identifying plausible worries the force provider through the GFM process. The end result is “apples-to-apples” trad- that a country or an agency might face.”13 From eoff analysis for senior leader this point, strategists and long-term force ADM Edmund P. Giambastiani, USN, speaks at  decisionmaking. These tradeoff structure planners develop a dispersed range Joint and Combined Warfighting School about  decisions are generally within of possible scenarios. Scenario analysis aims to programs and acquisitions or across plans, programs, and reveal potential friendly force capability needs time. However, tradeoffs can that could ensure access and advantage over an extend into many areas, including enemy. In this manner, force structure recom- changes in doctrine, operations, mendations develop to counter future enemy and training, or externally into capabilities. This is the commonly understood interagency and partner nation DOD method of using CBP, but it is not readily capabilities. Instead of updating apparent in the most frequently cited definition. a list of requirements, warfight- According to Paul Davis, CBP is “planning, ers are driven during each cycle under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable to develop or rewrite plans and for a wide range of modern-day challenges and options against a foe using a circumstances, while working within an eco- revised set of specific capabilities. nomic framework.”14 The definition seems very U.S. Air Force (Adam M. Stump) ndupress.ndu.edu  issue 47, 4th quarter 2007 / JFQ    101 ESSAY WINNERS | Planning Convergence close to the AP definition; however, the starting that planning period can satisfy an operational same core planning structure and encouraging points make the two processes different. AP must plan. If not, planners would adjust other compo- lower level interaction that can improve recom- use limited friendly resources to iteratively plan nents of the plan to mitigate shortfalls in capabili- mendations. Finally, execution readiness and against current problem sets, while CBP projects ties and minimize risk while capturing varying risk assessments are more relevant when using enemy capability problem sets and then evalu- options along the way. The results inform strate- globally managed, specific force sets. ates friendly force capability tradeoffs within gists as they prepare the detailed guidance to ini- budget constraints. Stated differently, near-term tiate the next plan cycle and decisionmakers on Implications operational plans must have narrow physical where the next capability dollar should be spent. Setting planning bounds is not new. constraints, while long-term procurement plans Today, changes in resources or shortfalls Strategists have worked through assumptions, have broader fiscal constraints. do not necessarily drive a responsive change in constraints, and mission definitions as a regular The commonly understood CBP a war plan. Planners often maintain a mission part of the planning process. Setting tight limits process is all well and good for a large group and task set and account for resource changes on available forces (capabilities) as part of the of operational researchers and analysts but not and shortfalls by adjusting risk. Process change strategic planning guidance is relatively new. practical for a combatant commander’s staff. needs to occur so an operational plan is rewrit- This is not apportionment or allocation of Combatant command staffs should utilize a less ten or reoriented according to adjustments in unnamed units. Nor is it a starting list of forces analytic CBP application appropriate to joint constraints and capabilities. According to Davis, that may be added to as planning circumstances operational planning that still fully supports “Having platforms, weapons, and infrastructure dictate. Bounding operational planners means a capability-needs comparison throughout a is not enough: What matters is whether the specific unit designations for planning purposes. single defense planning process. Expanding missions could be confidently accomplished The vertical and horizontal integration of DOD the CBP framework into AP will address and successfully.”16 Rapidly completing operational processes depends on debates over specific units define the interactions (inputs and outputs) mission analysis, resetting tasks, modifying an and the capabilities (to include availability and between each element of the PPBES to provide operational plan, and then updating risk are part readiness) they bring to the fight. synchronized support to the MDMP.15 In other of the emerging AP process and are essential to Glossing over the differences in units words, force structure tradeoffs between current improving the feedback loop. through generic allocations or Joint Capability and future forces can be synchronized and Areas (JCAs) introduces unneeded uncertainty justified more clearly through capability needs. today, planners often maintain into the process. It can also decrement the fidel- Permitting operational plans to stand as a set ity of results by generalizing capabilities in order a mission and task set and of unconstrained requirements is incompatible to simplify an otherwise large and complex account for resource changes with defining and prioritizing capability needs. matrix of units. JCAs offer value in terms of and shortfalls by adjusting risk Constraining or bounding available capabilities communicating concepts and categorizing capa- changes the paradigm. bilities but are no substitute for unit designa- To bound capabilities for operational plan- The MDMP tolerates higher risk only tions.18 To compensate, transformation requires ners requires a capacity to allocate or assign an when convinced no other ways or means exist. continuous collaboration using a common initial set of specific forces in light of the global Warfighters and their operational planners are framework and interrelated processes. spectrum of plans and priorities. GFM provides no longer independent actors vying for scarce Expanding CBP further and deeper into a valuable force structure baseline for strategy resources. In fact, “Combatant Commanders AP and GFM is an important step in the trans- writers to bound operational planners over short with new global command responsibilities are formational endeavor. Restricting operational planning periods (1 year or less). In turn, the expected to provide expert opinion and inputs planning with tight bounds promotes a rapid changing global availability of ready units and for the global force management system overseen trial and error process to overcome an inability resources yields a continuous shaping process of by the Pentagon and other national authorities.”17 to find effective solutions in other general or U.S. military plans and capability. Thus, for each To effectively accomplish this task, a synthesized rigorous ways. Of course, there are second- contingency plan that requires capability sourc- planning system must emerge. In turn, strategic order effects to consider. Addressing some of ing, strategists should direct GFM to allocate guidance thinkers can absorb new inputs from the key implications (for example, integrating forces for an entire planning cycle and opera- the GFM system and reset operational planning and synchronizing related processes, recalibrat- tional planners to revise the plan using actual boundary detail for the next planning cycle. ing senior leader focus, and reforming national unit location and readiness data. In summary, the characteristics of AP can strategy documents) will provide a broader DOD currently refers to the activity of converge with CBP and GFM using a common context for what it means to set bounds in bounding capabilities as contingency sourc- language (the lexicon and taxonomy of CBP) operational planning and foster a convergence ing, but the process and mechanism are still and specific force allocation (the contingency of AP, CBP, and GFM. immature and not broadly accepted or prac- sourcing of GFM). Detailed strategic guid- First, functional areas that support joint ticed. Essentially, contingency sourcing is the ance, constant information exchange, and a warfighting capacity will have to adjust processes automated data exchange process of updating common set of force capability identifiers enable and lexicons as DOD transforms the method of allocated forces and specific units. The point the process. Developing operational planning presenting tradeoff decisions to senior leaders. here is to fully develop contingency sourcing in options iteratively entails some trial and error For example, acquisition processes need to go order to connect GFM and AP. This, in turn, can but creativity increases. Furthermore, despite further to create a flexible, adaptable, and reli- enable iterative bounding and CBP linkages. The different starting points, current and future force able means of delivering information technol- concept is to determine if a force allocation for structure decisions benefit by leveraging the ogy. Bureaucratic and legal delays of software 102    JFQ / issue 47, 4th quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu JUDGE U.S. Army South specialist briefs U.S.  Strategic Direction tasks senior leaders The third implication relates to the Southern Command and Ecuadorian  to “identify the key outputs—not inputs—they National Security Strategy and the grand officers during planning and  expect from the Department’s components and strategy it implies. In a world of uncertainty coordination conference determine the appropriate near-, mid-, long- and difficult tradeoff decisions, the unclassified term strategies for achieving them.”22 Does a National Security Strategy and DOD counter- senior leader’s focus on outputs include provid- part documents will disconnect further from ing strategic guidance for a warfighter’s opera- realistic expectations and observable activities. tional plan? It is not clear, but certainly achieving In addition, an effective PPBES with a unified desired outputs starts with controlling inputs and collaborative planning process would neces- Negron) aanll dD pOroDc ecsosmesp. Tono eandtds htoa vthe ea csolinghfutlsyio dni,f fneereanrlty sHitoawtee rveefro, rtmhe oref anraet iloimnaitl ss ttroa tthegei cch dooiccuesm. Feonrts . Miguel A. Sdeenfiinoirt iloenad foerrs n meaurs-t, mdriidve-, tahned s ylosntegm-t etrhmro.u23g h emxeanmtsp tleo, rDemODain c oaus ltdh eayll oawre tahned s ptreartpegetyu daotec tuh-e Army ( unambiguous strategy and timelines. Otherwise, longstanding “strategy-resource mismatch”27; S. U. or networking hardware deliveries disrupt and the schedules for capability need decisions, and acquisition frustrate AP and GFM processes. This, in turn, milestone decisions must become interdependent undermines confidence in transformation and progress in broadening and institutionalizing CBP. As stated by the OSD Director of Program outputs from organizational components will update the documents at a rate commensurate Analysis and Evaluation, a key process objective continue to lack comparability and synthesis. with faster PPBES and operational planning of the Office of the Secretary of Defense is to Finally, a good argument can be made that a cycles; or add a series of classified strategic guid- “integrate and synchronize the requirements “shift to a top down capabilities-based planning ance statements for planning. In any case, the process, PPBE, and the acquisition system.”19 As system that is focused on outputs rather than documents must assist intuitive decisionmaking a framework, CBP can lead the integration, but inputs is a return to the basic principles of the and resource changes rather than inhibit them. only if the acquisition corps delivers enabling PPBS (predecessor to PPBES) implemented In terms of operational planning, a faster technology on agreed dates. by Secretary of Defense McNamara in 1961.”24 AP cycle will require more frequent updates Similarly, key decisions in weapons system Leaders today must provide explicit guidance of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) acquisition processes will have to align to the upfront (inputs), frequently conduct project and publication. Currently, the JSCP is “intended to cycle as well. In other words, the schedules for process reviews, and then evaluate outputs. provide planning guidance to combatant com- capability need decisions and acquisition mile- Senior leaders must also review organiza- manders and service chiefs based on current stone decisions must become interdependent. tional design. Reorganizing staffs could very well military capabilities.”28 However, it often falls The goal is to have flexibility to shift resources become an outgrowth of transforming business short of operational planning expectations in in a world of uncertainty without significant practices and decisionmaking. Christopher terms of content or the timing of an update. impacts or unknown costs to one functional Lamb and Irving Lachow make a good case for Improving the effectiveness of the JSCP is para- area or to DOD overall. Unlike the current reforming DOD decisionmaking and stand- mount if it will include the constraints and force system, a warfighting combatant commander ing up a “Decision Support Cell.”25 Although it sets for warfighting plans. and operational planners will have a better seems impractical in the current budget envi- Fortunately, some strides in changing the chance of satisfying short-term needs20 if capa- ronment to grow a staff or add responsibility to JSCP to improve support to AP are occurring. bility decisions are not consistently hand-tied by overtasked leaders, the three tasks for the Deci- For example, apportioning notional forces is expensive and inflexible acquisition processes. sion Support Cell are vital: fading in relevance. The term apportion is more A combatant commander with a clear voice in appropriate in the old threat-based system but a unified planning process (CBP and GFM) n integrate products for the Secretary of should not be part of the new CBP construct. simply replans and mitigates risk according Defense DOD should simply allocate resources for to strategy with specific bounds that include n improve the quality of decision support to long-range planning. Thus, the important final weapons system procurement decisions. contingency planning and resource allocation step will be how to allocate forces to combatant Another second-order effect is the focus n help senior leaders to develop their intui- commands for planning using GFM data in an of the senior leaders. According to the 2006 tive decisionmaking.26 automated method. Ultimately, this will dictate QDR, “a key measure of success is the extent how CBP works in operational planning and, in to which the Department’s senior leadership is At a minimum, senior leaders need train- turn, how solutions integrate with future force able to fulfill” six core functions.21 The potential ing because the system is complex, and neither structure plans. of specifying units as part of writing strategy general nor rigorous solutions are likely to In summary, three implications only begin and linking AP to CBP directly serves each surface. Managing the converging relationship to delve into the possible issues at hand. Planning function. However, resolving strategic guidance between AP (contingency planning), CBP (inte- for simultaneous contingencies, dependence on force bounds for use in operational planning grated products), and GFM (resource alloca- foreign capabilities, mismatch between the vision may conflict with the first listed function, Stra- tion) can serve the same purpose as a Decision and funding, expectations of other instruments tegic Direction. Support Cell. of national power, and unintended consequences ndupress.ndu.edu  issue 47, 4th quarter 2007 / JFQ    103 ESSAY WINNERS | Planning Convergence could all come into play. Driving a top-down span the spectrums of planning, programming, 10 Department of Defense, Adaptive Planning PPBES that includes strict bounds on operational budgets, and warfighter execution. Roadmap, 2005 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 13, 2005), v. planners should have careful and thorough The implications of setting tight bounds 11 The seven characteristics of Adaptive Planning consideration. Practically, time is of the essence, on operational planners are complex; therefore, are rapid, iterative, flexible, collaborative, networked, and momentum in many segments of DOD there will be hesitancy and resistance to trying seamless, and relevant. See Adaptive Planning is already under way. How to write strategy in it. Practically, managing detailed inputs at the Roadmap, 2005, 1.1. order to merge processes for the benefit of deci- strategic level is an intensive exercise but is also 12 These tasks include force capabilities iden- sionmakers may be the first order of business. a key part of a top-down driven decisionmak- tification and sourcing; wargaming; plan/project ing system. Theoretically, framing resources management (both within and across plans and Final Argument in detail contradicts the traditional mindset of projects); assessment of nonkinetic effects; interagency This essay has argued for strategic guid- issuing broad assumptions and constraints and coordination; Global Force Management; and plan ance with specific bounds for each operational expecting the operational and tactical levels to annex development. See Military Operations Research plan. The goals for force planning have hardly develop options by working through issues. The Society, Capabilities Based Planning: The Road Ahead, workshop proceedings (Alexandria, VA: Institute for changed in the last 10 years. DOD must take current fight and those of tomorrow “compel us Defense Analyses, October 19–21, 2004), 3. assertive actions to achieve these goals. The to rethink our assumptions, to reconfigure our 13 John Kamensky, “Capability-Based Planning: next step is to integrate emerging initiatives forces, and to reinvigorate our alliance.”31 Opera- Responding on Demand in a Post–September 11 such as Adaptive Planning, Capabilities-based tional planning can no longer have loose ties to World,” PA Times 28, no. 6 (June 2005), 8–9. Planning, and Global Force Management in future force planning; it must utilize the same 14 Paul K. Davis, Architecture for Capabilities- order to advance planning and force structure CBP framework to interject warfighter needs Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and Trans- decisionmaking. In so doing, planning conversa- in a useful way. In the end, the consequences of formation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 1. tions between combatant commanders and the instituting bounds on operational planners will 15 Boyd Bankston and Todd Key, “White Paper on Secretary of Defense will improve in three core require close monitoring. However, continuing Capabilities Based Planning (Draft),” paper presented ways. First, a deeper synthesis of information with the unbounded status quo assumes integra- at Military Operations Research Society, Capabilities and analysis will have occurred at lower levels tion will occur incrementally over time or by Based Planning: The Road Ahead, 11. 16 Davis, 1. and across functional areas. Second, risk discus- some unidentified, unifying catalyst. 17 Christopher J. Lamb, Transforming Defense, sion will center not on shortfalls in requirements The time has arrived to shift emphasis from Occasional Paper (Washington, DC: National Defense but on capability tradeoffs in light of multiple transformational initiatives to the interaction University Press, 2005), 19. options and timeframes. Third, top-down deci- among these maturing processes. Tight Global 18 Causes of difficulty in analytic architecture for sions on capabilities will have a greater effect on Force Management bounds on forces available in CBP include system complexity, the need for numerous DOD ability to adjust to changing threats, lessen an iterative Adaptive Planning process adds rigor, subjective judgments, the many legitimate consider- institutional resistance, and build unity of effort. communicates with Capabilities-based Planning, ations other than combat capability that affect defense The simple act of clearly defining and limiting and presents tradeoff decisions in a new way. expenditures, and a constantly changing environment. available forces for an operational plan is an DOD must focus on inputs, process, and outputs 19 Kenneth J. Krieg, key briefing to Military important facet of altering the PPBE system. In to best inform strategic choice. One is not more Operations Research Society, Capabilities Based Plan- fact, bounding operational planners may serve important than another. JFQ ning: The Road Ahead, slide 17. as a stepping stone toward the integration of the 20 Bankston and Key, 9. NoteS 21 The six core functions are strategic direction, PPBES and the MDMP. identity, capital acquisition and macro resource alloca- DOD continues to press for transforma- 1 Colin S. Gray, “Why Strategy is Difficult,” Joint tion, corporate decisionmaking, performance assess- tion and the use of a CBP framework to guide Force Quarterly 34 (Spring 2003), 81–86. ment, and force employment. See 2006 Quadrennial decisionmaking. According to the Joint Defense 2 Department of Defense, 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 66. Capabilities Study, “the adoption of a capabilities- Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department 22 Ibid. based approach provides capabilities to address a of Defense, February 6, 2006), vi–viii. 23 Bankston and Key, 10. wide range of potential adversaries or other secu- 3 Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working 24 Walker, 3. rity challenges, thus mitigating the uncertainty of Group, Report of the National Defense University 25 Christopher J. Lamb and Irving Lachow, current threat projections.”29 A National Defense Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group “Reforming Pentagon Decisionmaking,” Joint Force University paper states the critical importance of (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, Quarterly 43 (4th Quarter, 2006), 68. November 2000), 7. 26 Ibid., 70. a “transparent and well understood process” that 4 Ibid., 7. 27 Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working is “integrated at the strategic, operational, and 5 Ibid., 16. Group, 7. tactical levels”—all made possible by “institution- 6 Evan M. Chanik, key address to the Military 28 Jeffrey B. Kendall, “Capabilities-based Military alizing a capabilities-based approach to defense Operations Research Society Capabilities-Based Plan- Planning: The Myth” (Research paper, National War decisionmaking.”30 Both the 2001 and 2006 QDR ning Conference, Alexandria, VA, April 4, 2006. College, 2002), 7. call for the adoption of capabilities-based force 7 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, vi. 29 Walker, 7. planning, adaptive operational planning, and 8 Ibid., vi–vii. 30 Lamb, 31–33. global management of forces. As these initia- 9 Quoted in Stephen K. Walker, “Capabilities- 31 Brian M. Jenkins, “Redefining the Enemy: tives mature, the pressure to integrate them will Based Planning: How It Is Intended to Work and The World Has Changed, but Our Mindset Has Not,” escalate so senior leaders can make decisions that Challenges to Its Successful Implementation” (Master’s RAND Review 28, no. 1 (Spring 2004), 16–23. thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2005), 2. 104    JFQ / issue 47, 4th quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu

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